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05/20/88 140833 PRINTER: VK

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ACTION SCT-04

INFO LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	NSCE-00
ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00	L-02	AMAD-01	TRSE-00
PM-05	PA-02	INRE-00	CA-02	A-02	USSS-00	FBIE-00
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P 071955Z FEB 86

FM AMEMBASSY LIMA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9685

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

AMEMBASSY QUITO

USAFSO HOWARD AFB PN

USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

AMEMBASSY PANAMA

USIA WASHDC 5263

DEAHQS WASHDC

DIA WASHDC//AT-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 01449

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PINS, ASEC, KPRP, PE

SUBJECT: PERU: OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM DEVELOPMENTS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: PERU WITNESSED CONTINUED TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS DURING 1985. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDE INCREASED SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) ACTIVITY IN URBAN AREAS, ESPECIALLY LIMA, COMPLEMENTED BY RESURGENCE OF ATTACKS BY TUPAC AMARU REVO

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LUTIONARY MOVEMENTS (MRTA); DECREASE IN SL INCIDENTS IN THE AYACUCHO EMERGENCY ZONE, PARTICULARLY IN AYACUCHO CITY; AND APPARENT EXPANSION OF SL ACTIVITY SINCE NOVEMBER IN MOUNTAINOUS AREAS NORTH OF LIMA. ALTHOUGH THREE YEARS OF MILITARY CONTROL HAS NOW MANAGED TO KEEP THE LID ON SL IN AYACUCHO, SL LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO HAVE SURVIVED, AND TERRORISTS RETAIN SIGNIFICANT

CAPACITY TO ATTACK IN CITIES AND IN RURAL AREAS OUTSIDE DIRECT MILITARY CONTROL. GOP COUNTERTERRORIST STRATEGY PLACES GREAT IMPORTANCE ON MILITARY EFFORTS; ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP COMPLEMENTARY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES HAVE NOT YET MADE MUCH PROGRESS. FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR BOTH TERRORIST GROUPS IS ALLEGED FREQUENTLY, BUT NO HARD EVIDENCE HAS SURFACED.

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END SUMMARY

3. PERU'S TWO TERRORIST GROUPS, THE FANATICAL MAOIST-INSPIRED SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) AND THE MORE TRADITIONAL CASTROITE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA) CONTINUED VIOLENT ACTIVITIES DURING 1985. WE DISCERN SEVERAL IMPORTANT TRENDS IN TERRORIST SITUATION HERE, INCLUDING:

A. SL FOCUS ON URBAN AREAS: SL INCREASED ITS HIGH PROFILE IN URBAN AREAS, PARTICULARLY LIMA. ACTIVITIES INCLUDED BLACKOUTS, BOMBINGS OF GOVERNMENT AND APRA PARTY OFFICES, AND SELECTED ASSASSINATIONS OF MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (INCLUDING THE FAILED ATTEMPT IN MAY TO KILL ELECTIONS BOARD HEAD GARCIA RADA, AND THE AUGUST KILLING OF PRISON CHIEF CASTRO). A HIGHLY

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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT WAS THE INTRODUCTION IN JUNE BY SL OF CAR BOMBS, A TACTIC QUICKLY COPIED BY THE MRTA. POLICE OCCASIONALLY CAPTURE SL MEMBERS IN LIMA, BUT THE TERRORISTS' COMPARTMENTALIZED ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE, AND THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN CONTROLLING CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN A LARGE CITY, MAKE

DIFFICULT MAJOR INROADS AGAINST SL'S LIMA BRANCH. DURING 1985, SL CONTINUED TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE ATTACKS AGAINST USG PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS; WE EXPECT IT MAY WELL CONTINUE THESE EFFORTS IN 1986.

B. SL UNDER PRESSURE IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE: SL'S HOME TURF IS THE AYACUCHO EMERGENCY ZONE (EZ), WHICH INCLUDES 15 PROVINCES IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF AYACUCHO, HUANCAYELICA, AND APURIMAC. THE CONSENSUS AMONG PERUVIAN OFFICIALS AND OBSERVERS IS THAT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THREE YEARS OF MILITARY CONTROL OF THE AYACUCHO EZ HAS WEAKENED SL THERE AND HAS REDUCED ITS ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA. ALTHOUGH STATISTICS ARE GENERALLY UNAVAILABLE, WE CONCUR THAT THE MILITARY IS NOW KEEPING A LID ON SL IN THE EZ, PARTICULARLY IN THE CITY OF AYACUCHO AND NEARBY AREAS. NEVERTHELESS, SL MAY BE DOWN BUT IT IS NOT OUT. REPORTS CONTINUE TO SURFACE OF SL ATTACKS AGAINST RECALCITRANT PEASANTS, ASSASSINATIONS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS, AND HOLDUPS OF TRAVELLERS ON ISOLATED STRETCHES OF MAIN ACCESS HIGHWAYS. MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS TOLD POLOFF RECENTLY IN AYACUCHO THAT SL APPEARED LESS WILLING TO CHALLENGE LARGE NUMBERS OF SECURITY FORCES, CHOOSING INSTEAD TO AMBUSH SMALLER

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PAIROLS. THEY ALSO ADMITTED THAT NOTWITHSTANDING
REDUCED SL ACTIVITIES, SL PROBABLY MAINTAINED GOOD
INTELLIGENCE AND ORGANIZATION THROUGHOUT ITS TRADITIONAL
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P 071955Z FEB 88
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 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 USIA WASHDC 5264
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC//AT-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1//
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 LIMA 01449

TERREP
 PANAMA FOR ADS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PINS, ASEC, KPRP, PE
 SUBJECT: PERU: OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM DEVELOPMENTS
 AREAS IN THE EZ, INCLUDING THE CITY OF AYACUCHO. THESE
 OFFICIALS ALSO BELIEVED THAT LIFTING OF THE STATE OF
 EMERGENCY IN THESE AREAS AND ENDING OF MILITARY CONTROL
 WOULD RESULT IN RESUMPTION OF SL ATTACKS. HOWEVER,
 OFFICIALS ALSO POINTED TO THE "DEFECTION" OF 200
 PEASANTS WHO HAD LIVED IN SL AREAS AS EVIDENCE THAT
 SL "SUPPORT" WAS OFTEN RESULT OF FEAR RATHER THAN

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CONVICTION AMONG CAMPESINOS.

- C. SL MOVES NORTH: IN ADDITION TO ITS BASES IN
 AYACUCHO AND IN URBAN LIMA, SL HAS CARRIED OUT
 ACTIVITIES AT VARYING LEVELS IN MOST OF PERU'S 23
 OTHER DEPARTMENTS. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE APPEAR
 TO BE CENTRAL LA LIBERTAD DEPARTMENT AND WESTERN

HUANUCO DEPARTMENT, BOTH ISOLATED MOUNTAINOUS AREAS;
 FOUR PROVINCES IN THE LATTER ARE UNDER A STATE OF
 EMERGENCY DECREE. BY JANUARY 1983, THERE APPEARED TO
 BE A PATTERN OF INCREASED SL ATTACKS CENTERED AROUND
 WESTERN HUANUCO, EXTENDING INTO THE NEIGHBORING
 MOUNTAINS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ANCASH, LIMA AND
 PASCO (PASCO ALSO INTERESTS SL BECAUSE OF THE DYNAMITE
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AVAILABLE AT ITS NUMEROUS MINES). THE MILITARY AND OTHER LOCAL OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT PRESSURE ON SL IN THE AYACUCHO EZ HAS INDUCED SL TO SHIFT SOME RURAL OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE; SOME HAVE LIKENED THE PHENOMENON TO MAO'S "LONG MARCH." LIKE AYACUCHO, THE HUANUCO-ANCASH-PASCO AREA IS ISOLATED, POOR, AND HAS RUGGED TERRAIN; UNLIKE THE EZ, IT LIES OUTSIDE THE CURRENT AREA OF MILITARY CONTROL. SL ACTIONS HERE SO FAR REPORTEDLY INCLUDE THE ASSASSINATION OF LOCAL OFFICIALS, POLICE, AND A TEACHER, AS WELL AS FOUR PEASANTS. EMBASSY BELIEVES SL PROBABLY HAS INITIATED AN INCREASE IN ACTIVITIES NORTH OF LIMA THAT COULD PROVE DIFFICULT FOR THE GOP TO CONTROL WITHOUT MILITARY RESOURCES. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT THAT SL HAS DECIDED TO INITIATE STRATEGIC RETREAT FROM AYACUCHO. SL WORKED WITH PEASANTS IN AYACUCHO FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS BEFORE BEGINNING ARMED ATTACKS; IT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON COMPARABLE SUPPORT AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN OTHER AREAS.

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D. THE MRTA - IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY: BEGUN IN 1984, THE MRTA INITIATED 1985 WITH A SERIES OF TAKEOVERS OF RADIO STATIONS AND NEWS AGENCIES, DYNAMITE ATTACKS, AND THE SPECTACULAR BURNING OF THREE

KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN OUTLETS. IT HAS CONTINUED TO OPERATE MOSTLY IN LIMA, ALTHOUGH IT HAS CARRIED OUT MINOR ACTIONS IN THE CITIES OF HUANCAYO AND CHICLAYO. DURING A SPECIAL BRIEFING, PERUVIAN MILITARY OFFICERS TOLD US THEY ESTIMATED THE MRTA TO HAVE LESS THAN 100 HARDCORE ACTIVISTS. UNLIKE SL, THE MRTA AVOIDED FANATICISM OR REVOLUTIONARY DOGMA. UNLIKE SL, IT COURTED PUBLICITY AND FREQUENTLY ISSUED COMMUNIQUES IN WHICH IT TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR SPECIFIC ATTACKS. THE ADVENT OF THE GARCIA ADMINISTRATION APPEARED TO DIVIDE THE MRTA. IN AUGUST, THE GROUP PROCLAIMED A UNILATERAL SUSPENSION OF ARMED ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THE APRA PARTY, ALTHOUGH IT RESERVED THE RIGHT TO ATTACK "FORCES OF REPRESSION AND IMPERIALISM." DURING THIS HIATUS, IN WHICH MRTA SOUGHT A SIGNAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATION PROBABLY INVOLVING RELEASE OF MRTA PRISONERS, A POSSIBLE MRTA SPLINTER GROUP OR FACTION, THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND (CRP), APPEARED AND CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE JULY STRAFING OF THE U.S. CONSULATE BUILDING. BY NOVEMBER, THE MRTA HAD EFFECTIVELY ENDED ITS SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES, ATTACKING POLICE STATIONS, THE U.S. EMBASSY, CITIBANK, AND THE COLOMBIAN EMBASSY AND AVIANCA OFFICES. IN JANUARY 1986, IT BEGAN TO BOMB

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EXCLUSIVE RESTAURANTS AND CLUBS. IN CONTRAST TO SL,
THE MRTA APPEARS LESS INTERESTED IN CAUSING CASUALTIES;
IT DID NOT KILL ANYONE UNTIL ITS NOVEMBER ATTACK ON
THE COLOMBIAN EMBASSY. HOWEVER, SEVERAL PERSONS HAVE
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FAIM-01	DS-01	SLPD-01	DSE-00	/026 W		

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P 071955Z FEB 86
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 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 USIA WASHDC 5265
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC//AT-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1//
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 LIMA 01449

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PINS, ASEC, KPRP, PE

SUBJECT: PERU: OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM DEVELOPMENTS
 BEEN WOUNDED BY RECENT MRTA ATTACKS. FROM THE USG
 STANDPOINT, HOWEVER, THE MRTA REMAINS PARTICULARLY
 IMPORTANT DUE TO ITS ANTI-USG AND ANTI-U.S. BUSINESS
 IDEOLOGY, FREQUENTLY TRANSLATED INTO TERRORIST ACTS.

4. FOREIGN SUPPORT: ASSERTIONS THAT PERUVIAN TERRORISTS
 RECEIVE FOREIGN SUPPORT FREQUENTLY SURFACE IN THE

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LOCAL PRESS. SO FAR, WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY HARD
 EVIDENCE THAT WOULD SUPPORT SUCH ASSERTIONS. ON THE
 CONTRARY, SL'S APPARENT RELIANCE ON LOCAL SOURCES
 FOR WEAPONS, AND ITS INTENSE DOGMATISM ARGUE AGAINST
 SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN TIES. LOCAL PRESS HAS REPORTED,
 HOWEVER, SL'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL
 REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRI), A GROUP OF EXTREMIST

MAOIST PARTIES, AND GAVE PROMINENT COVERAGE TO PRO-SL
 PROPAGANDIZING IN FRANCE AND THE U.S. THE MRTA WOULD
 BE A MORE LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR FOREIGN SUPPORT, BECAUSE
 OF ITS LESS INFLEXIBLE IDEOLOGICAL POSITION, THE
 EXPERIENCE IN NICARAGUA OF ONE OF ITS FORMER LEADERS,
 AND ITS APPARENT SYMPATHIES FOR THE M-19. NEVERTHELESS,
 FIRM EVIDENCE IS LACKING.

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5. PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: PRESIDENT GARCIA THUS FAR HAS CONTINUED TO RELY UPON A STRONG MILITARY COMPONENT IN HIS COUNTERTERRORIST STRATEGY, AS REFLECTED BY THE PERIODIC RENEWAL OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY DECREES THAT ESTABLISH MILITARY CONTROL IN SELECTED PROVINCES. BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIANS APPEAR AWARE THAT THEY NEED TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL PROGRAMS IN THE TERRORISTS' RURAL BASES AS WELL. THUS FAR, THE REALITIES OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION'S BUDGET (WHICH COVERED CY 85) AND BUREAUCRATIC SQUABBLING HAVE RULED OUT LARGE SCALE DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY HAS PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO A FEW COMMUNITIES IN AYACUCHO. THE 30P HAS ALSO REDUCED THE AREA UNDER MILITARY CONTROL FROM 25 TO 19 PROVINCES, IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE PROGRESS AGAINST SL AND TO RESTORE CIVILIAN AUTHORITY. HOWEVER, SL CARRIED OUT IMPORTANT ATTACKS IN JANUARY, 1986 IN TWO OF THE

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PROVINCES WHERE MILITARY CONTROL WAS LIFTED, SUGGESTING THAT FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE WOULD BE PREMATURE. AT SAME TIME, COP HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED A COHERENT POLICY FOR DEALING WITH INCREASED URBAN

VIOLENCE.] BOTH SL AND MRTA HAVE PROVEN THEY CAN ATTACK ALMOST AT WILL IN LIMA. IF TERRORIST ACTIVITY INTENSIFIES STILL FURTHER IN CAPITAL, PUBLIC PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT TO DO SOMETHING EFFECTIVE TO COPE WITH SITUATION WILL GROW. JORDAN
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