

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

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ACTION ARA-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-15	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	HA-09	H-01
	INM-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	OMB-01
	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-01	SP-01	SSO-00
	SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/042W		

-----2CD91E 300122Z /38

O 300108Z APR 92
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7983
INFO THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

[REDACTED] SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 06397

DEPARTMENT PASS USOAS
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ON APRIL 29 AMBASSADOR MET WITH [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] STRONGLY FAVORED A QUICK
AND NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT POLITICAL
CRISIS, BUT DID NOT RULE OUT A MILITARY COUP.
HE SAID A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, WITH ELECTED
DELEGATES, WAS A POSSIBLE WAY OUT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ACCEPTED THAT
SOME 30 ARTICLES MIGHT HAVE TO BE "MODIFIED."
HOWEVER, INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WOULD BE NEEDED
TO BRING A "STUBBORN" FUJIMORI TO ANY TABLE.
FUJIMORI'S TIMETABLE NEEDED TO BE SHORTENED, BUT
[REDACTED] THOUGHT A RESOLUTION TO THE CRISIS WAS A
YEAR OFF. HOWEVER, THE REAL INTERLOCUTORS WOULD


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Current Class: [REDACTED]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: OSCAR J. OLSON
DATE/CASE ID: 21 AUG 2001 200003853

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BE THE MILITARY AND THE OPPOSITION. END SUMMARY.



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[REDACTED] ADVOCATES QUICK NEGOTIATIONS

4. [REDACTED] SAID HE STRONGLY FAVORED A QUICK AND

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NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT POLITICAL
CRISIS. A POLITICAL "TRANSACTION" BETWEEN THE
TWO SIDES (WITH OR WITHOUT FUJIMORI) WOULD BE
DIFFICULT BUT PREFERABLE TO A MILITARY COUP,
WHICH [REDACTED] SAW AS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY.
FOR [REDACTED] THE REAL INTERLOCUTORS SHOULD BE
THE MILITARY AND THE "OPPOSITION." FUJIMORI'S
CLINGING TO POSITIVE POPULARITY POLLS BELIED HIS
INSECURITIES, AND BESIDES, [REDACTED] SAID, IT
APPEARED AS IF MONTESINOS AND NOT THE PRESIDENT
WAS CALLING THE SHOTS. [REDACTED] DISCOUNTED SAN
ROMAN AS A FIGUREHEAD BUT SUGGESTED THAT MARIO
VARGAS LLOSA COULD HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY DUE TO
HIS INTERNATIONAL IMAGE. THE CHURCH WOULD NOT
PLAY A ROLE; IT WAS TOO DIVIDED.

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EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

[REDACTED]
AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR THAT ONE WAY OUT
MIGHT BE THROUGH A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.
[REDACTED] WAS EMPHATIC THAT AN ASSEMBLY WOULD HAVE
TO BE ELECTED AND SPECULATED IT WOULD HAVE TO

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MODIFY SOME 30 ARTICLES OR TEN PERCENT OF THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION. HE SUGGESTED THAT ANY CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION COULD BE PUT TO THE ELECTORATE IN A PLEBISCITE.

6. HOWEVER, THE "STUBBORN AND AUTHORITARIAN"

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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FUJIMORI WAS THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE TO ANY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. FUJIMORI WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESSURED INTO ACCEPTING THE IDEA. RESPONDING TO THIS, THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THAT FUJIMORI WAS STILL SET AGAINST A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. HE OUTLINED U.S. POLICY FOR A RAPID RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, WHICH INCLUDED POSSIBLE PRESSURE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (IFIS). THE AMBASSADOR TOLD [REDACTED] /S ARONSON MIGHT RETURN TO PERU SOON TO MAKE THE U.S. POSITION CLEAR TO THE GOP, INCLUDING OUR SUPPORT FOR A SHORTER TIMETABLE AND A TOUGH POLICY IN THE IFIS. [REDACTED] WAS

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DEPARTMENT PASS USOAS
 SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PE
 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH [REDACTED]
 ENCOURAGED THAT FUJIMORI HAD PUBLICLY STATED
 THAT THE GOP TIMETABLE WAS FLEXIBLE BUT OPINED
 THAT A SOLUTION WAS A YEAR AWAY.

DID FUJIMORI HAVE SUPPORT?

 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

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7. [REDACTED] ADMITTED THE POLITICAL PARTIES HAD
 MADE SOME SERIOUS ERRORS; THE JUDICIARY EVEN
 MORE SO. THE PEOPLE SUPPORTED CHANGES IN THESE
 INSTITUTIONS BUT DID NOT BACK A FUJIMORI
 "DICTATORSHIP." [REDACTED] CONCURRED WITH THE
 AMBASSADOR'S ANALYSIS THAT FUJIMORI HAD PLAYED
 TO THE PEOPLE'S GREATER DESIRE FOR AN "AGENDA OF
 JUSTICE" OVER AN "AGENDA OF LIBERTY." PEOPLE IN
 THE PUEBLOS JOVENES WERE MORE ANXIOUS FOR
 JUSTICE (I.E. A VIABLE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
 REDRESS FROM THEIR WANTS: FOOD, WATER, JOBS)
 THAN FOR PROTECTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIBERTIES.

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APRA, ALAN GARCIA AND THE COUP

8. [REDACTED] SAID APRA WOULD RALLY AROUND ALAN
 GARCIA NO MATTER WHAT. OPPOSITION TO APRA FROM
 THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND AMONG CERTAIN SECTORS
 IN THE MILITARY WAS WELL KNOWN. HOWEVER, THE
 GOP WAS USING APRA AS A PRETEXT FOR ITS ACTIONS
 AND THE HUNT FOR GARCIA WAS IN FACT PERSONAL; A
 MEANS FOR SIDELINING A HIGHLY CHARISMATIC
 "OPPOSITION CANDIDATE." NEVERTHELESS, [REDACTED]
 SAID GARCIA SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN OVER AS APRA
 SECRETARY GENERAL. THIS WAS AN "UNNECESSARY
 PROVOCATION" AND A DEMOTION FOR GARCIA, FROM
 FORMER PRESIDENT TO PARTY LEADER.

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C-130 INCIDENT: PERU ONLY HAS A 3 MILE LIMIT
 [REDACTED]

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9. THE AMBASSADOR BRIEFED [REDACTED] ON THE C-130 INCIDENT. [REDACTED] PERMED THE INCIDENT "DEPLORABLE AND INOPPORTUNE" AND EXPRESSED REGRET FOR THE LOSS OF AN AMERICAN LIFE. HE SAID HE WAS SURPRISED THAT THE PERUVIAN AIR FORCE HAD FIRED ON THE PLANE, ESPECIALLY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] PERU'S 200 MILE LIMIT REFERRED ONLY TO AN ECONOMIC EXCLUSION ZONE. [REDACTED] EXPLAINED THAT PERU ONLY HAS A THREE MILE TERRITORIAL LIMIT BECAUSE IT HAD REFUSED TO SIGN THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY THAT WOULD HAVE GRANTED PERU A 12 MILE LIMIT.

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 MONTESINOS LURKING IN THE BACKGROUND

10. [REDACTED] SAID IT APPEARED AS IF SHADOWY PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS WAS CALLING THE SHOTS AT THE PALACE. - MONTESINOS HAD PLACED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OPERATIVES (SIN) THROUGHOUT THE SYSTEM. [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT MONTESINOS' MEN WERE RUNNING THE ARMED FORCES, SPECIFICALLY NAMING FOR INTELLIGENCE CHIEF REAR ADMIRAL HESSE AND ARMY LT. GENERAL VALDIVIA DUENAS, WHO [REDACTED] POINTED OUT HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CAYARA MASSACRE.

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COMMENT
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

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11. [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] CLEARLY SUPPORTS A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION THAT INCLUDES A RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] HE NOW RECOGNIZES THAT CHANGES ARE NEEDED. HOWEVER, FUJIMORI IS STILL

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OPPOSED TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PLAN, AND
PROGRESS ON THIS FRONT IS UNLIKELY UNLESS HE CAN
BE PERSUADED TO COME ON BOARD.
QUAINTON##

[REDACTED]

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