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RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.5(D)

Case Number: S200200010

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000R

66011  
DRAFTED BY:S/S:WRPEARSON  
APPROVED BY:S/S:WRPEARSON  
S/S-O:SWO

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000  
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

STATE 020413  
DECAPTIONED

NSC FOR LAKE, CIA FOR [REDACTED]

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FOLLOWING LIMA 00756 DATED 22 JAN 93 SENT ACTION SECSTATE  
REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO  
QUOTE

[REDACTED] 0756

EXTEND CLASSIFICATION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, SNAR, PHUM, PE

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED] COMMENTS ON  
FUJIMORI, MONTESINOS, BUT  
NOT ON BARRIOS ALTOS

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- 1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT
- 2. SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

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THAT PRESIDENT FUJIMORI HAS A GOOD THEORETICAL  
UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS;

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E. LANDFAIR  
DATE/CASE ID: 19 JUL 2002 S200200010  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X6  
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 29 JAN 2019


[REDACTED]  
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
IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, FUJIMORI IS PREPARED TO SACRIFICE PRINCIPLES TO ACHIEVE A QUICK VICTORY OVER TERRORISM. [REDACTED] CHARACTERIZED PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS AS CONSUMED BY AMBITION. THE FUJIMORI/MONTESINOS TEAM IS GOVERNED BY AN OBSESSION FOR QUICK RESULTS THAT OFTEN LEADS TO UNWISE POLICY MOVES. BARRIOS ALTOS WAS TOO HOT [REDACTED] TO TOUCH. [REDACTED]

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VIEWED THIS AS THE BEST RECRUITING MECHANISM  
SENDERO LUMINOSO HAD. EVERY ABUSED PERSON, HE  
SAID, RESULTS IN TEN NEW RECRUITS FOR SL.

FUJIMORI AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

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7. CHARGE SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT  
PRESIDENT FUJIMORI UNDERSTOOD THIS TRUTH AND WAS  
APPLYING IT IN PRACTICE. CERTAINLY, FUJIMORI'S  


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DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE WITH US AND HIS PUBLIC SPEECHES REFLECT A CONPREHENSION OF THE DAMAGE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DO TO A GOVERNMENT'S OVERALL STRATEGY, ALTHOUGH CERTAIN CONTINUING PRACTICES INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DONE ENOUGH TO ROOT OUT THE BAD PRACTICES OF THE PAST. CHARGE ASKED [REDACTED] IF HE AGREED WITH THIS.

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8. [REDACTED] SAID HE AGREED THAT FUJIMORI SHOWS A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE THEORY. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, HE IS GOVERNED BY OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. [REDACTED] SAID THAT FUJIMORI IS ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO DESTROYING SENDERO LUMINOSO AND THE MRTA WITHIN HIS FIVE YEAR TERM AND IS PREPARED TO COUNTENANCE ANY METHODS THAT ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. THE PRESIDENT, HE SAID, IS CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ERADICATE SL IS BY PHYSICALLY ELIMINATING THE MEMERS OF THE ORGANIZATION; OVERALL GOVERNMENT COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY REFLECTS THIS. [REDACTED] CALLED THIS VIEW MISGUIDED. SENDERO LUMINOSO IS A DEEPLY ROOTED MOVEMENT AND CANNOT BE QUICKLY DEFEATED. IT HAS BEEN BADLY HURT BY THE REVERSES OF THE PAST YEAR, BUT COULD EASILY EVOLVE INTO SOMETHING EQUALLY DANGEROUS, SUCH AS A PURELY TERRORIST ORGANIZATION BASED ON SMALL, [REDACTED]

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HARD TO DETECT CELLS. CONSISTENT, LONG TERM POLICY APPROACHES ARE NEEDED TO ATTACK IT, NOT QUICK FIXES.

CHANGES IN STATISTICS  
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9. CHARGE ASKED [REDACTED] WHY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DECLINED NUMERICALLY FROM MID-1991, NOTING THAT MANY BELIEVE THAT THIS CHANGE REFLECTS A CONSCIOUS DECISION ON THE PART OF FUJIMORI [REDACTED] THE MAIN REASON IS THAT TERRORIST ACTIVITY BEGAN TO DECLINE IN THIS PERIOD. IN HIS VIEW, SL, THE MAIN SOURCE OF VIOLENCE, SUFFERED THE EFFECTS OF TOO RAPID A GROWTH IN THE LATE 1980'S. FROM A FEW HUNDRED ACTIVISTS IT BALLOONED TO THOUSANDS. COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSEQUENTLY SUFFERED AND THE GROUP

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[REDACTED]  
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LOST A GOOD PART OF ITS STRATEGIC THRUST. ALSO, INTERNAL EVENTS IN SL, SUCH AS THE MYSTERIOUS DEATH OF ABIMAEI GUZMAN'S WIFE (COMRADE NORAH, THOUGHT BY MANY TO HAVE BEEN KILLED BY GUZMAN) AND THE FAMOUS "ZORBA THE GREEK" VIDEO WHICH SHOWED GUZMAN TO BE A LIBERTINE, CREATED DISSENTION THAT UNDERMINED SL'S COHESION AND EFFECTIVENESS. [REDACTED] CONCEDED THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ALSO LED THE SECURITY FORCES TO EXERCISE GREATER CONTROL TO LIMIT INDESCRIMINATE ABUSES.

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MONTESINOS: BLIND AMBITION  
[REDACTED]

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10. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] PREPARING TO LEAVE WHEN CHARGE ASKED HIM HOW HE SAW THE ROLE OF VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS, PRESIDENT FUJIMORI'S ADVISOR, IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAMS OF THE GOVERNMENT. MONTESINOS IS FUJIMORI'S INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR.

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11. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAS KNOWN MONTESINOS SINCE [REDACTED] THEY REMAINED IN DISTANT TOUCH OVER THE YEARS THAT MONTESINOS WAS RISING IN THE MILITARY. HE ALWAYS SHOWED A DESIRE TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH POWER, [REDACTED] AND IN THE 1970'S WAS CLOSE TO THE TOP MILITARY FIGURES OF THE VELASCO REGIME. "HE WAS CASHIERED FROM THE ARMY FOR REASONS THAT ARE OBSCURE TO ME," [REDACTED] SAID. MONTESINOS THEN DROPPED OUT OF SIGHT.

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12. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] MONTESINOS WAS FOCUSED ON ONE THING: POWER, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC. HE WAS INTELLIGENT, ARTICULATE, AND ABLE AND BEGAN HIS SUCCESSFUL LAW CAREER TAKING CLIENTS WHO COULD PAY THE MOST. THIS LED HIM TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS WHO ALWAYS PAID WELL. MONTESINOS ALSO CULTIVATED USEFUL POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, WHICH IN THIS PERIOD MEANT AMONG THE APRISTAS

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[REDACTED]

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WHO WERE THEN IN POWER. ONE OF HIS KEY ALLIES  
WAS A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HUGO DENEGRI, WHO WAS  
PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO MONTESINOS

[REDACTED] (AFTER APRIL 5, FUJIMORI  
TRIED TO MAKE DENEGRI ATTORNEY GENERAL, BUT WAS  
FORCED TO BACK OFF DUE TO THE MAN'S POOR  
REPUTATION.) IN THIS PERIOD, MONTESINOS ALSO  
REBUILT HIS TIES TO THE MILITARY. ONE OF HIS  
KEY POINTS OF ENTRY WAS VIA THE DEFENSE OF  
GENERAL JOSE VALDIVIA DUENAS, THE OFFICER  
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CAYARA MASSACRE AND COVER-  
UP.

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13. IN 1990, AS THE GARCIA GOVERNMENT DREW TO A  
CLOSE, MONTESINOS LOOKED FOR NEW CONNECTIONS.  
HIS APPROACH TO THE MARIO VARGAS LLOSA CAMP WAS  
REBUFFED. VARGAS THOUGHT HE WAS A SHOE-IN AND  
HAD NO NEED FOR MONTESINOS. MONTESINOS THEN HIT  
ON ALBERTO FUJIMORI, VIA A MUTUAL FRIEND,  
FRANCISCO LOAYZA. ONCE LOAYZA WAS USED,  
MONTESINOS GOT RID OF HIM, "IN TYPICAL FASHION,"  
[REDACTED] MAKING A GESTURE LIKE FLICKING AWAY  
A CIGARETTE BUTT.

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14. FUJIMORI NEVER IMAGINED -- OR PLANNED FOR  
-- THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY THAT FELL TO HIM IN  
1990, [REDACTED] SAID. HE WAS TOTALLY UNPREPARED IN  
TERMS OF A NATIONAL POLICY OR POLITICAL BASE TO  
CARRY ONE OUT. CAMBIO-90, HIS PARTY, WAS THROWN  
TOGETHER OVERNIGHT AND HAD NO CONSISTENCY.  
ENTER MONTESINOS. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]

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MONTESINOS OFFERED FUJIMORI THE ARMY AS HIS  
POLITICAL BASE. THAT, HE SAID, HAS BEEN THE  
STORY OF THE FUJIMORI GOVERNMENT.

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15. [REDACTED] DESCRIBED MONTESINOS AS A CLEVER AND  
ABLE MAN WITH MANY IDEAS, BUT NO STRATEGIC  
CONCEPTION. HE IS ACTION ORIENTED, WANTS TO GET  
THINGS DONE QUICKLY. IN THIS, HE AND FUJIMORI  
ARE NEARLY IDENTICAL. IN ADDRESSING THE SENDERO  
PROBLEM, THE|THROW IDEAS AT IT WITHOUT THINKING

[REDACTED]  
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THROUGH THE CONSEQUENCES OR A STRATEGIC SCOPE.  
[REDACTED] CLEARLY  
DID NOT HAVE A HIGH OPINION OF THE MORE  
POLITICALLY GEARED FUJIMORI/MONTESINOS TEAM.

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16. ANOTHER KEY ELEMENT OF MONTESINOS, [REDACTED]  
SAID, IS HIS EXTREME JEALOUSLY OF HIS  
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE WANTS NO  
OTHER PERSON TO ENJOY THE ACCESS HE HAS AND  
SYSTEMATICALLY BARS CONTENDERS FOR THE  
PRESIDENT'S THINKING PROCESSES FROM CONTACT WITH  
HIM. [REDACTED] SAW THIS AS HIGHLY DANGEROUS, MAINLY  
BECAUSE FUJIMORI HAS ALLOWED MONTESINOS TO DO  
IT. THE REGIME, IN [REDACTED] VIEW, IS THUS LOCKED  
INTO THE VERY SHORT TERM POLITICAL CALCULATIONS  
AND MAKE-SHIFT POLICY IDEAS THAT THE TWO OF THEM  
DEVELOP. [REDACTED] MADE NO MENTION OF THE ROLE OF  
SANTIAGO FUJIMORI, THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER AND  
OTHER INTIMATE ADVISOR.

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17. CHARGE ASKED VIDAL IF HE THOUGHT MONTESINOS  
[REDACTED]

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STILL MAINTAINED HIS CONTACTS WITH DRUG FIGURES.  
[REDACTED] DOUBTEQ IT. MONTESINOS NO LONGER NEEDED  
THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES THAT HIS DRUG CONNECTIONS  
BROUGHT HIM IN HIS LAW PRACTICE.

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BARRIOS ALTOS  
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18. CHARGE SAID THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE LINKED  
MONTESINOS TO THE BARRIOS ALTOS MASSACRE IN  
NOVEMBER 1991. RECALLING THE EARLIER DISCUSSION  
OF PRESIDENT FUJIMORI'S REAL VIEWS ON HUMAN  
RIGHTS, CHARGE ASKED [REDACTED] WHAT WAS THE MEANING  
OF BARRIOS ALTOS AND WHETHER MONTESINOS HAD A  
CONNECTION TO IT. "THAT IS A VERY SENSITIVE  
ISSUE," [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] PERHAPS IT  
CAN BE DISCUSSED AT SOME OTHER TIME."

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FUTURE COOPERATION  
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19. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

# Full-Page Redaction

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**Exemption Category**

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UNCLASSIFIED

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[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
BRAYSHAW## UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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[REDACTED]  
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