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ACTION SCT-02

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-07	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-00
NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSD-00	L-03	CTME-00	
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FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1171

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR *ai jai* Date. 4/21/95

AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
USAFSD HOWARD AFB PM  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LIMA 12463

USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, SNAR, PINR, PGOV, PE  
SUBJECT: SENDERO BLUNDER FUELS GOP VICTORIES

REF: LIMA 12113.

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. THIS IS PART TWO OF A TWO PART CABLE ON RECENT MILITARY AND POLICE SUCCESSES AGAINST SENDERO LUMINOSO. IN PART ONE WE DISCUSSED THE FACTORS WHICH  
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HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO RECENT SECURITY FORCES SUCCESSES

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AGAINST PERUVIAN TERRORISTS. IN THIS PART WE WILL EXPLAIN THE TACTICAL BLUNDER COMMITTED BY SENDERO LUMINOSO LEADERSHIP WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THESE GOP VICTORIES.

3. SUMMARY. RECENT MILITARY AGGRESSIVENESS IS ONE CAUSE OF THE 236 TERRORIST DEATHS DURING JULY, 1989. BUT THE ROOTS OF RECENT SENDERO LOSSES GO BACK TO 1983 WHEN SENDERO BEGAN TO SHIFT ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS (NOT ITS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP) TO THE JUNGLES EAST OF THE ANDES. THOUGH THE JUNGLE PROVIDED SL A SAFE HAVEN TO ESTABLISH LARGE, PERMANENT CAMPS FOR TRAINING, RECRUITMENT, AND R&R, IT HAS ALSO MADE SL VULNERABLE TO A CONVENTIONAL MILITARY COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. CONDUCTING MILITARY OPERATIONS OUT OF THE JUNGLE ALSO MEANS THE SL MUST MOVE ITS COLUMNS OVER LONGER DISTANCES. THIS MAKES THEM MORE VULNERABLE TO A MILITARY WHICH NOW APPEARS MORE COMMITTED TO USING ITS AIR ASSETS AGAINST THE TERRORISTS. FINALLY, SL'S RECENT AGGRESSIVENESS (1989 TERRORIST INCIDENTS ARE DOUBLE THOSE OF 1988) SUGGESTS THAT SL IS OVERESTIMATING ITS OWN STRENGTH AND ITS SUPPORT AMONG PERUVIANS. THAT MISJUDGMENT MAY BE THE RESULT OF A NEW, YOUNGER, AND INEXPERIENCED GENERATION OF LEADERS. POLICE SOURCES TELL US THAT SL LEADERSHIP TODAY ARE SOLDIERS, NOT THINKERS, AND DO NOT HAVE THE PATIENCE OF GUZMAN AND HIS GENERATION. WHETHER THE EVENTS OF JULY WILL SERIOUSLY DAMAGE SENDERO DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE GOP WILL CONTINUE ITS AGGRESSIVENESS, AND ON HOW QUICKLY THE SL READJUSTS ITS TACTICS. IN THE PAST, THE TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN MORE ADEPT AT CHANGE THAN THE

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GOP. END SUMMARY.

4. THE LAST TIME SENDERO LOST:  
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THE ROOTS OF THE JULY, 1989 MILITARY DEFEATS SUFFERED BY SENDERO GO BACK TO 1983 AND 1984. IN 1982 SENDERO WAS ENTERING ITS SECOND YEAR OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE GOP. BUT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CONVINCED THAT SENDERO WAS A REAL THREAT. THEN PRESIDENT FERNANDO

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BELAUNDE REPEATEDLY TOLD GOVERNMENT INSIDERS THAT THE "TERRORISTS" WERE NOTHING MORE THAN BANDITS AND WOULD SOON BE DISPATCHED BY THE POLICE. HE WAS WRONG. BY NOVEMBER, 1982, AFTER A SERIES OF BRUTAL ATTACKS BY THE TERRORISTS, BELAUNDE ANNOUNCED THAT THE MILITARY WOULD BE TURNED LOOSE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS.

5. IN NOVEMBER, 1982, THE FIRST EMERGENCY ZONES WERE DECLARED, AND THE ARMY WENT TO WORK. IN THE THREE YEARS PRIOR TO JANUARY, 1983, A TOTAL OF 177 PERSONS HAD DIED IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS. IN 1983 ALONE THAT NUMBER LEAPED TO 2,800 AND IN 1984 TO 4,300. OF THE MORE THAN 7,000 DEATHS IN THOSE TWO YEARS, APPROXIMATELY 4,500 WERE SUSPECTED TERRORISTS KILLED BY THE MILITARY IN ITS ANTI-SUBVERSION CAMPAIGN. THAT CAMPAIGN LARGELY CENTERED IN THE THREE SIERRA DEPARTMENTS OF HUANCAMELICA, AYACUCHO AND APURIMAC.

6. THE ARMY WAS BRUTALLY EFFICIENT. ALLEGATIONS OF MASSACRES, MASS DISAPPEARANCES, AND OTHER SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WERE REGISTERED BY MOST RESPONSIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS. AMERICAN AND PERUVIAN PRIESTS WHO LIVED IN THE THREE DEPARTMENTS DURING THOSE YEARS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ARMY WOULD ARRIVE IN A VILLAGE WHICH HAD BEEN THE VICTIM OF A SENDERO ATTACK, AND WOULD MOVE THE ENTIRE VILLAGE TO  
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A DISTANT LOCATION IN A NEIGHBORING DEPARTMENT. A

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JUSE-00 FBIE-00 DC-01 DDEE-00 M-01 FAIM-01 DS-01  
DIG-04 P-02 /043 W

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P 222230Z AUG 89  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1172  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
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USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
DIA WASHDC

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DIA FOR DA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-B/DB-3C1

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PRIEST WHO STILL WORKS IN THE APURIMAC DEPARTMENT  
TOWN OF ANDAHUAYLAS TOLD US THAT BY THE END OF 1984  
THE ARMY HAD ALMOST ENTIRELY DEPOPULATED THE NORTHERN  
REACHES OF APURIMAC DEPARTMENT AND EASTERN AYACUCHO,  
LA MAR PROVINCE, ALSO CALLED THE "DOG'S EAR".

7. BY 1985, DEATHS WERE REDUCED BY MORE THAN HALF TO  
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1,350 (884 TERRORISTS) AND IN 1986 TO 1,260 (620  
TERRORISTS). IN 1987 FEWER THAN 700 PEOPLE DIED AS A

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RESULT OF TERRORIST AND ANTI-TERRORIST VIOLENCE. BUT BOTH 1984 AND 1985 WERE RECORD YEARS FOR ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCES INSIDE THE EMERGENCY ZONES. DESPITE SENDERO'S CONTINUED SLOW GROWTH, THE TERRORISTS HAD BEEN BADLY SHAKEN BY THE ARMY TACTICS IN THE SIERRA.

8. RETREAT DOWN INTO THE JUNGLE:  
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SOMETHING ELSE HAPPENED IN 1983. SENDERO LUMINOSO BEGAN TO MOVE INTO THE JUNGLES ALONG THE EASTERN SLOPE OF THE ANDES. SOME STUDENTS OF SENDERO ARGUE THAT THE MIGRATION WAS A TACTICAL RETREAT FROM THE ARMY. OTHERS STATE THAT IT WAS A LOGICAL STEP, NOT NECESSARILY RELATED TO THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN THE MOUNTAINS. WHATEVER THE MOTIVATION, THE RETREAT CHANGED THE FACE OF SENDERO TACTICS. UNDER THE COVER OF THE FOREST, SENDERO BEGAN TO ESTABLISH LARGER, MORE PERMANENT BASE CAMPS. IN AREAS LARGELY UNPOPULATED AND UNEXPLORED, SENDERO COULD TRAIN NEW CADRES WITH MINIMUM RISK OF MILITARY INTERFERENCE. FROM THOSE JUNGLE VALLEYS, SENDERO COULD LAUNCH ATTACKS WESTWARD UP THE SLOPES OF THE ANDES AND INTO THE HIGHER MOUNTAIN VALLEYS, AND THEN RETREAT BACK INTO THE JUNGLE.

9. NOTE: THE APPARENT SHIFT IN THE CENTER OF SENDERO ACTIVITIES INTO THE JUNGLE WAS A SHIFT IN ITS MILITARY COMMAND, NOT ITS POLITICAL COMMAND. MOST OF OUR PERUVIAN SOURCES CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF SL REMAINS IN THE SIERRA,  
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PROBABLY IN AYACUCHO DEPARTMENT. POLICE AND MILITARY CONTINUE TO CHASE SL FOUNDER ABIMAEI GUZMAN (OR HIS GHOST) AROUND THE HIGH ANDES. THE MOVE TO THE JUNGLES WAS A MILITARY, NOT POLITICAL ONE. END NOTE.

10. THIS MIGRATION OF MUCH OF THE SENDERO ARMY ALSO BROUGHT SL INTO CONTACT WITH THE COCA INDUSTRY. BY 1988 SL CONTROLLED THAT INDUSTRY IN THE JUNGLE VALLEYS OF THE HUALLAGA, ENE, AND APURIMAC RIVERS. IN SOME CASES SL MAY HAVE PROMOTED ITS GROWTH.  
NOTE: IN A RECENT JOINT DEA/EMBASSY AIRGRAM WE

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DISCUSS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SENDERO AND THE COCA INDUSTRY AND THE POTENTIAL FINANCIAL WINDFALL AND POPULAR SUPPORT BASE WHICH NARCOTRAFFICKING PROVIDES TO SENDERO LUMINOSO IN THE UHV AND ELSEWHERE. END NOTE.

11. BY AUGUST, 1988, TERRORIST INCIDENTS WERE AGAIN ON THE RISE. ONLY 697 DIED IN 1987. BUT NEARLY 2000 IN 1988, HALF OF THOSE IN THE FINAL FOUR MONTHS OF THE YEAR. AND IN THE FIRST SEVEN MONTHS OF 1989 ALREADY MORE THAN 1900 HAVE BEEN KILLED.

12. STRIKE UP INTO THE MOUNTAINS:  
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THE CENTER OF SENDERO MILITARY OPERATIONS HAS CLEARLY SHIFTED INTO THE EASTERN VALLEYS. IT IS RELATIVELY SIMPLE TO TRACK A SENDERO COLUMN WHICH COMES UP OUT OF ONE OF THE VALLEYS AND STRIKES A SERIES OF TARGETS OVER SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE RETREATING AGAIN INTO THE JUNGLE. MOST INCIDENTS IN PUNO DEPARTMENT, FOR (###)PATTERN. ON MAY 5 THE COLUMN ATTACKED THE TOWN OF CRUCERO. NINE POLICE AND A JUDGE WERE KILLED. A SWISS DOCTOR WORKING IN THE VILLAGE WAS KIDNAPPED. HE WAS RELEASED ON MAY 7 ABOUT 40 KILOMETERS NORTH OF  
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CRUCERO, TOWARD THE JUNGLE. HE DESCRIBED TO POLICE AUTHORITIES IN PUNO THE MOVEMENT OF THE COLUMN BACK TOWARD THE JUNGLE. WE HAVE TRACKED SIMILAR MOVEMENTS THIS YEAR IN PUNO, APURIMAC, AYACUCHO AND HUANUCO

NOTE BY DC/T: (###)OMISSION IN PARAGRAPH 12. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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FBIE-00 DC-01 DOEE-00 M-01 FAIM-01 DS-01 DIG-04  
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P 222230Z AUG 89  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1173  
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AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
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AMEMBASSY QUITO  
USAFSD HOWARD AFB PM  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
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USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

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DEPARTMENTS.

13. NOT ALL ARMED SL LIVE AND TRAIN IN THE JUNGLE.  
PERMANENT CELLS OPERATE IN MANY OF THE TOWNS AND  
CITIES OF PERU. IN A TYPICAL ATTACK PATTERN, A MAIN  
COLUMN WILL LEAVE THE SL BASE CAMP AND WILL PICK UP  
ARMED CADRE AS IT PASSES THROUGH VILLAGES ON ITS WAY  
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TO ITS TARGET. THE MAY 23, 1988 AMBUSH OF A MILITARY  
PATROL NEAR THE AYACUCHO DEPARTMENT VILLAGE OF

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CAYARA, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUCH AN OPERATION. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT CAYARA VILLAGERS WERE AMONG THE 100 TERRORISTS THAT ATTACKED THE ARMY COLUMN AND KILLED FOUR SOLDIERS. IT ALSO APPEARS LIKELY THAT THERE WERE SL MILITANTS AMONG THE APPROXIMATELY 30 CAYARA VILLAGERS KILLED BY THE MILITARY THE NEXT DAY.

14. HIGH RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE PRIVATELY COMPLAINED TO US THAT THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST THE SL ARE HAMPERED BY SL'S RECENT PATTERN OF MOVEMENT ACROSS DEPARTMENTAL BOUNDARIES, NORMALLY IN AND OUT OF THE JUNGLE. ONE COLONEL TOLD US THAT THE ARMY WILL SET OFF IN PURSUIT OF A MOVING SL COLUMN ONLY TO HAVE TO BREAK OFF THE CHASE BECAUSE THE COLUMN HAS PASSED OUT OF AN EMERGENCY ZONE ON ITS WAY TO ATTACK OR IN RETREAT FROM AN ATTACK IN A NON-EZ AREA. BY LAW THE MILITARY MAY NOT RUN MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE DESIGNATED EZS.

15. THE MILITARY FINALLY CATCHES ON:  
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ARMED SL ATTACKS ON COASTAL CITIES OUTSIDE LIMA FOLLOW A SIMILAR PATTERN. THESE ATTACKS ARE GENERALLY LAUNCHED FROM THE MOUNTAINS TO THE EAST. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF THE SMALL COLUMNS WHICH REPEATEDLY ATTACK IN THE CANETE AREA SOUTH OF LIMA ARE PERMANENTLY BASED IN THE MOUNTAINS, OR FURTHER EAST IN THE JUNGLES. THE GROUPS WHICH ATTACK IN ANCASH DEPARTMENT AND THE HUACHO AREA OF LIMA DEPARTMENT  
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(BOTH TO THE NORTH OF LIMA) ARE JUNGLE BASED.

16. IT WAS THE RECOGNITION OF THIS SL PATTERN (HARDLY A SECRET) AND THE DECISION OF THE MILITARY TO COOPERATE WITH THE POLICE THAT LED TO THE JUNE 27 SUCCESS AGAINST SL NORTH OF HUACHO. SENDERO ATTACKED HUACHO JULY 25. MININT INTELLIGENCE INDICATED THE COLUMN WAS MOVING NORTHEAST AND WOULD CROSS THE ANDES AND BACK INTO THE EZ NEAR THE INTERSECTION OF THE HUANUCO, PASCO AND LIMA DEPARTMENT BORDERS. THE MILITARY AGREED TO PROVIDE HELICOPTERS. THE COPS

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CAUGHT UP WITH THE TERRORISTS 50 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF HUACHO, BUT STILL IN THE LIMA DEPARTMENT. TWELVE SL DIED.

17. WITH THE NEW MILITARY AGGRESSIVENESS DESCRIBED IN PART ONE OF THIS REPORT, SL OPERATIONS, ONCE SECURE UNDER THE JUNGLE CANOPY, ARE NOW VULNERABLE. SENDERO TRAINING CAMPS IN THE VALLEY ARE NOT HIDDEN AMONG "INNOCENT" CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, DESPITE "EL DIARIO" HYSTERICIS OVER "GENOCIDE" IN THE UHV. THE PRESENCE OF ISOLATED CAMPS ALSO MAKES THE SOVIET HARDWARE NOW IN USE IN THE UHV, MORE EFFECTIVE. AGAINST WELL-ARMED ATTACK HELICOPTERS, SENDERO'S ONLY REAL CHOICE IN THE EASTERN JUNGLES IS RETREAT.

18. THE SAME IS TRUE OF COLUMN MOVEMENT UP INTO THE MOUNTAINS. WHILE THE MILITARY AND POLICE WERE CHASING THE TERRORISTS IN SURFACE VEHICLES (OFTEN CIVILIAN VEHICLES COMANDEERED BY SECURITY FORCES BECAUSE THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT WAS BROKEN DOWN OR OUT OF GAS), IT WAS EASY FOR SL TO LIE IN WAIT AND WREAK HAVOC AT SITES OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING. NOT SO WHEN THE ARMY MOVES IN HELICOPTERS. THE LONGER THE DISTANCES THE TERRORISTS ARE IN MOVEMENT, THE MORE EXPOSED THEY BECOME TO AIR STRIKES.

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19. THE SHARP UPSWING IN RECENT TERRORIST DEATHS IS REFLECTED BY THE INCREASE, SINCE JANUARY, IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS. 1989'S DEATH TOTAL WILL NEARLY DOUBLE 1988 FIGURES. SO WILL THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS THIS YEAR BE TWICE THAT OF LAST YEAR. EITHER MORE SENDERO COLUMNS ARE IN OPERATION, OR THESE COLUMNS ARE STAYING IN COMBAT FOR LONGER

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SVC-00	INRE-00	CA-02	CG-00	A-00	USSS-00	USIE-00	
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FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1174  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
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AMEMBASSY QUITO  
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USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
DIA WASHDC

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SUBJECT: SENDERO BLUNDER FUELS GOP VICTORIES

PERIODS OF TIME. THIS UPSWING IN INCIDENTS MEANS THAT THE TERRORISTS ARE INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO MILITARY COUNTER ATTACKS. THAT IS, AS LONG AS THE MILITARY USES ITS SUPERIOR EQUIPMENT AND AS LONG AS SENDERO PERSISTS IN LAUNCHING INTO THE MOUNTAINS FROM JUNGLE BASES, SENDERO LOSSES WILL REMAIN HIGH.

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20. THE FIRST SENDERO BLUNDER:  
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SL HAS ACTUALLY COMMITTED TWO BLUNDERS. THE FIRST WAS THE SHIFT IN OPERATIONS FROM THE MOUNTAINS INTO THE VALLEYS. SL CONTINUES TO SUCCESSFULLY RECRUIT -- FORCIBLY OR OTHERWISE -- IN THE SIERRA, ESPECIALLY AMONG YOUTH. BUT EVERYTHING WE HAVE SEEN INDICATES THAT THE SL IS NO CLOSER TO ESTABLISHING A CLASSICAL INSURGENCY MODEL IN THE MOUNTAINS THAN IT WAS EIGHT YEARS AGO. THE OPPOSITE. THE "BASES DE APOYO" (SUPPORT GROUPS) THAT GUZMAN PREDICTED WOULD PRECEED THE VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION ARE MORE MYTHICAL THAN REAL. TODAY SENDERO IS VIEWED BY MOST SIERRA CAMPESINOS AS AN "ALIEN" OCCUPATION FORCE, MUCH IN THE SAME WAY THEY VIEW THE ARMY.

21. THE SUPPORT THE SENDERO DOES ENJOY IS BASED MORE ON FEAR AND INTIMIDATION THAN ON ANY IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION WITH SL'S REVOLUTIONARY GOALS. THE SL HAS LEARNED TO EXPLOIT SYMBOLS WITH WHICH THE INDIAN AND MESTIZO INHABITANTS OF THE ANDES CAN EASILY IDENTIFY (MORE ON (####) OF THOSE AREAS LIBERATED BY THE SL IN 1982 AND 1983. THESE GROUPS DO NOT STAND UP WELL AGAINST THE BETTER ARMED AND TRAINED TERRORISTS, BUT THEIR EXISTENCE HAS FORCED SENDERO TO TARGET MORE AND MORE OF THEIR POTENTIAL FOLLOWERS FOR DEATH. MORE THAN HALF OF THE PERUVIANS KILLED BY SENDERO ARE PEASANTS. SUCH BRUTALITY, EVEN IN THE NAME OF THE REVOLUTION, IS SOWING SEEDS WHICH THE GOP COULD LEARN TO EXPLOIT.

23. DOES GUZMAN REALLY THINK HE IS WINNING?

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THE INCREASE IN SENDERO ACTIVITY, ESPECIALLY SINCE JANUARY, ALSO SUGGESTS THAT SENDERO LEADERS BELIEVE THE REVOLUTION IS MORE ADVANCED THAN OUR ANALYSIS INDICATES IT IS. IT IS THAT MISJUDGMENT OF ITS ACTUALLY STRENGTH, WHICH IS THE SECOND MAJOR BLUNDER SL LEADERSHIP HAS COMMITTED. WE BELIEVE THE MISJUDGMENT IS PARTIALLY THE RESULT IN A CHANGE IN SL LEADERSHIP.

24. WHEN SL WENT UNDERGROUND IN 1979 AND BROKE

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FEEBLY INTO THE HEADLINES IN 1980, SOME PRESS REPORTED IT AS A NEW MOVEMENT. IT WAS NOT. THE ROOTS OF SENDERO, AND GUZMAN, REACH BACK INTO THE EARLY SIXTIES. THE VAST MAJORITY OF SENDERO LEADERSHIP, MANY WHO WERE STUDENTS AND FACULTY AT THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF HUAMANGA IN AYACUCHO, WERE DEEPLY INDOCTRINATED IN MAOIST REVOLUTIONARY THINKING LONG BEFORE SL COMMITTED ITS FIRST VIOLENT ACT.

25. GUZMAN AND SL'S EARLY LEADERSHIP EXHIBITED THE PATIENCE THAT WAS TYPICAL OF THEIR NAMESAKE, MAO TSE TUNG. GUZMAN NOTED THAT THE REVOLUTION COULD TAKE FIFTY OR EVEN A HUNDRED YEARS TO SUCCEED. SL EARLY STRATEGY, THOUGH VIOLENT, WAS ALSO PATIENT.

26. SL HAS LOST SOME OF THAT PATIENCE. RECENT SL AGGRESSIVENESS APPEARS TO HAVE OVEREXTENDED AND OVEREXPOSED SL RESOURCES. THE LURE OF THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, AND THE EXPECTATION THAT THEY COULD SUCCESSFULLY BLOCK THEM, HAS FIRED UP CURRENT SL LEADERSHIP WITH A VISION OF IMMEDIATE SUCCESS WHICH WE BELIEVE IS UNREALISTIC.

27. POLICE SOURCES TELL US THAT MUCH OF THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP IS YOUNG. THEY ARE ALSO SOLDIERS, NOT

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PHILOSOPHERS. THIS GENERATION OF SL WAS BORN DURING WAR, NOT DURING THE PEDAGOGICAL HEYDAY AT HUAMANGA UNIVERSITY. TODAY'S LEADERSHIP IS MORE COMFORTABLE

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P 22230Z AUG 89  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1175  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
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AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
USAFSD HOWARD AFB PM  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
DIA WASHDC

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, SNAR, PINR, PGOV, PE  
SUBJECT: SENDERO BLUNDER FUELS GOP VICTORIES

WITH A RIFLE THAN A TEXT BOOK. THE OLD GUARD HAS  
PASSED AWAY. MANY WERE KILLED IN THE 1986 MASSACRES  
AT EL FRONTON AND LURIGANCHO PRISONS. OTHERS HAVE  
FLED INTO EXILE. SOME HAVE BEEN PURGED. THE  
WHEREABOUTS OF OTHERS, LIKE GUZMAN HIMSELF, IS  
UNCERTAIN.

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28. IN THE MEANTIME, THE SL OF TODAY IS LEARNING A  
PAINFUL LESSON ABOUT THE RELATIVELY SUPERIOR

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FIREPOWER OF THE MILITARY, AND ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT IN MANY AREAS OF PERU. THE TIME OF GUZMAN'S FIFTH PHASE, THE ATTACK AND ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE CITIES HAS NOT COME, BUT SOME IN SL APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT IT IS NEAR.

29. WILL THESE BLUNDERS BE FATAL TO SL?  
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THAT DEPENDS BOTH ON THE GOP AND SENDERO. THE GOP COULD STRIKE TELLING BLOWS AGAINST THE TERRORISTS IF IT WERE TO MAKE A FIRM AND NATIONWIDE COMMITMENT OF MILITARY RESOURCES AGAINST SL ELEMENTS BASED IN THE JUNGLE. SIMILARLY, A GOP EFFORT TO TAKE THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE, TO THOSE WHO HAVE LOST SERVICES IN THE FACE OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE, AND TO THOSE WHO HAVE NEVER BENEFITTED FROM GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, COULD MAKE ANY SENDERO EFFORT TO RETURN TO THE MOUNTAINS MORE DIFFICULT. WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THE GOP HAS EITHER THE RESOURCES OR THE WILL TO TAKE EITHER STEP.

30. AS TO THE SL, IT IS AN ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS SHOWN THE RESILIENCY OF A PHOENIX. IT WILL NOT BE SIMPLE FOR THE SL TO REDUCE ITS TIES TO THE JUNGLE, TO THE SAFETY AND MONEY THERE. BUT IF THE ARMY KEEPS UP THE PRESSURE, THE SL WILL HAVE LITTLE CHOICE. OR IT COULD CHOSE TO UNLEASH A MORE SOPHISTICATED ARSENAL AGAINST THE MILITARY. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE SENDERO MAY BE SECURING SUCH AN ARSENAL. ONE OR TWO ARMY HELICOPTERS KNOCKED OUT OF THE SKY BY POWERFUL  
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ARMS IMPORTED BY THE SL THROUGH ITS COLOMBIAN BUSINESS PARTNERS, WOULD CRIPPLE THE RESOLVE OF EVEN GENERAL ARCINIEGA.

31. THE OUTLOOK APPEARS TO PIVOT AROUND WHICH FORCE IS QUICKEST TO ADAPT. IF THE GOP MOVES SWIFTLY AND CONSISTENTLY, SL COULD BE DAMAGED. IF NOT, JULY AND AUGUST'S LOSSES BY SENDERO, IN THE LONG-TERM, WILL APPEAR NOTHING MORE THAN A MINOR STATISTICAL RIPPLE.

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