

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

INQUIRE=DOC16D
ITEM NO=00496035
ENVELOPE
CDSN = LGX027 MCN = 92003/09755 TOR = 920030833
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2262 0030831-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER
P 030831Z JAN 92
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHINGTON DC//KT//
RUWSMXI/MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEALGX/SAFE

P 021810Z JAN 92
FM CDR 470TH MIBDE COROZAL PM//IAGPP-O//
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUDHAAA/CDR INSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//IAOPS-H-C//
RUEHPE/USDAO LIMA PE
RUEOHNA/CDR 7TH SFG(A) FT BRAGG NC//AOSO-SSFB-SB//
RUEHWP/USDRO PANAMA CITY PM
RUEHWP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA CITY PM//POL-A//
RUEOGWA/CDR 193RD INF BDE (LT) FT CLAYTON PM//SOBA-B//
RUEOGWA/CDR USARSO FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2-IA/SCJ3-DDD//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DI/CRES/CTG/SRB//
RUWMEGA/AFOSI DET 721 HOWARD AFB PM//CC//
RUCOSYA/NAVINSERVRA FT AMADOR PM

BT

CONTROLS

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QQQQ
SECTION 01 OF 03
CITE: (U) 0084-92-PE-F.
SERIAL: (U) IIR 2 231 0113 92.

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY
PASS: (U) CIA FOR--OCR, SSG, DB; USCINCSO FOR--SCJ2-I; STATE DEPT
FOR--ARA-PPC.
COUNTRY: (U) PERU (PE).
SUBJ: IIR 2 231 0113 92/SENDERO LUMINOSO GROUND ACTIVITIES IN THE
SATIPO-MAZAMARI REGION (U)
WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET-NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 910117.
REQS: (U) G-SOC-44104.
SOURCE: ~~SECRET~~ //2 231 0533//
~~SECRET~~

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510552 (U) (1) (1)
510552 (U) (1)

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SUMMARY: ~~(S/NF)~~ SENDERO LUMINOSO GUERRILLAS CONDUCTED GROUND ACTIVITIES IN THE MAZAMARI-SATIPO REGION OF PE DURING JAN-JUN 91.

TEXT: 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ (FIELD COMMENT--THIS REPORT IS [REDACTED] SENDERO LUMINOSO ACTIVITIES [REDACTED] IT IS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS, LOCAL REPORTS OF SL ACTIVITIES, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INFORMATION REPORTS ATTACKS, AMBUSHES, ASSASSINATIONS, AND ROBBERIES BY SL (SENDERO LUMINOSO - SHINING PATH) GUERRILLAS IN THE SATIPO-MAZAMARI //GEOCOORD: 1105S/7428W// REGION OF PE FROM JAN-JUN 91.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ ON 14 JAN 91, SL GUERRILLAS AMBUSHED A COLUMN OF ARMORED VEHICLES FROM THE "SINCHI'S" 48TH COMMANDANCIA. THEY CONDUCTED THE ATTACK FROM TRENCHES ON BOTH SIDES OF A ROAD NEAR THE VILLAGE OF SATIPO //GEOCOORD: 1110S/7428W//. (FIELD COMMENT--THE "SINCHI" IS A BRANCH OF THE PERUVIAN POLICE AND IS MADE UP MAINLY OF INDIANS. THEY CONDUCT THE MAJORITY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN PE.)

[REDACTED] MAJ (FNU) ((MENDOZA)), THE SINCHI CONVOY CDR, DIED IN THE AMBUSH AFTER FAILING TO CLOSE THE HATCH OF HIS CASPIR ARMORED VEHICLE. SL GUERRILLAS USED MOLOTOV COCKTAILS, IMPROVISED HAND GRENADES, SMALL ARMS FIRE, AND A MINE IN THE ROAD DURING THE AMBUSH. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AFTER APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR IN THE KILL ZONE, THE SINCHI VEHICLES MOVED SLOWLY TO A POINT 400 METERS UP THE ROAD. THE PERSONNEL DISMOUNTED THE VEHICLES, ESTABLISHED A PERIMETER, AND CALLED FOR REINFORCEMENTS. THE REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVED THREE HOURS LATER. THE 46TH COMMANDANCIA RECEIVED THE WOUNDED SINCHI TROOPS. AFTER REPAIRING THE VEHICLES, THE SINCHI MOVED BACK TO THE AMBUSH SITE AND RECONNOITERED THE KILL ZONE. THEY FOUND ONE DEAD SL GUERRILLA WHO WAS THE REGIONAL POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE BOCA SAPITO (CNA) AREA. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN AN INSPECTION OF ONE OF THE CASPIR ARMORED VEHICLES INVOLVED IN THE AMBUSH, OVER 200 PENETRATIONS FROM SMALL ARMS FIRE WERE FOUND.

~~(S/NF)~~ ON 19 JAN 91, MAJ (FNU) ((CASADA)) OF THE 48TH COMMANDANCIA LED A PATROL BACK INTO THE SAPITO AREA TO TRY TO FIND MORE SL BODIES. THE HEAD AND FINGERS OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER KILLED IN THE 14 JAN AMBUSH HAD BEEN CUT OFF MAKING IDENTIFICATION IMPOSSIBLE. THE SINCHI PATROL FOUND ANOTHER BODY IN A DITCH. A VILLAGER INFORMED THE PATROL THAT THE SL WERE IN HER VILLAGE DEMANDING MEDICINE, WATER, AND MONEY. VILLAGERS ALSO TOLD THE PATROL THAT ABOUT 30 SL, CARRYING FIVE WOUNDED AND TWO DEAD, HAD JUST LEFT THE VILLAGE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE RIO PANGO //GEOCOORD: 1115S/7426W//. THE VILLAGERS RELATED THAT THE SL HAD PROBABLY CROSSED THE RIVER USING A CABLE AND DISPOSED OF THE TWO

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DEAD SL MEMBERS IN THE RIVER. [REDACTED]

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3. ~~(S)~~ ON 27 JAN 91, THE PRESIDENT AND LT GOVERNOR OF CIDIARI INFORMED THE SINCHI THAT ABOUT 50 SL GUERRILLAS WERE IN THE VILLAGE OF COBARO, 15 KM EAST OF MAZAMARI, ALONG THE RIO COBARO. THEY WERE DRINKING, ABUSING VILLAGERS, AND FIRING RANDOM SHOTS IN THE AIR

[REDACTED] A 34-MAN SINCHI PATROL WAS SENT TO THE VILLAGE IN AN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THEM, BUT THEY LEFT THE AREA APPROXIMATELY FOUR HOURS BEFORE THE PATROL ARRIVED.

4. ~~(u)~~ ON 3 FEB 91, 35 SL GUERRILLAS (FIELD COMMENT--TO AVOID CONFUSION LATER IN THIS PARAGRAPH, THIS GROUP WILL BE IDENTIFIED AS GROUP ONE) TRAVELED THROUGH SANTA CRUZ //GEOCOORD: 0533S/7548W//, ANAPATI (CNA), AND PAMPA TIGRE (CNA) ASKING ABOUT THE PRESIDENT OF THE "RONDAS" FOR THAT AREA. (FIELD COMMENT--A "RONDA" IS A LOCALLY ORGANIZED INDIAN MILITIA FORMED BY VILLAGES FOR SELF PROTECTION.) NOT FINDING THE PRESIDENT OR HIS FAMILY, GROUP ONE WENT INTO VILLA MARIA AND FIRED SHOTS TO FRIGHTEN THE VILLAGERS OUT OF THE AREA. THIRTY-FIVE MORE SL GUERRILLAS (GROUP TWO) ENTERED PAMPA TIGRE AND CAPTURED THE PRESIDENT OF THE RONDAS, CUBAS ((RODRIGUEZ)), AND HIS BROTHER, LUIS ((RODRIGUEZ)). THEY TIED THE MEN'S HANDS BEHIND THEIR BACKS AND THEIR FEET TOGETHER IN A KNEELING POSITION. THE GUERRILLAS THEN TIED A ROPE FROM THEIR FEET TO THEIR NECKS; THIS FORCED THEIR HEAD BACKWARDS. THE GUERRILLAS THEN STABBED CUBAS RODRIGUEZ IN THE HEART AND SHOT LUIS IN THE CHEST; BOTH MEN DIED. THE GUERRILLAS ALSO FORCED 30 FAMILIES FROM THE PAMPA TIGRE AREA TO CARRY THEIR SUPPLIES TO CIUDAD DE DIOS (CNA). THIS SAME GROUP FOUND AND KILLED FIERO ((SANCHEZ)), THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IN THE AREA, AND HIS BROTHER (NFI). THEY KILLED BOTH MEN IN THE SAME FASHION AS THE RODRIGUEZ'. THEY STOLE EVERYTHING OF VALUE THEY COULD FIND AND MOVED TO THE VILLA MARIA (CNA) AREA. GROUP ONE STOLE ALL SUPPLIES FROM PANGOA'S FOUR SUPPLY BINS IN VILLA MARIA. BOTH GROUPS THEN MET IN VILLA MARIA. GROUP TWO STOLE ALL POSSESSIONS OF VALUE FROM THE TOWN'S 30 INHABITANTS AND MOVED DOWN TO ABAJO KATIARI (CNA), THEN BACK TO SANTA CRUZ DE ANAPATI (CNA). GROUP ONE TRAVELLED TO TOPALAYO (CNA), ARRIVING AT 2300. THEY CAPTURED JULIAN ((MITA)). (FIELD COMMENT--"MITA" WAS A RONDA INDIAN PRESIDENT FAMOUS FOR CAPTURING AND KILLING SL GUERRILLAS WITH BOWS AND ARROWS.) THE GUERRILLAS KILLED BOTH MITA AND HIS BROTHER AND MOVED 20 KM SOUTH TO CAMPIRUSHARI (CNA), THEN ON TO PORVENIR (CNA). IN PORVENIR, GROUP ONE CAPTURED THE RONDA PRESIDENT AND KILLED HIM IN FRONT OF HIS FAMILY, THEN KILLED HIS FAMILY, ONE AT A TIME. GROUP ONE THEN LEFT PORVENIR AND TRAVELLED TO SANTA CRUZ //GEOCOORD: 0533S/7548W//, THROUGH CAMPISHARI AND SANGARENI (CNA).

5. ~~(S)~~ ON 3 FEB 91, THE OFFICIALS IN THE TOWN OF LLAYLLA (CNA)

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REPORTED A 50-MAN COLUMN OF SL GUERRILLAS OPERATING NEAR THE TOWN.

6. ~~(S/NF)~~
[REDACTED]

7. ~~(U)(S/NF)~~ ON 17 FEB 91, SL GUERRILLAS PLACED LEAFLETS IN SAN MARTIN DE PANGOA //GEOCOORD: 1125S/7430W// STATING THEY WOULD SOON ARRIVE TO "ABUSE, KILL, AND MOLEST AUTHORITIES OR ANYONE WHO GETS IN THEIR WAY." MOST OF THE VILLAGERS FLED THEIR HOMES BECAUSE THEY DID NOT SUPPORT THE SL AND FEARED SL REPRISALS.

~~(U)(S/NF)~~ CIVILIAN DRIVERS REPORTED THE SL GUERRILLAS HIJACKED AND STOLE 12 FOOD AND GAS TRUCKS IN PORTIO (CNA) ON 12 FEB 91. THESE DRIVERS WERE TOO SCARED TO REPORT THEIR LOSSES UNTIL 17 FEB 91.

8. ~~(U)(S/NF)~~ ON 18 FEB 91, ABOUT 50 SL GUERRILLAS ENTERED CHENI //GEOCOORD: 1116S/7345W// TO AVENGE THE DEATHS OF COMRADES WHO DIED DURING A PREVIOUS ATTACK. ALSO ON 18 FEB 91, VILLAGERS FROM PALOMAR //GEOCOORD: 0806S/7901W// FLED TO AOTI (CNA) DUE TO SL ATTACKS. HOWEVER, EYEWITNESSES REPORTED NUMEROUS WOUNDED CIVILIANS WERE LEFT IN PALOMAR.

9. ~~(S/NF)~~ AS OF 6 MAR 91, RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES ABANDONED ALL MISSIONS FROM PUERTO OCOPA TO ATALAYA (CNA) EXCEPT FOR THE FRANCISCAN MISSION IN PUERTO OCOPA, HEADED BY FATHER ((CASTILLO)).

10. ~~(S/NF)~~ ON 7 MAR 91, ABOUT 50 SL GUERRILLAS ATTACKED PUERTO OCOPA AT MIDNIGHT. THE GUERRILLAS STARTED THE ATTACK BY SHOOTING A GUARD STANDING NEAR THE AIRSTRIP. THE SINCHI'S AND RONDA'S OCCUPIED ONE BUILDING UNTIL THE GUERRILLAS WITHDREW AT 0400. SINCHI MEMBERS KILLED TWO SL GUERRILLAS,

11. ~~(U)(S/NF)~~ ON 22 MAR 91, IN SAN CRISTOBAL DE TONGOA (CNA), SL GUERRILLAS KILLED THE TOWN MAYOR, FELIZIANO ((LOPEZ)), AND HIS WIFE. LOPEZ WAS KILLED FOR FORMING A RONDA GROUP. ON THE SAME DAY, THE GUERRILLAS TORTURED AND KILLED TWO NATIVES FROM JERUSALEM DE MINIARO (CNA), DUMPING THE BODIES IN THE RIVER.

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12. (u) (S/NF) ON 28 MAR 91, SL GUERRILLAS TORTURED AND KILLED ALBERTO ((PARADO)) NUNEZ, THE EX-PRESIDENT OF THE CAMPRIRISHARI (CNA) AREA.

13. (u) (S/NF) ON 29 MAR 91, THE GUERRILLAS ATTACKED THE TOWN OF PAOTI (CNA). ONE NATIVE WAS KILLED.

14. (S/NF) IN APR 91, SL GUERRILLAS STARTED CAMPAIGNING AND RECRUITING IN CAMPRIRISHARI.

[REDACTED]

15. (u) (S/NF) ON 2 APR 91, THE VILLAGERS FROM ALTO ANAPATI (CNA) EVACUATED THE VILLAGE AND MOVED THREE KM SOUTH IN SEARCH OF HIGHER GROUND. ALTO ANAPATI HAD SUFFERED NUMEROUS GUERRILLA ATTACKS. SL GUERRILLAS IN THE AREA FORCED THE VILLAGERS TO TURN OVER 50 PERCENT OF THEIR COFFEE PROFITS. THE SL WOULD GO TO THE VILLAGE MONTHLY DURING THE COFFEE SEASON. THE LOCAL RONDA GROUP HAS REQUESTED SHOTGUNS, AMMUNITION, AND SINCHI SUPPORT TO HELP FIGHT THE GUERRILLAS. THE VILLAGERS ALSO REQUESTED MEDICINE AND ECONOMIC AID TO TREAT THEIR WOUNDED AND PROVIDE FOR VILLAGE CHILDREN.

16. (u) (S/NF) BETWEEN 26 MAR AND 4 APR 91, SL GUERRILLAS HARASSED THE RESIDENTS OF BOCA TINKABENI (CNA) BY RANDOMLY FIRING 10-15 SHOTS NIGHTLY AND OCCASIONALLY THROWING A HAND GRENADE; HOWEVER, NO VILLAGERS WERE INJURED.

17. (S/NF) ON 7 APR 91, [REDACTED] REPORTED THAT SL GUERRILLAS WERE USING A SCHOOLHOUSE IN MAPITAMANI (CNA) TO HOLD MEETINGS, RECRUIT PERSONNEL, AND PROMOTE THEIR CAUSE. THEY WERE IN CRITICAL NEED OF MEDICINE AND ATTEMPTED TO TAKE THE TOWN'S SUPPLIES. ALSO ON 7 APR, A NATIVE ESCAPED FROM A GUERRILLA CAMP AND REPORTED THEY WERE PLANNING TO ATTACK THE NYLAM POLICE DET TO OBTAIN AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS.

[REDACTED]

18. (u) (S/NF) ON 28 APR 91, THE NATIVES OF SAN MIGUEL DE MINIARD (CNA), PREVIOUSLY FORCED OUT OF THEIR VILLAGE BY THE SL, ATTEMPTED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES TO CULTIVATE THEIR CROPS. SL GUARDS AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE VILLAGE REFUSED THEM ENTRY.

19. (S/NF) [REDACTED]

20. (u) (S/NF) IN MAY 91, SL GUERRILLAS BEGAN USING 20-FOOT RIVER BOATS WITH OUTBOARD MOTORS TO MOVE SUPPLIES FROM NORTH TO SOUTH ALONG THE RIO ENE AT NIGHT.

21. (S/NF) [REDACTED]

22. (S/NF) [REDACTED]

23. (S/NF) ON 13 JUN 91, SL GUERRILLAS KIDNAPPED A COFFEE PLANTATION WORKER NEAR THE VILLAGE OF FLORIDA (CNA) AND HELD HIM FOR FOUR DAYS NEAR PALOMAR.

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[REDACTED]

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24. ~~(S/NF)~~

[REDACTED]

25. ~~(S/NF)~~

[REDACTED]

26. (U) ~~(S/NF)~~ ABOUT 50 SL GUERRILLAS ATTACKED BOCA MATSORINIARI (CNA) (DATE UNKNOWN) IN RETRIBUTION FOR FORMING A RONDA MILITIA. SL GUERRILLAS KILLED SIX NATIVES DURING THE ATTACK; HOWEVER, THEY SUFFERED SEVEN KIA'S. THE GUERRILLAS RETURNED TO THE VILLAGE ON 22 JUN 91. THE VILLAGERS FLED BECAUSE THEY HAD NO AMMUNITION. THE GUERRILLAS THEN ENTERED THE VILLAGE, STOLE EVERYTHING OF VALUE, AND BURNED ALL BUILDINGS TO THE GROUND.

COMMENTS: (U) (FIELD COMMENTS)--(U) FOR MORE INFORMATION, SEE 470TH MIBDE IIR'S 2 231 0089 92, 2 231 0090 92, AND 2 231 0091 92.

[REDACTED]

REFERRED

//IPSP: (U) PG 2300//.

//COMSOBJ: (U) 190//.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U) 240300.

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

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NOFORN WNINTEL NOCONTRACT

PAGE:0548

INQUIRE=DOC7D
ITEM NO=00219854

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX744 MCN = 89018/29107 TOR = 890182022
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS5425 0182024-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 182024Z JAN 89
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 131402Z JAN 89
FM CDR USAITAC WASHDC//AIAIT-KT//
TO RUEORNA/CDR USAITAC WASHDC//AIAIT-KT//
AIG 12149
ZEN/AIG 883
AIG 7437
AIG 8831
AIG 8832
AIG 8833
AIG 9181
AIG 9182
AIG 9184
AIG 11557
AIG 11717
AIG 12120

RUCDNBH/DCDRUSADC HUNTSVILLE AL/CSSD-IN-C//
RUHHBAA/DCDRUSASDC KWAJELIN NQ//CSSD-H-KM//ATTN: RES
RULYIEG/TWO TWO MEU
RHCUAAA/USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL//J2-J//
RHDIAAAA/HQ TAC LANGLEY AFB VA//SPRR//
RUEOGSA/CDR 3 BN 7TH SFG FT WILLIAM DAVIS PM
RUCKDDA/PLAD CG MARDIV//30PS//
RUCIPFA/CDR 160TH SOAGABN FT CAMPBELL KY//ASOF-AVN-SB//
RUCLGDA/TAWC CAEWIS EGLIN AFB FL//INAE//
RUWTATA/HQ AAFES DALLAS TX
RUEGGEA/CDRRG DEVENS FORT DEVENS MA//AFKA-RG-DE-S//
BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT SECTION 01 OF 04
RQQ

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJECT: USAITAC MONTHLY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SUMMARY -
JANUARY 1989 MITS 89-011 UU UJ8727XWWW PART 2 OF 3 TABLE OF
CONTENTS (U)

- 4. US/CANADA (U)
- 5. CENTRAL AMERICA/CARRIBEAN (U)
- 6. SOUTH AMERICA (U)

(U) USAITAC USES THE DOD STANDARD TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL
TERMINOLOGY OF CRITAL, HIGH, MEDIUN, LOW AND NEGLIGIBLE (AS

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DEFINED IN JCS SM 73-86 ANNEX B) IN ASSESSING THE TERRORIST THREAT. THE SIX FACTORS CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING THE THREAT LEVEL ARE EXISTENCE, CAPABILITY, INTENTIONS, HISTORY, TARGETING AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. SEE MITS 8710 FOR DEFINITIONS OF THREAT LEVELS AND FACTORS.

4. (U) UNITED STATES/CANADA-----ANALYST: [REDACTED]

(U) THE THREAT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK DIRECTED AGAINST MILITARY INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, EXCLUDING PUERTO RICO, REMAINS NEGLIGIBLE TO LOW.

A. (U) PUERTO RICO-----THREAT LEVEL MEDIUM

(U) THE LEVEL OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY REMAINED LOW IN PUERTO RICO THROUGHOUT 1988. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SEVERAL LOW-LEVEL BOMBING INCIDENTS IN 1988, NO EVIDENCE HAS LINKED THEM TO KNOWN INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS. SINCE THE 28 OCTOBER 1986 PIPE-BOMBINGS OF SEVERAL US MILITARY TARGETS, NO KNOWN INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUP, (IE; THE MACHETEROS OR THE ORGANIZATION OF VOLUNTEERS FOR THE PUERTO RICAN REVOLUTION-OVRP), HAS CLAIMED ACTS OF TERRORISM IN PUERTO RICO. HOWEVER, TWO NEW GROUP NAMES HAVE EMERGED SINCE THAT TIME. ON 25 MAY 1987, A GROUP CALLED THE (GUERRILLA FORCES OF LIBERATION) CLAIMED A SERIES OF BOMBINGS AGAINST ECONOMICALLY-RELATED GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND BUSINESSES. ON 12 JANUARY 1988 TWO INCENDIARY BOMBINGS OF US BUSINESSES IN SANTURCE AND RIO PIEDRAS WERE CLAIMED BY A GROUP CALLED THE (PEDRO ALBIZU CAMPOS REVOLUTIONARY FORCE FFRPAC.. THIS GROUP ALSO CLAIMED THE MOST RECENT BOMBING ON 1 NOVEMBER, AND AN ATTEMPTED BOMBING ON 4 NOVEMBER 1988, OF US BUSINESSES IN RIO PIEDRES. THESE BOMBINGS RESEMBLED PAST INDIGENOUS GROUP ACTIVITY EXCEPT FOR THE ABSENCE OF US MILITARY TARGETS. THE LAST BOMBINGS OF US MILITARY TARGETS IN PUERTO RICO OCCURRED ON 12 MARCH AND 22 JULY 1988, AT THE US ARMY/NAVY RECRUITING CENTER IN CAGUAS. NO CLAIMS WERE RECEIVED FOR THESE BOMBINGS.

(U) IT APPEARS THAT DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS, KNOWN INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS IN PUERTO RICO HAVE REFRAINED FROM CLAIMING ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD ADVERSELY EFFECT PUBLIC OPINION AND REFLECT UNFAVORABLY UPON THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIALS OF MACHETEROS MEMBERS CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE IN HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT. HOWEVER, IT IS EVIDENT THAT RADICAL ELEMENTS IN PUERTO RICO WILL CONTINUE TO USE VIOLENCE TO PROTEST LABOR-RELATED PROBLEMS AND PERCEIVED SOCIAL INJUSTICES, TARGETING LIGHTLY GUARDED GOVERNMENT/MILITARY FACILITIES AND US-OWNED BUSINESSES IN PUERTO RICO. WE CANNOT WITH CERTAINLY CLASSIFY THE 1988 BOMBINGS AS TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR CHARACTERIZE NEW GROUP NAMES AS VARIANTS USED BY INDIGENOUS TERRORISTS, ALTHOUGH THE USE OF SUCH NAMES IS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GROUPS. RADICAL ELEMENTS ON THE ISLAND MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM DESTRUCTIVE AND POSSIBLY DEADLY ATTACKS AGAINST US BUSINESSES AND LIGHTLY GUARDED GOVERNMENT/MILITARY FACILITIES IN PUERTO RICO. US MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE ENCOURAGED TO MAINTAIN PERSONAL SECURITY PRACTICES WHICH CAN EFFECTIVELY DETER TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE EARLY PLANNING STAGES. THE THREAT AGAINST US MILITARY INTERESTS IN PUERTO RICO REMAINS AT MEDIUM.

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 05 JUL 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
ADTR Fcra 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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PAGE:0556

POSES A SERIOUS RISK TO OFFICIAL US PERSONNEL INCLUDING CONTRACTORSA ASSIGNED TO PERU. IN THE LAST YEAR, TERRORISTS HAVE ASSASSINATED AN AMERICAN CITIZEN EMPLOYED BY THE US AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND CARRIED OUT ATTACKS AGAINST THE US EMBASSY CHANCERY, CONSULAR ANNEX, AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, AND TWO US INFORMATION SERVICE BINATIONAL CULTURAL CENTERS. IN ADDITION, THERE IS A HIGH THREAT TO US PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS [REDACTED]

05562 (b) (1)

(U) THE SHINING PATH SL--SENDERO LUMINOSO), THE LARGEST AND MOST DANGEROUS INSURGENT/TERRORIST GROUP IN PERU, CARRIED OUT A BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ELECTRICAL SUPPLY SYSTEM THAT CAUSED A PROLONGED BROWNOUT IN LIMA. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, 32 HIGH TENSION ELECTRICAL TOWERS WERE DOWNED BY SL BETWEEN 15 NOVEMBER AND 7 DECEMBER. THE BOMBINGS HAVE RESULTED IN LOSSES TO BUSINESSES IN LIMA AND CALLAO OF BETWEEN FIVE AND EIGHT MILLION DOLLARS PER DAY.

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S/NF)

[REDACTED]

THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA),

[REDACTED]

IN PERU; HOWEVER, THE GROUP FREQUENTLY ATTACKS US DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES THERE AND [REDACTED] REPRESENT A NEW THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF US PERSONNEL IN THE COUNTRY.

(U) (S) TWO ATTACKS ON FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS OCCURRED IN DECEMBER, BUT IT REMAINS UNLIKELY THAT THE INCIDENTS ARE PART OF A NEW SL CAMPAIGN AGAINST FOREIGNERS. ON 5 DECEMBER TWO FRENCH DEVELOPMENT WORKERS AND TWO PERUVIAN TECHNICIANS WERE BEATEN WITH HAMMERS AND STABBED TO DEATH BY SL GUERRILLAS IN THE VILLAGE OF HAKIRA IN THE DEPARTMENT OF APURIMAC. ON 21 DECEMBER TWENTY HOODED SL ATTACKED A RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT SUPPORTED BY THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY THAT WAS LOCATED ABOUT 100 KILOMETERS FROM THE CITY OF PUNO. TWO PERUVIANS WERE STABBED TO DEATH, EQUIPMENT WAS STOLEN AND 60 PER CENT OF THE FACILITY WAS DESTROYED BY FIRE. DESPITE THE TWO ATTACKS, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE

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PAGE:0557

THAT SL HAS BEGUN A CAMPAIGN TO SPECIFICALLY TARGET FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND PERSONNEL. THE TWO FRENCH ENGINEERS WERE RANDOM TARGETS OF AN OVERALL SL STRATEGY TO CAUSE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN PERU.

(U) POC THIS SSG: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ AV 335-2591; KY-3 .
361128. USAITAC RTN MSG ADRS US CDRUSAITAC AHS//AIAIT-KT//.
CLAS BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

ADMIN

DECLAS ON: OADR
BT

#5428

NNNN

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 05 JUL 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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~~NOFORN UNINTTEL NOCONTRACT~~

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~~NOFORN UNRETEL NOCONTRACT~~

INQUIRE=DOC9D
ITEM NO=00629915

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX139 MCN = 89349/33445 TOR = 893491918
PTTSZYUH RUEKJCS0961 3491913-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 151913Z DEC 89
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 151503Z DEC 89
FM CDR USAITAC WASHDC//AIAIT-RKT//
TO RUEORNA/CDRUSAITAC WASHINGTON DC //AIAIT-RKT//

- AIG 12149
- AIG 7437
- AIG 8831
- AIG 8832
- AIG 8833
- AIG 9181
- AIG 9182
- AIG 9184
- AIG 11557
- AIG 11717
- AIG 12120

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05
QQQQ

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJECT: USAITAC MONTHLY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SUMMARY - DEC 1989 (MITS 89-12, PART 3 OF 4) (U) (J8727XWW)
(U) THE MONTHLY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SUMMARY (MITS) CONSISTS OF FOUR PARTS. PART I OF THE MITS IS AN UNCLASSIFIED TRAVEL SECURITY ADVISORY; PART II IS A SECTION ON WESTERN EUROPE; PART III IS A SECTION ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE; AND PART IV IS A SECTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, PALESTINIAN TERRORISM, AFRICA, AND FAR EAST.
(U) PART 3 OF 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 3. (U) US/CANADA
- 4. (U) CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
- 5. (U) SOUTH AMERICA

(U) USAITAC USES THE DOD STANDARD TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL TERMINOLOGY OF CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, AND NEGLIGIBLE (AS DEFINED IN JCS SM 73-86 ANNEX B) IN ASSESSING THE TERRORIST THREAT. THE SIX FACTORS CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING THE THREAT LEVEL ARE EXISTENCE, CAPABILITY, INTENTIONS, HISTORY, TARGETING, AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. SEE MITS 87-10 FOR DEFINITIONS OF THREAT LEVELS AND FACTORS.

3. (U) UNITED STATES/CANADA-----ANALYST: ~~SECRET~~
(U) THE THREAT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST US MILITARY

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN UNRETEL NOCONTRACT~~

5. USC 552 (b) (6)

INTERESTS IN THE US AND CANADA, EXCLUDING PUERTO RICO, REMAINS NEGLIGIBLE TO LOW.

A. (U) PUERTO RICO-----THREAT LEVEL: MEDIUM

(U) NO REPORTS OF POSSIBLE ANTI-US ACTIVITY OR TERRORIST ACTION WERE RECEIVED DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER. IN EARLY DECEMBER, A REPORT INDICATED THAT THE FORT BUCHANAN US ARMY GARRISON WAS UNDER POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE BY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS; HOWEVER, PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS HAVE NOT UNCOVERED ANY TERRORIST ACTIVITY. RADICAL INDIGENOUS GROUPS CONTINUE TO POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT TO US INTERESTS. THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, CURRENTLY THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY OF THE PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS ARE GOING TO RESORT TO LETHAL OR INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE ON THE ISLAND IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. (U) CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN-----ANALYST: [REDACTED]

(U) CENTRAL AMERICA CONTINUES TO BE A REGION OF CHANGE AND CONFLICT. WITH ONLY A COUPLE OF MONTHS BEFORE SCHEDULED DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA, THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT CALLED OFF AN UNEASY CEASE-FIRE WITH THE RESISTANCE, WALKED OUT OF PEACE TALKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY ALLOWED A FLARE-UP OF THE ARMED CONFLICT. SINCE THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE FORCES HAVE REFUSED TO DISBAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DEMOBILIZATION PLAN AGREED UPON AT THE TELA SUMMIT, NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT ORTEGA HAS THREATENED TO USE MILITARY FORCE TO DISLodge THEM FROM HONDURAN CAMPS. THE POTENTIAL NICARAGUAN AGGRESSION AGAINST HONDURAN SOVEREIGNTY HAS ONLY ADDED TO THE TENSION PERVASIVE IN THE REGION. IN EL SALVADOR THE INSURGENTS HAVE REFOCUSSED THEIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES BY TURNING AFFLUENT URBAN SECTORS INTO BATTLEFIELDS [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (2)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

[REDACTED] ON 26 NOVEMBER, SALVADORAN PRESIDENT CRISTIANI SUSPENDED DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH NICARAGUA OVER ITS CONTINUED DESTABILIZING INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE ESQUIPULAS AGREEMENTS. CRISTIANI ALSO REFUSED TO ATTEND A SUMMIT OF CENTRAL AMERICAN DIGNITARIES SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN MANAGUA DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER. (THE VENUE OF THE SUMMIT WAS LATER CHANGED TO COSTA RICA TO ALLOW FOR SALVADORAN PARTICIPATION.) MEANWHILE, GUATEMALA IS STILL PLAGUED BY VIOLENCE BOTH FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT AND THE LEFT. IN PANAMA, GENERAL NORIEGA CONTINUES TO INTIMIDATE THE OPPOSITION AND IS ASSUMING A MORE CONFRONTATIONAL POSTURE VIS-A-VIS THE US MILITARY. US INVOLVEMENT AND/OR PRESENCE IN THESE AREAS OF CONFLICT INCREASES THE POSSIBILITY OF VIOLENT OR TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS, MORE SPECIFICALLY IN THE COUNTRIES DISCUSSED BELOW.

A. (U) EL SALVADOR-----THREAT LEVEL: HIGH

(U) THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) LAUNCHED ITS FIERCEST OFFENSIVE IN A DECADE-OLD WAR DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER. THE OFFENSIVE, [REDACTED] RAGED FOR DAYS IN THE SALVADORAN CAPITAL AND AS OF THIS WRITING HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETELY PUT DOWN BY THE

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

WIDE AND 30 FEET DEEP. THE FIRST FOUR FLOORS OF THE NINE-STORY BUILDING WERE DESTROYED, AND HUNDREDS OF BUILDINGS IN A 26-BLOCK AREA SUSTAINED DAMAGE. AT LEAST 50 DEATHS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED AND 500 TO 1,000 PEOPLE WERE INJURED. NO AMERICANS WERE REPORTED AMONG THE DEAD AND WOUNDED.

~~██████████~~ THE DAS HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE GOC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE NARCOS, AND ITS DIRECTOR, GENERAL MAZA, HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS IN THE PAST. LEADERS OF THE MEDELLIN CARTEL PROBABLY ORDERED THE BOMBING TO RETALIATE FOR RECENT COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE 22 NOVEMBER RAID AGAINST ESCOBAR. THE 6 DECEMBER BOMBING ILLUSTRATES THE ABILITY OF THE NARCOS TO STRIKE ALMOST ANY TARGET VIRTUALLY AT WILL AND SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GOC.

~~██████████~~ ON 6 DECEMBER "THE EXTRADITABLES" PROMISED TO CONTINUE THE "TOTAL WAR" AGAINST THE GOC UNTIL THE COLOMBIAN SENATE APPROVES EXTRADITION AS AN ISSUE IN THE NATIONWIDE REFERENDUM ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM SCHEDULED FOR 21 JANUARY 1990. THE NARCO CAMPAIGN OF BOMBINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO WEAKEN THE GOC'S COMMITMENT TO THE EXTRADITION OF COLOMBIAN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS TO THE US. EXTRADITION IS STILL THE GREATEST FEAR OF THE TRAFFICKERS, AS EXPRESSED IN THEIR SLOGAN "BETTER A TOMB IN COLOMBIA THAN A JAIL CELL IN THE UNITED STATES." (NINE TRAFFICKERS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE US SINCE THE GOC CRACKDOWN BEGAN IN AUGUST.)

~~██████████~~ PRIOR TO 27 NOVEMBER, NEITHER THE GUERRILLAS NOR THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS HAD DEMONSTRATED THE INTENT TO CARRY OUT INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS SUCH AS THOSE DIRECTED AT THE AVIANCA JET AND THE DAS HEADQUARTERS. IN THE PAST, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS HAD BEEN VERY SELECTIVE IN THEIR CHOICE OF TARGETS AND HAD DEMONSTRATED AN INTENT TO AVOID ATTACKS THAT INFLECT MASS CASUALTIES.

~~██████████~~ EVENTS IN LATE NOVEMBER TO DECEMBER SUGGEST THAT THE NARCOS HAVE ESCALATED THEIR WAR, WHICH RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT US PERSONNEL MAY BECOME DELIBERATE TARGETS. ALTHOUGH NO AMERICANS HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY TARGETED BY THE NARCOS, THERE IS SERIOUS CONCERN THAT THEY COULD BECOME VICTIMS OF THE RISING LEVEL OF NARCOTICS-RELATED VIOLENCE.

~~██████████~~ THE TRAFFICKERS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO FOCUS THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST GOC OFFICIALS, AND DIRECT TARGETING OF US PERSONNEL REMAINS UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM. IF ONE OF THE DRUG KINGPINS IS ACTUALLY CAPTURED AND EXTRADITED TO THE US, HOWEVER, THE PROBABILITY OF NARCO RETALIATION AGAINST US FACILITIES OR PERSONNEL WOULD INCREASE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE COLOMBIAN PEOPLE VOTE IN THE 21 JANUARY 1990 REFERENDUM TO END EXTRADITION,

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 *****/
THEN THE THREAT TO US PERSONNEL WOULD LIKELY DECREASE IN THE NEAR TERM.

D. (U) PERU-----THREAT LEVEL: HIGH.
~~██████████~~ THE THREAT TO PERMANENT AND TRANSIENT US PERSONNEL IN PERU IS HIGH AND WILL REMAIN SO FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. US

INTERESTS CONTINUE TO BE ATTRACTIVE TARGETS FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS, AND MORE BOMBINGS OF US DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR TERM. LIMA HAS ONE OF THE HIGHEST RATES OF TERRORISM OF ANY MAJOR CITY IN THE WORLD, AND THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION THERE REPRESENTS A GROWING THREAT TO US PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH NO US CITIZEN HAS BEEN INJURED OR KILLED IN A TERRORIST ATTACK IN LIMA, THERE IS AN INCREASING DANGER THAT US CITIZENS WILL BECOME DELIBERATELY TARGETED OR INADVERTENTLY INVOLVED IN A BOMBING OR OTHER TERRORIST ACTION.

(U) THE TERRORIST THREAT TO US PERSONNEL HAS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, THERE IS INDISPUTABLE EVIDENCE OF A GROWING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SHINING PATH (SL--SENDERO LUMINOSO) AND COCA GROWERS, [REDACTED]

BUSC552 (b) (7)

[REDACTED] SECOND, SL ACTIVITY IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE APRIL 1990 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. ATTACKS ON US INTERESTS WOULD PROVIDE MAXIMUM PUBLICITY FOR THE GUERRILLAS.

(U) NO TERRORIST ACTIVITY DIRECTED AT US PERSONNEL OR FACILITIES IN PERU OCCURRED DURING NOVEMBER 1989. THE MOST RECENT ANTI-US ATTACK WAS THE 25 OCTOBER CAR BOMB IN FRONT OF THE RESIDENCE OF THE US MARINE SECURITY GUARDS IN LIMA (SEE MITS 89-11).

(U) NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, RATHER THAN TERRORISTS, WERE MOST LIKELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST IN PERU DURING NOVEMBER. ON 21 NOVEMBER THE BODY OF THE REPORTER WAS DISCOVERED IN A PLAZA IN UCHIZA, LOCATED IN THE CENTER OF THE COCA-PRODUCING UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY. THE REPORTER WAS KILLED BY STRANGULATION, AND HIS BODY SHOWED SIGNS OF TORTURE. ON 28 NOVEMBER THE PERUVIAN MINISTER OF INTERIOR ANNOUNCED THAT DRUG TRAFFICKERS HAD ABDUCTED AND EXECUTED THE JOURNALIST. (INITIALLY, THE MINISTER SAID THAT THE REPORTER WAS KIDNAPPED BY SL GUERRILLAS AND THEN SOLD TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS.)

(U) A POSTER FOUND NEAR THE BODY OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST SUGGESTED THAT HE HAD BEEN MISTAKEN FOR A SPY. THE POSTER STATED: "THIS IS HOW NORTH AMERICAN SPIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PENTAGON DIE, THOSE THAT RUN ANTI-SUBVERSIVE PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA, ESPECIALLY PERU--DEATH TO YANKEE IMPERIALISM--LONG LIVE THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU--LONG LIVE THE POPULAR WAR. DOWN WITH THE GENOCIDE AND DEATH TO GEORGE BUSH."

(U) ACCORDING TO THE US EMBASSY IN LIMA, SL LIKELY WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KIDNAPPING OR DEATH OF THE AMERICAN REPORTER FOR SEVERAL REASONS. FIRST [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SL DOES NOT USUALLY ABDUCT OR HOLD HOSTAGES FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. SL ALMOST IMMEDIATELY EXECUTES ITS VICTIMS; THE JOURNALIST WAS KEPT ALIVE AND TORTURED FOR THREE DAYS. SECOND, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT SL WOULD SELL THE REPORTER TO COLOMBIAN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. [REDACTED]

BUSC552 (b) (7)
BUSC 552 (b) (7) (D)

[REDACTED] FINALLY, THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE POSTER FOUND NEAR THE [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN UNINTEL NOCONTRACT~~

PAGE:0684

JOURNALIST'S BODY IS QUESTIONABLE. SL DOES NOT USE THE TERM "SUBVERSIVE" TO DESCRIBE ITS ORGANIZATION.

~~(S)~~ AS THE LEVEL OF GUERRILLA VIOLENCE IN PERU INCREASES ~~_____~~ THE THREAT TO MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LIMA AND THE RURAL AREAS WILL ALSO INCREASE. ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ IN RECENT MONTHS, SL HAS REPORTEDLY CARRIED OUT SURVEILLANCE OF US EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN LIMA ~~_____~~

515C552 (b) (1)

(C) IN OTHER REPORTING OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY, MORE DETAILS WERE OBTAINED ON THE 25 OCTOBER SL BOMBING AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LIMA (SEE MITS 89-11). ~~_____~~

~~(C)~~ SOVIET PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN PERU HAVE BEEN THE TARGET OF SL TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE PAST, DUE IN PART TO SOVIET SUPPORT ~~_____~~ FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU. ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ SL TERRORIST ATTACKS DIRECTED AT SOVIET INTERESTS IN PERU CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE IN THE COMING MONTHS.

(U) POC THIS MSG: MR. ~~_____~~ AV 335-2591; STU III AV 335-2591; STU III LOCAL 479-1931; COMM LOCAL 479-1934. CLAS BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

515C552 (b) (6)

ADMIN
DECLAS: OADR
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~~NOFORN UNINTEL NOCONTRACT~~

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~~NOFORN UNINTEL NOCONTRACT~~

PAGE:1053

INQUIRE=DOC10D
ITEM NO=00420639

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX834 MCN = 90076/19274 TOR = 900761634
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS4902 0761633-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 171633Z MAR 90
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 162103Z MAR 90
FM CDR USAITAC WASHDC//AIAIT-RKT//
TO RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHINGTON DC //AIAIT-RKT//
AIG 12149
AIG 7437
AIG 8831
AIG 8832
AIG 8833
AIG 9181
AIG 9182
AIG 9184
AIG 11557
AIG 11717
AIG 12120

BT

CONTROLS

~~S E C R E T NOFORN UNINTEL NOCONTRACT~~ SECTION 01 OF 05
QQQQ

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJECT: USAITAC MONTHLY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SUMMARY - MAR 1990 (MITS 90-03, PART 3 OF 4) (U) (J8727XWW)
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3. (U) UNITED STATES/CANADA-----ANALYST: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN UNINTEL NOCONTRACT~~

313052 (b) (5)

SECRET

~~NOFORN UNINTEL NOCONTRACT~~

FOR USE AGAINST AIRCRAFT.

PAGE:1061

[REDACTED]

EUJSC552 (b) (7)
EUJSC 052 (b) (7) (D)

(U) IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS THE MEDELLIN CARTEL HAS MADE SEVERAL OFFERS TO END THE VIOLENCE AND CEASE ALL SHIPMENTS OF COCAINE FROM COLOMBIA, AND THE TRAFFICKERS HAVE TURNED OVER DYNAMITE AND COCAINE LABS AS A SIGN OF THEIR "GOOD FAITH." THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA (GOC) HAS FLATLY REJECTED ALL OF THE NARCO OVERTURES, VIEWING THEM AS EMPTY GESTURES.

(U) THE EQUIPMENT TURNED OVER BY THE NARCOS PALES IN COMPARISON WITH THE NARCO-OWNED EXPLOSIVES, COCAINE, AND LABS SEIZED BY THE COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES IN THE SAME PERIOD. ON 12 FEBRUARY THE COLOMBIAN POLICE DISCOVERED FIVE-AND-ONE-HALF TONS OF DYNAMITE HIDDEN ON THREE FARMS BELONGING TO PABLO ESCOBAR GAVIRIA, THE LEADER OF THE MEDELLIN CARTEL, NEAR THE CITY OF MEDELLIN. THE DYNAMITE, WHICH WAS OF PERUVIAN AND ECUADOREAN MANUFACTURE, HAD BEEN PLACED INSIDE FIBERGLASS CONTAINERS CONCEALED UNDERGROUND. THE MASSIVE CACHE WAS LOCATED ON FARMS IN CALDAS, RIDNEGRO, AND SANTA HELENA FOLLOWING AN UNSUCCESSFUL OPERATION INTENDED TO APPREHEND ESCOBAR.

(U) ON 3 MARCH THE SO-CALLED "EXTRADITABLES" ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE DECLARING A "STATE OF ALERT" BECAUSE THE GOC HAD REJECTED ALL OF THEIR OFFERS OF PEACE. THERE IS GROWING CONCERN THAT THE TRAFFICKERS WILL SOON RETURN TO THEIR "TOTAL WAR" AGAINST THE GOC AND ITS POLICY OF EXTRADITING COLOMBIAN NARCOS TO THE US FOR TRIAL. (AT LEAST 21 TRAFFICKERS HAVE BEEN DETAINED SINCE AUGUST 1989, 14 OF WHOM HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO THE US.) THE NARCOS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO FOCUS THEIR ATTACKS ON GOC OFFICIALS, AND DIRECT TARGETING OF US PERSONNEL REMAINS UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM.

D. (U) PERU-----THREAT LEVEL: HIGH.
(U) [REDACTED] THE THREAT TO PERMANENT AND TRANSIENT US PERSONNEL IN PERU IS HIGH AND WILL REMAIN SO FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. US INTERESTS CONTINUE TO BE ATTRACTIVE TARGETS FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS, AND MORE BOMBINGS OF US DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR TERM. LIMA HAS ONE OF THE HIGHEST RATES OF TERRORISM OF ANY MAJOR CITY IN THE WORLD, AND THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION THERE REPRESENTS A GROWING THREAT TO US PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH NO US CITIZEN HAS BEEN INJURED OR KILLED IN A TERRORIST ATTACK IN LIMA, THERE IS AN INCREASING

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 *****/
DANGER THAT US CITIZENS WILL BECOME DELIBERATELY TARGETED OR INADVERTENTLY INVOLVED IN A BOMBING OR OTHER TERRORIST ACTION.
[REDACTED] AS THE LEVEL OF GUERRILLA VIOLENCE IN PERU INCREASES [REDACTED] THE THREAT TO MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LIMA AND THE RURAL AREAS WILL

EUJSC552 (b) (7)

SECRET

~~NOFORN UNINTEL NOCONTRACT~~

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ALSO INCREASE.

[REDACTED] IN RECENT MONTHS, SL HAS REPORTEDLY CARRIED OUT SURVEILLANCE OF US EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN LIMA [REDACTED]

ELUSC562 (b) (1)

(U) SL ALSO POSES A THREAT TO FOREIGN TOURISTS, INCLUDING AMERICANS, TRAVELING IN REMOTE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. AN AMERICAN TOURIST WAS MURDERED ON 8 FEBRUARY 1990 BY SUSPECTED SL GUERRILLAS NEAR THE CITY OF CUZCO. THE VICTIM HAD BEEN SHOT IN THE HEAD AND BACK, AND HIS BODY SHOWED SIGNS OF TORTURE. THE DEAD US CITIZEN WAS FOUND IN THE ANCIENT INCA FORTRESS AT SACSABUAMAN, WHICH IS ONE OF PERU'S MAJOR TOURIST ATTRACTIONS.

(U) [REDACTED] AT LEAST FIVE SEPARATE ATTACKS BY SUSPECTED SL GUERRILLAS ON FOREIGN TOURISTS BETWEEN MAY 1989 AND FEBRUARY 1990 SUGGESTS A NEW SL CAMPAIGN DIRECTED AGAINST PERU'S \$430 MILLION-A-YEAR TOURISM INDUSTRY (SEE MITS 90-02). ALL BUT ONE OF THE ATTACKS OCCURRED IN THE AYACUCHO/APURIMAC SIERRA REGION. THE 8 FEBRUARY MURDER WAS THE FIRST SL ATTACK ON A US TOURIST IN THIS CAMPAIGN, AND THERE IS GROWING CONCERN THAT MORE AMERICANS WILL BECOME TARGETS IN THE FUTURE. ALL TOURISTS SHOULD EXERCISE PARTICULAR CAUTION WHEN TRAVELING IN THESE AREAS.

(U) [REDACTED] IN ADDITION TO THE MURDER OF AN AMERICAN TOURIST, TWO TERRORIST BOMBINGS DIRECTED AT US FACILITIES OCCURRED DURING FEBRUARY' AT 2145 HOURS ON 14 FEBRUARY AN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DETONATED NEAR THE EXTERIOR DOOR OF THE US EMBASSY'S WAREHOUSE IN LIMA. ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL SECURITY GUARD ON DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK, THREE MEN AND A WOMAN IN A FOUR-DOOR NISSAN VEHICLE STOPPED IN FRONT OF THE WAREHOUSE. ONE OF THE MEN EXITED THE CAR, PLACED A PACKAGE CLOSE TO THE WAREHOUSE DOOR, LIT THE FUSE, AND THEN LEFT THE AREA IN THE SAME CAR. THE GUARD ALERTLY PUSHED THE PACKAGE ABOUT THREE METERS AWAY FROM THE BUILDING INTO THE STREET WHERE IT EXPLODED. NO INJURIES OR PROPERTY DAMAGE TO THE US FACILITY WAS REPORTED.

(U) [REDACTED] LITERATURE LEFT AT THE SITE SUGGESTS THAT THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA) WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS ATTACK, AS WELL AS TWO OTHER BOMBINGS WITHIN A 30-MINUTE PERIOD AT THE EMBASSY OF PANAMA AND A CHAMPION SPARK PLUG FACTORY ON THE SAME EVENING. THE BOMBINGS OCCURRED SHORTLY BEFORE THE PRESIDENT OF PERU FLEW TO COLOMBIA FOR THE ANTI-DRUG SUMMIT.

ELUSC562 (b) (1)

[REDACTED] 23 FEBRUARY; HOWEVER, NO ATTACK AGAINST A US GOVERNMENT OR PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT INSTALLATION OCCURRED ON THAT DATE' INCREASED SECURITY AT THE US EMBASSY MAY HAVE PREVENTED THE TERRORISTS FROM CARRYING OUT THEIR PLANNED ATTACK, AND SUCH MEASURES MAY FORCE THE GROUP TO SELECT A

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PAGE:0071

INQUIRE=DOC18D
ITEM NO=00565992
ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX413 MCN = 92220/00404 TOR = 922200020
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS7423 2200020-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 070020Z AUG 92
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUWTPGA/12 AF BERGSTROM AFB TX//IN//
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHINGTON DC//KT//
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEALGX/SAFE

Return to:

~~U.S. Army Central Security Facility
USAINSCOM, 902d Military Intelligence Group
ATTN: IAGPA-CSF-F
Fort Meade, MD 20755-9998~~

P 061335Z AUG 92
FM CDR 470TH MIBDE COROZAL PM//IAGPP-O//
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUDHAAA/CDR INSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//IAOPS-H-C
RUEHWP/USDRO PANAMA CITY PM
RUEHWP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA CITY PM//POL-A//
RUEHPE/USDAO LIMA PE
RUEOGWA/CDR 193RD INF BDE (LT) FT CLAYTON PM//SOBA-B//
RUEOGWA/CDR USARSO FT CLAYTON PM//SOIN//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2-IA//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DI/CRES/CTG/SRB//
RUWMEGA/AFOSI DET 721 HOWARD AFB PM//CC//
RUCOSYA/NAVINSERVRA FT AMADOR PM

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

QQQQ
SECTION 01 OF 02
CITE: (U) 0527-92-PE-F.
SERIAL: (U) IIR 2 231 0508 92.

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY
PASS: (U) CIA FOR--OCR, SSG, DB; USCINCSO FOR--SCJ2-I; STATE DEPT
FOR--ARA-PPC.
COUNTRY: (U) PERU (PE).
SUBJ: IIR 2 231 0508 92/SHINING PATH AND TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY
MOVEMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE JUNIN DEPARTMENT (U).
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 920328.
REQS: (U) U-UCR-2300-29-88; (INITIATIVE).
SOURCE: (S/NF) //2 231 0533//

~~SECRET~~

5130552 (U) (1) (1)

~~NOFORN~~

SUMMARY:

TEXT: 1. (S/NFT)

2. (S/NFT)

3. (S/NFT)

4. (S/NFT)

5. (S/NFT)

6. (S/NFT)

7. (S/NFT)

8. (S/NFT)

9. (S/NFT)

10. (S/NFT)

SUSC 512 (b) (1)

~~NOFORN~~

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11. (S/NF)

12. (S/NF)

13. (S/NF)

14. (S/NF)

A.

B.

15. (S/NF)

A.

B.

16. (S/NF)

17. (S/NF)

18. (S/NF)

A.

B.

19. (S/NF)

20. (S/NF)

SUSC302 (b) (1)

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21. (S/NF)

22. (S/NF)

A.

B.

23. (S/NF)

A.

B.

34. (S/NF)

UNSCAS (P) (U)

COMMENTS: (u) (S) (FIELD COMMENTS)--(U) FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, SEE 470TH MIBDE IIR'S 2 231 0365 92 AND 2 231 0371 92.

REFERRED

//IPSP: (U) PG 2300//.
//COMSOBJ: (U) 190//.
ADMIN
PROJ: (U) 240300.
INSTR: (U) US NO.

~~SECRET~~

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