

F.A.S.

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS
307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 546-3300

X49 ✓

*Board of Sponsors
(Partial List)*

- * Sidney Altman
- * Philip W. Anderson
- * Christian B. Anfinsen
- * Kenneth J. Arrow
- * Julius Axelrod
- * David Baltimore
- * Lipman Bers
- * Hans A. Bethe
- * Konrad Bloch
- * Norman E. Borlaug
- * Anne Pitts Carter
- * Owen Chamberlain
- * Abram Chayes
- * Mildred Cohn
- * Leon N. Cooper
- * Paul B. Cornely
- * Carl Djerassi
- * Renato Dulbecco
- * John T. Edsall
- * Paul R. Ehrlich
- * George Field
- * Val L. Fitch
- * Jerome D. Frank
- * D. Carleton Gajdusek
- * John Kenneth Galbraith
- * Richard L. Garwin
- * Walter Gilbert
- * Edward L. Ginzton
- * Donald A. Glaser
- * Sheldon L. Glashow
- * Marvin L. Goldberger
- * Dudley R. Herschbach
- * Alfred D. Hershey
- * William Higinbotham
- * Roald Hoffmann
- * Robert W. Holley
- * Jerome Karle
- * H. Gobind Khorana
- * Arthur Kornberg
- * Polykarp Kusch
- * Willis E. Lamb, Jr.
- * Leon Lederman
- * Wassily W. Leontief
- * William N. Lipscomb
- * Roy Menninger
- * Robert Merton
- * Neal E. Miller
- * Philip Morrison
- * Richard A. Muller
- * Daniel Nathans
- * Marshall Nirenberg
- * Severo Ochoa
- * Charles E. Osgood
- * Linus Pauling
- * Arno A. Penzias
- * Gerard Piel
- * Charles C. Price
- * Mark Ptashne
- * Edward M. Purcell
- * George Rathjens
- * Burton Richter
- * David Riesman, Jr.
- * Alice M. Rivlin
- * Carl Sagan
- * Arthur Schawlow
- * J. Robert Schriener
- * Julian Schwinger
- * Glenn T. Seaborg
- * Phillip A. Sharp
- * George A. Silver
- * Herbert A. Simon
- * Alice Kimball Smith
- * Cyril S. Smith
- * Henry Taube
- * Howard M. Temin
- * James Tobin
- * Charles H. Townes
- * Frank von Hippel
- * George Wald
- * Myron E. Wegman
- * Robert A. Weinberg
- * Victor F. Weisskopf
- * Jerome B. Wiesner
- * Robert R. Wilson
- * C. S. Wu
- * Alfreid Yankauer
- * Herbert F. York
- * Nobel laureates

*Robert M. Sorow
Chairman

Richard L. Garwin
Vice-Chairman

Ann Druyan
Secretary

Carl Kaysen
Treasurer

Jeremy J. Stone
President

PT ER-SL

Embargoed until 1 pm, Wednesday, September 23, 1992

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY EO Citations
 DENY IN PART

4/28/97

Anne Hall

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
 PA Exemptions _____ CLASSIFY as S or C Sec. _____
 DOWNGRADE TS to S or C

"The Threat of the Shining Path Movement of Peru and the Appropriate International Response"

Testimony of Jeremy J. Stone
President, Federation of American Scientists

Committee on Foreign Affairs
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
U.S. House of Representatives
September 23, 1992

with attached views on
"Assessing the Capture of Abimael Guzman"
by
Michael L. Smith
Deputy Director, Project on Peru
FAS Fund

Attending Council Members

Barry M. Easper
Stephen F. Cohen
Denis Hayes

Gerald J. Halton
Thomas L. Neff
George W. Rathjens

Barbara Hatch Rosenberg
Arthur H. Rosenfeld
Lawrence Scheinman

Martin J. Sherwin
J. David Singer
Valerie Thomas

Ex Officio: John Holdren, Matthew S. Meselorn

Facsimile: (202) 675-1010 Telex: 9102509251 FAS DC UQ

94040778

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

Testimony of Jeremy J. Stone
President, Federation of American Scientists
Before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

September 23, 1992

"The Threat of the Shining Path Movement of Peru and the Appropriate International Response"

This Subcommittee, under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, has early and precisely concluded that Peru is a serious international problem. It is a distinct pleasure to participate in the important work of this perceptive body. I propose to answer the last two questions posed by the Subcommittee first:

Question 2: What is an appropriate strategy for the United States and the international community to pursue to help the Government of Peru defeat the Shining Path?

Question 3: What are the conditions that Peru should have to meet to receive such international support?

In answer to question 2, to my mind, an appropriate strategy for the United States and the international community to pursue to help the Government of Peru defeat the Shining Path may depend on increasing the international and professional component of decision-making on relevant aid to Peru while downgrading the political and domestic component. Some reasons follow.

People in trouble are often given, in lieu of help, gratuitous advice. And in relations between states, where political processes are at work, advice can become demands—even demands without concomitant pledges of help.

Countries may be told, as Russia was told by America, that economic aid would not be forthcoming "unless" certain free market reforms were accomplished, but this did not mean that significant aid would be forthcoming if the reforms were carried out. And it certainly did not mean that the United States would feel responsible if the market reforms failed.

In its present economic state, especially, America can be more prone to make demands than to provide assistance. George Orwell would surely have noticed that the Subcommittee's three questions somehow avoid any easily quotable reference to the issue of "U.S. aid"—referring only to an "appropriate strategy" and "international support." If the situation is this tense in Congress, can much money be available?

Even if much money were available, when a country like Peru asks a country like

America for help, it is promptly at the mercy of a complicated political process manned in many cases by persons, like myself, whose knowledge of Peru is cursory concerning a country whose declining political and economic situation is constantly changing.

And most of these participants are caught in a political web that shapes and limits what they say according to the interests they represent. Elected officials respond to their constituents. Bureaucrats represent the interests and point of view of their bureaucracies, whether it be State, Defense, or CIA. And non-profit sectors, such as the human rights sector, speak out for their individual goals.

If, from all this, an "appropriate strategy" would evolve for helping defeat Sendero, it would have to be judged a divinely inspired accident. More likely, the resolvent of such pressures would be reminiscent of the conversation between two physics professors, discussing the theory of a colleague, when one remarked: "His theory, you know, it isn't even wrong."

In particular, as was the case with Russia, where it was easy to generate theories that economic aid would be wasted if economic reforms were not in place, so also is it easy for vested interests to generate theories that Sendero Luminoso will not be defeated unless Peru makes x or y reform.

And this x or y may be put forward whether or not, in Peruvian political reality, it is likely to be achievable or, indeed, absolutely necessary to the goal of defeating Sendero.

As a high-level example of the mixing of goals, the hemispheric concern over the autocoup in Peru was motivated, perhaps, more by fears of nation states that a failure of Peruvian democracy might harm their democracies than the belief that this autocoup might harm Peruvian efforts to defeat Sendero.

All in all, this seems to me to be a time to congratulate President Alberto Fujimori: on his historic capture of Abimael Guzman; on the discipline of his forces—who did not simply kill Guzman when he was found; and on the determination of the Peruvian Government to try Guzman. After this capture, no one can claim that the Government's counterinsurgency campaign has been wholly ineffective or counterproductive. And the willingness of the population to turn against, and to turn in, Sendero followers must certainly be much enhanced, as some recent newspaper reports confirm.

Accordingly, I believe this is a time to move forward with the Fujimori government to help consolidate these gains against Sendero and to try to put this decapitated dragon out of business.

In particular, will combining pressures on Peru to pursue a suitable democratic path with pressures to adopt more acceptable and effective counterinsurgency methods produce an "appropriate" or only an "opportunistic" strategy? Certainly democracy is useful for a

counterinsurgency campaign. But, asked about the Peruvian constitution, one high State Department official said, "The devil is in the details," suggesting that the U.S. government may wish, as part of its calculation, to sit in judgement on the details of the Peruvian Constitution!

Or consider this, should we abandon, or put off, efforts to help Peru defeat Sendero if it turns out that Fujimori cannot reach agreement with his political enemies in the other political parties?

I start from the premise that Peru is a sovereign state and inhabited by a proud people. I feel there ought to be more sympathy for the desperate plight of the Peruvian people and their government. And there ought to be more recognition that in the end, the Peruvian people are going to have to solve their problems and live with their solutions.

Looking around at the correlation of non-Peruvian political forces, I conclude that the talk of pressuring the Peruvian government, and of imposing conditions on aid to Peru, should be less unanimous and there ought to be more talk of cooperating with the Peruvian government at its request and with its consent.

With this in mind, I make a relevant proposal requiring the invitation and consent of the Peruvian government. I believe the Peruvian government should give consideration to inviting the creation of a counterinsurgency support group (CSG) composed of experts from nations who have had experience with similar insurgencies.

Such a group could help devise an ongoing strategy sustainable for periods longer than the short-term tenure of military commanders or even the five-year tenure of Peruvian presidents. Experts of this kind would be aware of the need for human rights and appropriate judicial procedures, and would necessarily incorporate them in their suggestions along with more narrow military and intelligence aspects of the problem.

Besides formulating plans, and suggesting ideas, they would monitor the contest, and the implementation of their ideas and others, and give ongoing, constructive advice to President Fujimori, and his successors, in the inevitably lengthy and changing struggle.

In and of itself, the creation of the CSG would be a simple Peruvian decision to seek expert advice without, of course, any legal commitment to follow it immediately or later. The CSG would be helpful only if its advice were good and, to the extent that it was good, the advice were taken.

But, over and above this, for the international community, having the CSG to consult with could be helpful in its own ongoing deliberations over whether or not to provide more or less intelligence assistance, military training, economic aid, loans, or technical advice relevant to the defeat of Sendero.

Needless to say, America and other aid-giving states would make their decisions on support using other sources of information as well. But at least there would be one "node" in the chaotic international decision-making process, the CSG, which would be keeping its eye only on the ball in question here today: defeat of Sendero Luminoso.

Why should President Fujimori invite such an advisory group at a triumphant time when, in the popular mind and perhaps in his mind as well, he needs no such advice? I would think he would do this only if he felt that the creation of such a group would be considered, by the international community, to be an important signal of the Peruvian government's readiness to maintain an internationally acceptable counterinsurgency campaign—one that would simplify the international community's decisions to assist Peru.

And insofar as defeat of Sendero is the issue before us, in my opinion, the only condition that Peru should have to meet to receive international support to defeat Sendero is that it is demonstrably pursuing an appropriate strategy to achieve that goal.

But, clearly, defeat of Sendero is not the only problem that bedevils Peru. I do believe that it would be possible to defeat Sendero without removing many of the conditions that produced Sendero. Abimael Guzmans are not born every day. It is hard to get such insurgencies moving and to maintain them—especially when they use such cruel tactics to bestir the inhabitants.

But even without Sendero, or with a Sendero of a mutated form, Peru would have such enormous economic, social, and political problems that it could still collapse. Until these problems are attacked, the instability of Peru will continue to make it a threat to security in the hemisphere.

I believe that President Fujimori is determined to deal with economic and social problems and that the constituent assembly, new constitution, and new political process provide an opportunity for systemic change in Peru. Peru needs, as Hernando de Soto has written, to be released from mercantilism and to make its democracy more representative.

And there may be ways, not fully conceptualized today, in which the international community can assist both President Fujimori and reformist elements in Peru, to produce just such change, if invited. Certainly the world's concern about drugs, quite apart from its concern about terrorism, gives ample motivation for international cooperation in helping Peru reform itself. These are subjects for another day, but I mention them to remind that Peru's dilemma is not co-extensive with counterinsurgency.

Finally, I want to emphasize that the stakes in defeating Sendero are enormous, involving millions of lives, disruption in the hemisphere far exceeding current issues with Peruvian democracy, and a base for new and effective kinds of revolutionary tactics of a diabolic and cruel kind. For my views on this, I attach a copy of a recent article, "Save

Peru From Sendero," from The Washington Post

With regard to the first question on the effect of Guzman's capture, the Federation's Project on Peru has a truly distinguished expert on Sendero Luminoso. Mr. Michael Smith, who edits our publication "Sendero File," studied Sendero during the 17 years he lived in Peru. Because he can better answer the first question posed in the Committee's invitation, I have attached his views.

Assessing the Capture of Abimael Guzmán on Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peru.

By Michael L. Smith

Deputy Director, Project on Peru
Federation of American Scientists Fund

The capture of Abimael Guzmán by Peruvian security forces on September 12 in Lima raises as many questions about Sendero Luminoso's 12-year insurgency and the future of Peru as it answers about the short-term viability of the government of President Alberto Fujimori. Our capacity to answer the central questions of Peru's chances of fighting off this guerrilla movement is limited by many factors, among which are our lack of information about how many other national leaders the Peruvian security forces were able to sweep up and how seriously SL operations will be compromised and for how long. In addition, the lack of reliable, up-to-date information from Peru's interior makes it difficult to know how the war is going in areas where SL has been working for years.

There is no doubt that Abimael Guzmán's capture is a huge setback for SL and comes at a crucial time when the organization was planning an unprecedented offensive to demonstrate the vulnerability of the government. Guzman was the founder, ideologue and supreme strategist of Sendero Luminoso and has shaped the party, its military apparatus and its organizational satellites in his image. He was the instigator of a personality cult and the arbitrator of internal disputes, playing a role which no other party member can fill. However, Guzmán was not a typical Latin American caudillo, a revolutionary adventurer like Che Guevara or even a Mao Zedong from whom Guzmán drew his inspiration for organizing and leading his revolution.

This capture compromises the whole organization from the top down. It has struck a psychological blow when the Peruvian government and civilian society desperately needed it. However, the usefulness of much of the information will be shortlived, because Sendero cadres, especially the national and regional leadership, will quickly change identities and erase their trails. The government does not have the capacity to process it and move quickly to action. However, the mere existence of the information in government hands means that it sets back Sendero's timetable and requires it to step back and reorganize completely. A clandestine organization like SL cannot easily absorb a blow of this force. It is an intelligence blow which will give the government a more comprehensive view of Sendero - a vision from inside the organization - than it had ever had before.

It is an understatement to say that the Sendero Luminoso which Guzman created and forged into a potent threat to the government and civilian society will never be the same. However, Guzman himself has been laying the groundwork over the past eight years for Sendero to make a dramatic leap in striking capacity. The organization which

we know today as Sendero Luminoso is far removed from the tightly knit group that started its insurgency in Ayacucho in 1980, or the battle-hardened, but still isolated organization of 1986 or even the guerrilla force which began to expand into urban areas in 1990. In order to understand what remains of Sendero Luminoso in a post-Guzman era, there has to be an evaluation of this organizational buildup. There are five relevant points:

- Guzmán has endowed the party with a systematic codification of its ideology (in the Guzmán interview, the party congress discussion documents and other materials published in El Diario). Guzmán does not have to be physically present to reproduce his thinking, though its application could open up dissent within the organization.

This material has been incorporated into easily digestible capsules which activists disseminate through SL's recruitment programs, its "people's schools" and even the public education system. Guzman has emphasized the need to forge "new proto-type" men and women, and has invested huge resources in creating a "revolutionary pedagogy" which will reach the common man as well as the intellectuals.

- Guzmán has made the party, with its People's Guerrilla Army and satellite organizations, into a nationwide network with a clear, decentralized command structure, tactical initiative and defined objectives. Guzmán oversaw the expansion of a guerrilla force which is aiming to put a standing army in the field to be able to demonstrate what the party has claimed as "strategic parity" against government forces. SL retains its military apparatus intact and operative and has the political will to use it. Sendero has expanded its activities without sacrificing its strongholds and rural presence. From Piura on the Ecuadorian border to Puno on the Bolivian border, SL holds the high ground in geo-political and strategic terms. It will be impossible to surround and destroy these guerrilla strongholds in a single stroke. Perhaps as much as 70 percent of the national territory lies outside the permanent reach of the State.

- Guzmán laid out a broad, multi-faceted and multi-front strategy that is strikingly matched with an organization to carry it out. In a country where few organizations work efficiently, Sendero does, and that adds to its appeal. Although its terrorist tactics and guerrilla actions have grabbed the headlines, SL has marshalled far more resources for other lines of action: propaganda; recruitment and training; education; infiltration, neutralization and seizure on of competing organizations; logistical support and communication for its clandestine network, its operating units and its command structure; intelligence gathering and processing; and strategic thinking at a national, regional and local level.

- The party has a steady flow of funding through its connections with the cocaine trade in the Huallaga valley and elsewhere along the eastern tropical slopes of the Andes. Though this connection could compromise the integrity of its regional commands through corruption, it will provide resources for the foreseeable future. Simultaneously, SL holds the capacity to prevent the Peruvian economy from working (through power blackouts, knocking out bridges and railways, and other acts of sabotage which frighten both Peruvian and foreign investors), thus depriving the State of needed resources.

- Guzmán oversaw a Senderista penetration in urban areas, a risky transition for any guerrilla movement, but a prerequisite for taking power. Although the outcome of this shift is still uncertain, SL today is engaged in activities which were unimaginable five years ago.

In other words, Guzmán has left his organization with a legacy and tangible assets which will provide the resources to get through the near future. Indeed, as the organization has grown and diversified, Guzmán was becoming more of a chairman of the board, rather than a field general. Guzmán, with his penchant for far-sighted planning, probably drafted contingency plans for his loss by being captured, killed or incapacitated by illness. However, the blow of the surprise capture would make implementation of such a plan extremely difficult. In addition, Sendero will also be undergoing the transition of an institution passing from the founder's direct control to an institution in the hands of second- and third-generation militants, a difficult phase under the best of circumstances for any kind of organization.

The Government's Status:

The government of Alberto Fujimori does not have the manpower, logistics or funds to exploit this windfall of intelligence and psychological initiative fully. Large swaths of the countryside are beyond its reach, and it will take years, under the best of circumstances, to reassert state authority there. The intelligence haul at the safehouses and any additional information that can be obtained from those captured is a perishable commodity in tactical terms, but will have great usefulness in piecing together an understanding of how SL functioned.

The Fujimori government is trying to exploit the psychological blow by ridiculing Guzmán and the party and plant seeds of doubt about the organization's invincibility and motives. From reports from Lima, we can discern a risky tendency of concentrating in Guzmán all Sendero's destructive capacity and wiles and downplaying Sendero's capacity to absorb the blow. The state of euphoria and relief among Peru's national elites and middle class may lead to missing another golden opportunity to regain the political initiative.

The underlying causes of the insurgency and the setting of social and political decay have not changed with Guzmán's capture. The motherlode of ethnic and class hatred is still there to be mined. The economic recession is still grinding up scores of companies, spewing out massive unemployment. Narco-trafficking and corruption are undermining institutions already shaken by the impact of 15 years of crisis. The government has failed to provide minimum services to 22 million Peruvians, especially in health, education and justice. The political system is fragmented and in upheaval, facing a crisis which predates the April 5 coup and will continue. ✓

Conclusions:

At this early date, it is hard to venture any predictions until Sendero makes its first organized response to the capture and reveals how deeply it has been hit. The party will have to weigh how much effort it wants to invest in keeping Guzman alive or even rescuing him and how important it is to stay close to the timeline for revolution set down by Guzmán.

The central question is how the organization will fill the void in national leadership and unified command. A leadership struggle will be played out over the next 3 months to 3 years-36 and even longer if Guzmán remains alive. There will be a host of competing lines within the party, each trying to get the upper hand and each playing out its position in both internal debate and armed actions. An early victim will probably be the Lima metropolitan committee which was responsible for taking care of Guzmán's security. The Ayacucho regional committee will have a historical preeminence within the party, but the Huallaga commanders will also have a strong say because they control most of the party's purse strings and much of its fighting force. //

A Sendero Luminoso without Guzmán is not necessarily an organization condemned to extinction. Grassroots leaders frequently say that a constraint on Sendero's appeal has been its rigid ideological stance and its dogmatic refusal to enter into "impure" political alliances. Without Guzmán to dictate a hardline ideological position, Sendero could become more politically flexible and expand its social base to include those who support violent overthrow of the government and the system but do not feel compelled to become fire-breathing Maoists. //

An eventual decline of Sendero Luminoso as a threat to the government does not necessarily mean a reduction of violence in Peru. Instead of having political violence wielded by SL with almost surgical precision, Peru may degenerate into a slaughterhouse filled with scores of amateur butchers. There are already signs that the society is being brutalized by Sendero, government incompetence, the economic adjustment program and the failure of vision of the national leadership. After a decade in which SL sought a political monopoly on violence and staunchly defended its turf, its future decline might permit other groups equally intent on using violence to achieve their ends by occupying both the political and social scenes. These could be SL splinter groups, other insurgent ✓

groups, narco-traffickers, armed bands of bandits, mafia-like organizations, rogue bands of police and military and others or even the self-defense committees now being set up and encouraged by the Fujimori government.

BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL ON STONE:

Jeremy J. Stone has been the chief executive officer of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) since 1970; he left his profession of mathematics even earlier, in 1962, to work on international security affairs. Founded in 1945 by Manhattan Project atomic scientists, the Federation is a group devoted to world peace, and has long worked on such issues as disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, arms sales, secrecy and other related issues.

Among work for which Stone is known: early work in 1963 in conceiving an anti-ballistic missile treaty and campaigning for it in Washington and Moscow for a decade; rebuilding the Federation of American Scientists and leading it for two decades; helping restart U.S. scientific exchange with the People's Republic of China in 1972; defense of the human rights of Soviet scientists, including those of Andrei Sakharov, that catalyzed the 1976 institutionalization of human rights groups in the organs of the American scientific community.

Stone has had unusually close experience with the threat to world security of Maoist movements such as Sendero Luminoso. He dined with China's Prime Minister Chou En Lai in 1972 during the Great Cultural Revolution, worked almost full time from 1989 to early 1992 to prevent the return to power in Cambodia of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, and has visited Pyongyang, North Korea where yet another spin-off of hard core Maoist practices hold sway.

In early 1992, Stone started FAS's Project for Peru whose underlying goal is to save Peru from Sendero. In March, he hired an experienced Senderologist and Peruvian expert, Michael L. Smith, to write a monthly publication "Sendero File" which is currently sent to about 400 interested policy relevant persons. Since his May, 1992 trip to Peru, Stone has been drawing the attention of the international community to this problem and suggesting policy options.

Stone graduated from Swarthmore College in 1957, magna cum laude, and as President of his class, with a degree in mathematics to which the College added an honorary degree in 1985. His Ph.D. in mathematics is from Stanford University in 1960. He is the author of two books on arms control and more than 200 articles and newsletters on diverse subjects of science and society. His most recent article on Peru, "Save Peru From Sendero" [Washington Post, July 28, 1992] is attached. His work in opposing these Maoist movements, in Cambodia and Peru, has been supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL ON SMITH:

Michael L. Smith is a sociologist, journalist and political analyst who spent 16 years in Peru (1974-1990). His work has focused on the central issues which hamper Peru's full development as a society and a nation.

In 1987, he received a grant for research and writing from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's Program for Peace and International Cooperation to study the rise of the Shining Path guerrillas. Two essays from this research appeared in *The Shining Path of Peru* (ed. David Scott Palmer, New York: St. Martin Press, 1992). He also wrote a study on political violence and rural development in Peru for the International Development Research Centre of Canada. The investigation, *Rural Development in the Crossfire: The Role of Grassroots Support Organizations in a Context of Political Violence in Peru*, was published in Canada in 1991 and in Peru in 1992.

His articles have appeared in *The Washington Post*, *Newsweek*, *The International Herald Tribune*, and the *Times of London*, among others.

Jeremy J. Stone

Save Peru From Sendero

A determined, resilient and Machiavellian terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso, has advanced its revolution against demoralized Peru to the point where the international community is faced with a long-term emergency. This was dramatically confirmed by Sendero's unprecedented bombings in Lima this month.

Sendero is not just another Latin American revolutionary movement that will either be eventually defeated or with which one could eventually deal. Instead, it is a Maoist revolution based on Chinese political techniques that Sendero's leader learned during China's cultural revolution—techniques Sendero has improved on and which it modifies skillfully as circumstances change.

Intelligence specialists have continually underestimated Sendero for the last dozen years of its violent phase. Its Marxist indoctrination of young people, its extraordinary patience and its capacity for cruel Mafia-style intimidation make its defeat difficult.

Nor will it deal. It refuses all dialogue. Recently, it has begun a rapidly spreading phase of infiltration of popular organizations in urban shantytowns to complement its long-standing activities in rural areas. And last week it even began bombings in the neighborhoods of Lima's upper classes.

Some can hardly believe that a few thousand terrorists, no matter how disciplined, and even backed by many sympathizers, could take over a country of 22 million people.

But Sendero's intermediate goal is not to take over Peru but to destroy it by disrupting it. In today's world, this is not that hard. What happens, for example, when a repeatedly sabotaged

electrical or water network moves from rationing to cutoffs?

And Peru, in decline for decades, is already a very sick country, with its government continually shrinking in disposable revenues, its major entrepreneurs poised to flee, its impoverished population exhausted, its bureaucrats and army corrupted and its capital city, comprising one-third of the population, easily harassed.

As part of its strategy, this movement intends to provoke Peru into bloody repression that will, its spokesmen say, "irrigate its revolution" and cost 1 million lives.

Rebuilding from razed ground, Sendero would then build a Maoist hermit kingdom, along the lines of an agrarian North Korea. Its reconstruction of Peru on the basis of a permanent cultural revolution can be expected to cost millions more lives, as Chairman Gonzalo, the self-proclaimed Fourth Sword of Marxism, tries to move the society backward in time—away from the outside world that already feeds one Peruvian in four.

The movement's vigilant contempt for the "revisionism" of all other Marxist states, including North Korea, and its isolation from any friendly states, would prevent the Sendero leaders for decades to come from permitting ideological relaxation. Peru could be a long time returning to civilization.

An alternative is that its revolutionary movement might prove too incompetent or too ideological to run a government. In this case, Peru could move toward complete collapse at enormous further cost, as did another similar Maoist offshoot of China's cultural revolution, Pol Pot's Cambodia.



These costs outweigh the human rights outrages of Peruvian society, as an atomic bomb outweighs a conventional bomb. And because Sendero deliberately seeks to provoke far worse military repression, it represents a major continuing threat to Peruvian democracy. Sendero successes also mean further losses in the drug war. Sendero sees drug sales as a kind of twofor: It gets the revenue, and its capitalist adversary in America has its moral fiber undermined by drugs.

Accordingly, none should argue that if Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori does not, or cannot, meet specific human rights or democratic standards, we should "write off" Peru.

Instead, a coalition of interests should seek to save Peru from Sendero. The international human rights community ought to be against what Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson has called a "third holocaust" in our time, after that of Hitler and Pol Pot.

And all who love freedom should recognize that Sendero's Marxist ambitions of achieving world revolution, and its sophisticated methods for overwhelming the defenses of a state's body politic, might make it a kind of political AIDS virus in more than a few unstable Third World states.

Saving Peru from Sendero is not something Peru can do by itself. Neither can the United States, by itself, make a decisive difference. Instead, Peru has become an international problem requiring some kind of collective international help from the community of states—much as the permanent five members of the United Nations undertook to save Cambodia. Whether and how this will be done we don't know.

The writer is president of the Federation of American Scientists and has recently returned from Peru.

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE