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ACTION ARA-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-01 CIAE-00 H-01 NSAE-00
HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-01 PA-01 OMB-01 INM-01
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-01 SNP-01 PRS-01 OIG-01 SCT-03
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P 092053Z AUG 90
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0456
INFO THE WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
SECDEF WASHDC
DEAHQS WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 11756

USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, SNAR, MAAS, PE
SUBJECT: FUJIMORI REORGANIZES THE POLICE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. PRESIDENT FUJIMORI'S RAPID AND UNEXPECTED PURGE INSIDE THE PERUVIAN NATIONAL POLICE APPEARS MOTIVATED BY THREE OFFICIAL OBJECTIVES: AN EFFORT TO ELIMINATE CORRUPTION FROM THE POLICE; A DECISION TO
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PLACE THE ANTI-NARCOTICS AND ANTI-SUBVERSION PROGRAMS FULLY UNDER MILITARY CONTROL; AND A HOPE OF SECURING ADDITIONAL U.S. AID. PRIVATELY, THE MILITARY ALSO HOPE

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: OSCAR J. OLSON
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TO REDUCE SOME OF THE POWER THE POLICE ACHIEVED UNDER PRESIDENT GARCIA. THERE ARE GRAVE RISKS IN THESE DECISIONS. WHILE ASSUMING THAT HIS ARMY ADVISORS ARE NOT THEMSELVES CORRUPT, THE PRESIDENT HAS PURGED A NUMBER OF HONEST AND CAPABLE POLICE OFFICERS. THE TIMING IS ALSO QUESTIONABLE. THE COUNTRY MAY SUFFER FOR THE LACK OF EXPERIENCED POLICE LEADERSHIP TO MAINTAIN CIVIL ORDER OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS OF SEVERE ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT. THESE CHANGES HAVE INTERRUPTED LONG-STANDING AND EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MISSION AND OUR PERUVIAN COUNTERPARTS. HOWEVER, THERE ARE ALREADY SIGNS THAT SOME OF THE POLICE DISMISSALS ARE BEING REVERSED. ON BALANCE WE ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT OUR PROGRAM GOALS WILL BE BACK ON TRACK IN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. WHEN THE DUST SETTLES, WE COULD WELL FIND A SITUATION WHERE OUR ANTI-NARCOTICS OBJECTIVES AND GOP ANTI-TERRORIST CONCERNS ARE ADVANCED TO MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. END SUMMARY.

 A PURGE IN THE POLICE

3. PRESIDENT ALBERTO FUJIMORI HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT AND CONTROVERSIAL CHANGES IN THE PERUVIAN NATIONAL POLICE (PNP). THE PURGE ACTUALLY BEGAN IN THE INTERIOR MINISTRY WHERE ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN MOST KEY POSITIONS. EVERYONE EXPECTED MANTILLA'S HENCHMEN TO LEAVE, BUT FEW GUESSED THAT MOST VACANCIES WOULD BE FILLED WITH MILITARY
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OFFICERS. FROM WITHIN THE INTERIOR MINISTRY, THE MILITARY, WITH THE PRESIDENT'S IMPRIMATUR, ARE SHAPING THE NEW PNP.

4. TO DATE 135 SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS (MAJOR, COLONELS AND GENERALS) HAVE BEEN RETIRED OR TRANSFERRED FROM KEY POSITIONS IN THE THREE BRANCHES OF THE PNP. THE NATIONAL POLICE HAS THREE DIVISIONS -- THE GENERAL POLICE (INCLUDING NORMAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, TRAFFIC CONTROL, AND ANTI-NARCOTICS); THE SECURITY POLICE (PRINCIPALLY PRISON POLICE AND PROTECTIVE DETAILS FOR GOP FIGURES), AND THE TECHNICAL POLICE (INCLUDING THE ANTI-TERRORISM POLICE AND A SEPARATE NARCOTICS

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INVESTIGATION UNIT). THOUGH THE PURGE HAS AFFECTED ALL THREE DIVISIONS, NEARLY TWO-THIRDS OF THE FIRINGS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE TECHNICAL POLICE.

THE REASONS FOR THE CHANGES



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[REDACTED] THAT THE POLICE PURGE HAS THREE PRINCIPAL PURPOSES. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE THERE IS A FOURTH, UNSPOKEN MOTIVATION BEHIND THE PURGE, ONE THAT NO FUJIMORI ADVISOR HAS MENTIONED PUBLICLY.

6. FIRST, PRESIDENT FUJIMORI IS ATTEMPTING TO PURGE CORRUPT AND INCOMPETENT SENIOR POLICE OFFICERS. THE NEW PRESIDENT HAS BEEN CONVINCED BY HIS MILITARY ADVISORS THAT THE PNP IS RIFE WITH GRAFT, PARTICULARLY NARCOTICS

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P-02 T-01 /034 W

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P 092053Z AUG 90
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0457
INFO THE WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
SECDEF WASHDC
DEAHQS WASHDC
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USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, SNAR, MAAS, PE

SUBJECT: FUJIMORI REORGANIZES THE POLICE
 CORRUPTION. THE COPS TO BE SACKED ARE BEING NAMED BY
 PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS, A RETIRED
 ARMY CAPTAIN, AND NOW FUJIMORI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR ON
 SECURITY ISSUES.

7. SECOND, FUJIMORI HAS BEEN CONVINCED, AND ARMY
 GENERALS TORRES (DEFENSE MINISTER) AND ALVARADO
 (INTERIOR MINISTER) AGREE, THAT BOTH THE ANTI-TERRORISM
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AND ANTI-NARCOTICS PROGRAMS SHOULD BE ENTIRELY UNDER
 MILITARY CONTROL. TWO WORKING COMMITTEES WILL BE
 ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
 (SIN) AND FROM THERE A COORDINATED NARCOTICS/SUBVERSION
 CAMPAIGN WILL BE CONSTRUCTED UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE
 DEFENSE MINISTRY.

8. ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN, THE PNP WILL STILL HAVE
 SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN BOTH AREAS.
 BUT COMMAND AND POLICY DECISIONS WILL BE MADE BY THE
 MILITARY. IF THIS NEW PLAN IS PUT INTO EFFECT, MILITARY
 UNITS WILL ALSO NOW BE OPERATIONALLY INVOLVED IN
 ANTI-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING IN THE UPPER
 HUALLAGA VALLEY.

9. THIRD, PRESIDENT FUJIMORI AND THE MILITARY BELIEVE
 THAT THE BEST WAY TO TAP INTO THE LARGESSE AND BUDGET
 GENEROSITY OF THE UNITED STATES, IS FOR THE MILITARY TO
 ASSUME BOTH ROLES. THE MILITARY HAVE WATCHED WITH ENVY
 THE U.S. DOLLAR INVESTMENT IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA AND NOW
 RECOGNIZE THAT NARCOTICS IS THE PRIMARY MOVER IN THE
 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS.

10. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A FOURTH, UNSTATED MOTIVATION
 BEHIND THE POLICE PURGES. HISTORIC POLICE/MILITARY
 RIVALRY AND DISTRUST WAS GREATLY EXAGGERATED DURING THE
 GARCIA ADMINISTRATION. APRA HAD ITS OWN REASONS TO
 DISTRUST THE MILITARY, AND VICE VERSA. THE MILITARY HAS

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NEVER FORGOTTEN THAT THE "R" IN APRA MEANS
 "REVOLUTIONARY." FOR THEIR PART, THE APRISTAS NEVER
 FORGAVE THE ARMY THE JULY 1932 "MASSACRE" AT FORT
 O'DONOVAN IN TRUJILLO OR THE BLOODY OCTOBER 1948
 REPRESSION AGAINST APRISTA FAITHFUL IN CALLAO.
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11. THE ARMY BELIEVES THAT GARCIA, AND FORMER GARCIA
 INTERIOR MINISTERS ARMANDO VILLANUEVA AND AGUSTIN
 MANTILLA, OVER-ARMED THE POLICE IN AN EFFORT TO CREATE A
 SECOND "MILITARY FORCE" TO COUNTER-BALANCE THE ARMY AND
 PERHAPS TO DEFEND THE REGIME AGAINST A COUP. THOUGH IT
 MAY NOT BE ON PRESIDENT FUJIMORI'S AGENDA, THESE POLICE
 PURGES AND THE SHIFTS IN PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITY ARE
 ALMOST CERTAINLY MOTIVATED IN PART BY THE ARMY'S DESIRE
 TO RESTORE ITS TRADITIONAL HEGEMONY.

 SOME MISTAKES AND SOME RISKS

12. MANY POLICE ARE, OF COURSE, CRYING "FOUL". THERE
 HAS BEEN A VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS PROTEST IN UNISON FROM
 LIMA'S RESPONSIBLE MEDIA THAT THE PURGE HAS CUT TOO
 DEEPLY AND HAS HURT TOO MANY GOOD OFFICERS. SOME HAVE
 NOTED THAT AMONG THOSE FIRED ARE POLICE OFFICERS (AS WAS
 TRUE IN FUJIMORI'S HOUSE CLEANING OF THE MILITARY) WHOSE
 ONLY FAULT APPEARS TO BE THEIR PRE-ELECTION SUPPORT FOR
 POLITICAL PARTIES OTHER THAN THE NEW PRESIDENT'S.

13. THE ANTI-TERRORISM POLICE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE
 ARMY WANTS TO RAID THEIR ARCHIVES. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TOLD US THAT THE SAME THING HAPPENED AFTER
 GARCIA'S ELECTION. APRA FAITHFUL WERE PLACED IN
 IMPORTANT POLICE POSITIONS AND IN ONE YEAR NEARLY FIVE
 THOUSAND FILES "DISAPPEARED." ALL OF THESE FILES,
 [REDACTED] HAD APRA CONNECTIONS; MANY WERE
 PRESUMED MRTA OR, IN SOME CASES, SENDERO TERRORISTS.
 [REDACTED] SPECULATE

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AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 LIMA 11756

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
LAGS: PGOV, PTER, SNAR, MAAS, PE
SUBJECT: FUJIMORI REORGANIZES THE POLICE
THAT THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE IS SO BEREFT OF GOOD
INFORMATION THAT IT MUST ROB FROM THE POLICE TO MEET
FUJIMORI'S EXPECTATIONS.

14. FUJIMORI'S TACTIC ALSO ASSUMES THAT THE MILITARY HE
IS NOW RELYING UPON ARE MORE HONEST THAN THE POLICE HE
IS FIRING. THAT IS A RISKY PROPOSITION, AT BEST.
OUTGOING POLICE OFFICIALS TELL US THAT THE MILITARY
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WANTS ALL OF THE GRAFT INSTEAD OF JUST HALF OF IT.
SIMILAR THOUGHTS HAVE APPEARED IN THE PRESS. NEW
SECURITY LYNCHPIN MONTESINOS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS

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WELL-DOCUMENTED TIES TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS WHICH WE WILL REPORT SEPTEL.

15. THERE IS ALSO A QUESTION OF TIMING. EVEN IF THEY ARE CORRUPT, THESE POLICE KNOW THE SYSTEM. AT THE EXACT MOMENT WHEN THE COUNTRY IS FACING POSSIBLE CIVIL DISORDER FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF TOUGH NEW ECONOMIC MEASURES, MOST SENIOR POLICE OFFICIALS ARE NEW IN JOBS THEY HAVE NEVER HELD BEFORE.

16. THERE HAS BEEN A BRIEF FLURRY OF TALK ABOUT A POLICE STRIKE. THESE RUMORS WERE A FACTOR IN THE CANCELLATION OF FUJIMORI'S TRIP TO BOGOTA. SIX RECENTLY FIRED POLICE OFFICERS (MAJORS AND COLONELS) WERE "ARRESTED" BY THE ARMY THE EVENING OF AUGUST 7. THEY ARE ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE THE STRIKE. BUT AS DAMAGING AS A STRIKE WOULD BE, A POORLY MANAGED POLICE RESPONSE TO ECONOMICALLY-INDUCED PUBLIC DISORDER WOULD BE EVEN WORSE. MILITARY SUPPORT TO KEEP ORDER COULD ALSO BE DISASTROUS. AS BAD AS THE POLICE ARE, AT LEAST THEY HAVE MINIMUM TRAINING AND SOME EXPERIENCE IN RIOT CONTAINMENT. HISTORICALLY, THE MILITARY HAS USED A HEAVIER HAND IN SUCH CRISES.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR US?

17. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, THESE CHANGES HAVE INTERRUPTED CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIOUS MISSION ELEMENTS AND PERUVIAN POLICE COUNTERPARTS. IT IS CONFIDENTIAL

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INEVITABLE THAT OUR ANTI-NARCOTICS PROGRAM WILL BE SLOWED TEMPORARILY AS NEW RELATIONSHIPS ARE FORMED AND THE FUJIMORI TEAM GETS UP TO SPEED ON THEIR, AND OUR, PROGRAM. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT FUJIMORI MAY BE RETHINKING SOME OF THE DISMISSALS OF KEY POLICE OFFICERS. FOR INSTANCE, THE EFFECTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NARCOTICS POLICE, GENERAL ZARATE, HAS JUST TOLD US THAT HE WILL BE REINSTATED IN SOME CAPACITY. HOPEFULLY OTHER SUCH REAPPOINTMENTS OF KEY OFFICIALS WILL FOLLOW.

18. WE ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. FUJIMORI HAS EARLY ON SHOWN A TAKE-CHARGE STYLE WHICH HAS PERMITTED HIM TO MAKE CHANGES THAT ALAN GARCIA ONLY DREAMED ABOUT IN

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1985. ADDITIONALLY, WE DO NOT DOUBT FUJIMORI'S COMMITMENT TO PROGRAM OBJECTIVES WHICH APPEAR TO GENERALLY MATCH OUR OWN. IF THE NEW PRESIDENT DOES NOT LOSE CONTROL OF HIS TEAM, WE EXPECT TO BE OPERATING BACK ON ALL CYLINDERS BY YEAR'S END. THE DECISION TO ENGAGE THE ARMY DIRECTLY IN ANTI-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN THE UHV IS NOT WITHOUT RISKS. HOWEVER, IF PROPERLY CARRIED OUT IT WOULD CONFRONT NARCOTERRORISTS WITH OVERWHELMING FORCE IN THE AREA WHICH GROWS 60 PERCENT OF THE COCAINE CONSUMED IN THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REMAIN AN ISSUE, BUT PRESIDENT FUJIMORI AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE TORRES HAVE DECLARED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT THEY ARE NOW A TOP GOP PRIORITY. WITH THE CARROT OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE OFFING, WE COULD WELL END UP WITH AN INTEGRATED APPROACH WHICH MAKES MAJOR INROADS INTO NARCOTERRORISM IN A WAY WHICH WE CAN FULLY SUPPORT.

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