


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Security Recommendations for Santa Lucia

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~~Based on my background and experience, and~~ ^{As} requested, I offer the following suggestions to harden the security profile at Santa Lucia. I do not address which agency should provide the ^u find cite for any ~~items to be purchased~~. These ^{Following} recommendations ^{as of Feb 98.} ~~are for the current camp situation.~~ ~~Once~~ ^{as when the transition is} ~~move~~ to the new base ^{my complete} general ideas will still apply but the specifics should be reviewed again.

A very abbreviated threat analysis I believe can be broken down into two possibilities. First, we have received intelligence from several sources that the Sindero ^u Laminoso terrorists are gathering themselves and conscripting ^a campesinos for a mass attack, of between 1000 to 1500 strong, on the base. Historically they have launched attacks in the early morning hours. We have been told they will use both the river and ^{the} roads as avenues of approach. For maximum propaganda value they are supposed to drive us out or kill us before the April elections.

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The second alternative is to use the lone assailant or sapper team to fire an occasional Instalaga^Z rocket^K or machine gun burst at night as a harassment technique^S.

The best security for the first scenario is to have adequate warning to allow a sufficient quantity of properly equipped and supported personnel to man the perimeter. We have none of those things. Luck is our only early warning. There are not sufficient personnel to man the entire perimeter^A if under attack and we don't have adequate support weaponry. With regard to the second scenario we are less than defenseless. We are offering the enemy at least the entire new base and airstrip to sabotage whenever they desire. It is astounding that they haven't already been doing this periodically.

The few security measures we have emplaced are woefully^E inadequate and, at least the human portion, is largely ineffect^Ued to the point of being a non factor. The only recommendation I have heard come from Snowcap is that the Claymore mines^S be placed in concrete, presumably so they can't be turned around. If so reversed they are too far away and facing sand bagged positions to do much damage if detonated. However, shouldn't the whole key to security be to prevent anyone from getting close enough to move them?

Lately some NATI employees have been rotating in for a week at a time to help coordinate the air operations and be in charge of security. They use the call sign "Guardian." I have met noone at Santa Lucia who had a sufficient background to offer professional guidance when it comes to security. Having visited

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a Special Forces camp in Vietnam over twenty years ago is not qualification enough. Also, like any management position, managing a security force requires at least a nominal amount of leadership ability not apathy. Any deficiencies or agreed upon suggestions have not been followed up on.

For a relatively small amount of money and a modicum of attention to the issue the lives and aircraft at Santa Lucia would be comfortably secure. As it is now I believe we risk the entire program in Peru due to lack of prudent precautions. Undoubtedly, our threat is rising commensurate with our effectiveness.

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A. Changes in personnel:

1. There should be 14 GC on guard duty at night. Broken down as 8 manning the perimeter (^{one for} ~~over~~ each tower and/or one at each gate) 2 on roving patrol who should be ^{punished} ~~permissked~~ if they are ^{found} ~~formed~~ at the same past more than five minutes. As the appearance of security is as important as security itself - they should both carry lit flashlights. One sergeant of the guard on continuous patrol (with a lit flashlight). One radio operator to coordinate. 2 in the water tower in town as now.

One Corah worker should be kept on at night. But not to man a post and serve coffee as now. Because as standing post can be boring, he uses this as an excuse to slowly prepare and leisurely serve coffee leaving his post usually unmanned. He should be retained only to serve coffee. He should carry a lit flashlight.

2. There should be a minimum of 100 GC in camp at all times or we ^{just} ~~put~~ out. The perimeter is at least 300 meters long on all

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sides. A quantity of 100 breaks down to 15 per side for an average of 20 meters between individuals. Two squads of 7 and an officer (Lieutenant) for a total of 60. Two groups of 15 each to be ^{depicted} ~~displayed~~ to reinforce which ever side(s) the attack is coming from. 2 squads of 7 and one officer. The remaining 10 are 2 medics, one radio operator, one base commander, one executive officer and 5 as a M2HB crew. This is the bare minimum to hold the camp against a concerted attack. It does not allow for attrition in battle. There really should be another 20 GC. One more squad in each of the reaction teams and the other 5 as runners and stretcher bearers.

As it is now, 70 GC are supposed to be at the base at all times. However, there are usually not that many and even 70 is inadequate.

width

B. Changes in policy:

1. The towers should be manned, not the in ground bunkers beside them. The only advantage we have for a surprised attack is sufficient warning to mobilize a defense. Height to see out as far as possible is the only way. Some CC say they are scared they will be sniped if they are in the towers. They will be shot if the enemy is allowed to get close enough because we haven't used our advantages.

2. Those on post should be punished for looking toward the inside of the camp too often. Much of the time, especially during the day, the men on post seem to never once look out but sit turned face in to watch the goings on of the camp. It is incredible. This is the only time they seem to like the towers.

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3. No reading on post.

4. An incentive plan should be implemented to positively reward those who do well on guard duty.

5. To preclude boredom postions should rotate so that, for example, if they have a tower post one night they have roving or radio duty the next and so on.

6. The priority in construction should be to maintain and upgrade the perimeter. Currently there are weeds so high and thick one cannot see out from the ground.

7. The dusk security patrols every night with helicopters should continue.

W. 1/2 C. To construct:

1. An area several hundred meters wide along the west side of the new camp and airstrip should be cleared immediately. Currently this is a covered and concealed avenue of approach. It is very easy for someone to sneak in and ²sit charges on the unguarded new camp or crater the runaway ¹running all the months of labor and many dollars already spent. Also, it is very easy to sneak up to the current base through the weeds and then use the new buildings as cover.

2. A high two level sand bagged tower should be constructed in the center of the camp. The first level to be approximately twenty feet up and the next eight feet above that. The first level should be a command and control center from where the base commander can direct the battle. All Claymores should be strung into it. Claymores left in the hands of the closet GC mean that the first time anyone is spotted to the front they will detonate

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it. As you should wait until the enemy is no less than right on top of the mine, they will explode without hurting a sole and then we have no more Claymores. Presumably a responsible and trained officer will not prematurely set them off. The upper level would have two .50 caliber machine guns (M2HB) back to back with a 5 man crew assigned. The tower would need to be sturdy to withstand the record. Nothing turns courage to caution like a well placed "Ma Duece."

3. An effective, thorough and well planned perimeter lighting system. The few lights that are there now are under powered and poorly emplaced. This new system should be on its own circuit and generator and constructed so that if one were destroyed the others would remain lit.

4. A small concrete box protected ^{with} by sand bags should be constructed behind the DEA tent by the showers. It would be used to store all the demo, ammo and ^Pyro that is currently kept in the tent. It is necessary to keep some close by but, in the event of an attack or fire, ^Presents a tremendous hazard as presently stored.

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D. Items to purchase:

1. 6 of the high quality Litton night scopes (model M911A) like the one we now have. One for each corner, one for the water tower and one extra for us. I understand there have been problems in the past with accountability when loaning equipment to the GC. However, if the base commander or the sergeant of the guard is made to sign for them and they are collected back every morning I am sure it could work out. The night scope supposed to

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be in the water tower now is of such inferior quality that the guards there prefer the naked eye.

2. Two more M79's. Current camp policy is, if possible, to launch two helos during any attack. One M79 is to stay on the ground to fire illumination rounds and one ^oin board a ^ochopper as a direct fire HE launcher. It would be better if both helos had the capability to fire HE and if there were two on the ground.

3. More 40mm illumination rounds.

4. More parachute flares. We have a lot of star clusters but these are signalling devices and only last approximately five seconds. We have very few parachute flares and you can easily go through several cases trying to keep the area lit for any length of time. We need ten to twenty cases.

5. Two M2HB .50 caliber machine guns for new center of the camp C and C tower (with tracer ammo).

6. Heavy flak jackets for DEA personnel to wear during attack only.

7. Walkie talkies (5 watt) for the GC to use to communicate while on guard duty.

8. Infrared (IR) goggles for the pilots to use. There are enough pilots already ^{IR}12 certified for them to organize an in house training course for those who aren't. They have one pair now and need more (Litton model 912A or 915A NVG).

9. (optional) Personnel seismic intruder device system (PSID) with remote monitoring on the reverse slopes of northwest hills. It is the closest high ground and most likely avenue of approach.