

PRIORITY

*PTOS*  
*McAPS*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Refer to Dist for Dist Log*

INCOMING

(X143)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ARA/NEA REARCS

PAGE 01 121554Z 001864 S014101  
INFO: ARA (01) PPC (01) OAS (01) PPA (01) NCO (01) PE (02) DAND (01)  
SPA (01) PNC (01) RJ (01) RSG (01)  
----- 12/1854Z A1 LM (TOTAL COPIES: 012)

121554Z 001864 S014101  
LESS. PLUS, HE WAS CONCERNED WITH THE NUMBER OF JUNIOR OFFICERS LEAVING THE PERUVIAN NAVY DUE TO THEIR LOW SALARIES.

ACTION INR-01

2. ~~(U)~~ ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTION-- (b)(1)

INFO LOG-00 ARA-00 HA-09 INRE-00 /011W  
-----317E06 121555Z /38

Q. TO WHOM IS THE LOYALTY OF THE NAVY OFFICERS TO PRESIDENT FUJIMORI OR THEIR COMMANDING OFFICER?

P 121552Z MAY 92  
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
INFO OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
CNO WASHINGTON DC  
CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
CMC WASHINGTON DC

A. WITH EMPHASIS, HE STATED "OF COURSE TO THEIR COMMANDING OFFICERS, NOT ONLY IN NAVY, BUT THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE ALSO."

~~(S)~~ (b)(2)  
COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC

COMMENT: ~~(S)~~ IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE MASS MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE, AND MILITARY, AND POLICE SUPPORT PRESIDENT FUJIMORI'S POLICIES, BUT IT IS SUPPORT THAT COULD CHANGE QUICKLY WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDING OFFICERS OF THE SERVICES.

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
CIA WASHINGTON DC

~~(S)~~ (b)(2)

SAFE (b)(2)  
P 121549Z MAY 92

PROJ: (U)  
INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

TO DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

~~(S)~~ (b)(2)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR##

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(2)

SERIAL: (U) IIR ~~(S)~~

COUNTRY: (U) PERU (PE). (b)(2)

SUBJ: IIR ~~(S)~~ /ATTITUDE ON LOYALTY (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 920509.

~~(S)~~ (b)(2)

SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ ON 9 MAY 92, A HIGH RANKING PERUVIAN NAVY OFFICER STATED AT A SOCIAL GATHERING THAT THE NAVY OFFICERS SUPPORTED PRESIDENT FUJIMORI, BUT THE NAVY OFFICERS WOULD SUPPORT THEIR COMMANDING OFFICERS IF THERE WAS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO.

TEXT: 1. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)

~~(S)~~ THE ADMIRAL STATED HE WAS CONCERNED THAT RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD DETERIORATE FURTHER BECAUSE OF THE COUP ON 5 APRIL 92 AND THE SHOOTING OF THE USAF C-130 ON 24 APR 92. HE STATED HIS COUNTRY NEEDED MORE ASSISTANCE NOW NOT

940401 *3/1* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~