

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

WAR GAME



29-30 APRIL 1991

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LIC WAR GAME OBJECTIVES

1. APPLY INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY PRINCIPLES
2. DEVELOP SCENARIO DRIVEN COUNTER TERRORIST CONCEPTS
3. EXPLORE THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE POTENTIAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FROM A MILITARY VIEWPOINT
4. UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITIES INVOLVED IN THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION
5. DEVELOP A FORCE STRUCTURE SUITABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN LIC
6. DEMONSTRATE THE CRITICALITY OF MILITARY/DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION IN LIC
7. EXPLORE THE APPLICATION OF C3I ASSETS IN SOUTH COM
8. APPLY TIME SENSITIVE PLANNING TECHNIQUES WITHIN A JOINT CONTEXT
9. DEMONSTRATE A KNOWLEDGE OF THE DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS FROM THE CINCS VIEWPOINT

DAY ONE (MONDAY, 29 APRIL 1991)

- 0800 PLENARY SESSION SPEAKERS AND EXPERT WITNESSES BRIEFED
(PLENARY SPEAKERS TO VISITING LECTURES ROOM-EXPERT WITNESSES
TO ROOM 208)
- 0805 STUDENTS SEATED IN BRECKINRIDGE AUDITORIUM;
FILM-"48 HOURS IN THE COCAINE WAR"
- 0830 PLENARY SESSION BEGINS IN BRECKINRIDGE AUDITORIUM
- 0930 BREAK
- 0940 QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD
- 1010 BREAK
- 1020 EXPERT WITNESS DISCUSSION IN BRECKINRIDGE AUDITORIUM
- 1050 GENERAL SCENARIO AND GAME EXPLAINED
- 1130 LUNCH
- 1300 SEMINARS TO SEMINAR ROOMS
CONTROLLERS AND EXPERT WITNESSES TO ASSIGNED ROOMS
GAME MOVE #1 BEGINS
- 1530 DEBRIEF IN SEMINAR ROOMS
(TWO SEMINARS MEET IN ONE SEMINAR ROOM)
- 1630 END MOVE ONE

DAY TWO (TUESDAY, 30 APRIL 1991)

0800 INTEL BRIEF IN BRECKINRIDGE AUDITORIUM

0900 RETURN TO SEMINAR ROOMS
MOVE #2 BEGINS (COUNTER-MOVE)

1030 DEBRIEF IN SEMINAR ROOMS
(TWO SEMINARS MEET IN ONE SEMINAR ROOM)

1130 LUNCH

1300 RETURN TO SEMINAR ROOMS
MOVE #3 BEGINS (RESPONSE)

1430 DEBRIEF IN SEMINAR ROOMS
(TWO SEMINARS MEET IN ONE SEMINAR ROOM - 1 BLUE AND 1 RED
SPOKESMAN PICKED PER SEMINAR TO REPRESENT THEIR SEMINAR)

1530 ALL RED SPOKESMAN TO ROOM 208
ALL BLUE SPOKESMAN TO ROOM 224
LESSONS LEARNED ARE LISTED - 1 SPOKESMAN PICKED PER COLOR

1600 ALL HANDS IN BRECKINRIDGE AUDITORIUM FOR FINAL ASSESSMENT
SPOKESMAN FOR BLUE AND RED EXPLAIN LESSONS LEARNED

1630 END GAME

PLENARY SESSION


1. POLITICAL OVERVIEW OF REGION (COL (RET) TALBOT)
2. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT (MS. HOLLIS)
3. MILITARY PLANNING/MISSION IN THEATER CONSIDERATIONS
(BGEN ELLERSON)
4. U.S. DEFENSE OPERATIONS (USCG, RADM LELAND)

GAME DESIGN

GOAL: SIMULATE THE CINC/JTF PROBLEM IN FACING AN INSURGENCY AND DRUG CARTEL EFFORT TO CAUSE THE DISINTEGRATION OF A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN PERU

SEQUENCE:

- TURN 1: CREATE SIX TRACKS EACH WITH TWO GAMES AND TWO BLUE CELLS TO DEVELOP MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND CAMPAIGN PLAN GIVEN A POLICY
- TURN 2: CELLS CHANGE TO RED, ROTATE WITHIN TRACK, AND CONFRONT THE BLUE STRATEGY BY DEVELOPING A RED COUNTER-STRATEGY
- TURN 3: CELLS RETURN TO BLUE AND ROTATE TO ORIGINAL POSITION AND NOW RESPOND TO RED MOVE AGAINST ORIGINAL STRATEGY



LIC6

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SCENARIO FOR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE LIC WAR GAME

GENERAL SCENARIO (1991)

In August of 1989, President George Bush signed a National Security Directive targeting the Andean countries of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru as part of a greater International Counter-Narcotics strategy. This Andean Initiative provided Peru with badly needed financial support and the use of military equipment to support the "War on Drugs".

Producer of 60% of the unrefined coca in the world, Peru's counter-narcotics efforts in the main producing area, the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), were complicated by an active and growing insurgency by a Maoist guerrilla organization known as Sendero Luminoso (SL) or Shining Path. The SL insurgency was quickly becoming the number one threat to the survival of the government in 1989, which was record year in terms of SL incidents. Coloring the entire Peruvian anti-narcotics effort is the prevailing threat environment in the UHV. As a result of the increasing SL presence in the UHV and the movement of additional Peruvian military units to deal with them, counter-narcotics efforts have been curtailed and the supporting United States Government (USG) elements stood down pending security enhancements.

US-Peruvian relations took a decided turn for the worse

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after the US intervention in Panama which was denounced by Peruvian President Alan Garcia. Garcia, the most outspoken of all Latin American leaders criticizing the Dec 20 US invasion, said he would not attend the summit with President Bush and the presidents of Colombia and Bolivia in Cartagena, Colombia on 15 February 1989. He also halted joint US-Peruvian operations in the UHV temporarily but allowed the program to resume a few days later. Relations were further exacerbated when US forces surrounded the Peruvian Embassy in Panama after five fugitive PDF officers sought asylum there.

On January 10, 1989, terrorists assassinated the former defense minister Enrique Lopez Albuja. Police immediately set up roadblocks throughout Lima and arrested as many as 15,000 suspects in a search for the three killers. The murder of Albuja was the first shot in SL's ambitious plans to disrupt the April presidential elections.

Despite the ripples created by US actions in Panama, the start of a US withdrawal of military units sent there allowed the Andean summit to be held as planned in Cartagena. All three Andean leaders urged the US President to increase US efforts to address the demand for cocaine by US consumers. However, all stressed the need to attack the cocaine industry via a regional strategy. Implicit in this strategy would be

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the requirement to deal with the economic problems and growing insurgencies. This would include greater cooperation in the law enforcement arena and enhanced military assistance but not the direct use of US military personnel to target HCL processing operations moved to Bolivia and Peru in the wake of the crackdown in Colombia.

In April, 1990, Alan Garcia Perez's APRA party lost in a surprising upset to the Cambio (change) '90 political party headed by Alberto Keinya Fujimori- a dark horse candidate . Alberto Fujimori, a professor and rector of the National Agrarian University, gained national recognition by hosting a popular television talk show and formed the Cambio '90 party with a group of politically independent professionals seeking to revamp the ailing Peruvian economy. Between his election and his inauguration, Fujimori traveled to Japan and the United States, seeking to restore Peru to the good graces of the international financial community. Because Cambio '90 held a weak minority position in Congress and Fujimori lacked a well organized political base, the President-elect established a national unity government, selecting members of his administration from across the political spectrum. President Fujimori began his presidency with the population of Peru behind him, supporting his vague promises of economic growth. However, early in 1991 his support began to wane as

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he instituted harsh economic reforms which further stalled Peru's recovery. With the majority of the population desperate after ten years of constantly declining economic conditions and Fujimori's government powerless because of the contending factionalism of the various ideologies, the conditions were ripe for chaos inspired by the Sendero Luminosa, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), and the Colombian Drug Cartel.

SPECIAL SCENARIO

Late in November 1991, the SL had wrested control from the government of all the UHV and a fair portion of the agricultural regions beyond the cities with financial assistance from the Drug Cartel. Mean-while, the MRTA with material and financial support from Cuba, made large gains in the cities to the point of openly appointing "Mayors" from their ranks to govern. This accommodating behavior between the two insurgencies was the result of a secret meeting held in Huancayo, a neutral town, where a "letter of understanding" was initialed, dividing Peru into "zones of interest". Each of the insurgencies was secretly waiting for the Federal government to fail before they initiated open warfare with the other. The Drug Cartel, for its part, received protection for its financial support and

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continued to drain the legitimate economies of Peru and the rest of the hemisphere while the insurgencies positioned themselves for the final struggle.

The Army and the police were actively struggling for power in the rapidly splintering government when President Fujimori asked for a secret meeting with the United States Ambassador. Then early in December, President Fujimori, utilizing the secure communications at the US embassy, asked President Bush for military assistance to stabilize his country by defeating the sizable and now well armed guerilla forces operating in the countryside while his forces destroyed the urban threat. The Peruvian President was purposely vague when any mention was made of the Drug connection since he saw the insurgencies as the real threat to Peru and did not want to make any more enemies than he had to.

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19 December 1991

National Security Directive (NSD) 068

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT

Subject: Use of Military Forces in Counter Narcotics/ Counter
Insurgency operations in Peru

U.S. backed counter-narcotics efforts, despite modest successes, have not significantly disrupted cocaine production and distribution in Peru. This illicit activity has further exacerbated the domestic situation in Peru by feeding the insurgencies and corrupting the government. The insurgencies have now begun open warfare with the elected government of Peru, a government which is on the verge of dissolution. This deteriorating political stability in the region threatens our national interests of maintaining a stable economic and political conditions in this hemisphere.

I therefore direct the following actions under the coordination of the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council and based on country team approval and host nation concurrence:

--The Secretary of Defence, in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Director of Intelligence, shall recommend revisions to Department of Defence policy aimed at expanding DOD support of counter-narcotics/insurgency programs in Peru. DOD actions may include:

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- 1) Installation of mobile radars in Peru or offshore to monitor narco-trafficker/ insurgent flight activity.
- 2) Conduct of training by Mobile Training Teams in threat areas.
- 3) Assignment of operations/ intelligence trainers to host nation counter-narcotics/insurgent units.
- 4) Conduct of civic action programs in threat areas.
- 5) Deploy SOF forces to provide HUMINT and reconnaissance.
- 6) Advisors accompanying host nation operational patrols to provide evaluation.
- 7) Deployment of US military personnel for offensive operations as required.
- 8) Use of smart weapons by US forces in support of host country counter-narcotics/insurgency operations.
- 9) Use of US military helicopter assets to support host country counter-narcotics/insurgency operations.
- 10) Conduct of combined special operations by US personnel and host nation personnel to decapitate leadership of trafficking/insurgent organizations.
- 11) Conduct of unilateral raids by US personnel on jungle laboratories or trafficker hideouts.

My objective in adopting this policy is to dismantle the drug trafficking/insurgent organizations and prevent the further political deterioration of Peru by sending the support necessary to stabilize the regime and terminate the threat.

--Following initial Congressional consultation, the Secretary of State will approach the government of Peru for approval of expanded US actions.

George Bush

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TASKERS

1. Turn 1 (Blue)

a. State the military objectives to be adopted under the given counter narcotics/counter insurgency policy.

b. Define the threat to those objectives.

c. Assess the military and political risks involved in the conduct of such a campaign in the Andean Region.

d. Assess the impact of international law, host nation government, and command relationships on the US policy in the region.

e. Devise a counter narcotics/ counter insurgency campaign strategy for the region.

f. Establish criteria for success and failure and develop the options necessary to adjust or exploit such circumstances.

g. Determine force structure considerations essential to accomplish the military objectives.

2. Turn 2 (Red)

a. Analyze the effect of the US strategy upon the drug cartel and insurgency operations.

b. Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the US strategy.

c. How can the US commitment of power to the Region be turned to the advantage of the cartel and insurgency?

d. How does the US strategy effect the relationship between the cartel and the insurgent movements in the region?

e. Devise a counter-move to the US strategy.

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3. Turn 3 (Blue)

a. What adjustments to the US strategy are required to respond to the cartel/ insurgent counter-move?

b. Identify the vulnerabilities in the cartel/ insurgent operations and the expected costs and payoffs for exploiting them.

c. What circumstances can the cartel/ insurgents now generate that which would cause further extensive changes in the US strategy?

d. What criteria must exist in order to permit a long term US commitment to the Region?

e. What constitutes an acceptable level of success in a counter narcotics/ insurgents campaign and what should the US be willing to invest to achieve that level?

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part II of
CSC LIC

SHINING PATH (SL)

Date Formed 1969, began terrorist operations in 1980.

Estimated Membership 4,000-5,000.

Headquarters Ayacucho Department.

Area of Operations Peru.

Leadership Manuel Ruben Abimael Guzman (AKA President Gonzalo),
Julio Cesar Mezzich, Carlota Tello Cutti (AKA Carla).

Other Names Sendero Luminoso (original language).

Sponsors No foreign sponsors known.

Political Objectives/Target Audiences

* Stimulate a "peasant armed struggle" that will lead to overthrow of the current constitutional government and install a leftist, ethnic Indian state by the year 2000.

* Attack US and other "imperialist" targets in an effort to eliminate foreign influence in Peru, embarrass the Peruvian Government, and force it to take repressive measures. The SL also has attacked Soviet and Chinese targets.

Background

The Shining Path is a highly active and violent terrorist/insurgent group that claims a neo-Maoist orientation. Its hope is to create a rural-based insurgency that will sweep into the cities and destroy the current system of government.

The SL developed from an extremist splinter group of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP). It has tried to radicalize the Marxist-Leninist movement in Peru and feels that the "old, heroic traditions of the Quechua Indians" are the proper elements for a new social/political system. By using names and symbols from the Indian heritage of the rural regions, the SL has been able to attract some support that might not have been drawn to a purely Marxist ideology.

The SL is organized to conduct simultaneous urban terrorism and rural guerilla warfare. Although it is large and adequately equipped and trained, the group tends to avoid direct conflict with the military unless it can attack with overwhelming force.

Unlike most other Latin American leftist subversive groups, the SL is not believed to have obvious or extensive ties to Cuba or other sponsors. Bank robberies and extortion are the primary sources of funding. The SL imposes a "war tax" that apparently provides a large source of income.

The SL conducts very aggressive indoctrination programs in its rural bases. Its recruiting practices frequently target 12 to 15 year olds who can be molded into highly motivated, even fanatical activists.

The SL employs a cellular structure for terrorist operations, and each cell has at least one female member. Women serve as

members of assault teams as well as smugglers, intelligence operatives, and messengers.

Particularly gruesome assassinations are a hallmark of the SL. Victims often are ritually mutilated, and the corpses are left on public display. This feature of the SL operations is partly a reflection of an Indian belief that an un mutilated victim's spirit can reveal its killer, and it also magnifies the terror effect of the killings.

Although the SL espouses a rural, peasant revolution, its leadership comes from radical middle-class intellectual circles. The leaders, however, are very skillful at maintaining the image of a "people's movement," thus enhancing the SL's ability to attract support in the rural regions. Nonetheless, if a village demonstrates resistance to an SL takeover, residents frequently are terrorized into cooperation; extermination of the village leadership is not uncommon.

The principal targets of the SL assassination teams are civilian technicians of Government-sponsored civic action projects and local political leaders affiliated with the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) political party. Several relatively ambitious development projects cannot get off the ground because the SL assassinates the technicians, destroys works completed, and blows up construction machinery needed to continue work. Economic disruption by the SL also has targets the railways in an attempt to cripple the major transportation system.

TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)

Date Formed 1983, with first terrorist acts in 1984.

Estimated Membership 100-200.

Headquarters Unknown.

Area of Operations Primarily in Lima, Peru.

Leadership Ernesto Montes Aliaga (AKA Raul Perez).

Other Names Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (original language).

Sponsors Limited Nicaraguan and Cuban support suspected.

Political Objectives/Target Audiences

* Conduct "armed propaganda" to destabilize the Peruvian government.

* Force US Government and business activities out of Peru.

* Create an image of MRTA as the Peruvian militant group aligned with Marxist international revolutionary movements and proponents, in contrast with the xenophobic Sendero Luminoso (SL) terrorist group.

Background

When the MRTA's name surfaced in 1984, many thought it was simply a front name for Peru's major terrorist/insurgent group, the SL. Available information indicates that the group is an independent organization formed by university student radicals who espouse a Castroite, Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Despite its short history, the MRTA has been very active. It has made attacks on US targets a definite policy. The tactics used and proficiency shown in MRTA attacks indicate a relatively high degree of skill.

Some contact apparently exists with other Latin American revolutionary groups, such as Columbia's 19th of April Movement (M-19). Some of the MRTA leadership lived in Cuba and the Soviet Union in the 1970's after fleeing Peru during a Government crackdown on student radicals.

In fall 1986, the MRTA announced a merger with remnants of an earlier Peruvian radical group also referred to as the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The group then conducted a series of bombings in Lima to publicize the new alliance.

A small organization, the MRTA requires relatively little money to support its operations. Through robberies and extortion activities directed at businessmen and narcotics traffickers, the MRTA appears capable of acquiring sufficient funds for its operations. Police raids have captured modern weapons, including automatic rifles and a wide variety of commercial and homemade explosives.

MENU LISTING
12DEC89

PERU
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION/STRENGTH

OVERVIEW

Peru is generally considered to be one of the 4 militarily prominent nations in South America along with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Its geographical position on the Pacific ocean and land borders with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador, necessitate a large military force.

Peruvian terrain, including the Amazon Jungle, Lake Titicaca, and the Andes Mountains dictates extensive training in specialized warfare.

Internal security is also a defense concern, as several leftist guerrilla groups continue to battle the established political and military order.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The Peruvian President acts as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and is advised on military matters by his defense cabinet. This cabinet consists of the 3 service chiefs, each of

whom hold the rank of cabinet minister. One of the service chiefs also serves as Joint Armed Forces Commander and is responsible for the coordination of defense functions among the services.

ARMED FORCES

Peru maintains 3 military services--Army, Navy, and Air Force--as well as several paramilitary forces. For additional information on the individual services, see separate database entries for Peru

Army
Navy/Marines
Air Force

Peru also assigns military personnel to the United Nations in support of the Iran-Iraq Military Observer Force.

The total active manpower of the Peruvian Armed Forces is approximately 113,000.

CONSCRIPTION/RESERVES/MOBILIZATION

Peru uses a system of selective conscription to staff its military establishment. Although all male citizens between the ages of 20 and 25 may be subject to conscription, a 2-year service period keeps active manpower at sufficient levels without the induction of all those eligible.

Following a 2-year service period, conscripts serve a 10-year reserve term. All military reserves are assigned to the Peruvian Army, and conduct periodic refresher training with this service. The Army Reserve totals approximately 118,000. Upon completion of active reserve obligations, reserves are assigned to the Guardia Nacional, a secondary reserve, where service is required until age 45. The Guardia Nacional is technically a paramilitary force, but would become subordinate to the Army in the event of a military conflict.

PARAMILITARY FORCES

Peru maintains paramilitary forces in support of both land and sea-based defense functions.

The Peruvian Coast Guard was separated from the Navy in 1975 to serve the peacetime role of commercial maritime protection. Since Peru claims a 200-mile maritime zone, well beyond the internationally accepted 12-mile territorial limit, interaction between the Coast Guard and Navy is often used as a means of reinforcement. Major operations have entailed the interception of commercial craft, including US tuna boats, within Peru's self-declared defense zones.

The Coast Guard operates the following patrol craft

6 RIO CANETE class
3 RIO PATIVILCA class (British Vosper design)
2 RIO SAMA class (ex-US PGM design)
6 LA PUNTA class
3 RIO ZARUMILLA class

The total active manpower of the Peruvian Coast Guard is

approximately 600 personnel.

Support of the land-based forces is provided by the Guardia Nacional, a secondary Army reserve force. During peacetime, the Guardia Nacional is responsible for internal security, including countering Peruvian leftist guerrilla groups. The Guardia Nacional operates Roland armored personnel carriers, several of them armed, and uses individual infantry weapons. Approximately 36,000 personnel serve the Guardia Nacional.

The Peruvian National Police Force is also used in combating guerrilla warfare and would provide rear area support in the event of war. A major re-equipment plan for this force is underway, with automatic rifles and ammunition on order from North Korea. The National Police Force numbers approximately 15,000.

ISSUES/NOTES

Although the 1970s and early 1980s saw a major military build-up in Peru, sponsored largely by the United States, France, and Italy, economic problems surfaced in the mid-1980s to slow this development. Budget constraints now mandate that Peru seek less expensive options to its re-equipment plans.

Doors have been opened to Soviet and North Korean suppliers, who will negotiate trade plans with Peru by way of repayment. For this reason, the Peruvian military inventory consists of a combination of deteriorating NATO equipment being replaced by Soviet counterparts.

OPPOSITION FORCES

Although there are many leftist factions active in Peru, 2 groups generally are considered to be main opposition forces.

The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is a violent rural-based group known to employ Maoist tactics of mass attack. Originally based in the Ayacucho Military District, the Shining Path rebels spread camps to many mountain-based locations. Recently, attempts have been made to include city-based factions in the movement, and attacks have occurred in Lima.

Peruvian cities, however, seem to be threatened by a separate leftist group, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA). The MRTA appeals to the more moderate leftists, as their tactics are not as sensational as the Shining Path rebels; the MRTA prefers, instead, to concentrate on political opposition rather than extreme military tactics, although guerrilla attacks have been launched by the MRTA.

Due to disagreement between these major groups, a consolidated leftist movement has not formed in Peru.

MENU LISTING

PERU
ARMY

** = US/NATO code name or designation

ORGANIZATION/ORDER OF BATTLE

The Peruvian Army is the second largest army in South America; only Brazil is larger. The difficult Peruvian terrain--with its mountains, rivers, and the Amazon jungle--require specially trained troops, as well as organic aviation support. Ongoing border disputes with Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador, emphasize army readiness requirements.

For ground defense purposes, Peru is divided into 5 Military Regions that serve as the basis for administrative control of Army units. Several independent brigades are highly mobile and can be deployed to support threatened areas.

- 5 Military Regions, with a total of
 - 2 armored brigades
 - 1 cavalry division, with
 - 3 mechanized regiments
 - 1 horse regiment
 - 7 infantry brigades, each with
 - 4 infantry battalions
 - 1 artillery group
 - 1 airborne brigade, with
 - 3 paratroop battalions
 - 1 jungle brigade
 - 3 helicopter squadrons
- 2 independent field artillery groups, with
 - 2 independent field artillery battalions
- 2 independent anti-aircraft groups
- 4 independent infantry battalions
- 7 independent jungle infantry battalions
- 4 independent engineer battalions

The total active manpower of the Peruvian Army is approximately 75,000, including the Aviation Wing. Of this figure, 50,000 troops are conscripts. All persons of conscription age not on active duty are considered to be assigned to Army reserve forces. Reserves number approximately 188,000.

EQUIPMENT

The Peruvian inventory consists of equipment from a wide variety of supplier nations. Throughout the 1980s, economic problems led to the gradual loss of trading partners, including the United States and Italy. Recently, much equipment has been

supplied by the Soviet Union, which has been are willing to trade arms for Peruvian ship building services. Peru has also turned to neighboring Brazil, Argentina, and other emerging arms producers.

(For additional information on the equipment listed below, search Weapons/Systems/Platforms.)

Ground Combat Vehicles

Tanks

300 T-54/T-55 main battle tank (USSR)
110 AMX-13 light (France)

Reconnaissance

60 M8 (US)
several M20 (US M8)
10 Fiat 6616 (Italy Fiat 6614)

Armored Personnel Carriers

200 M113 (US)
150 UR416 (West Germany)

Air Defense

35 ZSU-23-4 Shilka** (USSR)

Artillery

Guns

35 155-mm M114 (US)
30 130-mm M-46 field gun (US)

Howitzers

30 122-mm D-30 towed (USSR)
170 105-mm M101 towed (US)
10 105-mm Model 56 pack (Italy)

Air Defense Guns

40-mm L70 towed (Sweden)

Anti-tank Weapons

14 122-mm BM-21 rocket launcher (USSR)
106-mm M40 recoilless rifle (US)
105-mm M27 recoilless rifle (US)

Mortars

300 120-mm M1943** (USSR)

Missiles

SA-3 Goa** surface-to-air (USSR)
SA-7 Grail** surface-to-air (USSR)

ARMY AVIATION

The Peruvian Army maintains an Aviation Wing to fulfill Army support needs. Aircraft in service include

Fixed-wing aircraft

1 A65 Queen Air transport (US)

- 5 U-10A Courier utility (US)
- 5 U-17A Skywagon utility (US)

Helicopters

- 6 Mi-6 Hook** transport (USSR)
- 42 Mi-8 Hip** transport (USSR)
- 6 SA316 Alouette III attack (France)
- 7 SA315B Lama attack (France)
- 8 Bell 47G (US H-13 Sioux)

Many Peruvian Army aircraft are reportedly in storage.

DEPLOYMENT

Each of Peru's Military Regions maintains a headquarters. These are located at

Arequipa	Iquitos	Piura
Cuzco	Lima	

Within these districts, major troop concentrations are at

Arequipa	Locumba	Talara
Ayachucho	Moquegua	Tumbes
Callao	Sullana	Puno
Lambayeque		

ISSUES/NOTES

Peru's leftist guerilla movements have led to the mobilization of the Army for internal security roles, often in conjunction with the nation's paramilitary forces. (See separate database entry for Peru/Defense Organization/Strength.)

MENU LISTING

PERU

AIR FORCE

** = US/NATO code name or designation

ORGANIZATION/ORDER OF BATTLE

The Peruvian Air Force is primarily responsible for protection of land and sea borders. Peru's border disputes with

neighboring Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile require monitoring by aircraft, as the Peruvian terrain often renders Army ground operations ineffectual.

The Air Force also patrols the maritime zones claimed by Peru, offering combat support to the Naval Air Force. Although a 12-mile limit is generally recognized as Peruvian territory, Peru extends its defenses out to 200-miles of its coastline.

The Peruvian Air Force consists of

- 1 bomber division, with
 - 3 bomber squadrons
- 4 fighter divisions, with
 - 9 fighter squadrons
- 1 counterinsurgency squadron
- 1 photo reconnaissance squadron
- 3 transport squadrons
- 4 training squadrons
- presidential fleet

The total active manpower of the Peruvian Air Force is approximately 40,000, of which 13,000 are conscripts.

AIRCRAFT

Aircraft in Peruvian service represent a variety of suppliers. Owing partly to budget troubles throughout the 1980s Peru has been compelled to trade with nations, such as the Soviet Union, that will integrate Peru into a trade plan to finance the acquisitions. Subsequently, many of the US and European aircraft in Peruvian service are aging with little prospect of attaining replacement parts.

(For additional information on the aircraft listed below, search Weapons/Systems/Platforms.)

Fighter/Attack

- 12 Mirage 2000 (France)
- 16 Mirage VP (France)
- 20 B8 Canberra (Great Britain B-57)
- 42 SU-22 Fitter** (USSR)
- 29 A-37B Dragonfly (US)

Transport

- 1 Boeing 707 tanker (US)
- 8 L-100-30 (US C-130 Hercules)
- 2 C-130 Hercules (US)
- 14 An-26 Curl** (USSR)
- 14 DHC5A Buffalo (Canada)
- 19 DHC6 Twin Otter (Canada)
- 2 DC-8 (US)
- 1 FH-227 (Netherlands F27)
- 1 F28 Fellowship (Netherlands)
- 1 Falcon 20F (France)

Utility/Communications

- 8 Alouette III liaison (France)
- 4 Learjet 25 (US)

- 3 King Air 90 (US)
- 14 Queen Air (US)
- 1 PA-31 Cheyenne (US Navajo)
- 2 Cessna 421 Golden Eagle (US Cessna 400)
- 1 Cessna 320 (US U-3)
- 5 U206 liaison (US U-26)
- 12 PC6B Turbo-Porter (Switzerland)

Trainers

- 2 T-54 Canberra (Great Britain)
- 4 SU-22 Fitter** (USSR)
- 13 MB339AP Veltro 2 (Italy)
- 20 EMB312 Tucano (Brazil)
- 4 Cessna 150/152 (US)
- 6 T-34B Mentor (US)
- 26 T-37B Dragonfly (US)
- 15 T-41 Mescalero (US)

Helicopters

- 6 Mi-6 Hook** transport (USSR)
- 6 Mi-8 Hip** transport (USSR)
- 12 Mi-24 Hind** gunship (USSR)
- 9 AB212 utility (US H-1 Huey)
- 12 UH-1H Huey utility (US H-1 Huey)
- 12 Bell 47G trainer (US H-13 Sioux)
- 18 BO105 utility (West Germany)

DEPLOYMENT

The main Peruvian Air Force bases are located at

Arequipa	Las Palmas	Piura
Callao	Lima	Talara
Chiclayo	Limatambo	Trujillo
Iquitos	Pisco	

Since 1985, Peruvian Mirage pilots have received training in France. With the future of additional Mirage orders uncertain, however, this training practice could also be uncertain.

ISSUES/NOTES

In March 1988, The United States registered formal protest with the Peruvian government following the attempted interception of US aircraft flying more than 50-miles from the Peruvian coast.

The protest sparked controversy concerning declared territorial limits versus the International Law of the Seas limits. Peru continues to upgrade its Air Force, albeit with less expensive alternatives to originally proposed systems. Current acquisitions focus on Soviet-built helicopters and Brazilian trainers.

MENU LISTING

PERU
NAVY/MARINES

ORGANIZATION/ORDER OF BATTLE

The Peruvian Navy is organized geographically into a divisions: the Pacific Ocean Fleet, the Amazon River Flotilla, and the Lake Titicaca Flotilla.

The Navy includes a Naval Air Wing and a Marine Corps brigade.

In the event of a conflict the Coast Guard, a paramilitary force, would lend support to the coastal defense elements of the Peruvian Navy. (For additional information on the Peruvian Coast Guard, see separate database entry for Defense Organization/Strength.)

The total active manpower of the Peruvian Navy is 23,000, including 2,500 Marines and 1,200 conscripts.

SHIPS

Submarines

- 6 CASMA class (West German Type 209)
- 1 PACOCHA class (ex-US GUPPY I class)
- 4 DOS DE MAYO class (US MACKEREL design)

Cruisers

- 2 ALMIRANTE GRAU class (ex-Dutch DE RUYTER class)

Destroyers

- 2 PALACIOS class (ex-British DARING class)
- 6 BOLOGNESI class (ex-Dutch FRIESLAND class)

Frigates

- 4 CARVAJAL class (Italian Modified LUPO design)
- 6 VELARDE-class fast attack missile craft
(French PR-72P design)

Amphibious

- 4 PIATA-class tank landing ships
(ex-US TERREBONNE PARISH class)

Small Combatants

- 2 MARANON-class river gunboats
- 2 AMAZONAS-class river gunboats
- 3 RIO RAMIS-class lake patrol craft
- 4 RIO MANU-class river patrol craft
- 3 P 33-type patrol craft

The Navy also operates approximately 10 tankers and support ships, and over 20 survey and oceanographic research ships.

Missiles

For additional information on the equipment listed below, search Weapons/Systems/Platforms.

Surface-to-air
Albatros (Italy)

Surface-to-surface
MM-38 Exocet (France)
Otomat (France)

Air-to-surface
AM-39 Exocet (France MM-38)

NAVAL AVIATION

The Naval Aviation Wing is responsible for anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol functions. Peru's cruisers and several destroyers are equipped to carry anti-submarine helicopters.

Anti-Submarine Warfare/Maritime Patrol
7 S-2E Tracker (US)
2 F27MPA (Netherlands F27)
4 Super King Air B-200T (US U-21A)

Transport
2 C-47 Dakota (US)

Trainers
6 T-34C Mentor (US)

Helicopters
4 AS-61 anti-submarine (US H-3 Sea King)
6 AB-212 anti-submarine (US H-1 Huey)
4 AB206 Jetranger utility (US H-58 Kiowa)
2 AB206 Jetranger trainers (US H-58 Kiowa)

The Navy has placed an order with Brazil for several EMB-111 Bandeirante utility aircraft.

MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps consists of a single brigade with a total of 3 battalions. A coastal defense unit consisting of 3 batteries is in the process of being dismantled, with its duties to be assigned to other units.

Combat Vehicles

- V-100 Commando reconnaissance (US V-150)
- 40 Chaimite armored personnel carrier (Portugal)

Artillery

- 155-mm M114 towed howitzers (US)
- 120-mm mortars (France; several types)
- 106-mm M40 recoilless rifles (US)
- 20-mm twin self-propelled air defense guns (several types)

DEPLOYMENT

The Pacific Ocean Fleet maintains bases at Callao, Paita, San Lorenzo Island, and Talara. The Lake Titicaca Flotilla is based at Puno, and the Amazon River Flotilla has bases at Iquitos and Puerto Maldonado.

ISSUES/NOTES

A collision with a Japanese ship near Peruvian waters led to the sinking of the Peruvian PACOCHA submarine on 26 August 1988. Seven men were lost on board the submarine.

The Peruvian Navy has a notable at-sea refueling capability, extending Peru's potential arena of naval operations beyond that of many of its South American neighbors.

Many older ships are in the process of refits and upgrades to improve capabilities.