

[REDACTED]  
Case Number: S200200010  
[REDACTED]

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.5(D)

PAGE 01 LIMA 05589 01 OF 02 171935Z  
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 /000W  
-----C07ECB 171936Z /38

P 171933Z MAY 93  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8394  
INFO DIA WASHDC  
CIA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 05589

DECAPTIONED

EXTEND CLASSIFICATION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] DISCUSSES MONTESINOS AND  
ARMY TENSIONS

B1

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

B1

[REDACTED] WAS PESSIMISTIC  
PRESIDENT FUJIMORI WOULD CHANGE HIS  
CONFRONTATIONAL POLICIES TOWARD THE ARMY.  
ROBLES WAS BUT THE LATEST INCIDENT IN THE  
TUG-OF-WAR OVER WHO CONTROLLED THE ARMY. NOR

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
PAGE 02 LIMA 05589 01 OF 02 171935Z  
COULD FUJIMORI RISK ACTIONS THAT WOULD BE  
INTERPRETED AS AN ADMISSION OF WEAKNESS. THE  
REAL PROBLEM WAS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
(SIN) ADVISER VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS. MONTESINOS,  
HOWEVER, HAD BECOME INDISPENSABLE TO THE  
PRESIDENT, AND THUS THERE WAS NO OUTLOOK FOR  
IMPROVEMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. [REDACTED]

B1

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
LUNCHED

[REDACTED]

Case Number: S200200010

WITH POLCOUNS ON MAY 14. THE MAIN TOPIC WAS RECENT PROBLEMS IN THE ARMY. [REDACTED] SAID ROBLES WAS JUST ONE OF MANY OFFICERS FRUSTRATED BY THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS TO DOMINATE THE ARMY. THE FIRST GENERALS TO GO -- E.G., FERNANDEZ DAVILA IN 1990 -- WENT FAIRLY QUIETLY. IN 1991, GEN. PASTOR HAD SUED THE GOP AFTER BEING FIRED. GEN. SALINAS, HOWEVER, HAD NURSED HIS GRUDGE BY PLANNING A COUP (ALONG WITH GENS. PASTOR AND OBANDO) IN NOVEMBER 1992, AND ROBLES HAD MADE UNPRECEDENTED ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS. THE TREND WAS FOR INCREASED AND MORE PUBLIC CONFRONTATION BETWEEN DISATISFIED ARMY OFFICERS AND THE PRESIDENT.

B1

4. [REDACTED] AGREED THAT THE ARMY/LA CANTUTA/ROBLES PROBLEM BOILED DOWN TO "WHO IS GOING TO RUN THE ARMY, AND HOW?" THE HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA WAS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE ISSUE. (COMMENT: [REDACTED] NEVER DISPUTED ROBLES' ACCUSATIONS IN THIS REGARD AGAINST HERMOZA AND

B2

B1

PAGE 03 LIMA 05589 01 OF 02 171935Z MONTESINOS.) THERE WAS NOW CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION TO THE PRESIDENT IN THE ARMY. THE FACT THAT SOME 47 GENERALS HAD SIGNED A PRO-HERMOZA COMMUNIQUE WAS MEANINGLESS -- ROBLES HAD DONE SO TOO IN APRIL -- AND THE PRESIDENT KNEW IT. MOREOVER, MUCH OF THE REAL OPPOSITION WAS FROM COLONEL ON DOWN.

5. THE REAL PROBLEM, [REDACTED] WAS THE TRUST FUJIMORI PLACED IN INTELLIGENCE ADVISER VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS. MONTESINOS WAS TEMPERAMENTAL, MACHIAVELLIAN, AND AN EXTREMIST. WHILE QUITE INTELLIGENT, HE WAS GIVEN TO EMOTION. THE PRESIDENT WAS ALSO INTELLIGENT AND MANIPULATIVE, BUT HE KNEW LITTLE ABOUT THE ARMY, AND RELIED SOLELY ON MONTESINOS FOR ADVICE ON THIS SUBJECT. THERE WAS NO DOUBT, [REDACTED] SAID, THAT MONTESINOS HAD COME UP WITH THE PLAN FOR HERMOZA TO CONFRONT CONGRESS APRIL 20-23 WITH COMMUNIQES AND TANKS. HERMOZA WOULD NOT HAVE DARED TO DO SO ON HIS OWN. MONTESINOS, HOWEVER,

B1

B1

[REDACTED]  
Case Number: S200200010

WOULD NOT HAVE PROCEEDED WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT'S BLESSING.

6. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S BEST MOVE NOW WOULD BE TO SEEK SOME CONCILIATION WITH THE INSTITUTIONALISTS IN THE ARMY. IN RETROSPECT, IT HAD BEEN UNNECESSARY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO GO SO FAR TO DOMINATE THE ARMY (COMMENT: SEVERAL OBSERVERS HAVE MADE THE SAME POINT, I.E. IF BELAUNDE AND GARCIA COULD AVOID A COUP, SO COULD

B1

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 LIMA 05589 01 OF 02 171935Z FUJIMORI). HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY CONCESSION NOW WOULD BE PERCEIVED BY HIS OPPONENTS AS A DANGEROUS SIGN OF WEAKNESS. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, SEE ANY HOPE THAT THE CURRENT GOP APPROACH TO THE ARMY WOULD BE FRUITFUL.

7. [REDACTED] THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP IN THE CANTUTA CASE WOULD BE FOR ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS TO STEP FORWARD AND TESTIFY.

B1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NNNN

PAGE 01 LIMA 05589 02 OF 02 171937Z ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 /000W  
-----C07EE5 171937Z /38

P 171933Z MAY 93  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8395  
INFO DIA WASHDC  
CIA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 02 LIMA 05589  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Case Number: S200200010

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE  
 SUBJECT: [REDACTED] DISCUSSES MONTESINOS AND

B1

INDEED, HE KNEW THAT ONE OR MORE HAD ALREADY SOUGHT TO DO SO IN EXCHANGE FOR REFUGE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. POLCOUNS SAID THAT MAJOR SANTIAGO MARTIN, THE ALLEGED HEAD OF THE SIN/ARMY HIT TEAM, HAD BEGUN TO TEST THE WATERS ON PUBLIC APPEARANCES; HE HAD CLAIMED TO A JOURNALIST RECENTLY THAT HE HAD WORKED BRIEFLY IN DINCOTE.

B1

8. POLCOUNS SAID THAT ONE OF OUR LONGTERM CONCERNS WAS THE WEAKENING OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS. [REDACTED] AGREED, SAYING THAT THE ARMY WAS A CASE IN POINT. FUJIMORI'S ACTIONS TOWARD IT HAD DIVIDED IT SO MUCH THAT IN THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE OF A REGIME CHANGE, THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS BETWEEN PRO- AND ANTI-FUJIMORISTAS.

B1

9. WHAT ACCOUNTED FOR THE CLOSE TIES BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MONTESINOS? [REDACTED] THAT EACH NEEDED THE OTHER, SINCE NEITHER COULD SURVIVE BY HIMSELF. FUJIMORI HAD FOUND OTHER ADVISERS AND MINISTERS EXPENDABLE, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY HAD BECOME FAMOUS IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, BUT MONTESINOS WAS A SPECIAL CASE. IN ADDITION, MONTESINOS PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT A NUMBER OF OTHER ADVISERS HE FOUND USEFUL IN THE POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ARENA. THERE WAS AUGUSTO ZIMMERMANN, THE FORMER VELASCO PRESS

B1

Case Number: S200200010

OFFICER MONTESINOS HAD MEET WHEN HE HAD WORKED FOR GEN. MERCADO JARRIN. (COMMENT: ZIMMERMANN



PAGE 03 LIMA 05589 02 OF 02 171937Z AND MONTESINOS ALSO REPORTEDLY WORKED JOINTLY ON THE "KAUSACHUM" YELLOW JOURNALIST MONTHLY IN THE EARLY-MID 1980S.) THERE WAS PSYCHIATRIST SEGISFREDO LUZA, WHO HAD BEEN JAILED FOR SEVERAL YEARS FOR THE 1966 MURDER OF THE FRIEND OF A PATIENT HE HAD FALLEN IN LOVE WITH.

[REDACTED] LUZA, WHO AFTER JAIL HAD WORKED FOR THE CENTRAL INFORMATION OFFICE IN THE SECOND MILITARY GOVERNMENT, HAD APPARENTLY LINKED UP WITH MONTESINOS DURING THE 1970S. THERE WAS RAFAEL MERINO, THE WOULD-BE SOCIOLOGIST WHO HAD WORKED WITH MONTESINOS WHEN GEN. EDWIN "CUCHARITA" DIAZ HAD BROUGHT MONTESINOS TO WORK IN THE SIN IN LATE 1989. MONTESINOS WAS THE COMMON LINK TO ALL.

B1

10. [REDACTED] COMPLIMENTED THE EMBASSY FOR THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ROBLES AFFAIR. POLCOUNS SAID THE PRESIDENT, AND PROBABLY MONTESINOS, SHOULD GET CREDIT FOR NOT LETTING THE MATTER DRAG ON LIKE THE ARCINIEGA REQUEST IN JANUARY. [REDACTED] SAID THE DIFFERENCE WAS THAT ROBLES HAD BEEN IN THE U.S. EMBASSY THIS TIME, NOT THE ARGENTINE, AND THAT THE GOP UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFERENCE.

B1

B1

11. COMMENT: OTHER CONTACTS IN THE MILITARY, MEDIA, AND ACADEMIA COINCIDE WITH [REDACTED] ANALYSIS OF THE TENSIONS IN THE ARMY. [REDACTED] IS EXCEPTIONALLY WELL-PLACED TO COMMENT ON MONTESINOS, AS BOTH A COLLEAGUE AND AS A VICTIM

B1

B1

PAGE 04 LIMA 05589 02 OF 02 171937Z OF PRESIDENTIAL WRATH. BRAYSHAW

