

INQUIRE=DOC16D  
ITEM NO=00369578

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX025 MCN = 91344/36069 TOR = 913442107  
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS7249 3442108- [REDACTED]-RUEALGX.  
ZNY [REDACTED]

HEADER

R 102108Z DEC 91  
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RUETIAQ/MPCFTGEORGEGMEADM  
RUEOGWA/CDRUSARSO FT CLAYTON PM  
RUEAIJU/NPIC WASHINGTON DC//IEG//  
RUWTPGA/USSOUTHAF BERGSTROM AFB TX//IN//  
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHINGTON DC//KT//  
RUWSMXI/MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//  
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//  
RUEHC /SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RULKQAN/MARCORINTCEN QUANTICO VA  
RUEALGX/SAFE  
R 102054Z DEC 91

**CORRECTED COPY  
REDISSEMINATION**

[REDACTED]  
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
INFO RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS//SCJ2/IAD/I//  
BT  
CONTROLS

SECTION 01 OF 04 [REDACTED]

SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

BODY

COUNTRY: (U) PERU (PE).

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] SENDERO LUMINOSO COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED

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- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 840000-911120.

2. [REDACTED] THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT OPENED THE LA MORADA AREA IN THE EARLY 1970'S TO COLONISTS OR SETTLERS IN ORDER TO DEVELOP THE AGRICULTURE OF THE UHV, BUT THE MAJORITY OF THE COLONISTS DID NOT ARRIVE UNTIL THE EARLY 1980'S. BY THE MID-1980'S LA MORADA HAD APPROXIMATELY 3,500 INHABITANTS. THIS HAS NOW DECREASED TO ABOUT 1,000 PERSONS BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH SL AND POOR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FOR RICE AND CATTLE FARMERS. CURRENTLY THERE EXISTS A SHORTAGE OF LABORERS BECAUSE OF THIS EXODUS AND SL POLICY OF NOT ALLOWING OUTSIDERS TO ENTER THE AREA.

3. [REDACTED] IN THE EARLY 1980'S, THE FIRST SL ENTERED THIS PART OF THE UHV AND ATTACKED A SMALL POLICE UNIT IN A FOREST PARK NEAR PUCUYACU (ABOUT 10 KM EAST OF LA MORADA AND ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE HUALLAGA RIVER). ONLY FIVE SL MEMBERS TOOK PART IN THIS ATTACK BUT THEY MANAGED TO CAPTURE THE OUTPOST AND TOOK THREE OR FOUR WEAPONS. ALTHOUGH THE RESIDENTS WERE MADE AWARE THAT IT WAS AN ATTACK BY SL, THE SUBVERSIVES TOOK NO POLITICAL ACTION TO ORGANIZE OR WORK WITH THE PEOPLE IN THE ZONE.

4. [REDACTED] IN AUG 1984 ANOTHER SL ARMED GROUP ARRIVED

IN LA MORADA AREA WITH OVER SIXTY COMBATANTS LED BY A SL LEADER (NAME UNKNOWN) WHO IS CURRENTLY WORKING IN TARAPOTO. THIS TIME THE SL MADE AN EFFORT TO ORGANIZE THE TOWN. INITIALLY THEY ORGANIZED THE "BASE DE APOYO" OR "BASE POPULAR"(SUPPORT BASE) WITH THE LOCAL INHABITANTS USING SMALL CELLS. THEY ALSO ATTACKED GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND THREATENED THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS, MOST OF WHOM IMMEDIATELY LEFT TOWN. SL ROBBED AND RAIDED SEVERAL STORES AND DISTRIBUTED THE MERCHANDISE TO THE NEEDY.

[REDACTED] DURING THIS PERIOD SL PUNISHED SEVERAL OF THE LOCAL CRIMINALS, THREATENED ANY REMAINING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, BUT ONLY KILLED ONE FAMILY FOR BEING INFORMERS.

5. [REDACTED] IN ADDITION TO LA MORADA, SL ORGANIZED SEVERAL OF THE NEARBY "CASERIOS" (SMALL VILLAGES). INITIALLY SL ENTERED A VILLAGE AND CALLED FOR A TOWN MEETING. AT THE MEETING SL EXPLAINED THAT THEY WANTED TO FORM A SUPPORT BASE AND THEN ASKED FOR A VOLUNTEER TO BE THE LEADER (DELEGATE) OF THE VILLAGE. IN SOME VILLAGES NO ONE VOLUNTEERED, SO A "VOLUNTEER" WAS APPOINTED. THE PEASANTS USUALLY WERE FEARFUL THAT REFUSING TO ACCEPT THE APPOINTMENT WOULD PUT THEIR LIVES IN DANGER AND THUS THEY ACCEPTED THE POSITIONS. NEVERTHELESS, SOME DO VOLUNTEER ESPECIALLY THE YOUTH WHO HAVE FORMERLY SERVED AS MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL MILITARY FORCE. A POLITICAL LEADER, MILITARY LEADER, AND A LOGISTICS LEADER WERE APPOINTED IN A SIMILAR MANNER IN EACH VILLAGE. SL WOULD THEN ORGANIZE A SECURITY FORCE, WOMEN'S MOVEMENT AND YOUTH MOVEMENT (FOR THOSE UNDER THE AGE OF 25 YEARS). EACH OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS HAD A DELEGATE TO LEAD THE MOVEMENT AND TO REPRESENT THE MOVEMENT AT THE NEXT HIGHER ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL.

6. [REDACTED] BY 1989 LA MORADA HAD PROGRESSED IN THE "REVOLUTIONARY ADVANCEMENT" AND SL REORGANIZED THE TOWN AND THE SURROUNDING VILLAGES INTO "COMITES POPULARES" (CP - PUBLIC COMMITTEES).

[REDACTED]

7. [REDACTED] UNDER THE CP ORGANIZATION SL HAS ORGANIZED EACH VILLAGE WITH A FARMERS' (CAMPESINO) MOVEMENT, YOUTH MOVEMENT, AND WOMEN'S MOVEMENT. EACH MOVEMENT HAS A DELEGATE, SUB-DELEGATE, POLITICAL LEADER, MILITARY LEADER, AND LOGISTICS LEADER. THE DELEGATES

[REDACTED]

AND SUB-DELEGATES PERIODICALLY ATTEND CP LEVEL MEETINGS (REUNION DE ENCARGADOS). AT THESE MEETINGS THEY HAVE NAMED OR APPOINTED A COMMISSARIAT SECRETARY (POLITICAL LEADER), COMMISSARIAT FOR SECURITY (MILITARY LEADER), AND A COMMISSARIAT FOR PRODUCTION (LOGISTIC LEADER) AND TWO OTHER COMMISSARIATS WHO DEAL WITH THE SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL (INTELLECTUAL) ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNITY. THESE COMMISSARIATS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE KNOWN ONLY BY THE DELEGATES AND ARE THE MAXIMUM LEADERS OF THE CP. THE COMMISSARIATS ARE TO PROVIDE THE DELEGATES WITH AN ACCOUNTING OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE DELEGATES IN TURN PROVIDE IT TO THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY (VILLAGE INHABITANTS). THIS, HOWEVER, SELDOM HAPPENS AND NO ONE WANTS TO QUESTION THE DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSARIATS.

EACH CP IS CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ORGANIZING A "FUERZA DE BASE" OR LOCAL MILITARY FORCE COMPRISED OF THE YOUNG MEN WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE COMMISSARIAT FOR SECURITY. IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS MILITARY OBLIGATION, MANY OF THE YOUNG MEN IN LA MORADA AREA LEFT. THE SL PRINCIPAL FORCE (MAIN COMBAT FORCE) PERIODICALLY PASSES THROUGH THIS AREA AND RECRUITS ITS COMBATANTS FROM THESE LOCAL FORCES. IN COMBAT THEY HAVE ALSO USED THE LOCAL FORCE FOR "CANNON FODDER" DURING AN ACTUAL ATTACK. THE LOCAL FORCES IN LA MORADA AREA LACK MOTIVATION AND LEADERSHIP. CONSEQUENTLY THEY OFTEN DISSOLVE WHEN THE PERUVIAN ARMY BEGINS TO PATROL OR OPERATE IN THE AREA.

THE SL MILITARY FORCES GENERALLY HAVE OPERATED AND TRAINED ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE HUALLAGA RIVER AND THE ARMY USUALLY STAYS ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE RIVER. THESE LOCAL FORCES IN LA MORADA AREA ARE POORLY ARMED SINCE IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH CP TO ARM THEIR LOCAL FORCE. CONSEQUENTLY THEIR MILITARY ACTIONS TAKE A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF PLANNING IN ORDER TO ASSEMBLE THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FROM A VARIETY OF LOCATIONS.

10. THROUGHOUT LA MORADA AREA THERE IS VERY LITTLE POLITICAL WORK BY SL. ONCE THE SL LEADERSHIP

ORGANIZES A VILLAGE, THE LOCAL APPOINTED LEADERS HAVE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THEIR LIVES, POWER, PRESTIGE AND AN ORGANIZATION TO SUPPORT THEM. THE CAMPESINO SOON DISCOVERS THAT HE HAS EARNED A DEGREE OF "RESPECT" OR "FEAR" FROM THE OTHER INHABITANTS. THIS NEW POWER SOON TRANSFORMS ITSELF AND THE PREVIOUSLY RELUCTANT INDIVIDUAL GRADUALLY BECOMES A MORE FERVENT SL SUPPORTER. SL DOES REQUIRE THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE VILLAGE LEARN MANY OF THE SL GREETINGS. ALL ARE REQUIRED TO LEARN THE FIRST WHICH ACKNOWLEDGES THAT SL AND ITS PRESIDENT GONZALO ARE SUPREME. THOSE THAT ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE CP'S LOCAL FORCE ENJOY THE BENEFIT THAT THE OTHER VILLAGERS ARE REQUIRED TO ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS LAND AND FAMILY.

11. [REDACTED] THE AVERAGE CAMPESINO, HOWEVER, DOES NOT SUPPORT SL AND WOULD PREFER THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAVE CONTROL OF VILLAGE. OFTEN THE NEW SL LEADERS BECOME ABUSIVE OR CORRUPT IN THEIR MANAGEMENT OF THE CP. IN LA MORADA THEY HAVE BECOME INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL SUPPORT TO THE NARCOTRAFFICKERS AND OFTEN SPECULATE IN THE PURCHASE OF COCAINE. THE FORCED SUPPORT OF SL HAS PLACED A FINANCIAL HARDSHIP ON THE RESIDENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, SL TAXED THREE OF THE CP'S (LA MORADA, LA FLORIDA, AND EL TRIUNFAL) USD 3000 IN ORDER TO BUY A MACHINE GUN.

[REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED] IN LA MORADA THERE IS ONE FAMILY, [REDACTED] THAT HAS BEEN ACTIVE FOR SEVERAL YEARS IN THE SL DEVELOPMENT OF THIS REGION. THE FATHER AND HIS TWO SONS HAVE POSITIONS IN EL BOLSON AS COMMISSARIATS. THE SONS, [REDACTED] ARE FARMERS AND TRAVEL THROUGHOUT THE REGION ON HORSEBACK. THE FATHER, [REDACTED] WORKS FOR THE AUCAYACU CATHOLIC PARISH [REDACTED] AND DRIVES THE PARISH PICKUP TRUCK. WHEN USING THIS TRUCK HE IS ABLE TO GO THROUGH ARMY AND POLICE CHECKPOINTS WITHOUT BEING INSPECTED BY STATING THAT WHAT HE IS CARRYING IS FOR THE PARISH.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

14. [REDACTED] ACTUAL COMBAT ACTION IN THE AREA HAS GENERALLY BEEN QUITE LIMITED. IN JULY 89 THE SL COMANDANTE (SAME ONE THAT WAS PRESENT IN 1984) CONDUCTED AN ATTACK ON THE ARMY POST LOCATED AT MADRE MIA (EAST OF LA MORADA AND ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE HUALLAGA RIVER).

[REDACTED]

16. [REDACTED] ON 16 SEP 1991 A SL UNIT AMBUSHED AN ARMY PATROL [REDACTED] AT BAJO SUCRE WHICH IS NEAR AUCAYACU. APPROXIMATELY 15 SOLDIERS WERE KILLED.

[REDACTED]

[/] [redacted] [redacted]  
//IPSP: (U) PG 2310//.

//COMSOBJ: (U) 191//.

ADMIN

PROJ: (U).

INSTR: (U). U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) [redacted]

ACQ: (U) [redacted] (911120-911126).

DISSEM: (U) FIELD: AMEMB LIMA (AMB DCM POL POL:JM).

WARNING: REPORT CLASSIFIED [redacted]  
[redacted]

BT

#7249

NNNN  
[redacted] [redacted]