

171935Z

Case Number: S200200010



RELEASED IN PART B1, 1.5(D)



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PAGE 01 ACTION SS-00

05589

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00

LIMA

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-----C07ECB 171936Z /38

P 171933Z MAY 93 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8394 INFO DIA WASHDC CIA WASHDC AMEMBASSY CARACAS USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 05589

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR **EXTEND CLASSIFICATION**

TAGS: SUBJECT: PGOV, PINR,

PHUM, US, PE

DISCUSSES MONTESINOS AND

ARMY TENSIONS

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ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY:

WAS PESSIMISTIC

PRESIDENT FUJIMORI WOULD CHANGE HIS CONFRONTATIONAL POLICIES TOWARD THE ARMY. ROBLES WAS BUT THE LATEST INCIDENT IN THE TUG-OF-WAR OVER WHO CONTROLLED THE ARMY.



PAGE 02 LIMA 05589 01 OF 02 171935Z COULD FUJIMORI RISK ACTIONS THAT WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS AN ADMISSION OF WEAKNESS. REAL PROBLEM WAS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIN) ADVISER VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS. MONTESINOS, HOWEVER, HAD BECOME INDISPENSABLE TO THE PRESIDENT, AND THUS THERE WAS NO OUTLOOK FOR IMPROVEMENT. END SUMMARY.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E. LANDFAIR DATE/CASE ID: 29 JUL 2002 S200200010 **CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X6 DECLASSIFY AFTER: 17 MAY 2019**



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WITH POLCOUNS ON MAY 14. THE MAIN TOPIC WAS RECENT PROBLEMS IN THE ARMY. WAS JUST ONE OF MANY OFFICERS FRUSTRATED BY THE B1. PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS TO DOMINATE THE ARMY. FIRST GENERALS TO GO -- E.G., FERNANDEZ DAVILA IN 1990 -- WENT FAIRLY QUIETLY. IN 1991, GEN. PASTOR HAD SUED THE GOP AFTER BEING FIRED. SALINAS, HOWEVER, HAD NURSED HIS GRUDGE BY PLANNING A COUP (ALONG WITH GENS. PASTOR AND OBANDO) IN NOVEMBER 1992, AND ROBLES HAD MADE UNPRECEDENTED ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HERMOZA AND THE TREND WAS FOR INCREASED AND MONTESINOS. MORE PUBLIC CONFRONTATION BETWEEN DISATISFIED ARMY OFFICERS AND THE PRESIDENT.

4. AGREED THAT THE ARMY/LA CANTUTA/ROBLES PROBLEM BOILED DOWN TO "WHO IS GOING TO RUN THE ARMY, AND HOW?" THE HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA WAS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE ISSUE. (COMMENT: NEVER DISPUTED ROBLES' ACCUSATIONS IN THIS REGARD AGAINST HERMOZA AND

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
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PAGE 03 LIMA 05589 01 OF 02 171935Z MONTESINOS.) THERE WAS NOW CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION TO THE PRESIDENT IN THE ARMY. THE FACT THAT SOME 47 GENERALS HAD SIGNED A PRO-HERMOZA COMMUNIQUE WAS MEANINGLESS -- ROBLES HAD DONE SO TOO IN APRIL -- AND THE PRESIDENT KNEW IT. MOREOVER, MUCH OF THE REAL OPPOSITION WAS FROM COLONEL ON DOWN.

5. THE REAL PROBLEM, WAS THE TRUST FUJIMORI PLACED IN INTELLIGENCE ADVISER VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS. MONTESINOS WAS TEMPERAMENTAL, MACHIAVELLIAN, AND AN EXTREMIST. WHILE QUITE INTELLIGENT, HE WAS GIVEN TO EMOTION. THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO INTELLIGENT AND MANIPULATIVE, BUT HE KNEW LITTLE ABOUT THE ARMY, AND RELIED SOLELY ON MONTESINOS FOR ADVICE ON THIS SUBJECT. THERE WAS NO DOUBT, SAID, THAT MONTESINOS HAD COME UP WITH THE PLAN FOR HERMOZA TO CONFRONT CONGRESS APRIL 20-23 WITH COMMUNIQUES AND TANKS. HERMOZA WOULD NOT HAVE DARED TO DO SO ON HIS OWN. MONTESINOS, HOWEVER,



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WOULD NOT HAVE PROCEEDED WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT'S BLESSING.

SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S BEST MOVE NOW WOULD BE TO SEEK SOME CONCILIATION WITH THE INSTITUTIONALISTS IN THE ARMY. IN RETROSPECT, IT HAD BEEN UNNECESSARY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO GO SO FAR TO DOMINATE THE ARMY (COMMENT: SEVERAL OBSERVERS HAVE MADE THE SAME POINT, I.E. IF BELAUNDE AND GARCIA COULD AVOID A COUP, SO COULD

PAGE 04 05589 01 OF 02 LIMA FUJIMORI). HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY CONCESSION NOW WOULD BE PERCEIVED BY HIS OPPONENTS AS A DANGEROUS SIGN OF WEAKNESS. DID NOT, HOWEVER, SEE ANY HOPE THAT THE CURRENT GOP APPROACH TO THE ARMY WOULD BE FRUITFUL.

THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP IN THE CANTUTA CASE WOULD BE FOR ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS TO STEP FORWARD AND TESTIFY.

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| E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE SUBJECT: DISCUSSES MONTESINOS AND | B1 |
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| INDEED, HE KNEW THAT ONE OR MORE HAD ALREADY SOUGHT TO DO SO IN EXCHANGE FOR REFUGE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. POLCOUNS SAID THAT MAJOR SANTIAGO MARTIN, THE ALLEGED HEAD OF THE SIN/ARMY HIT TEAM, HAD BEGUN TO TEST THE WATERS ON PUBLIC APPEARANCES; HE HAD CLAIMED TO A JOURNALIST RECENTLY THAT HE HAD WORKED BRIEFLY IN DINCOTE. | - |
| IN DINCOIE. | B1 |
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8. POLCOUNS SAID THAT ONE OF OUR LONGTERM CONCERNS WAS THE WEAKENING OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS. AGREED, SAYING THAT THE ARMY WAS A CASE IN POINT. FUJIMORI'S ACTIONS TOWARD IT HAD DIVIDED IT SO MUCH THAT IN THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE OF A REGIME CHANGE, THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE SETTLING OF ACCOUNTS BETWEEN PRO- AND ANTI-FUJIMORISTAS.

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9. WHAT ACCOUNTED FOR THE CLOSE TIES BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND MONTESINOS?

EACH NEEDED THE OTHER, SINCE NEITHER COULD
SURVIVE BY HIMSELF. FUJIMORI HAD FOUND OTHER
ADVISERS AND MINISTERS EXPENDABLE, ESPECIALLY
WHEN THEY HAD BECOME FAMOUS IN THEIR OWN RIGHT,
BUT MONTESINOS WAS A SPECIAL CASE. IN ADDITION,
MONTESINOS PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT A NUMBER OF
OTHER ADVISERS HE FOUND USEFUL IN THE
POLITICAL/PSYCOLOGICAL WARFARE ARENA. THERE WAS
AUGUSTO ZIMMERMANN, THE FORMER VELASCO PRESS



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OFFICER MONTESINOS HAD MEET WHEN HE HAD WORKED FOR GEN. MERCADO JARRIN. (COMMENT: ZIMMERMANN



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AND MONTESINOS ALSO REPORTEDLY WORKED JOINTLY ON
THE "KAUSACHUM" YELLOW JOURNALIST MONTHLY IN THE
EARLY-MID 1980S.) THERE WAS PSYCHIATRIST
SEGISFREDO LUZA, WHO HAD BEEN JAILED FOR SEVERAL
YEARS FOR THE 1966 MURDER OF THE FRIEND OF A
PATIENT HE HAD FALLEN IN LOVE WITH.

LUZA, WHO AFTER JAIL


LUZA, WHO AFTER JAIL
HAD WORKED FOR THE CENTRAL INFORMATION OFFICE IN
THE SECOND MILITARY GOVERNMENT, HAD APPARENTLY
LINKED UP WITH MONTESINOS DURING THE 1970S.
THERE WAS RAFAEL MERINO, THE WOULD-BE
SOCIOLOGIST WHO HAD WORKED WITH MONTESINOS WHEN
GEN. EDWIN "CUCHARITA" DIAZ HAD BROUGHT
MONTESINOS TO WORK IN THE SIN IN LATE 1989.
MONTESINOS WAS THE COMMON LINK TO ALL.

10. COMPLIMENTED THE EMBASSY FOR THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ROBLES AFFAIR. POLCOUNS SAID THE PRESIDENT, AND PROBABLY MONTESINOS, SHOULD GET CREDIT FOR NOT LETTING THE MATTER DRAG ON LIKE THE ARCINIEGA REQUEST IN JANUARY. SAID THE DIFFERENCE WAS THAT ROBLES HAD BEEN IN THE U.S. EMBASSY THIS TIME, NOT THE ARGENTINE, AND THAT THE GOP UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFERENCE.

11. COMMENT: OTHER CONTACTS IN THE MILITARY, MEDIA, AND ACADEMIA COINCIDE WITH ANALYSIS OF THE TENSIONS IN THE ARMY. IS EXCEPTIONALLY WELL-PLACED TO COMMENT ON MONTESINOS, AS BOTH A COLLEAGUE AND AS A VICTIM



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