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UNCLASSIFIED

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ACTION ARA-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-13	ADS-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	DEAE-00
	ANHR-01	DS-00	HA-09	H-01	INM-01	INRE-00	INR-01
	L-03	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01
	P-01	SCT-03	SNP-01	SP-01	SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01
	USIE-00	/044W					

-----8C8D2D 231618Z /43

P 231352Z AUG 91  
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0793  
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
 AMEMBASSY QUITO  
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN  
 DIA WASHDC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR **B** Date: 9/11/97  
 RELEASE  DECLASSIFY  
 EXCISE  DECLASSIFY EO Citations \_\_\_\_\_  
 DENY  IN PART

FOIA Exemptions \_\_\_\_\_ TS authority to  
 PA Exemptions \_\_\_\_\_  CLASSIFY as  S or  C Sec. \_\_\_\_\_  
 DOWNGRADE TS to  S or  C

SECTION 01 OF 05 LIMA 11463

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR  
 TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PHUM, SNAR, PGOV, PE  
 SUBJECT: CAN THE REVOLUTIONARIES WIN IN PERU? THE  
 - CASE FOR SENDERO LUMINOSO.

REF: A) 90 LIMA 17143, B) LIMA 7182, C) LIMA 9176

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 2. SUMMARY. APPEARANCES TO THE CONTRARY, SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) MAY HAVE POSITIONED ITSELF TO LOSE THE STRUGGLE FOR PERU -- WHETHER TO THE GOVERNMENT OR MRTA REMAINS TO BE SEEN. MOST DATA WOULD APPEAR TO SUGGEST THAT SL IS WINNING. THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST-RELATED DEATHS AND INCIDENTS CONTINUES TO RISE. THE NUMBER OF PROVINCES UNDER EMERGENCY ZONE STATUS HAS NEVER BEEN HIGHER. ALL RELIABLE ESTIMATES OF SL STRENGTH SHOW THE MOVEMENT GROWING. BUT THERE ARE SIGNS, AND WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, THAT THE

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REVOLUTION OF ABIMAEEL GUZMAN IS VULNERABLE. WITH ITS RELIANCE ON COCA LEAF PROFITS, SL NO LONGER NEEDS THE PEASANT OF THE SIERRA FOR SHELTER AND SUPPORT. THE POPULAR SUPPORT SL ONCE ENJOYED IN PARTS OF THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS PRIOR TO 1983 IS DECREASING. IN FORMER SENDERO STRONGHOLDS THE PEASANTS NOW VIEW SL BRUTALITY WITH EVEN GREATER CENSURE THAN THE OCCASIONAL REPRESSION OF THE POLICE AND THE ARMY. IN THE UNIVERSITIES AND IN THE LIMA SLUMS THE PEOPLE ARE ALSO REJECTING THE POLITICS OF TERROR. THOUGH SL'S CLAIM THAT IT HAS REACHED STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM IS PURE FANTASY, SENDERO DOES REPRESENT A GRAVE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY IN PERU. SL WRITINGS PREDICT THAT A REPRESSIVE MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL LEAD TO AN SL VICTORY. BUT WE JUDGE THAT AN END TO DEMOCRACY COULD FAVOR MRTA, NOT SL. EVEN IF DEMOCRACY FALLS, IN THE SHORT OR MEDIUM TERM THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE OF SL WINNING POWER IN PERU. END SUMMARY.

3. THIS IS THE FIRST OF A TWO PART SERIES BY DEPARTING POLOFF GARLAND DENNETT ON THE PROSPECTS FOR

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 TERRORISM IN PERU. OTHER MISSION ELEMENTS HAVE CONTRIBUTED, BUT AS APPROPRIATE IN A SWAN SONG, THE DRAFTING OFFICER GETS THE FINAL SAY. SOME WHO REMAIN, HAVE A DIFFERENT PRISM. BUT BY THE TIME WE KNOW AS MUCH AS DENNETT, WE MAY SEE THINGS THE SAME WAY HE DOES.

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 SENDERO APPEARS TO BE WINNING THE WAR  
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4. ON THE SURFACE THE EVIDENCE APPEARS PERSUASIVE THAT SENDERO LUMINOSO IS WINNING ITS WAR WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU. THE GENERAL TREND IN TERRORIST RELATED DEATHS AND TERRORIST INCIDENTS IS STEADILY UPWARD. SL'S ABILITY TO STRIKE TARGETS IN LIMA AND IN THE COUNTRYSIDE REMAINS LARGELY UNIMPEDED. THE AREA OF PERU IN WHICH SL OPERATES IS EXPANDING. EACH YEAR SINCE 1981 THE NUMBER OF PROVINCES UNDER EMERGENCY ZONE STATUS HAS INCREASED. IN 1991, 90 OF PERU'S 183 PROVINCES HAVE BEEN IN EZ STATUS.

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5. RESEARCHERS PIEDAD PAREJA AND ALDO GATTI DID A STUDY PRIOR TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS HELD ON AUGUST 18 WHICH DISCUSSES AREAS WHERE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PRESENCE IS ABSENT. THEY REPORT THAT THE GOP WAS UNABLE TO HOLD SUCCESSFUL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER 1989 (DUE TO NO CANDIDATES, ELECTIONS ANNULLED BECAUSE OF LOW VOTER TURN-OUT OR A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF NULL BALLOTS, OR ELECTED OFFICIALS REFUSING TO TAKE OFFICE) IN TWENTY-EIGHT PERCENT OF

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PAGE 04 LIMA 11463 01 OF 05 231358Z THE NATION'S POLITICAL JURISDICTIONS. THIS REPRESENTS FIFTEEN PERCENT OF PERU'S TERRITORY AND SEVEN PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE. THE TWENTY-EIGHT PERCENT IN 1989 COMPARES TO FAILED ELECTIONS IN PREVIOUS NATIONAL MUNICIPAL BALLOTING OF SEVEN POINT FIVE PERCENT IN 1980, EIGHT PERCENT IN 1983, AND SIX POINT SEVEN PERCENT IN 1986.

6. BY ANY MEASURE, SL'S ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND DEPLOY FIGHTERS IS UNDIMINISHED. MOST ESTIMATES OF SL'S STRENGTH SHOW ABSOLUTE GROWTH IN THE NUMBER AND SIZES OF COLUMNS SINCE 1985. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS PLACE SL STRENGTH AT: TWO TO THREE THOUSAND TRAINED

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L-03	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01
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USIE-00	/044W					

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P 231352Z AUG 91  
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0794  
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
 AMEMBASSY QUITO  
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN  
 DIA WASHDC

SECTION 02 OF 05 LIMA 11463

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR  
 TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PHUM, SNAR, PGOV, PE  
 SUBJECT: CAN THE REVOLUTIONARIES WIN IN PERU? THE  
 CADRE UNDER PERMANENT ARMS; THREE TO FIVE THOUSAND  
 LOCAL MILITIA OCCASIONALLY UNDER ARMS; 17,000 TO  
 21,000 DEDICATED SYMPATHIZERS IN FRONT GROUPS AND  
 OTHER SL ORGANIZATIONS. AS A MEASURE OF SL'S ABILITY  
 TO RECRUIT, THOSE ESTIMATES GENERALLY IGNORE THE  
 1100 SL TERRORISTS IN JAIL AND THE THOUSAND THE

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 MILITARY AND POLICE HAVE KILLED EACH OF THE PAST FOUR  
 YEARS. IF THE NUMBER OF SL CADRE AT LARGE TODAY IS  
 GREATER THAN FIVE YEARS AGO (WHICH EVERYONE AGREES IS  
 LIKELY) THEN SL'S GROWTH IS THE MORE STRIKING GIVEN  
 THE NUMBERS OF ITS LOSSES IN THOSE FIVE YEARS. (SEE  
 REF B FOR A COMPARISON OF RECENT INTELLIGENCE  
 ESTIMATES OF SL STRENGTH.)

7. BUT THE STATISTICS DO NOT FULLY EXPRESS THE  
 FEELING OF THE PEOPLE THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT IS LOSING  
 THE WAR. A LATE 1988 UNPUBLISHED SURVEY TAKEN BY THE  
 BERNALES COMMISSION REVEALED THAT AS MANY AS 10  
 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF PERU BELIEVE THAT SL  
 MIGHT WIN AND THAT IF THEY DID THINGS MIGHT IMPROVE.  
 (NOTE: WE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THE DETAILS OF THIS  
 SURVEY AND THE SAMPLE DEFECTS WHICH DETRACT FROM ITS

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SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY.) NEVERTHELESS, MOST PERUVIANS EXPRESS THEIR VIEW OF THE WAR WITH THEIR FEET: THE RATE OF MIGRATION OUT OF THE COUNTRYSIDE REMAINS HIGH. THE MAYORS OF HUANCAYO, AYACUCHO, AREQUIPA, LIMA (ESPECIALLY LIMA) AND MOST MAJOR CITIES POINT TO PHENOMENAL GROWTH OF THEIR CITIES' SLUMS, HOME TO THE REFUGEES FLEEING THE VIOLENCE AND ECONOMIC DISORDER.

8. ESPECIALLY IN THE POLITICAL LEFT THERE IS A VIEW THAT IF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS CONTINUES, THE HUNGER AND MISERY WILL DRIVE INCREASING NUMBERS OF PERUVIANS INTO THE ARMS OF THE TERRORISTS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF THE GENERATION OF 15 TO 25 YEAR OLDS WHO ARE GROWING UP WITH LITTLE EXPECTATION THAT THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT CAN OFFER THEM ANY KIND OF

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FUTURE.

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FORGETTING THE ROOTS OF THE REVOLUTION  
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9. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, IT REMAINS OUR VIEW THAT SENDERO LUMINOSO IS VULNERABLE; THAT ABIMAEEL GUZMAN'S REVOLUTION HAS FAILED IN ITS BASIC GOAL: TO WIN THE PEASANTS OF THE ANDEAN RIDGE TO THE REVOLUTION. AS WE ARGUED IN REF A, SENDERO IS GROWING, BUT NOT DEVELOPING. IN PART THIS IS BECAUSE THE MOVEMENT HAS LARGELY ABANDONED GUZMAN'S BASIC STRATEGY, TO ESTABLISH "BASES DE APOYO" IN THE SIERRA, AND FROM THE SIERRA LAUNCH THE ATTACK THAT WOULD ENCIRCLE LIMA AND THE COASTAL CITIES AND DRIVE THE WHITE RULING CLASS INTO THE SEA. SL NO LONGER NEEDS THE PEASANT OF THE SIERRA FOR SHELTER, FOOD AND REFUGE. SL NOW USES THE EASTERN JUNGLE AND ITS PROFIT FROM THE COCA LEAF FOR THOSE PURPOSES.

10. GUZMAN OFTEN QUOTED MAO ON THE FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM OF A RURAL-BASED REVOLUTION, "WATER IS TO THE FISH WHAT THE PEASANTS ARE TO THE GUERRILLA." WE WERE NOT HERE IN THE BEGINNING, BUT OUR FRIENDS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE TELL US THAT IN THE 70S AND EARLY 80S SL TRULY ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE CAMPESINADO OF AYACUCHO, HUANCABELICA AND APURIMAC.

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THOSE WERE THE HALCYON DAYS OF THE REVOLUTION. BUT FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS THE MOOD OF PUBLIC OPINION THERE SHIFTED. NOW IN MOST PLACES IN THE CENTRAL

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HIGHLANDS THE PEASANT VIEWS THE BRUTALITY OF SENDERO LUMINOSO WITH EVEN GREATER REJECTION THAN THE OCCASIONAL REPRESSION OF THE ARMY AND THE POLICE. LIKE THE FORCES OF ORDER, THE PEASANT SEES SL AS AN INTERLOPER. IN MOST PLACES IN THE SIERRA SL IS NOW A SHARK OUT OF WATER.

11. IT IS STILL A SHARK, AND IN ITS THRASHINGS ABOUT IT IS KILLING THOUSANDS, MOSTLY THE VERY CAMPESINOS THAT GUZMAN ONCE THOUGHT TO WIN OVER. THE MAJORITY OF THE PEASANTS OF THE SIERRA DO NOT SUPPORT THE REVOLUTION. NEITHER DO THEY SUPPORT OR TRUST THEIR GOVERNMENT OR IT AGENTS, THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE. THUS, MANY FLEE. MOST OF THOSE WHO REMAIN

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	P-01	SCT-03	SNP-01	SP-01	SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01
	USIE-00	/044W					

-----8C8D32 231618Z /43

P 231352Z AUG 91  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0795  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN  
DIA WASHDC

[REDACTED] SECTION 03 OF 05 LIMA 11463

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR  
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PHUM, SNAR, PGOV, PE  
SUBJECT: CAN THE REVOLUTIONARIES WIN IN PERU? THE  
ARE POLITICALLY INDIFFERENT, BUT CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO  
RAGING TIDES OF VIOLENCE. SOME ARE SWEEPED UP BY THE  
RONDAS CAMPESINAS MOVEMENT. THERE THE ENTHUSIASM OF  
THE PEASANT FOR AUTO-DEFENSE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS  
IS NOT A PRODUCT OF IDEOLOGY, BUT OF PERSONAL  
SECURITY. SIMILARLY IN TOWNS CONTROLLED BY SL. THE

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PEASANT WILL MARCH TO WHICHEVER DRUMMER IS CURRENTLY  
WIELDING THE BIGGEST STICK. BUT THE PEASANT  
UNDERSTANDS OR FAVORS NEITHER TUNE.

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SIGNS OF SL'S FAILURE  
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12. THE PEASANT'S INDIFFERENCE DERIVES FROM HIS  
DESIRE TO WORK HIS LAND, FEED HIS FAMILY, AND BE LEFT  
ALONE. SL'S IDEOLOGY AND CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE  
OWNERSHIP AND LAND MANAGEMENT FLIES IN THE FACE OF  
THOSE DESIRES. THERE IS NO BETTER EVIDENCE OF THIS  
THAN IN THE CENTRAL HUALLAGA. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY  
ARGUED THAT THE COCA GROWERS' RELATIONSHIP WITH SL IS  
AN ARTIFICIAL ONE; THAT THE COCA GROWER IS A TRUE  
CAPITALIST, TOLERATING SL HEGEMONY ONLY AS A BUFFER  
AGAINST TRAFFICKERS AND THE GOP. WE SAW SOME  
EVIDENCE OF THIS IN 1989 WITH GENERAL ARCINIEGA, BUT  
EVEN WE HAVE BEEN SURPRISED IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS BY

THE NUMBER OF COCA GROWERS ASSOCIATIONS IN THE SENDERO AREA OF THE UHV WHO HAVE COME FORWARD TO OFFER COOPERATION WITH THE GOP IN ITS CROP SUBSTITUTION EFFORT.

13. WE ARE NOT FOOLED INTO BELIEVING THAT THESE CAMPELINOS ARE YET PREPARED TO PULL UP THEIR BUSHES IN EXCHANGE FOR PROMISES AND PIPE DREAMS. BUT THE VERY GESTURE OF ORGANIZING IN DEFIANCE OF SL, AND COMING FORWARD TO ENTER INTO CONVERSATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT, ALSO IN DEFIANCE OF SL, IS EVIDENCE THAT

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THE GROWERS ARE TIRED OF THE VIOLENCE AND TIRED OF SL'S IRON RULE OVER THEIR LIVES. AS WALTER TOCAS LEARNED (REF C), THAT DEFIANCE CAN BE FATAL. BUT TOCAS' DEATH AT THE HANDS OF SL HAS NOT DENTED THE SURGE OF COCALERO INTEREST IN BECOMING PLAYERS WITH THE GOP AND SHARING THE ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PIE.

14. ON THE BATTLEFIELD SL HAS RARELY SHOWN A WILLINGNESS OR ABILITY TO CONFRONT A MODERATELY WELL-ARMED OR PREPARED FORCE. IN MOST ARMED CLASHES SL CONTINUES TO RELY MORE ON UNTRAINED FORCE MULTIPLIERS FOR PROTECTION THAN MODERN ARMAMENT. THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS OF WELL-ARMED SL COMPANIES. SOME SL OPERATIONS IN LIMA AND ELSEWHERE ARE WELL-PLANNED AND SUPPORTED BY MODERN EQUIPMENT. BUT HIGH QUALITY OPERATIONS REMAIN THE EXCEPTION. EMBOFFS HAVE VISITED STOCKPILES OF WEAPONS SEIZED FROM SL IN MAZAMARI, HUANCAYO, AYACUCHO, HUARAZ, TINGO MARIA, LIMA, PUNO AND AREQUIPA. AMONG THE WEAPONS THE POLICE AND ARMY HAVE TAKEN FROM THE TERRORISTS ARE ONLY A FEW DECENT ARMS, MOSTLY WEAPONS TAKEN OR PURCHASED FROM THE POLICE AND MILITARY. WE HAVE RECENTLY REPORTED A GATHERING OF AS MANY AS 500 ARMED SL. BUT WHEN THAT FORCE DEPLOYED TO THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY, IT DIVIDED INTO SMALLER COLUMNS AGAIN RELYING ON LOCAL PEASANTS TO AUGMENT ITS NUMBERS IN A SERIES OF AMBUSHES AGAINST POLICE AND MILITARY PATROLS. SL'S WEAPON OF CHOICE REMAINS THE STICK OF DYNAMITE.

15. THERE ARE OTHER SIGNS OF SL FUTILITY. AT  
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 CURRENT RATES OF GROWTH GREATER LIMA WILL HOLD ONE  
 HALF OF PERU'S POPULATION BY THE END OF THE CENTURY.  
 THE SLUM TOWNS, EVEN THE NEW ONES, ARE BURSTING AT  
 THE SEAMS. THESE ARE FOLKS LARGELY WITHOUT JOBS,  
 ELECTRICITY, WATER, SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, AND GENERALLY  
 WITH LITTLE HOPE. BUT OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT SL HAS  
 REACHED A PLATEAU IN ITS EFFORT TO CONTROL THESE  
 SLUMS. THERE ARE ACTIVE SL CELLS IN MANY OF THEM.  
 BUT DEFIANTLY ANTI-SL LEADERS ARE SERVING IN VILLA EL  
 SALVADOR, HUAYCAN, VILLA MARIA, SAN JUAN DE  
 LURIGANCHO, ETC. AS WE REPORTED, IN HUAYCAN  
 COMMUNITY LEADERS ARE RISKING THEIR LIVES IN OPEN  
 DEFIANCE OF SL'S EFFORTS TO CONTROL THEIR TOWN.



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	P-01	SCT-03	SNP-01	SP-01	SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01
	USIE-00	/044W					

-----8C8D34 231618Z /43

P 231352Z AUG 91  
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0796  
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN  
DIA WASHDC

SECTION 04 OF 05 LIMA 11463

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR  
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PHUM, SNAR, PGOV, PE  
SUBJECT: CAN THE REVOLUTIONARIES WIN IN PERU? THE  
16. CONSIDER RECENT SL EFFORTS TO CALL ARMED STRIKES  
IN LIMA. UNLIKE THE FIRST SUCH STRIKES IN 1988, THE  
MORE RECENT HAVE BEEN UTTER FAILURES. THE MIDDLE  
CLASS HAS BEEN INTIMIDATED; PRIVATE BUS OWNERS STAY  
OFF THE STREETS TO PROTECT THEIR VEHICLES. BUT IN  
THE SLUMS WHERE SL PRESENCE SHOULD BE THE HIGHEST,

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CITIZENS MOBILIZE EN MASSE IN TRUCKS, PICK-UPS, ON  
FOOT OR ANY OTHER WAY THEY CAN TO GET TO WORK IN  
DEFIANCE OF SL THREATS. EARNING A DAY'S WAGE IS MORE  
IMPORTANT THAN IDEOLOGY.

17. SIMILAR DEFIANCE IS APPEARING IN SOME PERUVIAN  
UNIVERSITIES. SL SLATES HAVE LOST MOST RECENT  
ELECTIONS IN ALL THE UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES THEY ONCE  
CONTROLLED, EXCEPT THE CENTRAL UNIVERSITY (UNCP) IN  
HUANCAYO. VERY LITTLE REVOLUTIONARY GRAFFITI HAS  
REAPPEARED ON CAMPUS FOLLOWING FUJIMORI'S PAINTING  
CAMPAIGNS AT SAN MARCOS, LA CANTUTA AND UNCP. OUR  
CONTACTS AT SAN MARCOS TELL US THAT SL'S PRESENCE ON  
CAMPUS IS UNCHANGED, BUT THE STUDENTS' WILLINGNESS TO  
DEFY SL IS INCREASING. WE HAVE OBSERVED THE SAME IN  
OUR VISITS TO SL'S BIRTHPLACE, THE UNIVERSITY OF  
HUAMANGA. FRIENDS ON OTHER LIMA CAMPUSES TELL US  
THAT THE SMALL GROUPS OF SL SYMPATHIZERS THAT BEGAN  
APPEARING IN THE MID-80S ARE ENTIRELY GONE. MORE  
LIKELY THESE GROUPS HAVE GONE FURTHER UNDERGROUND AS  
A RESULT OF RECENT POLICE SUCCESS AGAINST LIMA SL  
OPERATIONS.

18. WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED OUR VIEW THAT THERE  
HAS NOT BEEN AN ADEQUATE REPLENISHMENT OF SL  
LEADERSHIP. MANY OF THE FOUNDERS ARE NOW IN EXILE,



DEAD IN THE 1986 PENALES MASSACRES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, OR PURGED BY SL ITSELF. POLICE AND NAVY INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE CURRENT SL LEADERSHIP IS YOUNGER, LESS WELL-EDUCATED AND LESS PATIENT THAN THE PHILOSOPHERS AND PROFESSIONALS WHO




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FOUNDED THE MOVEMENT IN THE MID 60S. SL DOES MARGINALLY WELL IN RECRUITING SOLDIERS AMONG THE POOR, YOUNG PEASANTS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE OF A LEANNESS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE RANKS OF SL'S POLITICAL AND SENIOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP.

19. IN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, SL CLAIMS IT HAS REACHED "STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM" WITH THE GOP. WE JUDGE THAT TO BE PURE FANTASY. THERE IS NO PLACE IN PERU WHERE SL HAS ESTABLISHED A DEFENSIVE PERIMETER ACROSS WHICH THE ARMY IS NOT ABLE TO CROSS, ASSUMING ADEQUATE FUEL AND MUNITIONS FOR EXISTING HARDWARE. SL CAN STRIKE POORLY DEFENDED TARGETS AT WILL, CAN BLACK-OUT LIMA AND SHUT DOWN THIS CITY'S FOOD SUPPLY, AND CAN HIDE ITS CADRE IN THE JUNGLE OR AMONG THE POOR AND BEYOND THE ARMY'S ABILITY TO FIND THEM. BUT THERE IS NO VILLAGE OR SECTION OF JUNGLE "CONTROLLED" BY SL WHERE THE GOP CANNOT ENTER AND ESTABLISH A PERMANENT SECURITY PRESENCE IF IT CHOSSES TO DO SO.

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PREDICTING THE FUTURE  
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20. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WELL-INFORMED STUDENTS OF SENDERO LUMINOSO WHO DISAGREE WITH OUR VIEW. GUSTAVO GORRITI, MANUEL JESUS GRANADOS, IVAN DEGREGORI AND OTHERS BELIEVE THAT SL IS WINNING AND THAT THE TIDE MAY BE IRREVERSIBLE. GORRITI ADMITS THE SIGNS OF SL DEBILITY WE HAVE IDENTIFIED, BUT OPINES THAT THIS IS



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AN SL TACTIC TO HIDE ITS STRENGTH UNTIL THE FINAL



ASSAULT IS READY. GORRITI AND GRANADOS BELIEVE THAT SL MAY BE USING ITS COCA PROFITS TO PURCHASE AND STOCKPILE TREMENDOUS QUANTITIES OF MODERN ARMS, WEAPONS THE TERRORISTS WILL NOT UNVEIL UNTIL IT IS TOO LATE FOR THE GOP TO RESIST.

21. THESE ANALYSTS ARE FURTHER CONVINCED THAT SL INFILTRATION IN THE LABOR UNIONS AND LIMA AREA INDUSTRIES IS GREATER THAN ANYONE IS WILLING TO ADMIT. THEY NOTE, AND WE AGREE, THAT THE PEOPLE OF PERU ARE ON THE EDGE OF DESPERATION. THESE WHO VIEW AN SL VICTORY AS LIKELY POINT TO THE CURRENT GENERATION OF 18 TO 25 YEAR OLDS. IF THE CURRENT



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-----8C8D37 231619Z /43

P 231352Z AUG 91  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0797  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
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USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN  
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SECTION 05 OF 05 LIMA 11463

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR  
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PHUM, SNAR, PGOV, PE  
SUBJECT: CAN THE REVOLUTIONARIES WIN IN PERU? THE  
HOPELESSNESS PERSISTS, THEY ARGUE, THESE YOUTHS COULD  
QUICKLY BECOME THE CATALYST THAT LEADS TO THE SOCIAL  
DISORDER PRECEDING AN SL VICTORY.

22. BUT SL'S MECHANISM FOR VICTORY REMAINS  
ILL-DEFINED. NO ONE IS YET WILLING TO ARGUE THAT SL  
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CAN DEFEAT THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES ON THE  
BATTLEFIELD. SO LONG AS SL REFUSES ANY RELATIONSHIP  
WITH FOREIGN SOURCES OF ARMS IT CAN NEVER OUTGUN THE  
GOP. THROUGH AT LEAST THE MEDIUM TERM, SL WILL NOT  
COME TO POWER THROUGH A MILITARY VICTORY. NOR ARE  
THERE SIGNS OF A POPULAR UPRISING IN SUPPORT OF THE  
REVOLUTION. CIVIL DISORDER WILL LIKELY INCREASE IF  
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION DOES NOT IMPROVE. BUT THERE  
IS YET LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT SUCH VIOLENCE WILL BE  
DIRECTED BY OR SUPPORTIVE OF SENDERO LUMINOSO. THE  
SINGLE MOST LIKELY ALTERNATIVE WE SEE FOR PERU IS A  
CONTINUATION OF SL VIOLENCE, WITH INCREMENTAL YEARLY  
INCREASES IN DEATHS, INTO THE NEXT DECADE.

23. THE FEW OCCASIONS WHEN GUZMAN AND OTHER SL  
WRITERS TALK IN SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ABOUT THE  
TRANSITION FROM GUERRILLA WAR TO TAKING POWER, A  
REPRESSIVE MILITARY COUP IN REACTION TO CIVIL  
DISORDER IS A KEY INTERMEDIATE STAGE. IT IS  
CERTAINLY POSSIBLE THAT CONTINUED SL VIOLENCE,  
COMBINED WITH UNABATED ECONOMIC SUFFERING, COULD  
TOPPLE DEMOCRACY IN PERU. BUT AN END TO DEMOCRACY  
DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN A VICTORY FOR SENDERO  
LUMINOSO. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SL WOULD BE THE  
PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARY OF SUCH A NON-CONSTITUTIONAL  
TRANSITION. WE WILL DISCUSS OUR VIEWS AS TO WHO WINS  
IF THERE IS A MILITARY COUP IN A COMPANION REPORT:  
"CAN THE REVOLUTIONARIES WIN IN PERU? THE CASE FOR  
THE MRTA."  
QUAINTON##