

SECRET

LIBRARY FILE




Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Not Releasable to Contractors, Contractor Consultants
(WFOIA) (RACT)

NEGATIVE RECORD COPY
DO NOT CIRCULATE, PURGE,
OR POST CHANGES TO THIS
COPY

ATP

ARMY COUNTRY PROFILE



INDEX
CB
ES
DI
ST
DISSEM MADE

Peru (U)



DOC #: ATC-RD-1100-028-91
100 121 974 MF#:
RK:
LOANED TO: KNEAR, M, PAUL
OFFICE: DATE DUE: 950803

SEP 09 1992
FSTC COLLATERAL
100 121 974
SEP 09 1992

WARNING NOTICE
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on OADR

United States Army Intelligence Agency
Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject To Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

ATC-RD-1100-028-

AUG 26 1992

Enck 1

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER
BUILDING 213
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON, DC 20374-5085

15 JUN 1992

IAAII-RAL

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Army Country Profile (ACP)--Peru (U), ATC-RD-1100-028-91

- (u)
1. (CONF) This document provides information on the Peruvian ground and security forces and discusses ground forces' mission, composition, disposition, tactics, training, logistics, capabilities, and equipment.
 2. (CONF) The Peruvian Army's authorized strength totals approximately 80,000 (officers and enlisted). The principal mission of the Peruvian military is to defend the nation against external as well as internal threats. (

3. (U) The ACP is produced in five parts. Part I is disseminated with a cover sheet and end spine for insertion into a view binder notebook. Tabs that identify the five parts are provided for inclusion in the notebook. Comments on the content and utility of this intelligence publication should be addressed to Commander, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, ATTN: IAAII-00, Building 213, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374-5085.

James L. Solomon

JAMES L. SOLOMON
Colonel, MI
Commanding

~~Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved~~

~~Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals~~

~~Classified by MULTIPLE SOURCES
Declassify on ADR~~

~~Not Releasable to Contractors
or Contractor Consultants~~

~~SECRET~~

2

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON *20 Sep 01*
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Department of the Army
United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
United States Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

Army Country Profile—Peru, Part I (U)

Publication date: May 1992
Information cutoff date: 1 May 1991

National Security Information
~~Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions~~

~~Warning Notice~~
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved

~~Classified by MULTIPLE SOURCES~~
Declassify on OADR

~~Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals~~

~~Not Releasable to Contractors
or Contractor Consultants~~

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNIINTEL

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

5

Preface (U)

(U) The Army Country Profile (ACP) provides intelligence information on a selected country and is produced in five parts, each relating a specific area of intelligence information. The ACP replaces the Army Intelligence Survey (AIS) that was produced prior to fiscal year 1990. A compilation of five parts of finished intelligence to support tactical commanders and contingency planners, the ACP is useful for both real-world situations and tactical training. Part I of the product will be disseminated with a cover sheet, end spine, commander's memorandum, and tab sheets that will identify each part. Commands may receive a Part II or Part III prior to Part I. In that event, file the part received in a three-ring binder; the other parts will be sent out as soon as completed.

(U) Part I, *Ground Forces*, describes the ground forces components in the various armed forces of the country; Part II, *Intelligence and Security*, discusses the counterintelligence situation of the country and how this situation would affect US deployment in the country; Part III, *Military Geography*, addresses specific characteristics and factors of military geography; Part IV, *Medical Intelligence*, analyzes the environment and health factors that effect the country and that may influence US military operations; and Part V, *Psychological*

Operations, provides psychological profile information on the country's military forces.

(U) This study, *ACP—Peru, Part I*, is produced by Mr. Edmundo Flores, Latin America Branch, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress and Mr. William Skidmore, Latin America Branch, Asia/Americas Division, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center.

(U) This document has been coordinated with the Defense Intelligence Agency and Headquarters, Department of the Army. Interpretation of intelligence information in this publication represents the views of the USAITAC and may be subject to modification in the light of subsequent information.

(U) All comments and suggestions should be addressed to Commander, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, ATTN: IAII-OO, Building 213, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374-5085. Requests for copies of this document, or for changes in distribution requirements, should be coordinated as directed in AR 381-19, Intelligence Dissemination and Product Support, February 1988.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sept 81
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Summary (U)

(U) The Peruvian ground forces are the third largest in Latin America following Cuba and Brazil. The army comprises the largest service entity while the navy augments the ground forces. The Peruvian National Police (PNP) is the primary paramilitary organization that augments these ground forces for a domestic security role.

(S/NF) The primary mission of the ground forces is the defense of Peruvian territory from potential adversaries.

but is possible in isolated instances at low levels along border areas. The military is incapable of defending the country for an extended period of time against a tenacious regional adversary for a variety of reasons: inadequate preparedness, budget constraints, logistical weaknesses, equipment shortfalls, insufficient training, lack of joint coordination, intelligence shortfalls, and uneven leadership.

(S/NF)

~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~ (NF)

Table of Contents (U)

(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

Part I—Ground Forces (U)

	Page
Preface	iii
Summary	v
List of Illustrations	ix
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	xi
List of Place Names	xv
Area of Interest Map	xvii
National Flag	xix
Land Area Comparison Map	xix
Chapter 1. Recent Significant Events	
1-1. Politics, The National Elections, 1990	1-1
1-2. Economy	1-2
1-3. Insurgency	1-2
1-4. Armed Forces	1-4
Chapter 2. Armed Forces Overview	
2-1. Mission and Doctrine of the Armed Forces	2-1
2-2. Military Manpower and Mobilization	2-2
2-3. Order of Battle	2-3
2-4. Role of the Armed Forces in the Government	2-9
2-5. Foreign Forces	2-9

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Table of Contents, continued (U)

(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

	Page
Chapter 3. Regular Army	
3-1. Mission	3-1
3-2. Composition	3-2
3-3. Disposition	3-9
3-4. Personnel Strength	3-10
3-5. Tactics	3-10
3-6. Training	3-20
3-7. Logistics	3-26
3-8. Capabilities	3-31
3-9. Key Personalities	3-33
3-10. Uniforms, Ranks, Insignia, and Decorations	3-33
 Chapter 4. Paramilitary Forces	
Peruvian National Police	4-1
 Chapter 5. Ground Forces of Other Services	
5-1. Naval Infantry Force	5-1
5-2. Naval Special Operations Force	5-4
5-3. Light Countersubversive Battalions	5-6
 Chapter 6. Ground Forces Reserves	
Army Reserves	6-1
 Chapter 7. Weapons and Equipment	
7-1. General Discussion	7-1
7-2. Weapons and Equipment Inventory	7-4
7-3. Projected Changes in Inventory	7-6
7-4. Illustrations and Specifications	7-6
 Intelligence Gaps	 Intel-1
 Bibliography	 Bib-1
 Distribution List	 Dist-1

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 07
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 52-1.1

11

List of Illustrations (U) (This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

Figure	Figures	Page
2-1.	Armed Forces and Police Organization	2-5
3-1.	Organization of the Army	3-3
3-2.	Military Regions Demarcation Map	3-4
3-3.	Disposition of Units in the Military Regions	3-6
3-4.	Disposition Map of Army Units	3-12
3-5.	Fronts Demarcation Map	3-16
3-6.	Fronts Organization and C2	3-18
3-7.	5th Jungle Infantry Division Organizational Chart	3-19
3-8.	Military Region II Organization	3-19
3-9.	Leoncio Prado Detachment Organization	3-20
3-10.	31st Infantry Division Organizational Chart	3-21
3-11.	2d Infantry Division Organization	3-21
3-12.	Special Forces Division Organization	3-22
3-13.	Chorillos Training Complex	3-23
3-14.	Peruvian Army Officer Insignia	3-35
4-1.	Peruvian National Police Organization	4-2
4-2.	Mazamari Training Facility and 49th Comandancia Base	4-4
5-1.	IMAP's Ancon Base and Training Facility	5-2
7-1.	FN/FAL 7.62mm Light Automatic Rifle	7-6
7-2.	ZSU-23-4 Self-propelled Antiaircraft Gun	7-7
7-3.	SA-3/GOA Surface-to-Air Missile	7-8
7-4.	M20 Armored Car	7-8
7-5.	T-55 Medium Tank	7-8
7-6.	UR-416 Armored Personnel Carrier	7-9
7-7.	AMX-13 Light Tank	7-9

Table	Tables	Page
2-1.	Total Armed Forces Personnel Strength (includes National Police)	2-1
2-2.	Inventory of Air Force Aircraft	2-6
2-3.	Inventory of Naval Vessels	2-7
2-4.	Inventory of Naval Aircraft	2-8
3-1.	Military Regions, Departments, and Headquarters	3-2
3-2.	Peruvian Ground Force Maneuver Units	3-5
3-3.	Composition of Army Divisions	3-7

12

List of Illustrations, continued (U) (This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

Table	Page
3-4. Composition of Artillery Groups	3-9
3-5. Armor Battalions—Disposition and Equipment	3-9
3-6. Armored and Horse Cavalry—Disposition and Equipment	3-10
3-7. Major Ground Force Installations	3-11
3-8. Separate Units Under Military Region Headquarters	3-11
3-9. Army Strength, January 1991	3-13
3-10. Tactical Strength by Type of Unit.	3-14
3-11. Typical Division Breakdown.	3-14
3-12. Estimated Manpower Strength by Type of Tactical Unit	3-15
3-13. Front Organization	3-17
3-14. Peruvian Army Ranks with US Army Equivalents	3-34
7-1. Weapons and Equipment Inventory	7-5

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20Sep01
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

13

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms (U)

(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

A

AB	airbase
Abn	airborne
ADA	air defense artillery
APC	armored personnel carrier
AR	armored regiment
ARC	armored reconnaissance carrier
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
AT	antitank

B

BALICO	Light Countersubversive Battalion (IMAP/Navy)
BFA	Blank Firing Adaptor
BN	battalion
BOES	Special Forces Battalion
BRDM	Soviet Wheeled Amphibious Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle

C

CAEM	Army's Center for Higher Military Studies (<i>Centro de Altos Estudios Militares</i>)
CAS	close air support
CAV	cavalry
CCAAE	Army Academic Center (<i>Centro Academico del Ejército</i>)
CCFFAA	Joint Command of the Armed Forces (<i>Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas</i>)
CDGP	Commission of Directors of the Police Forces
CG	commanding general
CICM	Military Clothing Industrial Center (<i>Centro Industrial de Confecciones Militares</i>)
CIMP	Center of Military Instruction (<i>Centro de Instrucción Militar del Perú</i>)
cm	centimeter
ENPZ/EIN	Nestor Paz Zamora Commission/National Liberation Army (<i>Comisión Nestor Paz Zamora/Ejército Liberación Nacional</i>)
CO	company
CURTE	Army Training Center (<i>Curtiembre del Ejército</i>)

D

DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DET	detachment
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms, continued (U)

(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

D, continued

DINTE	Directorate of Intelligence (<i>Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército</i>)
DINTID	Investigative Directorate for Illicit Drug Traffic
DIPAD	Police Directorate for Drug Enforcement
DIRCOTE	Directorate Against Terrorism (<i>Dirección Contra Terrorismo</i>)
DOES	Directorate of Special Operations

E

ELN	National Liberation Army (<i>Ejército Liberación Nacional</i>)
EMCH	Chorrillos Military Academy (<i>Escuela Militar de Chorrillos</i>)
ENGR	engineer
ESG	Superior War School (<i>Escuela Superior de Guerra</i>)
ETE	Army Technical School (<i>Escuela Técnica del Ejército</i>)
ETRAMSA	Military Equipment and Transports (<i>Empresa de Equipos y Transportes Militares</i>)
EZ	Emergency Zone

F

FABLE	Huachipa Ammunition Plant (<i>Fábrica de Barras de Latón del Ejército</i>)
FAME	Army Munitions Factory (<i>Fábrica de Municiones del Ejército</i>)
FAP	Peruvian Air Force
FCP	Lead Cable Plant (<i>Fábrica de Cables de Plomo</i>)
FETE	Army Telecommunications Equipment Factory (<i>Fábrica de Equipos de Telecomunicaciones del Ejército</i>)
FOES	Peruvian Naval Special Operations Force (<i>Fuerza de Operaciones Especiales</i>)
FREDEMO	Democratic Front
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

G

GDAP	Civil Guard Anti-Drug Police
GEN	general
GP	General Police

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Anti Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

H

HALO	high altitude low opening
HE	high explosive
HMMWV	high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HQ	headquarters

15

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms, continued (U) (This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

I

ID	infantry division
IIR	Intelligence Information Report
IMAP	Peruvian Naval Infantry Force (<i>Infantería de Marina Armada Peruana</i>)
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INDAER	Air Industries (<i>Industrias de Aerea</i>)
INDUMIL	Military Industries of Peru (<i>Industrias Militares del Perú</i>)

K

kg	kilogram
KGB	Commission of State Security (<i>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti</i>)
km	kilometer

L

LAVINDE	Army Industrial Laundry (<i>Lavandería Industrial del Ejército</i>)
LFE	Army Pharmaceutical Laboratory (<i>Laboratorio Farmacéutico del Ejército</i>)
LST	Amphibious Vehicle Landing Ship
LTG	lieutenant general

M

m	meter
MASH	mobile surgical hospital
MG	major general
mm	millimeter
MR	military region
MRTA	Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (<i>Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru</i>)
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MTZ	motorized

N

NAB	Naval Air Base
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NFI	not further identified

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms, continued (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

P

PNP Peruvian National Police (~~Policia Nacional Peruana~~)
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants

R

REGT regiment
RPM rounds per minute

S

SA special agent
SER service
SFD Special Forces Division
SIMA Industrial Services of the Navy (*Servicios Industriales de la Marina*)
SL Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*)
SP Security Police
SQDN squadron

T

TK tank
TP Technical Police

U

UHV Upper Huallaga Valley
UK United Kingdom

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20Sep01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.107

17

List of Place Names (U) (This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

Place Name	Geographic Coordinate
Amazon River	0010S04900W
Ancon	1147S07711W
Andes Mountains	2000S06700W
Arequipa	1624S07133W
Arica, Chile	1829S00720W
Ayacucho	1307S07413W
Bayovar	0550S08103W
Cajabamba	0737S07803W
Callao	1204S07709W
Callique	1156S07704W
Chiclayo	0646S07951W
Chimbote	0905S07836W
Chorrillos (Lima)	1210S07702W
Cordillera de El Condor (mountains)	0400S07830W
Cusco	1331S07159W
Departamento de Arica, Chile (department)	1830S06950W
Departamento de Cajamarca (department)	0615S07850W
Departamento de Ica (department)	1420S07530W
Departamento de Loreto (department)	0500S07500W
Departamento de Madre de Dios (department)	1200S07015W
Departamento de Tacna (department)	1740S07020W
Desierto de Atacama (Atacama Desert)	2430S06915W
El Milagro	0538S07830W
Estrecho	0228S07242W
Guayaquil, Golfo de, Ecuador, Peru (gulf)	0300S08030W
Huancavelica	1246S07502W
Huanuco	0955S07605W
Humay	1343S07554W
Ica	1404S07542W
Ilo	1738S07120W
Inkites	0346S07315W
Jaen	0542S07847W
Jauja	1140S07529W
Juanjui	0711S07645W
Junin	1130S07500W
La Joya	1416S07541W
La Mar	1255S07350W
Lambayeque	0642S07955W
La Molina (Lima)	1205S07657W
La Oroya	1132S07554W

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

18

List of Place Names, continued (U)

(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

Place Name	Geographic Coordinate
Las Palmas	1210S07701W
Leticia, Colombia	0490S06957W
Lima	1203S07703W
Mollendo	1702S07201W
Monterrico Chico (Lima)	1206S07658W
Monterrico Grande (Lima)	1204S07658W
Nanay Naval Base	0340S07315W
Paita	0506S08107W
Pisco	1342S07613W
Piura	0512S08038W
Provincia de Tacna (province)	1750S07030W
Provincia de Tarapaca, Chile (province)	2000S06920W
Pucallpa	0823S07432W
Puerto Bolivar, Ecuador	0316S07959W
Puerto Maldonado	1236S06911W
Puerto Pizana	0802S07639W
Puno	1490S07542W
Quito, Ecuador	0013S07830W
Rio Caqueta, Colombia (river)	0308S06446W
Rio Maranon (river)	0430S07327W
Rio Putumayo (river)	0307S06758W
Rio Puyango (river)	0207S07948W
Salinas	1113S07737W
San Juan de Marcona	1504S07415W
San Marcos	0720S07811W
Santa Lucia	0821S07623W
Santiago, Chile	3327S07040W
Saposa	0656S07648W
Somate	0445S08033W
Tacna	1801S07015W
Talara	0434S08117W
Tarapoto	0630S07625W
Tingo Maria	0909S07556W
Tocache	0811S07630W
Trujillo	0805S07855W
Tumbes	0334S08028W
Ucayali	0710S07515W
Uchiza	0829S07623W
Vitarte (Lima)	1202S07656W
Zarumilla, Ecuador	0234S07839W

UNCLASSIFIED




(U) Area of Interest Map

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R


21

UNCLASSIFIED



(U) National Flag

UNCLASSIFIED



(U) Land Area Comparison Map

22

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Chapter 1: Recent Significant Events (U)

1-1. (U) Politics, The National Elections, 1990

(U)
a. (C/NF) Peruvians elected Alberto Fujimori of the center-right Cambio 90 Party as their new president in a run-off election on 10 June 1990, with nearly 60 percent of the vote. Mario Vargas Llosa from the Democratic Front (FREDEMO) was defeated. The official results confirmed Fujimori's victory, and he was inaugurated on 28 July 1990. His constitutional term of office is 5 years. Coalitions will be needed in both houses for Fujimori to rule since no party achieved a majority. President Fujimori, since being elected, has not succeeded in developing a constructive consensus in the legislature, and his influence on the new multiparty congress will depend largely upon his political skills at cajoling, compromising, and securing majority support for new measures. Consequently, a political stalemate between the executive and legislative branches would make Peru ungovernable. Fujimori has maintained a collection of advisers that have effectively excluded some important political figures. Although his governing style is autocratic and he remains aloof, President Fujimori has displayed a successful degree of political acumen,

especially for someone who has no previous political experience.

b. (S/NF) President Fujimori's landslide election victory surprised many people, especially the FREDEMO party. Polls had suggested that the run-off election would be narrowly decided. Cambio 90's dramatic finish in the 8 April elections also caught many people, including Fujimori and Cambio 90, off guard. Fujimori's close second place finish in April left him scrambling to develop a coherent government strategy and trying to attract a competent team of advisers. His intention during his earlier campaign was to obtain enough votes for his party to secure a senatorial seat. Major issues such as the economy, employment, and terrorism were not the focus of the emotional run-off election. Instead, personal attacks that focused on competency, corruption, race, and religion captured the interest of the electorate. Initially, Fujimori's fresh image and his failure to outline his intentions once elected had political benefits for his campaign, but attention brought scrutiny. Nearly a month passed before he announced the outline of his economic strategy, and only in the few weeks prior to the run-off election was the Cambio 90 plan of government publicized.

c. (U) As the new president, Fujimori will be faced with the arduous task of rebuilding the economy, neutralizing an expansive insurgency and narcotics corruption, and restoring foreign confidence in Peru. All of these tasks will require the implementation of significant legislation without the benefit of a majority in Congress. The implementation of new policies and programs within Peru's complicated and burdensome bureaucracy will depend on the maturity, ingenuity, and persuasiveness of the new leader's team of advisers and Congressional delegations. As a result of the campaigning and the lack of response by the previous administration of President Alan Garcia Perez for Peru's situation, Peruvians have become disenchanted with politics and have been quite mercurial in their voting preferences.

d. (U) Peru is still plagued by endemic problems despite the election of President Fujimori in 1990. The insurgencies, the economy, and the drug trafficking have maintained an intensity that negatively impacts on the daily functions of government and the lives of most Peruvians. The transition from former President Garcia to Fujimori, however, has incorporated some changes that may favorably impact on the country's future.

e. (U) President Fujimori has approached old problems with a new perspective that offers possible solutions. Fujimori's government has a sense of commitment and pragmatism needed to methodically implement policies and programs. Without a strong political party for support, however, President Fujimori has had to rely on deft maneuvers to garner support and assuage critics. He has not been successfully dominant in every political test. Resistance to change has developed in political and economic circles. The military appears to be committed to the Peruvian democratic process as long as their institutional prerogatives are satisfactorily addressed and the civilian leadership does not interfere with the institution.

1-2. (U) Economy

(S/NOFORN) President Fujimori's economic strategy is based on free market principles but does not embrace the need to implement drastic changes

1-2

in fiscal and monetary sectors to strengthen the economy. The privatization that Fujimori desires will not affect some of Peru's largest and more inefficient state corporations. He expects economic assistance from Japan but at a level which Japanese leaders are not expected to commit to Peru or sustain over the next 5 to 10 years. President Fujimori's visions for economic revitalization include loans to small businesses, transportation projects in the remote interior, and access to international lenders. All of these projects and expectations will require a major influx of funds to Peru and the confidence of lenders that these plans will work. The country already is almost \$12 billion in arrears and must develop an acceptable arrangement with international lenders before it can expect new loan funds. Fujimori's administration probably will encounter some hesitation from lenders because the former president did not honor debt obligations to the satisfaction of international lenders. President Fujimori enacted dramatic wage and price adjustments, despite the campaign rhetoric that touted an incremental approach to avoid drastic dislocations and hardships. Inflation has been reduced from a monthly average of 33 percent to 9 percent, but hardships are being felt by nearly every Peruvian. The currency was stabilized and the Sol replaced the Intis as Peru's monetary denomination soon after Fujimori assumed office. Vargas Llosa was constantly derided by his opponents for his emphasis on the need to make significant adjustments quickly before the economy became unsalvageable and unresponsive to remedial measures. President Fujimori's unorthodox and drastic "shock" economic plan for recovery demanded extensive sacrifices from many Peruvians and left them bewildered and unwilling to bear the brunt of those measures needed to save the economy. President Fujimori was forced to implement these measures for recovery and will have to develop strategies to alleviate some of the hardships.

1-3. (U) Insurgency

(U) Two major insurgency organizations operate in Peru: the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*—SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac*

Amaru—MRTA). Of the two organizations, the SL is the most potentially destabilizing force in the country and has replaced government authority in some remote sections of the country's interior. The impact of the SL's activities, however, has been experienced in jungle towns, in sierra villages, and in Lima, the capital. Large portions of the country have been declared national security zones and have been organized into fronts by the Peruvian Armed Forces. Efforts by government security forces, the military, and the police to control insurgency activity and terrorist activities have been frustrated by insufficient economic and political support. The population in these contested regions remains distrustful of government efforts to encourage support because of historical ambivalence and excesses by the central government. The SL has moved into this vacuum that characterizes the underdeveloped and ignored interior by replacing, often ruthlessly, government authority. Presently, the organization is not capable of replacing the government of Peru or defeating security forces, although SL activities have managed to inflict heavy economic and psychological damage on the country.

(u) ~~(S)~~ b. The ability of the SL to seize power from the government and consolidate its power, however, remains unlikely over the next 5 to 10 years. During the next 5 years, the SL likely will further expand its operations in the department and city of Lima, in other urban centers along the coast, and in the Andean Mountains. The SL's leadership also will attempt to coordinate more closely the operations and political initiatives being orchestrated in Peru's interior. The SL's mode of operations probably will remain the same with some attention being focused on their presence and influence in narcotics production areas. Since the SL's military organization is too small to challenge directly Peru's military, the SL leadership likely will continue its harassment and its economically disruptive measures. Unless consistent economic stabilization, counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and interior development programs are implemented by the Government of Peru, it is possible that the SL could seize power in the next 10 to 20 years. This takeover could only occur if the insurgency attracts a national base of support by means other than intimidation and confronts the military conventionally. Such an outcome, however, assumes that the SL's

stated goals are accepted by major sectors of the Peruvian population; that the SL's armed cadre can grow sufficiently and improve its capabilities; and that Peru's economic, political, and social structure unravels and disintegrates.

(u) ~~(S)~~ c. The MRTA emerged in November 1983 with its bombing of the US Marine security guard residence in Lima. The MRTA's name is derived from the 18th century Inca chief, Tupac Amaru II, who initiated a bloody and futile rebellion against the Spaniards on 4 November 1780. The group's stated objective is to overthrow the government and diminish US influence in Peru. The MRTA is not likely to overthrow the Government of Peru by military action at any time during the next 10 years. The MRTA is in a better position than the SL to gain some degree of political influence because of its ability to work with other leftist Peruvian political groups. The MRTA has been more flexible than the SL in dealing with other domestic groups and sources of foreign support. Nevertheless, it remains one of the greatest terrorist threats to US interests in South America.

(u) ~~(S)~~ d. The MRTA is Marxist-Leninist in orientation and is directed by a national executive committee. This committee manages subcommittees that are responsible for political activities, intelligence, support, and military actions. The founder, Victor Polay, might be experiencing the erosion of his influence in the organization to hardliners such as Nestor Cerpa and Alberto Galvez. Overall, the MRTA is well trained and armed, but it is smaller than its SL rival, with about 1,500 to 2,000 armed cadre. The MRTA leadership is predominately middle and upper class and is well educated. The group's activities are mostly urban based, predominately in the city of Lima, and are characterized by sophisticated and disciplined tactics and methods. The MRTA's rural military columns recruit peasants for their military actions, but have not used the ruthless, macabre techniques of intimidation utilized by the SL.

(u) ~~(S)~~ e. The MRTA supports its activities with bank robberies, theft, extortion, drug trafficking, and external assistance from Cuba and Libya. The external support, thus far, is limited to training and travel, but, in the past, a small amount of arms

have come from Cuba. Since the end of the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of Communist power in the USSR and Eastern Europe, Cuba and Libya have diminished contact and support of the MRTA. The MRTA has links to several other South American terrorist/insurgent organizations that hold similar ideologies and command structures. The most notable organizations outside of Peru that the MRTA maintains contact with are the Nestor Paz Zamora Commission/National Liberation Army (~~Comisión Nestor Paz Zamora/Ejército Liberación Nacional—CNPZ/ELN~~) terrorist group in Bolivia and the National Liberation Army (~~Ejército Liberación Nacional—ELN~~) insurgent group in Colombia.

1-4. (U) Armed Forces

(u) a. (S) The Peruvian military has supported democratic elections in Peru and has consistently worked with the National Police since the municipal elections of 1989 and during the national elections held in April 1990. Although severely strained logistically, the military remained supportive of the run-off elections in June 1990. Insurgent violence did not significantly affect the outcome of the election. Security forces, however, were not able to prevent polling disruptions by insurgent activity in some remote rural areas. In augmenting the National Police, the military strained its meager resources to ensure election day security at polling places in urban centers and delivery of the vote for counting in Lima. The military took the necessary steps to ensure President Fujimori's inauguration and the establishment of a new government. The continued military commitment to the civilian government will depend on the new president's ability to address the serious economic and stability concerns of the country. Military intervention in the government is possible if civil unrest, economic hardship, and insurgent violence lead Peru into chaos. President Fujimori's grace period of civilian rule could be shortened because he is perceived by the military as being ill prepared for the task of governing Peru. Although the military may be forced to intervene given these conditions, the military does not have any workable solutions to Peru's complicated problems. The military appears to be committed to the civilian government, and Fuji-

mori likely will complete his term in office. In the aftermath of a coup, the military likely will try to establish order and allow a new civilian government to rule.

(u) b. (S) The major focus of the Peruvian military is the SL insurgency. Contingency plans have also been developed to defend the country against Peru's traditional adversaries, Ecuador and Chile. Peruvian military leaders believe that actual conflict with these countries is not likely to occur; however, an outbreak of hostilities or increased border tensions could occur with Ecuador. The border demarcation between Peru and Ecuador is not recognized by Ecuador, and brief hostilities erupted in 1981. Neither country is sufficiently prepared to initiate combat without warning, and neither country could sustain military operations for more than 2 to 8 weeks without an extensive restructuring of force dispositions. Any outbreak in hostilities would probably be preceded by troop and equipment rotations, stockpiling, and intensive diplomatic negotiations.

c. (S)

d. (S)

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NO CONTRACT WNINTEL

~~SECRET~~

28

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT W/INTEL

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

Chapter 2: Armed Forces Overview (U)

2-1. (U) Mission and Doctrine of the Armed Forces

a. (S)

(see table 2-1).

Table 2-1. (U) Total Armed Forces Personnel Strength (includes National Police)

Army
Navy
Air Force
General Police
Security Police
Total

Source: Multiple Sources

b. (U) The Peruvian Army is the second largest army in South America and is the largest military service in Peru. As the dominant service, the Army's mission is to protect the independence,

sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Peru, in accordance with the laws and Constitution. The Army is required to restore public order during a state of emergency, if ordered by the President. (A detailed discussion of the Peruvian Army can be found in Chapter 3, Regular Army).

c. The Air Force's main responsibility is to defend Peru against air attack. Other Air Force responsibilities include assisting the ground forces in maintaining internal order; participating in the economic and social developments of the country that are funded, in part, from the Air Force's commercial enterprises; providing aerial photographic services, communications, meteorological services, and air search, rescue, and evacuation services; and operating a civil aviation school and the country's aeronautics industry.

~~SECRET~~ /NF

d. ~~(CONF)~~ The Navy's mission is to defend the coastline, enforce Peru's 322-kilometer (km) limit for territorial waters, safeguard coastal shipping, and patrol inland waterways.

2-2. (U) Military Manpower and Mobilization

a. (U) Armed Forces Strength

(1) (U) The personnel requirements of the Peruvian Armed Forces could not be met in a general mobilization without reducing the number of workers in the labor force. However, the educational level of the average conscript and reservist does not normally exceed grade-school level. The conscript does not have the sufficient background necessary to operate sophisticated equipment but serves adequately as an infantry soldier. A large military callup of skilled reservists could deprive the nation's industrial sector of much needed manpower.

(5) ~~(CONF)~~

(2) (U) In mid-1988, Peru had a population of 21.3 million, of which 5.2 million were males between the ages of 15 and 49. A total of 3.5 million males of the 5.2 million persons were physically fit for military service.

(3) ~~(CONF)~~

(4) ~~(CONF)~~

(6) (U) In contrast to conscripts, officers and most career soldiers are commissioned through an extensive military educational system. Conscripts can become career soldiers or, later, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) if they choose to volunteer for 1 to 2 years of service after their enlisted conscription period.

31

b. (U) Mobilization and Reserves

(1) ~~(CONF)~~

(3) (U) Air Force

(a) ~~(CONF)~~

(b) ~~(CONF)~~

(2) (U) Navy

(a) ~~(CONF)~~

(c) ~~(CONF)~~

(b) ~~(CONF)~~

2-3. (U) Order of Battle

a. (U) Armed Forces National-level Organization

(1) ~~(CONF)~~

(2) ~~(S)~~

(3) ~~(S)~~

(3) ~~(NF)~~

(S)

(S)

(S)

b. (U) Air Force

(1) ~~(C)~~

(4) ~~(S)~~

s.

(S)

(2) ~~(C)~~

(5) ~~(C/NF)~~

(S)

(u)
CONFIDENTIAL/NF




Figure 2-1. (U) Armed Forces and Police Organization

(6) ~~(S/NF)~~

(8) ~~(S/NF)~~

(7) ~~(S/NF)~~

Table 2-2. (U) Inventory of Air Force Aircraft

Source: Multiple Sources
DOI: July 1989

~~SECRET~~/NC/WN

(9) (S/N) /WN

(10) ~~(S)~~

(c) ~~(S)~~

Table 2-3. (U) Inventory of Naval Vessels

c. (U) Navy

(1) (U) General Service

(a) ~~(S)~~

(b) ~~(C)~~

(d) ~~(CONF)~~

(e) ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~ / NC/WN
Source: DIA On-Line System, Naval Order of Battle
DOI: December 1988

36

(f)

Table 2-4. (U) Inventory of Naval Aircraft

Aircraft Type	Total	Home Base/BE No.
---------------	-------	------------------

(g)

(h)

(i)

(2)

~~SECRET/NF/WN~~

Source: DIA. Military Intelligence Summary: Volume VIII, Latin America (U). DDB-2680-108-88. December 1988

(3)

(4) (U) Naval Ground Forces. A detailed discussion of the Peruvian Navy's ground forces—naval infantry, light infantry battalions (BNs), and special operation forces—can be found in chapter 5, Ground Forces of Other Services.

2-4. (U) Role of the Armed Forces in the Government

(U) The Armed Forces have always played a large role in the political affairs of Peru. Many Peruvians assume military intervention as the rule rather than the exception, and they believe that the present period of civilian government, which began in 1980, is on very unstable ground. The current and past two civilian administrations may represent a new democratic direction, which indicates that the Army is willing to relinquish its hold, practice tolerance, and allow an elected government to run the country. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces continue to maintain the prerogative of replacing the government if it feels the institution's vital interests are threatened.

2-5. (U) Foreign Forces

a. (S/NF)

b. (U) Soviet Advisory Group

(1) (S/NF) The Economic Mission of the Soviet Embassy in Lima is the main Soviet advisory center that coordinates all Soviet military assistance to Peru. The Mission's offices are located at 770 Javier Prado (West), Magdalena del Mar, Lima

17; and at 3990 Avenida Santo Toribio, San Isidro, Lima. The Soviets have from 59 to 65 military personnel serving as project managers, advisers, instructors, technicians, and translators in Peru. Their presence is due primarily to the large quantities of Army and Air Force equipment, exceeding \$1.5 billion in value, that Peru purchased from the Soviet Union between 1974 and 1983. Soviet military personnel in Peru are involved in logistics, financial matters, and the coordination of visits by technical representatives to ensure that contract requirements and maintenance schedules are kept. Specially trained technicians are dispatched from the Soviet Union, as needed, to work on equipment.

(U)
(2) (S/NF) The Peruvian Government has authorized the assignment of 58 Soviet military advisers. Five are advisers to the Army and 53 are for the Air Force. The Peruvian Navy refuses to accept Soviet military aid. In April 1988, the Soviets had 49 military advisers in Peru, 4 for the Army and 45 for the Air Force. Figures for 1990 and 1988 represent a decline, for cost savings reasons, from approximately 120 advisers in 1987. Each Soviet military adviser costs Peru about \$60,000 per year.

(U)
(3) (S/NF) An additional 180 non-military Soviet personnel were engaged in diplomatic and trade activity in Peru in 1988; many of these may have been military personnel with KGB connections posing as civilians. All Soviet military personnel are instructed to maintain a low profile while in Peru. Soviet military personnel assigned to the Economic Mission normally wear civilian clothes, although those assigned to Peruvian Army units wear Peruvian Army uniforms. The Soviets generally attempt to maintain cordial relationships with ~~Peruvian military officers~~. Soviet personnel employed as advisers in combat arms or as technicians generally serve 1 to 2 years in Peru, while attaches and senior officers serve at least 3 years. Soviet personnel are assigned to Peru after intensive language and area studies training.

38

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN NOCONTRACT WHINTEL~~

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

39

~~SECRET~~

Chapter 3: Regular Army (U)

3-1. (U) Mission

a. (U) **General.** The Army is Peru's largest and most important armed service. Its mission is to defend the country's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and to comply with the 1979 Constitution and other laws. During an emergency, the President can use the Army to restore public order. The Constitution also requires the Army to participate in civic action projects, humanitarian assistance activities, and disaster relief efforts.

b. (C) (U)

3-2. (U) Composition

a. ~~(CONF)~~

b. ~~(CONF)~~

Table 3-1. (U) Military Regions, Departments, and Headquarters

c. (U) Units

(1) ~~(S/NF)~~

Source: Multiple Sources

~~SECRET/NF~~

~~SECRET/NF~~




Figure 3-1. (U) Organization of the Army

42

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

Figure 3-2. (U) Military Regions Demarcation Map

Table 3-2. (U) Peruvian Ground Force
Maneuver Units

(4) (S/N) ()

d. (U) Combat Support Units

(1) (S/N) ()


~~SECRET~~/NF

Source: Compiled from analyst's notes

(2) (S/N) ()

(3) (S/N) ()

44



~~SECRET/NF~~

Figure 3-3. (U) Disposition of Units in the Military Regions

Table 3-3. (U) Composition of Army Divisions

(S)

(S)

(S)

46

Table 3-4. (U) Composition of Artillery Groups

Headquarters Combat and Support Units

3-3. (U) Disposition

(S/N)

~~SECRET~~ /NF/NC/WN

Source: DIA On-Line System, Ground Order of Battle
DOI: June 1990

(4) (S/N)

Table 3-5. (U) Armor Battalions—Disposition and Equipment

Unit	BE No.	Division	Equipment
------	--------	----------	-----------

(5) (S/N)

~~SECRET~~ /NF/NC/WN

Source: DIA On-Line System, Ground Order of Battle
DOI: June 1990

Table 3-7. (U) Major Ground Force Installations

Table 3-8. (U) Separate Units Under Military Region Headquarters

Unit	Location	BE No.
------	----------	--------

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~/NC/WN

Source: DIA On-Line System, Ground Order of Battle
DOI: June 1990

~~SECRET~~/NC/WN

Source: DIA On-Line System, Ground Order of Battle
DOI: June 1990




Figure 3-4. (U) Disposition Map of Army Units

Table 3-9. (U) Army Strength, January 1991

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ /NF/WN

Source: DIA, "Army Strength" (U), IIR 6 876 0272 91, 19 Feb 91 (S/NF/WN)

52

Table 3-12. (U) Estimated Manpower Strength
by Type of Tactical Unit

Type of Unit	Strength per Unit
--------------	-------------------

(2) (U) MR 2. MR 2 consists of four divisions and one division-size detachment as well as separate battalions attached to the MR headquarters (figure 3-8 depicts MR 2's organization).

(a) (S/NF/WN)

~~SECRET/NF~~

Source: Multiple Sources

c. (U) Counterinsurgency Operations by
Military Region

(1) (S/NF)

(b) (S/NF)



Figure 3-5. (U) Fronts Demarcation Map

55

~~SECRET/NF~~




Figure 3-6. (U) Fronts Organization and C2




Figure 3-7. (U) 5th Jungle Infantry Division Organizational Chart




Figure 3-8. (U) Military Region II Organization




Figure 3-9. (U) Leoncio Prado Detachment Organization

3-6. (U) Training

a. (U) Individual Training

(1) (C/NF)

(3) (C/NF)

(4) (C/NF)

(2) (U) All military schools are operated by the Army Academic Center (*Centro Academico del Ejército—CCAAE*), based in Chorrillos (BE 1135-00105) (see figure 3-13), which has replaced the older Peruvian Center of Military Instruction (*Centro de Instrucción Militar del Perú—CIMP*). Many schools are located within the Center's Chorrillos complex. The commanding general of the CCAA E supervises the military academy and a comprehensive network of specialized branch schools, most of which are in the Lima metropolitan area. These specialized schools include infantry, armor, parachute, commando, mountain

59




Figure 3-10. (U) 31st Infantry Division Organizational Chart




Figure 3-11. (U) 2d Infantry Division Organization




Figure 3-12 (U) Special Forces Division Organization

(3) ~~(C)~~

(5) ~~(S)~~

(4) ~~(C)~~

(6) ~~(CONF)~~




Figure 3-13. (U) Chorillos Training Complex

62 3-23

(9) ~~(S)~~

(7) (U) During the 1960s and 1970s, a special training program was initiated for conscripts nearing the end of their service time who express a career interest in the military. At the Army Industrial Training Center in Chorrillos (BE 1135-00105), enlisted men and noncommissioned officers receive intensive practical training in job skills that will be useful in civilian life, such as plumbing, carpentry, electrical work, welding, shoemaking, and farming. This training will benefit both the Peruvian economy and the soldiers.

(10) ~~(S)~~

(8) ~~(S)~~

(11) (U) The CAEM plays an important role in high-level military training and in formulating national defense doctrine. Topics in the CAEM curriculum include assessment of national objectives, manpower development planning, and counterinsurgency warfare.

(12) (U) National economic, political, and social concerns have always been a major preoccupation of the CAEM, overshadowing purely military subjects in the number of classroom hours taught. The Center functions as an important national "think tank," exposing the officer corps to

new ideas that reshape their social and political ideas.

(u)

(13) ~~(S)~~ The Army Intelligence School, subordinate to the Army Directorate of Intelligence, is located in Chorrillos, where it shares a compound with the National Intelligence Service.

(14) ~~(S)~~

(17) (C)

(15) ~~(S)~~

(18) ~~(S)~~

(19) ~~(S)~~

(20) ~~(S)~~

(16) ~~(S)~~

(21) (C)

(22) ~~(S)~~

(23) ~~(S)~~

64

skills that would benefit their augmentation to the unit during mobilization.

(24) ~~(S)~~

subsequent deterioration of US-Peruvian relations. Since 1973, most foreign training of Peruvian military personnel has taken place in the Soviet Union.

(2) (S/CONF) ^(U) Peruvian Army officers who travel to the Soviet Union receive training in a variety of fields, including intelligence, helicopter maintenance, pilot instruction, ordnance and missiles, armored vehicle maintenance, and supply operations. No reliable data is available on the exact number of Peruvian Army officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel trained in the Soviet Union. A 1987 estimate indicated that over 4,000 persons have been trained in the Soviet Union compared to only 2,800 Peruvian military personnel who have been trained at US facilities since 1976.

(3) (S) ^(U) The Soviets have also maintained a force of approximately 59 to 65 military advisers in Peru, plus 30 additional temporary advisers. The Soviet presence in Peru is second only to Cuba in Latin America. Among other things, there are plans to provide Soviet KGB intelligence training for members of the Peruvian Army and Air Force. However, Soviet military advisers in Peru have yet to address the counterinsurgency problem, which has become the country's primary security threat since gaining more visibility during the last 10 years.

b. (CONF) ~~(S)~~

3-7. (U) Logistics

a. (CONF) ~~(S)~~

c. (U) Foreign Training

(1) ^(U) From the end of World War II until the late 1960s, the US, France, Argentina, and Brazil trained almost all Peruvian military personnel who received training abroad. Training offered by the US during that period occurred either in the US or at US facilities in Panama. The number of Peruvian military personnel trained in the US has dropped sharply since the events of 1968 and the

b. (U) Organization and Disposition

(1) ~~(S)~~ (R)

(3) ~~(S)~~

(2) ~~(C)~~ (NF)

(4) ~~(S)~~

c. (U) Defense Production

(1) ~~(S)~~

(5) ~~(C)~~ (NF)

(2) ~~(S)~~ Peru's limited capability to assemble aircraft and ships is only marginally beneficial to the Army. Since the 1930s, Peruvian industry has produced a number of aircraft and ships that

66

(6) ~~(S)~~ (

(8) (S/~~NI~~ WN)

(7) ~~(S)~~ (

d. (U) Supply and Reserves

(1) ~~(S)~~ (

67

(2) ~~(NF)~~

~~(S/N/WN)~~

e. (U) Maintenance

(1) ~~(S/N/WN)~~

(3) ~~(S/N/WN)~~

(2) ~~(C/NF)~~

(4) ~~(S/N/WN)~~

(3) ~~(C/NF)~~

(4) ~~(C/NF)~~

(8) (C) ()

(5) (C) ()

(6) (C) ()

f. (U) Transportation

(1) (U) Overview

(a) (C) ()

(7) (S) (NF) (u) A chronic shortage of spare parts and repair equipment complicates the maintenance of Soviet systems. Additional complications arise because of the inefficiencies of the Soviet logistics support and bottlenecks in the Peruvian military distribution system. Delivery of spare parts, if available in the Soviet Union, normally takes 6 to 8 months. Payment for these parts must be made to the Soviets in US dollars through a Swiss bank before the order is processed for delivery. Another arrangement that has developed between Soviets and Peruvians is a barter exchange with such goods as fishmeal for spare parts. Other problems include mismanagement in the Peruvian logistics systems, poor communications between Soviet advisers and the Peruvians, and mislabelling or misdirecting Soviet parts. Sometimes equipment is disabled because of poor maintenance or incorrect use by poorly trained Peruvian personnel or by the corrosive effects of environmental factors and climate.

(b) (C) ()

(c) (S/N) ()

(c) (C/N) ()

(2) (C/N) ()

(4) (C/N) ()

(3) (U) Roads

g. (U) Medical Logistics

(a) (C/N) ()

(1) (S/N) ()

(b) (C/N) ()

(2) (S/N) ()

3-8. (U) Capabilities

a. () ()

c. (U) Low-Intensity Conflict

(1) (S/NI/WN) ^(u) Overview. The Army and police have been unable to control the SL and MRTA and have ceded large areas of the country to the insurgents. The Army has not conducted sustained counterinsurgency operations primarily because of shortages of materiel, funds, and lack of will. A coherent national strategy does not exist but is being slowly developed as an integrated strategy by the civilian leadership and the CCFFAA. About 90 percent of the military budget is earmarked for feeding and clothing troops. The budget has no operational funds. The Army's 1989 small-arms ammunition budget, for example, will cover only 4 percent (about 13 rounds per soldier) of its needs. Fear of invasion ties up military equipment and manpower along the borders; only portions of 5 divisions (2d ID, 31st ID, 5th JID, 18th AR, 1st SFD) and the Leoncio Prado Detachment, out of a possible 16 divisions and 2 division-size detachments, are assigned to a counterinsurgent role in the interior. Recent troop deployments have shown a greater priority for counterinsurgency operations in the interior; however, the absence of a counterinsurgency doctrine and a national counterinsurgency plan weaken the Government's efforts. To improve counterinsurgency capabilities, the Army must develop a training and acquisitions program that adequately covers the following areas:

- Intelligence gathering and exploitation—including interrogation, photo interpretation, processing, dissemination, and counterintelligence
- Psychological operations—including political-military coordination, theme development, and production of visual and other materials for distribution
- Joint military planning—including multi-service counterinsurgency plans and tactical operations
- Communications—including command and control, operational security, electronic communications, and countermeasures and voice jamming

b. (U) Mid-Intensity Conflict

(1) (C/NI)

(2) (S/NI)

21

- Tactical mobility—including maintenance, refueling, and night vision devices
- Medical training—including advanced field medical treatment techniques, intensive care procedures, and microsurgery.

AN/PRC 77 radios and Thomson-CSF high-frequency radios.

(4) (S/NE/WN)

(U)
(2) (C/AF) **Tactical Air Support.** The Army relies primarily on 28 Soviet-manufactured Mi-8/HIP helicopters for counterinsurgency operations, but only about a dozen are operational at any one time. The Air Force has been reluctant to cooperate with Army counterinsurgency operations because of logistical shortcomings and command relationships. However, in June 1989, three Air Force Bell 212 helicopters armed with rocket launchers and 12.7mm machineguns were deployed to Jauja (1148S07530W) to increase the Air Force's presence in areas of insurgent activity and to provide close air support to ground troops. The Air Force has also deployed Mi-25/HINDs to some fronts for support.

(3) (C/AF)

3-9. (U) Key Personalities

(U) The key Peruvian Government and military personalities are Alberto Fujimori, President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces since July 1990; Jorge Torres Aciego, Minister of Defense; LTG Victor Malca Villanueva, Minister of Interior; GEN Pedro Villanueva Valdivia, Commanding General of the Army; GEN Arnaldo Velarde Ramirez, President of the Joint Command and Commanding General of the Air Force (FAP); and ADM Arnaiz Alfredo, Commander of the Navy.

3-10. (U) ~~Uniforms, Ranks, Insignia~~ and Decorations

a. (U) Uniforms

(1) (U) Peruvian and US Army uniforms are similar in style. Officer and enlisted person's battle dress uniforms are green or camouflaged khaki. Standard equipment includes black leather army boots, webbing, and an M1-style steel helmet.

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL

(2) (U) Service uniforms for enlisted persons consist of an overseas cap, two-pocket blouse with collar, and trousers, all in either army khaki or army green. Black shoes are worn with the uniforms. A high-collar overcoat is worn, when necessary.

(3) (U) Officers wear service and dress uniforms similar to those of their US Army counterparts. The officer's uniform includes tie, beige shirt, olive-green trousers and coat, and shiny black shoes. Officers also may wear a white uniform during the summer months.

b. (U) Rank and Insignia

(1) (U) The Peruvian Army rank structure, including officers and enlisted personnel, has 21 grades and includes conscripts, NCOs technical specialists, and officers (see table 3-14).

(2) (U) While the majority of Army volunteers and draftees are required to serve up to 2 years, the actual length of service is determined by educational level. During this 2-year period, volunteers and draftees may advance through the grades of soldier (soldado), corporal (cabo), sergeant second class (sargento segundo), to sergeant 1st class (sargento primero).

(3) (U) After 2 years of service, enlistees may take an examination for promotion to the technical grades of *sub-oficial*—3d, 2d, or 1st class, which are equivalent to US Army sergeant 1st class, master sergeant, and sergeant major, respectively. Qualifying candidates also may elect to attend the Army Technical School (*Escuela Tecnica del Ejercito*—ETE) in Chorrillos. ETE courses normally last 4 years and produce graduates who will serve in the Army at the grade of technical officer (*tecnico*) 3d class. Further promotions to 2d and 1st class technical officer may be earned after passing qualifying examinations. The Army's technical officers are highly trained specialists comparable to US Army warrant officers.

(4) (U) Enlisted personnel and NCO ranks are worn on shoulder boards or shirt collars and on field caps. The Army conscript has no rank and wears no insignia. Enlisted rank insignia con-

sists of branch insignia and "V" chevrons below, one for corporal, two for sergeant 2d class, and three for sergeant 1st class. The sub-officer rank is indicated by inverted "V" chevrons, one for 3d class, two for 2d class, and three for 1st class, with the branch insignia underneath.

(5) (U) The Peruvian Army's officer rank structure is similar to the US Army structure, and is identical through the rank of colonel. There are three general officer grades in the Peruvian Army: *general de brigada* (MG), *general de division* (LTG), and *general de ejército* (GEN) (see figure 3-14).

Table 3-14. (U) Peruvian Army Ranks with US Army Equivalents

Peruvian Army	US Army Equivalent
Enlisted (Conscripto) Soldado (Raso)	No equivalent E-1 Basic Private E-2 Private E-3 Private First Class
Cabo Sargento Segundo Sargento Primero Sub-Oficial de Tercera	E-4 Corporal E-5 Sergeant E-6 Staff Sergeant E-7 Sergeant First Class
Sub-Oficial de Segunda Sub-Oficial de Primera Tecnico Primero Tecnico Segundo	E-8 Master Sergeant E-9 Sergeant Major W-1 Warrant Officer W-2 Chief Warrant Officer
Tecnico Tercero	W-3 Chief Warrant Officer
Tecnico Cuarto	W-4 Chief Warrant Officer
Tecnico Quinto	No equivalent
Alferez (or) Subteniente	2d Lieutenant
Teniente	1st Lieutenant
Capitan	Captain
Mayor	Major
Teniente Coronel	Lieutenant Colonel
Coronel	Colonel
General de Brigada	Major General
General de Division	Lieutenant General
General de Ejército	General

Source: Compiled from analyst's notes

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure 3-14. (U) Peruvian Army Officer Insignia

(6) (U) Officers wear their insignia on a diamond-shaped lapel patch. General officers wear an elaborate gold braid design on their front lapels and a gold braid on their cap. Rank insignia is worn on shoulder boards. Ranks for 2d lieutenant through colonel are identified by the number of gold bars worn on the shoulder board. Officers also wear a single gold button above the bars. Second lieutenants wear one bar, first lieutenants wear two bars, captains wear three bars, majors wear four bars, lieutenant colonels wear five bars, and colonels wear six bars. A major general wears two gold sun emblems inlaid on a red background with a single button above. A lieutenant general and a general wear three and four, respectively, gold sun emblems inlaid on a red background with a single button above.

(7) (U) The color of the shoulder strap or collar patch denotes the service arm of the officer. Colors are assigned as follows:

Infantry	Sky blue
Artillery	Light red

Cavalry	Dark red
Engineers	Dark blue
Signal	Turquoise blue
Train	Green
Medical	Cherry red
General Staff	Black
Veterinary Corp	Violet
Armored Mechanics	Orange
Physical Education	White
Technicians	Yellow
Chaplains	Purple

c. (U) Decorations. The following describes selected decorations issued to Peruvian Army enlisted and officer personnel.

(1) (U) The Military Order of Ayacucho (*Orden Militar de Ayacucho*), created in 1944, is Peru's highest military award. This award is given for distinguished service to military and police personnel for distinguished service. The Order is divided into five classes, with 1st class being the highest honor.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 SEP 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

(2) (U) The Cross for Military Merit (*Cruz al Mérito Militar*) was created in 1949. The cross is awarded to military personnel for outstanding service in the defense of the nation.

(3) (U) The Peruvian Order of the Sun (*Orden el Sol del Peru*) was created in 1821, then abolished and reestablished in 1921. This order is awarded for civic and military accomplishment.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Chapter 4: Paramilitary Forces (U)

(U) Peruvian National Police

a. ~~(C/N)~~

(2) (S/NE ~~C/WN~~)

b. (U) Organization

(1) (C/N)

(3) (C/NE)

~~SECRET~~ NF/WN

(6) (U) Special Police Units

(a) (S/NF)

(b) (S/NF)

(c) (S/NF)

Figure 4-1. (U) Peruvian National Police Organization

(4) (C/NF)

(5) (C/NF)

c. (U) Disposition

(1) (S/NF)

17

(S/NF)

(S/NF)

g. (U) Capabilities

(1) (S/NF)

(2) (S/NF)

(S/NF)

(S/NF)

(S/NF)

(S/NF)

d. (S/NF)

(S/NF)

(2) (S/NF)

tic

e. (S/NF)

(S/NF)

(S/NF)

(S/NF)

f. (S/NF)

(S/NF)

~~SECRET~~

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

Figure 4-2. (U) Mazamari Training Facility and 49th Comandancia Base

Chapter 5: Ground Forces of Other Services (U)

5-1. (U) Naval Infantry Force

a. ~~(S)~~ ()

c. (U) Disposition

(1) ~~(S)~~ ()

b. ~~(S)~~ ()

(2) ~~(S)~~ ()

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

Figure 5-1. (U) IMAP's Ancon Base and Training Facility

(3) (S)

(U)

(3) ~~(S)~~ (F)

d. ~~(S)~~ (NF)

(U)

e. (U) Tactics and Training

(1) ~~(S)~~

f. (U) Logistics

(1) ~~(S)~~ (F)

(U)

(U)

(2) ~~(S)~~

(2) ~~(S)~~ (NF)

(U)

82

(3) (C)

(2) (C/NF)

(S)

(S)

(U)
h. (C/NF) **Uniforms.** Enlisted persons and officers wear a two-piece camouflage field dress uniform that is similar to the US Marine Corps uniform but is made of a seemingly more durable material. The Peruvian enlisted Marines display rank insignia on the shoulders, but officers display standard Peruvian naval rank insignia on both collars.

g. (U) **Capabilities**

(1) (C/NF)

5-2. (U) **Naval Special Operations Force**

a. (S/NF)

(S)

(S)

b. (C/NF/WN)

c. (C/NF/WN)

f. (C/NF)

d. (C/NF)

e. (U) Training

(1) (C/NF/WN)

g. (U) Capabilities

(1) (C/NF/WN)

(2) (C/NF/WN)

(2) (C/NF)

84

(2) (S/N)

5-3. (U) Light Countersubversive Battalions

a. (U) **Mission.** In 1990, the CCFFAA required the Navy to become more involved with counterinsurgency operations. The CCFFAA stipulated that the Navy assign four battalions to this effort at all times. What emerged from this tasking was the Light Countersubversive Battalions—BALICOs. The BALICOs' assignment to the expansion of a counterinsurgency effort would have to be accompanied by appropriate funding, since it involves an additional 3,000 soldiers.

b. (S/N)

d. (S/N)

e. (S/N)

c. (U) Disposition/Strength

(1) (S/N)

wit

85

(2) ~~(S)~~ AF

h. (U) Capabilities

(1) ~~(S)~~ AF

86

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN CONTRACT WHINTEL~~

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON *10 Sep 01*
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Anti Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

87

Chapter 6: Ground Forces Reserves (U)

(U) Army Reserves

a. (U) The Peruvian Army uses two separate reserve systems: active and inactive. The active reserve is composed of all military servicemen released from active duty. These servicemen remain on active reserve for 5 years after their release from active duty. The inactive reserve is made up of draftable males between the ages of 18 and 50 and all draftable females between the ages of 18 and 45. In practice, the inactive reserve is only a manpower pool. The Army's active reserve is estimated at 9,750 men and women, including 600 officers, 1,650 NCOs, and 7,500 troops.

b. (U) Each service determines its own normal reserve training period, but the training period does not exceed 30 days annually unless extended by a Presidential decree. Only the President may declare an emergency mobilization. When reactivated, reservists report to a preassigned unit. The Army, under normal circumstances, recalls active reservists twice a year for 2-week training periods. All active Army reservists are assigned permanently to their own battalion-sized units where they train with regular Army units. Each military branch operates its own recruiting offices and each reservist has a personnel file kept at a local recruit-

ment office. Reservists are required to keep the information in their personnel folders current. When a reservist is transferred to another unit, this file is transferred with him. These compiled files of active and inactive reservists serve as an important roster of personnel available for service.

~~(U)~~
c. (U) After activation, reserve forces have a limited impact on the operational capabilities of the regular forces. Reservists augment unit strength; however, operational capabilities are not necessarily enhanced in proportion to the numerical increase of personnel. Training opportunities to maintain necessary skills such as marksmanship and tactics are not often available. The impact of insufficient training would be felt greatly by units attempting to employ reservists in relatively sophisticated capacities such as in mechanized units. The most recently discharged troops have the greater capacity to enhance a unit's operational capabilities because of their recent familiarization with active service. Garrison duty that includes maintenance and security functions, however, can be performed by all reserve troops. The operational deployment of reserves mobilized for the duration of a national emergency would be limited by the logistical structure and assets of their parent unit.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONT ~~SECRET~~ WMINTEL

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD S200. IR

~~SECRET~~

89

Chapter 7: Weapons and Equipment (U)

7-1. (U) General Discussion

a. (U) General

(1) ~~(S)~~

(3) ~~(S)~~ (F) I

(2) ~~(S)~~

(4) ~~(S)~~ (F)

US Congress place stringent limitations on countries like Peru that are not fulfilling their debt obligations. The Peruvian Army has very little money in its budget for purchasing equipment. The Soviets have filled the gap, offering an assortment of military equipment at bargain prices and on extremely generous credit terms. The Soviet Union also has been willing to accept Peruvian export products as payment. Peruvian Army pragmatists, despite a general anti-Communist sentiment and reluctance to purchase Soviet military equipment, have as their first priority a militarily strong Peru. This has resulted in an increase in the amount of Soviet equipment in the Peruvian Armed Forces. However, the drawbacks to Soviet aid have led to waning Soviet influence. Soviet advisors have accompanied Soviet equipment, providing instruction on the use of the equipment. Soviet engineers and technicians have been flown in from the Soviet Union to repair the equipment. In furthering Peru's dependency on the Soviet Union the Soviet engineers and technicians have at times denied Peruvians complete access to necessary information on Soviet equipment, and service manuals have been purposely denied to the Peruvians. The Peruvians also have had difficulty obtaining Soviet spare parts, which has caused chronic shortages and routine cannibalization.

(u)
(5) (S/NF) Peru is now heavily in debt to the Soviet Union and Western nations, especially after former President Garcia refused to pay only a token portion of the debt during his 5-year term. Soviet contracts, valued at \$2 billion, account for about one-half of Peru's military assistance agreements. Other assistance comes from various Eastern Bloc and West European nations. In contrast, deliveries by the US are valued at \$246 million. Soviet-made equipment has become the backbone of the Peruvian Army and Air Force.

(u)
(6) (C/NF) Efforts at modernization are hampered by a general lack of funds. Many units are restricted to purchasing only spare parts and fuel. The Army's top priority is to improve its combat air support capability by purchasing a combination of observation, attack, and transport helicopters.

(u)
(7) (S/NF) Army leaders have decided to decrease their dependence on the Soviet Union and have sought to attract other foreign sources, especially Western. Given Peru's current economic situation, however, they face a long uphill battle to diversify their purchases. The Army wants to break its dependency upon the Soviet Union for parts, tools, special lubricants, and test equipment within the next year and avoid further arms purchases from the Soviets in the next 5 to 10 years. If Peru suddenly discontinued Soviet military aid, the Peruvian Army's readiness would be jeopardized. The US, on the other hand, has made military aid to Peru contingent upon human rights and drug interdiction support and has also denied aid on the basis of Peru's foreign debt policies. The current Brooke-Alexander Amendment, International Military Education and Training (IMET) embargo, and 620(Q) sanctions give the Peruvians little leeway.

(8) (C/NF)

(9) (S/NF)

(4) (U) Artillery

(a) (S)

b. (U) Equipment

(1) (U) Small Arms

(a) (S) About 35,000 small arms were purchased from Belgium in 1988 as part of the Army's modernization program.

(b) (U) The standard weapon of the Peruvian Armed Forces and the PNP is the 7.62mm FN/FAL light automatic rifle, imported from Belgium, Argentina, and Brazil. A wide variety of 9mm submachineguns obtained from a number of Western sources are also standard weapons. The MPIKM (or AKM) small army rifle is assigned to Army airborne, commando, and aviation elements. These same groups may also have received several copies of a 5.56mm Soviet/Warsaw Pact version of the assault weapon and several East German and Soviet sniper rifles. The West German-made MP5K submachinegun has been assigned to Army officers since February 1985.

(2) (U) Mortars

(a) (U) All mortars used by the Peruvian Army are of Western origin. These nations include 60mm, 81mm, 107mm, and 120mm mortars.

(b) (S/NF) Jungle infantry troops stationed on the northern border with Ecuador are lightly armed with 60mm mortars.

(3) (S)

(b) (U) The Soviet-made BM-21 is a motorized artillery vehicle with a platform that serves as a base for 40 tubes. This vehicle can launch simultaneous projectiles at targets up to 30 km away. The BM-21 is equipped with electronics that enable it to locate targets and automatically activate the 40 firing mechanisms. Much of Peru's inventory of Soviet-supplied artillery suffers from poor maintenance and spare parts shortages.

(5) (U) Air Defense Weapons

(a) (S/NF) Soviet tactics are used with Soviet weapons systems, especially ADA weapons systems. The Soviet-made ZSU-23-4 air defense weapon system and the SA-3 systems have been employed by Peruvian forces exactly as Soviet doctrine dictated. Most of the Army's SA-3 systems have fallen into disrepair and are inoperable.

(b) (U) The ZSU-23-4/SHILKA Soviet antiaircraft system, considered by many NATO strategists to be one of the most efficient in the world, is the main antiaircraft defense weapon available to the motorized infantry and armored divisions. The ZSU-23-4 is a light armored vehicle with a swivel turret on which four 23mm guns are mounted. The firing range of the guns is controlled by radar, and the guns are capable of operating with great efficiency in the face of attempted electronic interference from the enemy. The radar can detect planes flying at low altitudes and at distances of up to 150 km away. An infantry regiment or tank regiment normally has four ZSU-23-4 batteries, which have been set up at strategic points in Peru. Many of the ZSU-23-4s are inoperable because of spare parts shortages.

(6) (U) Armored Vehicles

(a) (S/NF/WN) Peruvian armor is comparable to that of its chief adversaries, Ecuador and Chile; however, armor activity has been virtually non-existent for 3 years. The Peruvian Army's armored vehicle inventory is dominated by the T-55 medium tank, over 300 of which were purchased from the Soviet Union in 1973. These vintage tanks originated from surplus Soviet inventories. Although equipped with 100mm guns, these tanks are ill-suited to Peru's mountainous terrain. Tactical operations are limited to the coastal plains along the Chilean and Ecuadorean borders. Maintenance and wear make the armor prone to breakdown. A mid-1988 survey of vehicles assigned to the 9th Armor Division (MR 1) revealed that only 50 percent of MR 1's T-55s and 40 percent of the trucks were operable. Similar deficiencies exist throughout the Army's armored vehicle inventory. A lack of spare parts, lubricants, and fuel and a shortage of munitions have left this mobile force entrenched in the garrison. The Peruvian T-55s have been enhanced in various ways, including the addition of a laser beam fire control system, flame throwers, and smoke launchers for camouflage.

(b) (S) In 1988, 78 AMX-13 light tanks were purchased from France. All Peruvian AMX-13s now carry 105mm guns. They are mainly assigned to the Tacna Detachment in Military Region 3 and are used as armored reconnaissance vehicles near the Chilean border. APCs from various countries are also included in the Peruvian Army's armor inventory.

(7) (U) Support Vehicles

(a) (S) Support vehicles have been obtained from various foreign countries. The Federal Republic of Germany sold Peru 1,000 general purpose trucks in 1988.

(b) (S/NF/WN)

(8) (U) Aircraft

(a) (S) Peruvian Army Aviation was established in 1971 with five Helio Super Courier aircraft. During the 1970s, 20 Mi-6 and 42 Mi-8 helicopters were acquired.

(b) (S/NF) The Mi-8s in the Army's inventory can fly up to 250 km per hour and can carry 24 to 26 troops at sea level, 12 at 2,000 m, or 6 at 4,000 m; they are equipped with rocket pods, 2 on each side, capable of destroying targets up to 200 km away. The Mi-8, however, is unreliable in the Peruvian highlands regions because it tends to lose power above 4,000 m. Mi-8s have also had a very poor maintenance record, and many are kept in storage. Only 10 of the Army's 28 Mi-8 helicopters were flyable in 1985. In mid-1989, the Soviets agreed to sell 14 Mi-17 helicopters to the Army, and the Air Force is currently negotiating for 14 Mi-35s. The Mi-17 is essentially a newer version of the Mi-8 but is capable of operation at higher altitudes.

7-2. (U) Weapons and Equipment Inventory

(U) Table 7-1 lists the weapons and equipment known or believed to be in the inventory of the Peruvian ground forces as of June 1989. This list may not represent the entire inventory, and some of the equipment may no longer be serviceable. In June 1989, Peru had weapons from 15 different foreign countries, resulting in major spare parts and maintenance problems for the country's armed forces.

Table 7-1. (U) Weapons and Equipment Inventory

Source: Multiple Sources
DOI: June 1989

~~SECRET~~ NF/NC/WN

94

7-3. (U) Projected Changes in Inventory

(U) The Peruvian military favors Western sources of equipment and technology but is unable to afford the purchases because of severe budget problems. Soviet and Eastern European sources of equipment were viable alternatives for Peru because of more favorable terms of trade and credit, often in the form of barter agreements or marginal down payments. Some of the important items needed for the ground forces include personal equipment (boots, load-bearing equipment, fatigues), sufficient ammunition (5.56mm, 7.62mm, 9mm, 60mm, 81mm), assault rifles and personal weapons (5.56mm, 7.62mm, and 9mm), night vision devices (personal, aircraft), secure radio communications, and transportation (high-altitude helicopters, troop transports, possible HMMWVs or civilian trucks, e.g., Toyota, Nissan).

b. (U) Air Defense Weapons (see figures 7-2 and 7-3)

(1) (U) ZSU-23-4 Self-propelled Antiaircraft Gun Specifications:

Caliber	23mm
Barrel Length (Overall)	2.01 m
Operation	Gas, full automatic
Elevation/Depression	+90°/-10°
Traverse	360°

Rate of Fire per Barrel:	
cyclic	800-1,000 rpm
practical	200 rpm
Feed	50-round belt
Maximum Range	

horizontal	7,000 m
vertical	5,100 m
Crew	5

(2) SA-3/GOA Missile Specifications:

Guidance	Command
Propulsion	Two-stage, solid propellant
Missile Weight w/warhead	957 kg (894 kg w/booster)
Minimum Effective Range	6 km (3.5 km w/booster)
Maximum Effective Range	27 km
Minimum Effective Altitude	20 to 50 m
Maximum Effective Altitude	27 km
Rate of Fire	2/salvo w/5-sec separation
Reload Time	3-5 min from onsite storage
Type/Weight of Warhead	FRAG-HE/73 kg

7-4. (U) Illustrations and Specifications

a. (U) Small Arms (see figure 7-1).

FN/FAL 7.62mm Light Automatic Rifle Specifications:

Weight (Empty)	4.3 kg
Maximum Effective Range	600-m, semiautomatic
Feed Device	20-round box magazine
Type of Fire	Semiautomatic or automatic
Practical Rate of Fire	60 rpm semiautomatic; 120 rpm automatic

c. (U) Armor (see figures 7-4 through 7-7)

(1) (U) M20 Armored Car Specifications:

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure 7-1. (U) FN/FAL 7.62mm Light Automatic Rifle

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

95




Figure 7-2. (U) ZSU-23-4 Self-propelled Antiaircraft Gun

Crew	2+4	Crew/Passengers	2/8
Configuration	6x6	Weight, Combat Loaded	7.6 metric tons
Combat Weight	6,576 to 7,937 kg	Engine	Daimler Benz OM352 120 hp, in-line, 6-cylinder diesel
Length	5.003 m	Maximum Road Speed	85 km/hr
Width	2.54 m	Cruising Range	700 km
Height (without AA MG)	2.311 m	Armament	Rail-mounted 7.62mm MG Optional 7.62mm MG mounted on rear deck
Maximum Speed (road)	90 km/hr		
Maximum Range (road)	560 km		

(2) (U) T-55 Medium Tank Specifications:

Crew	4
Weight, Combat Loaded	36.0 metric tons
Engine	V-55 572-hp, V-12 diesel
Maximum Road Speed	50 km/hr
Cruising Range	500 km
Primary Armament	D-10T25 100mm gun
Effective Range vs. Armor	1,200 m
Rate of Fire	4 to 7 rpm
Basic Load	43 rounds
Secondary Armament	12.7mm/7.62mm coaxial MG

(3) (U) UR-416 Armored Personnel Carrier Specifications:

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
 ON 20 Sep 01
 BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
 Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200. ER

(4) (U) AMX-13 Light Tank Specifications:

Crew	3
Weight, Combat Loaded	14.8 metric tons
Engine	SOFAM 8 GXB, 270-hp, opposed 8-cylinder, gasoline
Maximum Road Speed	60 km/hr
Cruising Range	350 km
Primary Armament	CN-75-50 75mm gun FL-10 turret
Maximum Range	8,000 m
Effective Range vs Armor	1,000 m
Practical Rate of Fire	8 rpm
Basic Load	37 rounds
Secondary Armament	7.62mm MG

96

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure 7-3. (U) SA-3/GOA Surface-to-Air Missile

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure 7-4. (U) M20 Armored Car



Figure 7-5. (U) T-55 Medium Tank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON *Case 01*
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

97

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure 7-6. (U) UR-416 Armored Personnel Carrier

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure 7-7. (U) AMX-13 Light Tank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Intelligence Gaps (U)

(U) Chapter 2, Armed Forces Overview

(U) Paragraph 2-2a(4)

(U) Paragraph 2-2b(2)(a)

(U) Paragraph 2-3b(6)

(U) Paragraph 2-3c(a)

(U) Chapter 3, Regular Army

(U) Paragraph 3-4a

(U) What is the Army's current manpower strength in officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel?

(U) Paragraph 3-4b

(U) Paragraph 3-6b(19)

(U) Paragraph 3-6b

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Intel-1 REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL
ON 20SEP01
~~SECRET~~ BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para I-603 DOD 5200.1R

180

(U) Paragraph 3-6c(2)

(U) Chapter 5, Ground Forces of Other Services

(U) Paragraph 3-7c(4)

(U) Paragraph 5-1f

(U) Paragraph 3-9

(U) Paragraph 5-2d

(U) Chapter 4, Paramilitary Forces

(U) Chapter 6, Ground Forces Reserves

(U) Paragraph a

(U) Paragraph a

(U) Paragraph e

(U) Chapter 7, Weapons and Equipment

(U) Paragraph 7-1a(2)

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL
ON 20 Sep 01
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para I-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Intel

~~SECRET~~

101

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 102-113

APR 27 1993

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCOMINT ACT WNINTEL

LIBRARY FILE

ORIGINAL RECORD COPY
DO NOT CIRCULATE, PURGE
OR POST CHANGES TO THIS
COPY

ATC-CI-2400-095-92

DISSEM MADE

Department of the Army
United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

INDEX
AC
PASS to MS
BE
PASS to BR
" " MA
CH
PASS to MA
" " AT
AS
PASS to CH

Army Country Profile—Peru, Part II (U)

✓
FSTC COLLATERAL
100 130 653

Publication date: January 1993
Information cutoff date: 15 September 1992

National Security Information
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Warning Notice:
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved

Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on OADR

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

Not Releasable to Contractors
or Contractor Consultants

APR 12 1993

~~SECRET~~

1
ENCL 2

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT WMINTEL

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

2

Summary (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) Peru is a nation confronted with numerous serious problems. Two active insurgencies are responsible for 25,000 deaths and 20 billion dollars of property damage during the past 12 years. A healthy narcotics industry results in Peru producing 60 percent of the world's coca supply. Due to a combative Congress that blocked presidential economic and governmental reforms, President Fujimori launched a unilateral political coup in April 1992; his dissolution of Congress and suspension of the Constitution have placed Peru in a precarious position regarding its international and domestic standing. Finally, Peru's economic status is grave, affecting popular sentiment, standard of living, and the effectiveness of Peru's intelligence and security services (I&SS).

(U) Source documents used in the preparation of this report are available upon request. Point of contact is Mary Canciglia, Counterintelligence and Terrorism Division, USAITAC, commercial (202) 479-1932; autovon 335-2591.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL
ON 20 Sep 01
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para I-603 DOD 5200.1R

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

4

Table of Contents (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

Part II—Intelligence and Security (U)

	Page
Summary	iii
List of Illustrations	vii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	ix
List of Place Names	xi
Chapter 8. Intelligence and Security Services	
8-1. Mission and Structure	8-1
8-2. Background	8-1
8-3. Intelligence and Security Services	8-3
8-4. Key Personalities	8-15
8-5. Foreign Intelligence Services	8-18
Chapter 9. Counterintelligence Situation	
9-1. Operational Environment-Background	9-1
9-2. Threat	9-1
9-3. Outlook	9-8
Intelligence Gaps	Intel-1
Distribution List	Dist-1

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON *20 Sep 01*
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

6

List of Illustrations (U)
(This list is CONFIDENTIAL/NF)

Figure	Page
8-1. (U) Peruvian National Intelligence System (SINA)	8-2
8-2. (U) National Intelligence Service (SIN)	8-4
8-3. (U) Directorate of Intelligence, Army General Staff (DINTE)	8-6
8-4. (U) Army Intelligence Service (SIE)	8-7
8-5. (U) Air Force Intelligence Service (SEDIN)	8-8
8-6. (U) Air Force Security Service (SESEG)	8-10
8-7. (U) Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DIN)	8-11
8-8. (U) Peruvian National Police (PNP)	8-12
8-9. (U) PNP Special Operations Command (DIROES)	8-13
9-1. (U) Areas of Coca Cultivation in Peru	9-3
9-2. (U) Insurgent Operating Areas in Peru	9-6

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 205401
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

7

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms (U) (This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

A

AGI Auxiliary General Intelligence Ship
APRA American Popular Revolutionary Alliance

C

CRF *Commando Rodrigo Franco* vigilante group
CSI Superior Council for Intelligence (*Consejo Superior de Inteligencia*)

D

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DIANDRO PNP National Directorate of Counternarcotics (*Direccion de Anti-Drogas*)
DIGIS Air Force Directorate for Intelligence and Security (*Direccion General de Inteligencia y Seguridad*)
DIN Directorate of Naval Intelligence (*Direccion de Inteligencia Naval*)
DINCOTE PNP Directorate of Counterterrorism (*Direccion de Inteligencia y Contra el Terrorismo*)
DINTE Directorate of Intelligence, Army General Staff (*Direccion de Inteligencia del Ejercito*)
DINTID PNP Directorate for Narcotics and Drug Trafficking (*Direccion de Investigacion de Trafico Illicito de Drogas*)
DIPA PNP Air Wing
DIPOD PNP Anti-narcotics Division (*Direccion de Policia de Drogas*)
DIRIN PNP Directorate for Intelligence (*Direccion de Inteligencia*)
DIROES Special Operations Command (*Direccion de Operaciones Especiales*)
DIRSEG PNP Directorate for Security (*Direccion de Seguridad*)
DOES PNP Directorate of Special Operations (*Direccion de Operaciones Especiales*)

E

EIE Army Intelligence School (*Escuela Inteligencia Ejercito*)
ESCUPOL PNP Police Academy (*Escuela Superior de Policia*)
ESIN National Intelligence School (*Escuela Strategica de Inteligencia Nacional*)

G

GRUDE PNP Special Operations Group/Delta Group (*Grupo Delta de Operaciones Especiales*)

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms, continued (U) (This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

H

HF/DF High Frequency/Direction Finding
HUMINT Human Intelligence

I

I&SS Intelligence and Security Services

J

J-2 Second Division of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces (*Segunda Direccion [Inteligencia] del Estado Mayor Del Comando Conjunto*)

M

MH Military Household

P

PNP Peruvian National Police (*Policia Nacional Peruana*)

S

SEDIN Air Force Intelligence Service (*Servicio de Inteligencia*)
SESEG Air Force Security Service (*Servicio de Seguridad*)
SICAM Military Intelligence System (*Sistema de Campos de Accion Militar*)
SICANOM Civilian Intelligence System (*Sistema de Campos de Accion no Militares*)
SIE Army Intelligence Service (*Servicio Inteligencia del Ejercito*)
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIN National Intelligence Service (*Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional*)
SINA National Intelligence System (*Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional*)
SUAT PNP Sub-unit for Tactical Operations (*Sub Unidad de Acciones Tacticos*)

U

UHV Upper Huallaga Valley
UMOPAR Rural Police (*Unidad Movil de Patrullaje Rural*)

List of Place Names (U)
(This list is UNCLASSIFIED)

Place Name	Geographic Coordinate
Arequipa	1624S07133W
Ayacucho	1307S07413W
Chiclayo	07540S7717W
Cusco	1331S07159W
Huancavelica	1300S07500W
Huancayo	1204S07514W
Huanuco	0930S07550W
Huaraz	0932S07732W
Ica	1404S07540W
Ilo	1738S07120W
Iquitos	0346S71315W
Junin	1130S07500W
Lima	1230S07703W
Mazamari	1121S07434W
Pasco	1342S07613W
Piura	0512S08038W
Pucallpa	0823S07432W
Santa Lucia	1542S07036W
Toocache	0811S07630W
Trujillo	0807S07902W

||

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

12

Chapter 8: Peruvian Intelligence and Security Services (U)

8-1. (U) Mission and Structure

(U) a. (S/CF) Faced with major problems of insurgency and narcotics trafficking, Peru's National Intelligence System, SINA, is organized and structured to support the primary national policy of internal stability. Peru's intelligence and security responsibilities are shared among civilian, military, and police agencies, which are subordinate to the Ministers of Interior or Defense or directly to the President. SINA is divided into civilian and military intelligence elements (see figure 8-1). Overall coordination and supervision of the SINA is directed by the Superior Council of Intelligence (CSI).

(U) b. (S/CF) The Civilian Intelligence System, called SICANOM, consists of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), which serves as the overall coordinator of SICANOM activities; the Joint Intelligence staff for non-military matters; the Peruvian National Police (PNP); and the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Interior (DIGIMIN). SICANOM is directed by the Minister of Interior.

(U) c. (S/CF) The military leg of SINA, called SICAM, consists of the Second Division of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces (otherwise known as the J-2), which provides overall coordination of SICAM activities, and the intelligence elements of each of the armed services: Army Intelligence (DINTE), Air Force Intelligence (SEDIN), and Naval Intelligence (DIN). SICAM is directed by the chief of the J-2.

8-2. (U) Background

(U) a. (S/CF) SINA's effectiveness has been marred by several significant problems. A national economic crisis has been exacting an increasing toll on the intelligence and security services (I&SS), significantly reducing salaries and operational capabilities, while increasing corruption. Abysmally low salaries, which continued to lose value as inflation rose in recent years, force most police and military personnel to work second and third jobs to support their families. Discontent over salaries has affected all ranks, not only by reducing morale, but

(U)
~~CONFIDENTIAL/NF~~




Figure 8-1. (U) Peruvian National Intelligence System (SINA)

also by setting off a virtual stampede of resignations and, in the PNP and Army, desertions. Corruption among the services is common and is particularly pronounced in PNP and Army units located in the coca-growing regions of the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Lack of funding has also resulted in inadequate personnel training and aging, inoperable, or insufficient equipment. Basic supplies, such as ammunition or boots, are often unavailable.

b. (U) Another factor influencing I&SS effectiveness is the historic rivalries among the services, especially between the PNP and Army elements. Widespread jealousies, coupled with competition for scarce resources, status, and influence have served to exacerbate the longstanding institutional rivalries from Cabinet ministers down to the I&SS working level. Such contentiousness precludes any true coordination.

c. (U) An additional problem facing Peru's military and I&SS is the international reputation they have developed over the years as one of the world's grossest offenders of human rights. Charges of human rights abuses by the military have prompted President Alberto Fujimori, and President Garcia before him, to promote educational and sensitization programs within the Army. The PNP, viewed with deep resentment and contempt by most Peruvians due to its egregious corruption and inefficiency, has also been charged with abuses. Nevertheless, Fujimori has made significant strides in stemming such abuses. He has instituted a series of decrees dealing with human rights abuses, which facilitate monitoring of human rights compliance and enhance accountability for alleged abuses. Prosecution of human rights abusers in the armed forces and the PNP has risen dramatically since Fujimori took office.

14

8-3. (U) Intelligence and Security Services

a. (U) Superior Council for Intelligence

(U) (1) (S/NF) The Superior Council for Intelligence (CSI) is Peru's highest level intelligence organization and is responsible for coordinating all national-level intelligence activities of SINA. Subordinate directly to the President, its membership includes the director of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), the director of intelligence for the Armed Forces (J-2), the service intelligence chiefs, the director general of the Peruvian National Police, and the director of the Ministry of Interior's Intelligence Directorate.

(U) (2) (S/NF) The CSI, which meets twice monthly and is chaired by the director of SIN, is responsible for the overall supervision, guidance, and coordination of intelligence requirements and collection. Additionally, it is responsible for establishing national intelligence objectives and policies and for coordinating and collating intelligence from SIKANOM and SICAM. The CSI also serves as a forum for intelligence exchanges among the Peruvian intelligence community and supervises liaison relationships among the various Peruvian intelligence and security services as well as with foreign services.

b. (U) Ministry of Interior Directorate of Intelligence

(U) (C/NF) The Ministry of Interior's Directorate of Intelligence (DIGIMIN) provides direct analysis to the Minister of Interior and ministry officials. Commanded by Army Major General Luis Chacon Tejada, DIGIMIN employs operational collection units, which provide raw intelligence used for DIGIMIN analysis. It also receives periodic reports from police and Army intelligence. The organization's major focus, however, is on producing analysis for Ministry of Interior officials and decisionmakers.

c. (U) National Intelligence Service

(U) (1) (S/NF/NC) The National Intelligence Service (SIN) is Peru's principal civilian intelligence agency. Established in 1960, SIN is directly subordinate to the President. Its functions include planning, directing, and producing finished strategic intelligence for the President and senior-level decisionmakers; providing guidance and tasking to SIKANOM intelligence community members; maintaining a central repository of intelligence information; providing primary planning and direction of Peru's national counterintelligence effort; collection of intelligence necessary for national defense; planning and coordinating political action operations; and maintaining liaison with foreign intelligence services. SIN has established bilateral intelligence exchange agreements with several Latin American countries, including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Additionally, the organization maintains liaison with the intelligence services of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan.

(U) (2) (C/NF) SIN is commanded by Army Lieutenant General Julio Salazar Monroe. His deputy is Colonel Santiago Zegarra Guevarra. The organization is staffed with approximately 600 employees drawn from the military services, the Peruvian National Police, and civilian sources. Only a small percentage of SIN personnel is involved in intelligence analysis. The majority are dedicated to collection, operations, and administrative support.

(U) (3) (S/NF/NF/WN) SIN's operational and analytical elements include general directorates for the External Front, the Internal Front, Counterintelligence, and Information. Additionally, SIN maintains a National Narcotics Intelligence Directorate (see figure 8-2). The External Front collects intelligence and produces analysis on bordering countries, all countries with diplomatic relations with Peru, and certain international organizations, such as the United Nations, the

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R




Figure 8-2. (U) National Intelligence Service (SIN)

World Bank, and Amnesty International. SIN's Internal Front has mission responsibilities for domestic developments only and monitors political, economic, sociological, subversion, and human rights issues. The General Directorate for Counterintelligence monitors the foreign threat in the country and mounts operations to counter foreign intelligence collection and subversion. The General Directorate for Information exploits open-source information, in addition to information collected clandestinely. Further, it conducts technical surveillance and signals intelligence collection operations, especially against insurgents and narcotics traffickers. This directorate also actively monitors the telephones of foreign embassies in Lima. The National Narcotics Intelligence Directorate is responsible for monitoring, conducting operations against, and writing analytic documents on the narcotics trade in Peru.

(U) (4) (C/INT) Although its original charter envisioned SIN as the lead intelligence organization in Peru, with broad authority over the various Peruvian I&SS, SIN has yet to fulfill this role. Traditional rivalries among the services, overlapping responsibilities, and a refusal by other organizations to recognize SIN's supremacy have left it with no real authority to enforce its ostensible lead role

in SINA. Because of the parochial nature of Peruvian I&SS, SIN does not enjoy particularly close working relations with other intelligence organizations.

(U) (5) (S/INT) SIN provides oversight to the National Intelligence School (ESIN), located in Lima. ESIN provides instruction in investigative procedures, analytic methodology, counterintelligence tradecraft, political science and international relations, and other related topics. Although SIN analysts are not required to have a degree, they must have some college. Most analysts have backgrounds in economics or international affairs.

d. (U) The Armed Forces' Intelligence Directorate

(U) (C/INT) Peru's J-2 advises the Minister of Defense, to whom it is directly subordinate, and the Chief of the Armed Forces on intelligence issues affecting the armed forces and national security. It is responsible for overseeing all intelligence collection, analysis, production, and operations of the various service intelligence organizations within SICAM. Recently, the J-2 was reorganized into an

Internal and an External Front in order to direct
countersubversive operations more effectively.

**e. (U) Directorate of Intelligence, Army
General Staff**

(1) ~~(CONF)~~

(5) ~~(CONF)~~

(2) ~~(CONF)~~

(6) ~~(CONF)~~

(3) ~~(S/AF/NC/WN)~~

f. (U) Army Intelligence Service

(1) ~~(CONF)~~

(4) ~~(S/AF/NC/WN)~~




Figure 8-3. (U) Directorate of Intelligence, Army General Staff (DINTE)

(2) (S/~~NF~~/NC/WN)

(4) (S/NF/~~NF~~/WN)

(3) (S/NF/~~NF~~/C/WN)

(5) (S/NF/~~NF~~/C/WN)



Figure 8-4. (U) Army Intelligence Service (SIE)

(6) (S/NF/~~WN~~)

g. (U) Air Force Directorate for Intelligence and Security

(1) (C/~~WN~~)

(7) (S/NF/~~C/WN~~)




Figure 8-5. (U) Air Force Intelligence Service (SEBIN)

(2) (C/N)

(a) (C/N)

(b) (C/N)

(2) ~~(S)~~

(c) ~~(S)~~ ~~(NF)~~

(3) ~~(S)~~ ~~(NF)~~

(3) ~~(S)~~ ~~(NF)~~

h. (U) Directorate of Naval Intelligence

~~(S)~~ ~~(NF)~~

i. (U) Peruvian National Police

(1) ~~(S)~~

(4) ~~(S)~~ ~~(NF)~~ ~~(WN)~~




Figure 8-6. (U) Air Force Security Service (SESEG)

(5) (U) The Technical Police

(a) (S) ~~SECRET~~

(b) (S) ~~SECRET~~

22




Figure 8-7. (U) Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DIN)

(6) (U) The Security Police

(a) (S/~~SECRET~~/WN)

(7) (U) Counternarcotics Forces

(a) (S/~~SECRET~~/WN)

(b) (S/~~SECRET~~/WN)




Figure 8-8. (U) Peruvian National Police (PNP)

(8) (U) Special Forces Units

(a) (S/NF/NC/WN)

(b) (CONF)




Figure 8-9. (U) PNP Special Operations Command (DIROE)

(b) (S//NF//C//WN)

(d) (G//WN)

(c) (S//NF//NC//WN)

(e) ~~SECRET~~

(10) (U) Reorganization

(a) (U) Since the Garcia administration in the late 1980s, the PNP has been undergoing varying degrees of reorganization. The 1988 National Police Act created the current Peruvian National Police force by combining the three separate Peruvian law enforcement entities — the Civil Guard, Republican Guard, and Investigative Police. The forces were renamed the General Police, the Security Police, and the Technical Police respectively. Although Garcia attempted to ferret out corrupt officials, he was thwarted by overlapping duties, rivalries, and political intrigue. Under Garcia, the police forces were highly politicized and infamous for their corruption.

(f) (S/~~SECRET~~/NC/WN)

(b) (S/~~SECRET~~/NF)

(g) ~~SECRET~~

(c) (S/~~SECRET~~/NF)

(9) ~~SECRET~~

(d) (U) Fujimori's actions were prompted in part by the long-term, widespread corruption within the police. A significant number of those individuals involved in counternarcotics missions in the coca-producing area of the Upper

26


(e) ~~(S)~~

8-4. (U) Key Personalities

a. (U) Alberto Kenyo *Fujimori*
Fujimori

UNCLASSIFIED

(f) ~~(CONF)~~



Alberto Kenyo Fujimori Fujimori

(g) ~~(CONF)~~

(1) (S/~~N~~/NC) The son of Japanese immigrants, Alberto Kenyo *Fujimori* Fujimori was born in 1938. He received a Bachelor's degree in Agricultural Science in 1961 and a Master's degree in mathematics from the University of Wisconsin in 1972. An academic by profession, Fujimori was

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL

a professor of mathematics at the National Agrarian University from 1975 to 1984. In spite of his lack of political experience, he was elected President in July 1990. Fujimori speaks English, some Japanese, French, and German.

(2) ~~(S/NF)~~ Even prior to the April 1992 political coup, Fujimori demonstrated a somewhat authoritarian decisionmaking style. Described as cautious and suspicious, Fujimori has compartmentalized relations, preferring to deal with individuals rather than groups. Additionally, he allows duplication of effort in order to foster rivalries, thereby allowing no one entity to gain inordinate power. These tactics contribute to the lack of coordination among his ministers and staff. He is reportedly aloof and open to advice only when he requests it. He makes major policy decisions alone rather than through a negotiated consensual agreement of his advisers, who rarely make significant actions without his approval. He has surrounded himself with a circle of loyal academics who, like him have no previous political experience.

b. (U) Vladimiro Montesinos Torres

UNCLASSIFIED



Vladimiro Montesinos Torres

(1) ~~(S/NF)~~ Vladimiro Montesinos Torres, a 48-year-old former Army artillery captain, serves

as one of Fujimori's main advisers. Montesinos, who graduated from the Military Academy in 1966, had a checkered military career. Considered to be a brilliant officer by some, in 1973 he was appointed chief of staff to the Prime Minister under the Velasco regime. In 1975, however, he was implicated in an aborted coup attempt. He was eventually dishonorably discharged and served close to 2 years imprisonment. In 1983, a separate charge of treason was filed against Montesinos, relating to the accusation that he had sold classified documents to the United States and that, while in the Army, he had passed military secrets to the civilian National Intelligence Service (SIN). He fled the country, returning in 1985 after the charges were dropped.

(2) ~~(S/NF)~~ Montesinos gradually insinuated himself back into military circles and, eventually, into Fujimori's entourage. He was appointed deputy director of SIN in July 1990, only to be removed shortly thereafter in a cloud of controversy. He was then secretly appointed to head SIN's Advisory Committee, COASIN. He reportedly wields tremendous influence over SIN and, to a lesser degree, Peru's other I&SS.

(3) ~~(S/NF)~~ His demonstrable power in the Fujimori administration has alienated many in military and civilian circles. He has been instrumental in forcing unpopular military promotions, as well as in forcing retirement of individuals he dislikes. He has also manipulated the appointments to key intelligence and security positions of individuals loyal to him, regardless of their competence or suitability for the job. In his mid-fifties, Montesinos speaks little English.

c. (U) LTG Julio Salazar Monroe

(1) ~~(S/NF)~~ LTG Julio Salazar Monroe currently serves as the director of Peru's National Intelligence Service (SIN). Born in 1935, Salazar graduated from the Military Academy in 1958. During his career he has had regular field assignments in both artillery and armor divisions. He has additionally served as an instructor at the Military Academy.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

(U) (2) (CONF) Although Salazar has experienced a regular progression through the ranks during his career, his recent promotion to LTG was problematic. In December 1991, Salazar's promotion, and that of one other general officer, was disapproved by Congress, due to the perceived undue influence exerted in the promotion process by presidential adviser Vladimiro Montesinos. Fujimori has since overridden Congress's action and promoted Salazar, effective June 1992. Salazar was allegedly handpicked for his current assignment by Montesinos, who has reportedly garnered considerable control over SIN.

d. (U) Rear Admiral Jorge Ibarcena Amico

(U) (1) (CONF) Rear Admiral *Ibarcena*, current commander of the Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DIN), is a seasoned intelligence professional, who has worked in numerous intelligence positions throughout his career. A graduate of the Peruvian Naval Academy, some of his early intelligence assignments included director of DIN's Department of Special Operations, director of DIN's Intelligence Department, Commandant of the Naval Intelligence School, and SIN's Operations officer. In 1985 he became the Deputy Director of DIN. In 1987 he was assigned to the Armed Forces J-2, and was selected to become the J-2 chief in April 1991. He has commanded DIN since February 1992.

(U) (2) (CONF) Little is known of *Ibarcena's* political views, although, based on the overall philosophy of the Peruvian Navy, he is quite likely conservative. *Ibarcena* has a strong command of English and also speaks French.

e. (U) Major General Victor Manuel Alva Plasencia


(U) (1) (CONF) Major General Victor Manuel *Alva Plasencia* was abruptly appointed Director General of the PNP on 15 October 1992. He replaced Lieutenant General *Cuba y Escobeda*, who was appointed head of the PNP in 1990 during Fujimori's initial stages of reorganization of the PNP. *Cuba y Escobeda* was not well respected among his subordinates and was tainted with allegations of corruption. Reportedly *Cuba y Escobeda*

had "rented" police security units to private concerns. Further it has been alleged that he may have overlooked specific narcotics corruption among his force.

(U) (2) (CONF) Prior to his appointment as Director General, *Alva* served as *Cuba y Escobeda's* Chief of Staff, a position he held since January 1992. He was also the Director of the General Police in 1991 before all police elements were merged into the National Police. Additionally, as a former director of the PNP's drug police (DIPOD), *Alva* was responsible for PNP counternarcotics operations in Peru's coca-growing regions. During his tenure at DIPOD, although he was cooperative with US embassy personnel, *Alva* was not considered very effective. It is anticipated that *Alva* will be promoted shortly to Lieutenant General, as the position of PNP Director General is a three-star billet.

f. (U) Lieutenant General Juan Briones Davila

UNCLASSIFIED



Lieutenant General Juan Briones Davila

(U) (CONF) Although the Ministry of Interior is normally run by a civilian, LTG *Juan Briones Davila* is the third Army officer appointed by President Fujimori to hold the post. *Briones* is viewed throughout police ranks as an improvement over his predecessor, Minister of Defense LTG *Malca*. He is considered a professional and has pledged to improve the historically combative relations

between the police and the army. Little is known of his views on counternarcotics, although he has acted favorably on Fujimori's directives to staff aggressive generals in Peru's coca-growing regions.

g. (U) Lieutenant General Victor Malca Villanueva

UNCLASSIFIED



Lieutenant General Victor Malca Villanueva

(1) (S/NF) Previously the Minister of Interior, LTG Victor Malca Villanueva was appointed Minister of Defense in April 1991. Upon graduation from the Military Academy in 1957, he was branched artillery. He has attended various military schools, including the War College. He was an instructor and director of the Artillery School as well as Commander of the Army's Academic Center. He has received training in both Argentina and Brazil. As a general officer, Malca commanded the 32d Infantry Division and was Chief of Staff, Inspector General and Commander of the 1st Military Region in Piura. Although he has not visited the US, he is reportedly friendly to US interests. Prior to his assignment as Minister of Defense, Malca served as Minister of Interior.

(2) (C/NF) Considered a yes man and Fujimori's weakest cabinet member, Malca was not well respected by his peers when he was Interior Minister. As Minister of Defense he is still considered out of his element. Montesinos, a friend of

Malca's, is believed to have influenced his appointment to the post of Defense Minister.

h. (U) Colonel Enrique Oliveros Perez

(U) (C/NF) Colonel Enrique Oliveros Perez was appointed commander of the Army's Intelligence Service (SIE) in October 1992. He replaced Colonel Pinto Cardenas, who was relieved for unauthorized disclosure of information. Oliveros had been assigned to the National Intelligence Service (SIN). In 1991 he had worked in the Presidential Palace. Like Pinto before him, Oliveros is an artillery officer who is well known by key presidential adviser Montesinos, who may well have been influential in his selection to SIE's top post.

8-5. (U) Foreign Intelligence Services

a. (U) Russia

(1) (S/NF) The former Soviet Union stepped into the void created by souring US-Peruvian relations after a 1968 military coup. During the late 1960s and early 1970s the USSR forged close relations with Peru through extensive military sales and technical assistance programs. Soviet equipment accounts for about 50 percent of all military purchases since 1973 and totaled more than \$1.5 billion. These military and technical agreements allowed the former USSR to make great inroads into Peru. The former Soviet Union also provided significant training to both Peruvian military and civilian personnel. Intelligence courses, held in Moscow and lasting up to 1 year, were co-sponsored by the Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) and GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) and served as recruitment opportunities. Soviet-trained personnel have reported that after being compromised while undergoing training, they were tasked by the Soviets to collect and report on activities of the Peruvian I&SS, political personnel, and US personnel and facilities in Peru. The last such training occurred in 1991.

(2) (S/NF/NC/WN)

30

(3) ~~(S/NF/NC)~~

(2) (S/NF/~~NC~~/WN)

(4) (C/~~NC~~)

b. (U) Cuba

(1) (S/NF/~~NC~~/WN)

c. (U) Other Services

(U) The Government of Peru also maintains diplomatic relations with North Korea, which it officially recognized in 1989. The Palestine Liberation Organization also maintains an information office in Lima.

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 208001
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

32

~~SECRET~~

Chapter 9: Counterintelligence Situation (U)

9-1. (U) Operational Environment- Background

a. (U) In response to a combative Congress, a dysfunctional judiciary, an extremely ailing economy, and an increasingly violent insurgency, President Fujimori took over complete control of the government in April 1992. Since that time he has ruled autocratically, passing innumerable decrees designed to address corruption, insurgency, and the economy. (u)

b. (U) Peru's insurgencies, spearheaded by the *Sendero Luminoso* and to a lesser extent by the MRTA, have resulted in large areas of Peru being placed under military rule. Although previously operating only in rural Peru, Sendero has recently extended its area of activity to the capital city, wreaking physical havoc and undermining confidence in the government's ability to protect its citizens. (u)

c. (U) Peru is also the world's largest coca-growing region. Deeply entrenched narcotics traffickers have provided livelihood for thousands of poor Peruvian peasant farmers. The lucrative trade has also increased corruption among the

poorly paid military and security services assigned to the region. (u)

d. (U) A priority concern of the Peruvian military is the potential for military aggression by its historic rivals, Ecuador and Chile. The majority of military manpower and resources are directed toward border patrol and early detection missions, thereby diverting essential support from the counterinsurgency problem.

9-2. (U) Threat

a. (U) Domestic Threat

(1) (U) Economics

(a) (U) Peru has a mixed economy that combines elements of domestic market capitalism with state ownership of major industries. Although Peru is currently experiencing a severe recession, Fujimori has made extraordinary progress in reversing decades of economic mismanagement. He has pursued a rigorous economic stabilization and adjustment program by instituting sweeping reforms aimed at stimulating the ailing economy. He has slashed government subsidies,

cut import tariffs, liberalized foreign exchange restrictions, and settled several multimillion dollar investment disputes with US firms. Fujimori is also implementing a program to privatize state-owned enterprises.

(b) (U) Inflation has plummeted from 7,650 percent in 1990 to 139 percent in 1991. Nevertheless, virtually all economic factors currently indicate an extremely sick economy in crisis. According to a United Nations' report, more than 70 percent of Peru's population lives in extreme poverty, and unemployment and under-employment remain high. The lack of ready capital, resulting in poorly trained and ill-equipped forces, has undermined the effectiveness of the I&SS. Low salaries have had a devastating impact on the morale of the I&SS.

(c) (U) Insurgent-related violence has also had an unfavorable effect on Peru's economy. Although Peru is believed to have tremendous untapped oil reserves, insurgent targeting of the economic infrastructure and foreign nationals has resulted in the country being rated as one of the world's worst investment risks for businesses.

(2) (U) Politics

(a) (U) Fujimori assumed complete political power on 5 April 1992. Ruling by decree, he suspended the Constitution, dissolved Congress, and purged the Supreme Court. Although several bilateral donors, including the US, have suspended assistance programs in wake of the coup, Peru's largest donor, Japan, has continued aid.

(b) (U) Fujimori stated that a combative Congress and an impotent judicial system were blocking his economic reforms and impeding his efforts to combat corruption, narcotics trafficking, and widespread government corruption. He has pledged to hold elections for a new Congress by November 1992 and to leave office upon completion of his term in July 1995, but not earlier.

(c) (U) According to public opinion polls, Fujimori's actions have broad public support. Thoroughly disillusioned with corrupt government institutions, economic difficulties, and growing ter-

rorist violence, approximately 75 percent of the Peruvian populace approves of his seizure of power. The military also fully backed Fujimori's actions. Fujimori assiduously cultivated military favor since his 1990 election by placing military personnel in key positions in the PNP and naming Army Lieutenant General *Briones Davila* to the post of Minister of Interior, traditionally a civilian post. Nevertheless, there are indications that the military is becoming increasingly restive because of Fujimori's footdragging regarding low salaries.

(d) (U) Fujimori has limited time to make concrete inroads against terrorism, narcotics trafficking, corruption, and economic malaise, or else face growing popular discontent and military impatience that could lead to his early ouster.

(3) (U) Narcotics Threat

(a) (U) Peru produces over 60 percent of the world's supply of coca leaves, the precursor to cocaine. The Upper Huallaga Valley has become the heartland of Peru's illegal coca cultivation (see figure 9-1). Approximately 90 percent of the tillable land in the valley is planted with coca. Coca cultivation and cocaine processing are an essential way of life for approximately 250,000 poor Peruvian farmers who cannot earn a decent living from any other crop. Thousands more find employment in narcotics-related activities, such as transportation and protection services.

(b) (U) Fujimori, as other leaders before him, has placed a lower priority on counter-narcotics than on either the country's insurgent threat or economic crisis. Official preoccupation with the latter has resulted in inadequate attention and resources being dedicated to counternarcotics strategy and operations. Many of the narcotics eradication and interdiction operations occur only because of US encouragement and support. US support has included training PNP counter-narcotics personnel, providing funding and equipment, assisting in interdiction and eradication operations, and providing aid for crop substitution programs. With the advent of Fujimori's unilateral coup, however, the US has minimized its presence in country and suspended all but humanitarian aid.

Coca Cultivation in Peru



Figure 9-1. (U) Areas of Coca Cultivation in Peru

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 01
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

725200 (B01044) 2 92

(c) (U) Although Peru's counter-narcotics mission has traditionally been exclusively a PNP responsibility, Fujimori has mandated that the military must now aid the police in counter-narcotics operations. Nevertheless, the military still considers the conventional threat posed by Ecuador and Chile and its counterinsurgency mission to be of far higher priority. Viewing counter-narcotics primarily as a law enforcement responsibility, the military continues to devote the bulk of its manpower and resources toward its traditional missions. Additionally, traditional hostility between the police and the Army have hindered cooperation in counter-narcotics operations.

(d) (U) Despite some counter-narcotics successes, the overall performance of the I&SS has been mixed. A frail national economy limits government resources available for counter-narcotics operations. Currently, police units lack uniforms, housing, and other essential support. Fujimori has enacted several decrees aimed at providing the I&SS with more authority to prosecute their counter-narcotics mission.

(e) (U) Despite Fujimori's actions, widespread narcotics corruption has hindered police and military effectiveness. Poorly paid I&SS are prime targets for bribery by narcotics traffickers. US Embassy reporting indicates that narcotics traffickers are frequently alerted to pending PNP operations by corrupt police. Additionally, although working in the UHV is considerably hazardous, many PNP officers vie for an assignment there because of the opportunity to make money by extorting from coca-growers and traffickers. The judicial system in the Huallaga Valley is deeply corrupted by narcotics and perpetuates the problem by failing to convict individuals involved in the drug trade. In the past 6 years, only one major narcotics figure has been convicted in Peru, and that occurred in Lima.

(f) (U) In response to the corruption of Army and police units, often bought off by narcotics traffickers, Fujimori has given the Air Force authority to impose control over all aircraft and airports in the coca-growing areas. Moreover, all armed forces and police personnel are now required to provide a complete financial disclosure statement upon transfer from the area. Further,

many of the thousands of mid- and senior-level police dismissed from the PNP during Fujimori's purge were assigned to coca-leaf production areas and deeply involved in narcotics corruption.

(g) (U) Fujimori remains convinced that developing alternate crops to the coca leaf is ultimately a more effective, long-term solution to Peru's narcotics problem than coca eradication and interdiction. The government has drafted plans to create incentives designed to encourage coca farmers to switch to legal crops by granting land titles, increasing rural access to credit, and removing bureaucratic obstacles that discourage production. The proposed measures, however, minimize the difficulties involved in dealing with narcotics-related corruption in the I&SS. Corruption in the UHV remains widespread, allowing traffickers to continue operations despite the government counter-narcotics campaign. Fujimori's administration lacks a national strategy integrating enforcement, alternative development, coca eradication, public awareness, and demand reduction.

b. (U) Foreign Threat

(1) (U) Peru's relations with its neighbors have been greatly influenced by longstanding border disputes with its neighbors. Relations with Chile have been poor since the War of the Pacific (1879 to 1884), during which Chilean armed forces brutally occupied Lima. Peru also lost two southern provinces to Chile, and Bolivia lost all access to the Pacific Ocean. In January 1992 Peru satisfied Bolivia's primary foreign policy concern by signing a series of historic agreements granting Bolivia access to the Pacific through the Peruvian port of Ilo, approximately 525 kilometers south of Lima. Relations with Chile remain strained. Disagreements over Antarctic exploration and narcotics trafficking are current causes of diplomatic dispute between the two countries.

(2) (U) Ecuador's territorial dispute with Peru dates back to the early 1800s. Since that time Ecuador has claimed a large part of the Amazon basin north of the Peruvian department of Loreto, which includes Peru's main jungle oil-producing region. A 1941 border conflict was ostensibly resolved by the Rio Protocol. The

Protocol established the present international borders, leaving Ecuador without access to the Amazon River. Hostilities have erupted periodically ever since. Most recently, in August 1991, tensions between the two countries escalated to the brink of war. Although both militaries mobilized on the border, war was narrowly averted through political negotiations. (U)

(3) (S) Fujimori held an unprecedented summit with Ecuadoran President Borja and presented a far-reaching proposal for settling the border dispute. Although an agreement was not reached, the summit paved the way for future negotiations. Fujimori has taken additional steps to improve relations with Ecuador and thereby free up military resources and personnel from the border mission. He has proposed that both Ecuador and Peru reduce their arms purchases by 50 percent. Fujimori hopes that the benefits Bolivia received from its settlement with Peru will influence Ecuador to resolve its border dispute also.

c. (U) Terrorism Threat

(1) (U) Although relatively free of terrorism during the 12-year period of military rule (1968 to 1980), Peru has become one of the world's bloodiest terrorist battlefields (see figure 9-2). In the past 12 years terrorist activity has claimed over 25,000 lives and resulted in an estimated 20 billion dollars in damage to property. In 1991 approximately 3,180 died from terrorist attacks, with a record 422 people killed in October alone. In response to the escalating violence, the government has placed over one half of the population and approximately 47 percent of the country under state-of-emergency status. Since his coup in April 1992, Fujimori has issued numerous anti-terrorism decrees designed to curb the violence. Thus far, however, the I&SS have failed to contain the insurgencies.

(2) (C/N) The government's failure to gain control of the insurgent problem is due to several factors: lack of a comprehensive, national counterinsurgency strategy; logistical problems sustaining tactical operations; weak communications and intelligence; inadequate training for small unit guerilla warfare; and difficult terrain. Additionally, the vast majority of Peru's military personnel and

equipment has not been committed to counterinsurgency, but continues to be distributed along the border with Chile and Ecuador. The chronically resource-poor Army and police lack adequate equipment and training to conduct sustained counterinsurgency operations. Further, the Army, which assumed control of the counterinsurgency mission from the PNP in 1989, is plagued by some of Latin America's worst narcotics corruption, as well as traditional graft.

(3) (C/NF) Another major contributing factor to the government failure in counterinsurgency is the bankrupt Peruvian judicial system. Widespread corruption, intimidation of judges, cumbersome prosecution procedures, extremely low salaries for judges and prosecutors alike, and serious budgetary constraints all contribute to making the system a major impediment to effective counterinsurgency programs. The Peruvian people and members of the I&SS have universal contempt for the corrupt, dysfunctional justice system. Peru has a notoriously low conviction rate of persons charged with terrorism, currently less than 10 percent. The handful that are prosecuted are generally low-level recruits.

(4) (C/N) Until quite recently, the small percentage of terrorists actually convicted and incarcerated received terrorism training in Peru's prisons, which had become de facto training centers. The government lost control to the inmates during the Garcia administration. Neither prison guards nor security personnel ever entered the cell blocks, and inmates possessed automatic weapons. Fujimori launched an operation to regain government control of Peruvian prisons in April 1992. Pitched battles with inmates ensued in several Peruvian prisons. Although reporting has not been conclusive, it is believed that the government has reestablished its authority at some prisons.

(5) (C/N) In the past year President Fujimori has placed increased emphasis on dealing with terrorism. In November the administration passed a flurry of decrees designed to strengthen Peru's counterinsurgency capabilities, including decrees to pardon former guerrillas, reduce sentences in exchange for information, and reorganize the PNP and the I&SS. Fujimori has encouraged




Figure 9-2. (U) Insurgent Operating Areas in Peru

the growth of rural civil defense units (*rondas campesinas*) and in July 1992 inaugurated a city version (*rondas urbanas*) to combat the increasing violence in Lima. Further, the I&SS have been authorized to enter university campuses, historically off-limits to security forces, to ferret out terrorist strongholds. Nevertheless, the violence in Peru is expected to rise if the government fails to provide adequate guidance, training, or resources to I&SS involved in counterinsurgency operations. Peru will remain a high threat region for US personnel for the foreseeable future.

(6) (U) ~~SECRET~~ **The Sendero Luminoso**

(a) (U) ~~SECRET~~ **The Sendero Luminoso** (Shining Path—SL) is one of the world's most violent and bloody terrorist groups. SL activities have resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and billions of dollars in damage to the Peruvian economy. The group's aim is the complete overthrow of the Peruvian government and the establishment of a worker-peasant society based on Maoist doctrine. Extremely xenophobic and independent, SL views virtually all groups and nations, including the former Soviet Union and China, as ideological enemies. Responsible for gross atrocities, the SL has been likened to Cambodia's Khmer Rouge.

(b) (U) ~~SECRET~~ The SL was founded in the late 1960s by Marxist philosophy professor Abimael Guzman Reynoso, also known as Chairman Gonzalo. Founded as part of the Peruvian Communist Party, the SL broke with the PCP in 1970. The group's armed struggle began in 1980 in the province of Ayacucho in the undeveloped southeastern highlands. Following Maoist tenets, the SL's chief priority is to gain control of the countryside through armed struggle with security forces and the coopting or intimidation of the peasants. Eventually the SL plans to move its struggle to the cities, ultimately strangling the capital city of Lima with "bands of iron."

(c) (U) ~~SECRET~~ Hardcore SL membership has been estimated at approximately 5,000 members, with an additional 50,000 supporters and sympathizers. SL has consolidated its grip over large areas of the Peruvian countryside, including five economically important departments

(Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Junin, Pasco, and Huanuco), where Peru's major mines are located. Its strongest foothold is in the UHV, where it remains virtually unopposed. It currently operates throughout Peru's 24 departments and has made significant inroads into Lima.

(d) (U) ~~SECRET~~ Sendero tactics include bombing of electric pylons and substations, hydroelectric projects, highways and bridges, factories, water pumping stations, and railroads. The SL has also attacked foreign targets, including the Lima-based embassies of the US, the former Soviet Union, China, Nicaragua, and the former German Democratic Republic. Other targets have included the North Korean Commercial Mission, Mormon churches, and numerous international corporations. The latest attack against US interests occurred in February 1992, when a powerful car bomb seriously damaged the US ambassador's residence. The SL has bombed government buildings, schools, and warehouses; attacked police stations and patrols, extorted money, assassinated political party leaders; engaged in kidnapping, rape, and dismemberment; and carried out successful jail escapes. The organization also exercises ruthless control over captured villages, killing all resisters. It has also massacred entire villages to dissuade peasants from passively collaborating with security forces or becoming members of the *rondas campesinas*. Claiming to have reached "strategic equilibrium" with Peruvian security forces, the SL has escalated its operations in the past year, launching a campaign of unprecedented bombing in Lima. Its urban offensive strategy has included large bombing attacks against hotels, banks, commercial enterprises, and schools. Additionally, it has mounted several armed strikes that have paralyzed transportation networks, thereby temporarily paralyzing the capital.

(e) (U) ~~SECRET~~ The SL augments its income by robbing banks and farms, charging fees on transit and food crops, and levying "war taxes" on businesses. The majority of SL's funding, however, is derived from its relations with narcotics traffickers. The organization's domination of the UHV enables it to tax all levels of the cocaine industry: subsistence farmers, speculators, middlemen, lab owners, and Colombian traffickers. The SL charges a fee on all aspects of

coca-production: on coca plants grown by peasant farmers, paste processors and laboratory operators, and up to \$15,000 on each flight from clandestine air fields located in the UHV. Estimates of SL earnings from narcotics are approximately 25 million dollars annually. (U)

19th of April Movement (known as the M-19—*Movimiento 19 de Abril*) in Colombia, and the FSLN in Nicaragua. Additionally, both Libya and Cuba have provided training and support in the past.

d. (U) Threats to US Interests

(1) (C/NF)

(f) (U) Members from the PNP's Counterterrorism Directorate, DINCOTE, recently dealt a severe blow to the SL. In late September DINCOTE forces located and arrested the elusive Guzman and several members of the SL's inner circle. Guzman, who was the exclusive drafter of SL strategy, was quickly tried in a military court. He has been sentenced to life imprisonment and fined 25 billion dollars in damages. Although Guzman's capture is a devastating blow to the SL, the organization will continue to be a formidable force at least for the next few years.

(7) (U) Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement

(a) (U) (C/NF) The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru*—MRTA) is an anti-imperialist, pro-Castro, Marxist-Leninist group that denounces US imperialism. Its objectives are to replace the current Peruvian Government with a Cuban model and to eliminate US commercial and governmental influences within Peru. The organization began operations in 1984 and consists of approximately 1,000 armed combatants. In an attempt to distinguish itself from the random violence of *Sendero Luminoso*, the MRTA has limited its attacks to Peruvian Government and US targets, and avoids innocent Peruvians. Popular MRTA targets include US diplomatic and commercial facilities, police stations, and upper-class Peruvian businesses (e.g., luxury hotels, casinos, boutiques, clubs). The organization cultivates a Robin Hood image by frequently redistributing stolen food to Lima slum dwellers. (U)

(b) (U) (C/NF) Unlike the SL, the MRTA has had relations with several foreign terrorist/insurgent groups, including the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (known as MIR—*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*) in Chile, the former

(2) (U) (C/NF) Although US presence is limited, Peru is nevertheless considered a high threat area due to insurgent activities. Both the SL and the MRTA have targeted US personnel, the February 1992 SL bombing of the US ambassador's residence in Lima being the most recent. Therefore, diplomatic personnel and private US citizens, most of whom reside in Lima, could be targeted, directly or indirectly, by Peru's insurgent groups.

9-3. (U) Outlook

a. Trends

(1) (U) Since its return to democracy 12 years ago, Peru has experienced a political coup, a severe economic crisis, a boom in coca production, and the spread of a brutal insurgency from the rural areas of Peru to the capital. With few exceptions, Peruvian I&SS have proved to be ineffectual, with reputations often sullied by widespread corruption and criminal activity. Due to major budgetary constraints, insufficient operating budgets, which have resulted in long-term inadequate training, equipment, and salaries, will continue for the foreseeable future.

(u)
(2) (C/NF) Although the Army assumed control of the counterinsurgency mission from the police in 1989, the country continues to suffer from escalating violence. The government has been unable to control its insurgencies. A major factor in Peru's poor track record in this area is Fujimori's failure to articulate a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. Until this is accomplished, Peru's piecemeal counterinsurgency effort will continue to drain the country of vital resources needed for development.

(3) (C/NF) A significant portion of Peruvian I&SS personnel will continue to be involved in corruption. The military alone is plagued by some of Latin America's worst narcotics corruption. Although Fujimori has taken measures to ameliorate the problem, it will continue until I&SS salaries grant personnel an acceptable standard of living.

b. (U) Expected Environment in the Event of US Deployment

(u)
(1) (C/NF) With some exceptions, the operational environment appears generally favorable in the event of a deployment of US troops to Peru. If deployment is focused on preserving internal stability, US troops should encounter a positive reception from the population. US troops operating in rural Peru, however, will risk being targeted by the SL. Narcotics traffickers or corrupt I&SS personnel may pose a threat to US personnel involved in counternarcotics activities.

(2) (C/NF)

(3) (C/NF)

(4) (C/NF)

(5) (S/NF)

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Sep 07
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

NOFORN NOCONTRACT WNINTEL

Intelligence Gaps (U)

(U) Chapter 8. Intelligence and Security Services

(U) Paragraph 8-3

(C/NF)

(U) Chapter 9. Counterintelligence Situation

(U) Paragraph 9-2

(U) Paragraph 8-4

(C/NF)

(C/NF)

(U) Paragraph 8-5

(C/NF)

(C/NF)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL
ON 20 Sep 01
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
Auth Para I-603 DOD 5200.1R

Intel-1

~~SECRET~~

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

43

SECRET

~~NOFORN NO CONTACT WITHTEL~~

This page left intentionally blank

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON *10 Sep 01*
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

Intel-2

~~SECRET~~

44

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 45-46