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ENVELOPE  
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AIG 12120  
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CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05  
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/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

BODY  
SUBJECT: USAITAC MONTHLY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SUMMARY - DEC 1989 (MITS 89-12, PART 3 OF 4) (U) (J8727XWW)  
(U) THE MONTHLY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SUMMARY (MITS) CONSISTS OF FOUR PARTS. PART I OF THE MITS IS AN UNCLASSIFIED TRAVEL SECURITY ADVISORY; PART II IS A SECTION ON WESTERN EUROPE; PART III IS A SECTION ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE; AND PART IV IS A SECTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, PALESTINIAN TERRORISM, AFRICA, AND FAR EAST.  
(U) PART 3 OF 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS  
3. (U) US/CANADA  
4. (U) CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN  
5. (U) SOUTH AMERICA

(U) USAITAC USES THE DOD STANDARD TERRORIST THREAT LEVEL TERMINOLOGY OF CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, AND NEGLIGIBLE (AS DEFINED IN JCS SM 73-86 ANNEX B) IN ASSESSING THE TERRORIST THREAT. THE SIX FACTORS CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING THE THREAT LEVEL ARE EXISTENCE, CAPABILITY, INTENTIONS, HISTORY, TARGETING, AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. SEE MITS 87-10 FOR DEFINITIONS OF THREAT LEVELS AND FACTORS.

3. (U) UNITED STATES/CANADA-----ANALYST: ~~SECRET~~  
(U) THE THREAT OF A TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST US MILITARY

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5. USC 552 (b) (1)

INTERESTS IN THE US AND CANADA, EXCLUDING PUERTO RICO, REMAINS NEGLIGIBLE TO LOW.

A. (U) PUERTO RICO-----THREAT LEVEL: MEDIUM

(u) NO REPORTS OF POSSIBLE ANTI-US ACTIVITY OR TERRORIST ACTION WERE RECEIVED DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER. IN EARLY DECEMBER, A REPORT INDICATED THAT THE FORT BUCHANAN US ARMY GARRISON WAS UNDER POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE BY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS; HOWEVER, PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS HAVE NOT UNCOVERED ANY TERRORIST ACTIVITY. RADICAL INDIGENOUS GROUPS CONTINUE TO POSE A POTENTIAL THREAT TO US INTERESTS. THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, CURRENTLY THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY OF THE PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS ARE GOING TO RESORT TO LETHAL OR INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE ON THE ISLAND IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. (U) CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN-----ANALYST: [REDACTED]

(u) CENTRAL AMERICA CONTINUES TO BE A REGION OF CHANGE AND CONFLICT. WITH ONLY A COUPLE OF MONTHS BEFORE SCHEDULED DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA, THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT CALLED OFF AN UNEASY CEASE-FIRE WITH THE RESISTANCE, WALKED OUT OF PEACE TALKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY ALLOWED A FLARE-UP OF THE ARMED CONFLICT. SINCE THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE FORCES HAVE REFUSED TO DISBAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH A DEMOBILIZATION PLAN AGREED UPON AT THE TELA SUMMIT, NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT ORTEGA HAS THREATENED TO USE MILITARY FORCE TO DISLodge THEM FROM HONDURAN CAMPS. THE POTENTIAL NICARAGUAN AGGRESSION AGAINST HONDURAN SOVEREIGNTY HAS ONLY ADDED TO THE TENSION PERVASIVE IN THE REGION. IN EL SALVADOR THE INSURGENTS HAVE REFOCUSSED THEIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES BY TURNING AFFLUENT URBAN SECTORS INTO BATTLEFIELDS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ON 26 NOVEMBER, SALVADORAN PRESIDENT CRISTIANI SUSPENDED DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH NICARAGUA OVER ITS CONTINUED DESTABILIZING INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE ESQUIPULAS AGREEMENTS. CRISTIANI ALSO REFUSED TO ATTEND A SUMMIT OF CENTRAL AMERICAN DIGNITARIES SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN MANAGUA DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER. (THE VENUE OF THE SUMMIT WAS LATER CHANGED TO COSTA RICA TO ALLOW FOR SALVADORAN PARTICIPATION.) MEANWHILE, GUATEMALA IS STILL PLAGUED BY VIOLENCE BOTH FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT AND THE LEFT. IN PANAMA, GENERAL NORIEGA CONTINUES TO INTIMIDATE THE OPPOSITION AND IS ASSUMING A MORE CONFRONTATIONAL POSTURE VIS-A-VIS THE US MILITARY. US INVOLVEMENT AND/OR PRESENCE IN THESE AREAS OF CONFLICT INCREASES THE POSSIBILITY OF VIOLENT OR TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS, MORE SPECIFICALLY IN THE COUNTRIES DISCUSSED BELOW.

A. (U) EL SALVADOR-----THREAT LEVEL: HIGH

(u) THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) LAUNCHED ITS FIERCEST OFFENSIVE IN A DECADE-OLD WAR DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER. THE OFFENSIVE, [REDACTED] RAGED FOR DAYS IN THE SALVADORAN CAPITAL AND AS OF THIS WRITING HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETELY PUT DOWN BY THE

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WIDE AND 30 FEET DEEP. THE FIRST FOUR FLOORS OF THE NINE-STORY BUILDING WERE DESTROYED, AND HUNDREDS OF BUILDINGS IN A 26-BLOCK AREA SUSTAINED DAMAGE. AT LEAST 50 DEATHS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED AND 500 TO 1,000 PEOPLE WERE INJURED. NO AMERICANS WERE REPORTED AMONG THE DEAD AND WOUNDED.

~~██████████~~ THE DAS HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE GOC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE NARCOS, AND ITS DIRECTOR, GENERAL MAZA, HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS IN THE PAST. LEADERS OF THE MEDELLIN CARTEL PROBABLY ORDERED THE BOMBING TO RETALIATE FOR RECENT COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE 22 NOVEMBER RAID AGAINST ESCOBAR. THE 6 DECEMBER BOMBING ILLUSTRATES THE ABILITY OF THE NARCOS TO STRIKE ALMOST ANY TARGET VIRTUALLY AT WILL AND SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GOC.

~~██████████~~ ON 6 DECEMBER "THE EXTRADITABLES" PROMISED TO CONTINUE THE "TOTAL WAR" AGAINST THE GOC UNTIL THE COLOMBIAN SENATE APPROVES EXTRADITION AS AN ISSUE IN THE NATIONWIDE REFERENDUM ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM SCHEDULED FOR 21 JANUARY 1990. THE NARCO CAMPAIGN OF BOMBINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO WEAKEN THE GOC'S COMMITMENT TO THE EXTRADITION OF COLOMBIAN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS TO THE US. EXTRADITION IS STILL THE GREATEST FEAR OF THE TRAFFICKERS, AS EXPRESSED IN THEIR SLOGAN "BETTER A TOMB IN COLOMBIA THAN A JAIL CELL IN THE UNITED STATES." (NINE TRAFFICKERS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE US SINCE THE GOC CRACKDOWN BEGAN IN AUGUST.)

~~██████████~~ PRIOR TO 27 NOVEMBER, NEITHER THE GUERRILLAS NOR THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS HAD DEMONSTRATED THE INTENT TO CARRY OUT INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS SUCH AS THOSE DIRECTED AT THE AVIANCA JET AND THE DAS HEADQUARTERS. IN THE PAST, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS HAD BEEN VERY SELECTIVE IN THEIR CHOICE OF TARGETS AND HAD DEMONSTRATED AN INTENT TO AVOID ATTACKS THAT INFLICT MASS CASUALTIES.

~~██████████~~ EVENTS IN LATE NOVEMBER TO DECEMBER SUGGEST THAT THE NARCOS HAVE ESCALATED THEIR WAR, WHICH RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT US PERSONNEL MAY BECOME DELIBERATE TARGETS. ALTHOUGH NO AMERICANS HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY TARGETED BY THE NARCOS, THERE IS SERIOUS CONCERN THAT THEY COULD BECOME VICTIMS OF THE RISING LEVEL OF NARCOTICS-RELATED VIOLENCE.

~~██████████~~ THE TRAFFICKERS WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO FOCUS THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST GOC OFFICIALS, AND DIRECT TARGETING OF US PERSONNEL REMAINS UNLIKELY IN THE NEAR TERM. IF ONE OF THE DRUG KINGPINS IS ACTUALLY CAPTURED AND EXTRADITED TO THE US, HOWEVER, THE PROBABILITY OF NARCO RETALIATION AGAINST US FACILITIES OR PERSONNEL WOULD INCREASE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE COLOMBIAN PEOPLE VOTE IN THE 21 JANUARY 1990 REFERENDUM TO END EXTRADITION,

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 \*\*\*\*\*/

THEN THE THREAT TO US PERSONNEL WOULD LIKELY DECREASE IN THE NEAR TERM.

D. (U) PERU-----THREAT LEVEL: HIGH.

~~██████████~~ THE THREAT TO PERMANENT AND TRANSIENT US PERSONNEL IN PERU IS HIGH AND WILL REMAIN SO FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. US

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JOURNALIST'S BODY IS QUESTIONABLE. SL DOES NOT USE THE TERM "SUBVERSIVE" TO DESCRIBE ITS ORGANIZATION.

~~AS THE LEVEL OF GUERRILLA VIOLENCE IN PERU INCREASES~~  
THE THREAT TO MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LIMA AND THE RURAL AREAS WILL ALSO INCREASE.

~~IN RECENT MONTHS, SL HAS REPORTEDLY CARRIED OUT SURVEILLANCE OF US EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN LIMA~~

(C) IN OTHER REPORTING OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY, MORE DETAILS WERE OBTAINED ON THE 25 OCTOBER SL BOMBING AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LIMA (SEE MITS 89-11).

(C) SOVIET PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN PERU HAVE BEEN THE TARGET OF SL TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE PAST, DUE IN PART TO SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU.

SL TERRORIST ATTACKS DIRECTED AT SOVIET INTERESTS IN PERU CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE IN THE COMING MONTHS.

(U) POC THIS MSG: MR. [REDACTED] AV 335-2591; STU III AV 335-2591; STU III LOCAL 479-1931; COMM LOCAL 479-1934.

CLAS BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN

DECLAS: OADR

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