



Department of State

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EXCISE

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 01 OF 17 221536Z
ACTION PM-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
H-01 NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00 MC-02 HA-09 L-03
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BBM Date. 9/18/96

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SECTION 01 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
- ASSISTANCE (AIASA) PERU

REF: A) STATE 052389 (DTG 200634Z FEB 88)

THE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE AIASA
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SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE AIASA FOR

PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 01 OF 17 221536Z

PERU, PER INSTRUCTION UPDATED BY REFTEL. DATA

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PROVIDED BELOW ARE KEYED TO SUBPARAGRAPHS OF REFTEL; THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT IS A FULLY COORDINATED U.S. DOCUMENT.

I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

THE ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN A KEY POLITICAL INSTITUTION IN PERU FOR MUCH OF ITS HISTORY. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IS WEAK AND NEEDS TO BE STRENGTHENED. THE ARMED FORCES SEE THEMSELVES AS THE DEFENDER AND, IN DEFENSE MATTERS AT LEAST, AS INTERPRETER OF NATIONAL INTERESTS. SINCE THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY IN 1980, THEY HAVE PROVIDED STRONG SUPPORT TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, BUT REMAIN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO POLICIES AFFECTING MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND RETAIN A CLEAR POTENTIAL TO CHANGE OR MODIFY PERU'S POWER STRUCTURE AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT. THE ARMED FORCES ARE KEY ON OTHER ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE USG, SUCH AS TERRORISM/INSURGENCY, NARCOTICS, REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND HEMISPHERIC POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION. U.S. INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE DEPEND ON A SUSTAINED COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP.

A. U.S. POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

- 1. POLITICAL:

- A) SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRACY IS A STABILIZING FACTOR WITHIN PERU. THE CONTINUANCE OF DEMOCRACY HERE SUPPORTS OUR EFFORTS ELSEWHERE IN THE

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PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 01 OF 17 221536Z

HEMISPHERE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY IS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS, SINCE 1987 THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS OF DISCONTENT WITH PRESIDENT GARCIA'S ADMINISTRATION. THE ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO WEATHER ITS CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND TO BE SUCCEEDED IN 1990 BY ANOTHER DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT DEPENDS IN LARGE PART UPON THE MILITARY.

- B) FIGHTING TERRORISM: RURAL AND URBAN

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GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN GROWING STEADILY SINCE 1980. THE MAOIST SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) AND THE CASTROITE TUPAC AMARU (MRTA) POSE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE GARCIA ADMINISTRATION AND TEND TO UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. THE GUERRILLA PRESENCE IN COCA-GROWING AREAS UNDERCUTS PROGRESS ON THE NARCOTICS FRONT. THE MILITARY HAS THE LEAD ROLE IN COMBATTING THE GUERRILLAS IN THE MOST SEVERELY AFFECTED AREAS. ON BALANCE THE MILITARY HAS NOT GIVEN (ALTHOUGH IT IS IMPROVING) COUNTER-INSURGENCY SUFFICIENT ATTENTION AND RESOURCES, COMPARED TO ITS PREPARATION FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR. WHEN THE MILITARY HAS CARRIED OUT SIGNIFICANT COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS, THEY FREQUENTLY HAVE BEEN UNDERCUT BY HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT ALIENATION OF THE AFFECTED POPULATION. WE NEED TO ENCOURAGE IT TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE, WHILE ALSO ENCOURAGING GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

- C) FIGHTING NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING: AN

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 02 OF 17 221539Z
ACTION PM-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
H-01 NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00 MC-02 HA-09 L-03
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 17 LIMA 09546

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MASS, PE

SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
IMPORTANT USG OBJECTIVE IS TO INCREASE NARCOTICS
INTERDICTION AND ERADICATION EFFORTS IN PERU.
SINCE NOVEMBER 1987 THE MILITARY HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY (UHV), WHERE THE
MAJORITY OF PERU'S COCA IS GROWN AND PROCESSED. IN
THE FACE OF INCREASING GUERRILLA RECRUITMENT AND
SUPPORT AMONG THE COCA GROWERS, THE MILITARY RE-

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 02 OF 17 221539Z

SOURCES ARE CLEARLY INSUFFICIENT.

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- D) COUNTERING THE SOVIET PRESENCE: THE USSR HAS PROVIDED PERU AN ESTIMATED USD 1.5 BILLION IN MILITARY SALES AND ASSISTANCE SINCE THE EARLY 1970'S. THE SOVIETS HAVE TRAINED HUNDREDS OF PERUVIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND THUS HAVE INCREASED THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE ARMED FORCES, ESPECIALLY IN THE JUNIOR AND MIDDLE OFFICER RANKS. IN EARLY 1988, THE USSR UNDERSCORED ITS INTEREST IN PERU BY CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON DEBT REPAYMENT, AND BY INITIATING NEGOTIATIONS IN OTHER AREAS, INCLUDING JOINT CONSTRUCTION OF VESSELS WITH THE PERUVIAN NAVY SHIPYARDS AND FISHING RIGHTS WITHIN PERU'S CLAIMED 200 MILE LIMIT. A LARGE SOVIET FLEET OPERATES OUTSIDE THIS LIMIT, AND USES PERUVIAN PORTS FOR REPROVISIONING AND THE EXCHANGE OF CREWS.

- E) PERUVIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE ARMED FORCES ARE A POTENTIAL BALANCING FORCE ON PERUVIAN FOREIGN POLICY, INCLUDING SUCH IMPORTANT ISSUES AS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, PERU'S NEIGHBORS, AND TO A MUCH LESSER EXTENT, TIES WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM.

- 2. ECONOMIC:

- A) ECONOMIC STABILITY. THE UNITED STATES HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN PERU'S FOREMOST TRADING PARTNER AND A PRIMARY SOURCE OF INVESTMENT CAPITAL. IN 1987, NEARLY 30 PERCENT OF PERU'S TOTAL IMPORTS CAME FROM THE U.S., AND IN RETURN, NEARLY 25 PERCENT OF ALL PERUVIAN EXPORTS WERE SOLD TO U.S. CUSTOMERS. SEVERAL AMERICAN-OWNED COMPANIES ARE AMONG THE

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PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 02 OF 17 221539Z

LARGEST AND MOST PROFITABLE IN PERU. CONTINUED ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH ARE NECESSARY TO KEEP OUR BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT INTERESTS STRONG; THIS STABILITY IS ALSO REQUIRED TO KEEP PERUVIAN DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT ON TRACK. CONTINUING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATE, INFLATION, AND BUDGET DEFICIT PROBLEMS -- AND THE GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS SQUARELY -- ARE ERODING CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE.

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B) RELATIONS WITH CREDITORS: THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO RESTRICT PAYMENTS TO MANY OF ITS FOREIGN CREDITORS AS A MATTER OF POLICY. AS A RESULT, RELATIONS WITH BILATERAL, MULTILATERAL, AND PRIVATE COMMERCIAL CREDITORS ARE STRAINED AND PERU'S ACCESS TO FRESH FOREIGN CAPITAL IS SEVERELY RESTRICTED. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN SIGNS OF INCREASING COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE WITH MANY OF THE CREDITORS, WE CONTINUE TO STRESS THE NEED FOR THE GOP TO ENTER INTO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS WITH ALL OF ITS CREDITORS TO ENSURE THE ORDERLY REPAYMENTS OF ITS DEBTS OVER TIME.

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C) OFFICIAL BILATERAL DEBT: THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT REMAINS UNABLE AND/OR UNWILLING TO MEET ITS DEBT SERVICING OBLIGATIONS ON A TIMELY BASIS. WE URGE THE GOP TO AVOID ARREARAGES IN THE REPAYMENT OF ITS OFFICIAL DEBT TO THE USG IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE ORDERLY DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS THROUGH U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND IMET.

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D) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WE ENCOURAGE CENTRAL

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 03 OF 17 221540Z
ACTION PM-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
H-01 NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00 MC-02 HA-09 L-03
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DISAM WPAFB OH
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE

SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
GOVERNMENT MEASURES DESIGNED TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT
CONDUCTIVE TO STEADY GROWTH IN PRIORITY AREAS OF THE
ECONOMY AND TO EXPANDED INVESTMENT IN THE COUNTRY'S
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY. U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE CON-
TRIBUTES IN AN IMPORTANT WAY TO THE GOP'S EFFORTS
TO REVITALIZE THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, STIMULATE
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVE HEALTH WITH

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 03 OF 17 221540Z

EMPHASIS ON CHILD SURVIVAL, PROMOTE FAMILY PLANNING,
AND PROMOTE DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY.

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E) NARCOTICS: THROUGH SPECIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, WE ARE WORKING WITH THE GOP TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES TO THOSE SECTORS OF THE POPULATION INVOLVED IN COCA PRODUCTION. WE ALSO CONDUCT SUBSTANTIAL ERADICATION AND INTERDICTION PROGRAMS IN COOPERATION WITH THE GOP, AND SUPPORT SIGNIFICANT DRUG AWARENESS PROGRAMS.

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3. MILITARY:

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A) STRENGTHENING OF DEMOCRATIC, PRO-WESTERN ATTITUDES AND POSITIONS, WHILE OFFSETTING SOVIET INFLUENCE: THE USSR HAS INVESTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THE PERUVIAN MILITARY. IN RETURN. THE USSR HAS GAINED A BEACHHEAD IN SOUTH AMERICA. IN ADDITION TO A FISHING AGREEMENT WHICH GIVES THE USSR MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFITS, PERU PROVIDES THE USSR WITH ITS ONLY AEROFLOT ROUTE TO THE CONTINENT AND ACCESS TO ALL OF PERU'S MILITARY SCHOOLS, BUT NOT AS STUDENTS OR PERMANENT FACULTY. WHILE THERE IS SERIOUS DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS AND OTHER ESSENTIALS OF SOVIET-PRODUCED EQUIPMENT, OFFERS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TO CONSTRUCT SOVIET BOATS IN PERU. NONETHELESS, THE PERUVIANS ARE SEEKING ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF OBTAINING SUPPLIES, AND ADEQUATE LEVELS OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE COULD STILL REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS THROUGH LOGISTIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT AND (STILL PREFERRED) U.S. TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

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PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 03 OF 17 221540Z

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B) ENCOURAGING THE DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES: WE MUST CONTINUE EMPHASIZING THE DOCTRINE, ATTITUDE, AND TRAINING NECESSARY TO MULTI-SERVICE OPERATIONS. THIS IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL IN COUNTERINSURGENCY AND OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IN OTHER COUNTERSUBVERSION ACTIVITIES.

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C) INTERNAL DEFENSE AND NATION BUILDING (RURAL DEVELOPMENT ASPECTS): PERU IS BESET BY A

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MAJOR INSURGENCY MOVEMENT WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DESTABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT AND DISRUPT THE ECONOMY. THE MILITARY IS ILL PREPARED AND EVEN MORE POORLY EQUIPPED TO CONFRONT THE THREAT. THE PERUVIAN MILITARY HAS BEGUN TO RECOGNIZE THE SENDERO LUMINOSO (AND MRTA), AMPLIFIED BY NARCO TRAFFICKING, AS THE MAIN THREATS AS OPPOSED TO CHILE AND/OR ECUADOR. A SUSTAINED PRESENCE AND CONTINUOUS ACTIVITIES IN CONTESTED AND REMOTE AREAS, ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO SUCCESSFUL INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT, BUT HAVE ENORMOUS RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS. THIS IS WHERE WE CAN HELP WITH WELL TARGETED SECURITY ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY AS THE SOVIETS HAVE DECLINED TO DO SO.

II. THREAT PERCEPTION:

- A. HOST COUNTRY PERCEPTION.

- 1) EXTERNAL: PERU'S MILITARY IS STILL ORIENTED OVERWHELMINGLY TOWARD A PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREAT FROM MILITARILY STRONG AND RESOURCE-HUNGRY CHILE TO THE SOUTH

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 04 OF 17 221542Z
ACTION PM-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
H-01 NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00 MC-02 HA-09 L-03
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
AND A MILITARILY WEAK BUT REVANCHIST ECUADOR
TO THE NORTH. THE PERUVIAN MILITARY PLANS FOR A WORST-
CASE SCENARIO IN WHICH IT MUST FIGHT A TWO-FRONT WAR
WITH THESE TWO NEIGHBORS.

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2. INTERNAL:

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 04 OF 17 221542Z

A) THE ARMED FORCES CURRENTLY CONFRONT TWO
INTERNAL GROUPS. THE MORE IMPORTANT, TO DATE, IS

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THE MAOIST SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL), WHICH CARRIES OUT GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST ACTIONS IN NUMEROUS RURAL AREAS, AND ASSASSINATIONS AND BOMBINGS IN LIMA AND OTHER CITIES. SL SEEKS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY A COMMUNIST "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY." SL HAS REJECTED DIALOGUE AND ANY ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. A SMALLER, MORE TRADITIONAL LATIN AMERICAN MARXIST TERRORIST GROUP IS THE COALITION OF THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MRTA-MIR), ACTIVE PRIMARILY IN LIMA AND OTHER CITIES, ALTHOUGH MRTA DID MOUNT A HIGHLY-PUBLICIZED RAID IN THE RURAL UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY IN NOVEMBER 1987.

- B) THE ARMED FORCES PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN COMBATTING GUERRILLAS AND TERRORIST GROUPS. CURRENTLY 33 OF THE 181 PROVINCES IN THE COUNTRY ARE UNDER A MILITARY STATE OF EMERGENCY, UP FROM 10 FROM LAST YEAR. WE ESTIMATE THAT SOME 6,000 TROOPS ARE STATIONED IN AYACUCHO, AND ABOUT 7,000 TROOPS ARE ASSIGNED TO THE OTHER RURAL AREAS UNDER MILITARY RULE.

- C) MILITARY OFFICERS RECOGNIZE THAT GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY IS GROWING AND POSES A GREAT THREAT TO PERU'S STABILITY. DESPITE SOME RECENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES TOWARD A GREATER COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY, THE BULK OF PERU'S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT NEVERTHELESS IS STILL GEARED TOWARD

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PAGE 03 LIMA 09546 04 OF 17 221542Z

A CONVENTIONAL EXTERNAL THREAT.

- B. COUNTRY TEAM PERCEPTION:

- 1. EXTERNAL: [

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2. INTERNAL:

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A) IN THE PAST YEAR, THE ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY COMBATTING TWO ARMED INSURGENT GROUPS: THE MAOIST SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) AND THE MORE ADAPTABLE MARXIST TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA). THE SL HAS MADE IMPORTANT TERRITORIAL GAINS WHILE THE MRTA HAS DEMONSTRATED INITIATIVE IN GAINING PUBLIC AWARENESS AND THE ABILITY TO OPERATE BEYOND ITS TRADITIONAL URBAN BASE.

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B) THE MAJOR BURDEN OF COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTION HAS FALLEN ON THE ARMY. ARMY POLITICAL/MILITARY COMMANDERS CONTROL ALL OF THE 33 PROVINCES IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY. THE ADDITION OF 23 PROVINCES IN THIS CATEGORY IN 1987 HAS STRETCHED ARMY MANPOWER AND LOGISTICS RESOURCES TO THE LIMIT.

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 05 OF 17 221544Z
ACTION PM-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
- C) THE CONTINUED LACK OF A NATIONAL
WAR HYPOTHESIS, INTERSERVICE COORDINATION, SUFFICIENT
BUDGET
FURTHER WEAKEN A VERY LIMITED COMBAT CAPABILITY.
MOST SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS RECOGNIZE THE DESTABI-
LIZING INFLUENCE OF THE INSURGENCY THREAT. A MINORITY
HAVE SHOWN REALIZATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 05 OF 17 221544Z

TO BECOME ADVOCATES FOR MILITARY CHANGE. MANY, HOW-
EVER, ARE BOUND TO TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL ROLES

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AND THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS AS BEYOND THE MILITARY CONTROL. MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO ORIENTATION TOWARD AN EXTERNAL THREAT PERMITS THE INDIVIDUAL SERVICE TO AVOID MAKING THE COMPROMISES AND CHANGES NECESSARY TO DEFEAT A PERSISTENT INSURGENCY.

III. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

1. GENERAL:

A) IN OCTOBER 1987, OVER THE STRONG OBJECTIONS OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE, THE PERUVIAN CONGRESS APPROVED THE CREATION OF A DEFENSE MINISTRY, REPLACING THE FORMER WAR, NAVAL AND AIR MINISTRIES. THE DEFENSE MINISTER HAS CONSIDERABLE POWER OVER SERVICE STRENGTHS, BUDGETING, PROMOTIONS, POLICY, ETC. HE IS NOT, HOWEVER, IN THE DIRECT OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR WAR FIGHTING. WHILE THE FIRST MINISTER CHOSEN IS A HIGHLY RESPECTED RETIRED ARMY COMMANDER, ALL SERVICES ARE EXTREMELY WARY OF THE POWER WHICH A POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CIVILIAN MINISTER COULD WIELD.

B) THE WAR FIGHTING FUNCTION, HOWEVER, IS RETAINED BY THE "COMANDO CONJUNTO" - THE RELATIVELY SMALL PERUVIAN JOINT STAFF. PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF THE COMANDO CONJUNTO ARE THE COMMANDERS OF THE THREE SERVICES WITH THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COMMAND ROTATING YEARLY AS AN ADDED RESPONSIBILITY OF ONE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS. THAT IS TO SAY, THERE IS NO FULL TIME PRESIDENT WHO CORRESPONDS TO OUR CJCS.

PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 05 OF 17 221544Z

C) ALL SERVICES WANT TO MAINTAIN -- IF NOT INCREASE -- THE SUPERIORITY THEY CURRENTLY ENJOY OVER THEIR NEIGHBORS IN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT. THE AIR FORCE AND THE ARMY, BOTH OF WHOSE HARDWARE INVENTORY IS MORE THAN 50 PERCENT SOVIET SUPPLIED, WOULD LIKE TO BREAK THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS FOR PARTS, TOOLS, SPECIAL LUBRICANTS, TEST EQUIPMENT IN THE SHORT TERM AND AVOID FURTHER ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIETS IN THE LONG TERM. THIS GOAL WILL BE HARD FOR THEM TO ACHIEVE, HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIETS

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REMAIN THE ONLY MAJOR SUPPLIER WILLING TO EXTEND EASY CREDIT TO THE PERUVIAN MILITARY. FINALLY, ALL SERVICES WANT BETTER EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO ALLOW THEM TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE EVER MORE CAPABLE AND DISTURBING THREAT FROM INSURGENTS AND TERRORISTS. THE NEED FOR RIVER PATROL BOATS, LIGHT AIRCRAFT, TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS, GROUND TRANSPORT VEHICLES; COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, ENGINEER CIVIC ACTION EQUIPMENT, ETC., IS OBVIOUS. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ANY OF IT CAN BE ACQUIRED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. FRUSTRATION ON THE PART OF DEPLOYED FORCES IS EVIDENT AND HAS PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED IN THE ANDEAN EMERGENCY ZONE.

2. ARMY:

A) MISSION: THE MISSION OF THE ARMY IS TO GUARANTEE THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC, COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS, AND IF CALLED UPON BY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 06 OF 17 221545Z
ACTION PM-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
H-01 NSCE-00 ARA-00 NSAE-00 MC-02 HA-09 L-03
AMAD-01 INRF-00 ACDA-12 SP-02 T-01 /051 W
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R 221524Z JUL 88
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OMB WASHDC
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DISAM WPAFB OH
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MASS, PE

SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
THE PRESIDENT, ASSUME CONTROL OF THE PUBLIC ORDER
DURING A STATE OF EMERGENCY. ITS PRIMARY MILITARY
DUTIES ARE TO PROTECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF
THE NATION AND GUARANTEE PUBLIC ORDER.

B) CAPABILITIES: THE ARMY, AS CURRENTLY
STRUCTURED AND EQUIPPED, IS MINIMALLY CAPABLE OF

PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 06 OF 17 221545Z

PERFORMING THE DUAL MISSION OF CONDUCTING CON-
VENTIONAL OR INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS. THE

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- C) PERSONNEL STRENGTH: ESTIMATED 84,500 (7,488 OFFICERS; 12,350 NCO; 64,680 ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND CONSCRIPTS), THE ARMY ALSO HAS 1,000 CADETS AND 9,289 CIVILIANS.

- D) WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT: THE ARMY IS EQUIPPED WITH A VARIETY OF MATERIEL OF DIFFERENT ORIGINS DATING TO MID-1967. INCLUDED ARE U.S. 105MM HOWITZERS, FRENCH AMX-13 LIGHT TANKS W/105MM GUNS, WEST GERMAN ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, COBRA ANTI-TANK MISSILES, 1,000 TRUCKS AND BELGIAN SMALL ARMS. IN 1973, THE PERUVIAN ARMY BECAME A CLIENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ACQUIRED T-55 TANKS, COMBAT CARS, FIELD ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY, ANTI-TANK MISSILES, AND TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS.

- E) TRAINING: ALL ENLISTED PERSONNEL ENTER THE ARMY AS CONSCRIPTS WITH A ONE YEAR TERM OF SERVICE FOR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AND TWO YEARS FOR NON-GRADUATES. ALL BASIC MILITARY TRAINING, 10 WEEKS, IS CONDUCTED IN THE UNIT TO WHICH THE SOLDIER IS ASSIGNED WITH GREAT VARIANCE IN TRAINING STANDARDS AND QUALITY. A VERY SELECT FEW ENLISTED PERSONNEL RECEIVE FURTHER TRAINING IN BRANCH, SERVICE SCHOOLS OR CIVILIAN TECHNICAL SCHOOLS.

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PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 06 OF 17 221545Z

- THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM PROVIDES VARIOUS LEVELS OF TRAINING FOR OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AS THEY PROGRESS THROUGH THEIR CAREERS. THE MAJORITY OF INSTRUCTION IS CLASSROOM-ORIENTED AND COMPETITION IS FIERCE. OFFICER EDUCATION FOR MOST CULMINATES IN A TWO-YEAR COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE. THE COURSE, ENTIRELY IN A CLASSROOM SETTING, EMPHASIZES CONVENTIONAL WARFARE AGAINST AN EXTERNAL THREAT AND STAFF SKILLS. CLASS RANKINGS IN THIS

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COURSE HAVE GREAT IMPACT ON THE REMAINDER OF AN OFFICER'S CAREER.

- SINCE 1973, APPROXIMATELY 450 OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION IN SOME 30 DIFFERENT COURSES. COURSES TAKEN HAVE RANGED FROM HELICOPTER AVIATION TO ARMOR OPERATIONS TO MAINTENANCE AND INTELLIGENCE. NUMBERS TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE DROPPED STEADILY IN RECENT YEARS TO LESS THAN 10 ANNUALLY.

- F) ARMY GOAL REMAINS TO MAINTAIN CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY OVER NEIGHBORS WHILE BUILDING COUNTERINSURGENCY -- INCLUDING NATION BUILDING AND HELD TRANSPORT -- CAPABILITY NEEDED TO DEFEAT SENDERO LUMINOSO AND TO WORK WITH THE ANDEAN POPULATION TO COUNTERACT CONDITIONS WHICH HAVE ALLOWED INSURGENCY TO DEVELOP. THE ARMY PARTICULARLY WANTS TO MODERNIZE ITS HELICOPTER FLEET AND AT LEAST SOME ELEMENTS WISH TO ENSURE THAT THIS IS DONE WHILE

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 07 OF 17 221546Z
ACTION PM-10

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SECTION 07 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MASS, PE

SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
STAYING COMPLETELY AWAY FROM PURCHASE OF ADDITIONAL
SOVIET HELICOPTERS.

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- G) LOGISTICALLY, THE ARMY WOULD LIKE TO
SIMPLIFY ITS CURRENT SPARE PARTS NIGHTMARE CAUSED BY
DEPENDENCE ON TOO MANY SUPPLIERS. AGAIN, MANY ARMY
LEADERS WISH TO DRASTICALLY DECREASE THEIR DEPENDENCE

PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 07 OF 17 221546Z

ON THE SOVIETS; HOWEVER, THE U.S. TRACK RECORD AS
A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PARTNER HERE, TOGETHER WITH

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THE CURRENT FREEZE UNDER BROOKE-ALEXANDER, COMBINE TO CAUSE THEM TO KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN. WITH RESPECT TO TRAINING, ONCE AGAIN, THE PERUVIAN ARMY PREFERS AND DESIRES U.S. TRAINING. THE IMET EMBARGO UNDER BROOKE-ALEXANDER, AND 620 (Q) HOWEVER, MAKES THIS IMPOSSIBLE.

- 3. NAVY:

- A) MISSION: THE MISSION OF THE NAVY IS TO DEFEND THE COASTLINE, ENFORCE PERU'S CLAIM TO THE 200-NAUTICAL MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL WATERS, PROTECT COASTAL SHIPPING, AND PATROL THE INLAND WATERS. THE NAVY ALSO ENGAGES IN CIVIC ACTION MISSIONS AND COMMERCIAL SHIPPING IN THE AMAZON BASIN.

- B) CAPABILITY: THE PERUVIAN NAVY IS CAPABLE OF DEFENDING PERU FROM ATTACK BY THE NAVAL FORCES OF ANY IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOR. ITS SUBMARINE FORCE IS ONE OF THE LARGEST IN LATIN AMERICA, BUT THESE AND THE SHIPS ASSIGNED TO THE SURFACE FLEET ARE AGING AND BEGINNING TO SHOW SIGNS OF WEAR AND TEAR DUE TO A SHORTAGE OF REPAIR FUNDS. THE NAVY POSSESSES A SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY IN SUBMARINE, ANTI-SUBMARINE, AND SURFACE WARFARE AREAS, ITS STRENGTHS INCLUDE HIGH MORALE AND GOOD TACTICAL PROFICIENCY. **L**

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PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 07 OF 17 221546Z

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C) THE PERUVIAN NAVY IS AN ANNUAL PARTICIPANT IN THE U.S. NAVY-SPONSORED UNITAS EXERCISES. PERFORMANCE IN THESE EXERCISES HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE PERUVIAN NAVY IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION WITH U.S. NAVAL UNITS IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE IN THE DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. ~~SECRET~~

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D) WITHIN THE NAVY ARE NAVAL POLICE AND MARINE CORPS UNITS, WHICH PROVIDE A MODEST CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL ORDER. THREE NAVY HOSPITAL SHIPS ARE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THE NAVY'S CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM OR ROUTINE MEDICAL ATTENTION TO VILLAGERS, TRANSPORTATION OF MATERIEL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. UNFORTUNATELY, LACK OF FUNDS PRECLUDE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS MISSION ON A REGULAR BASIS.

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E) PERSONNEL STRENGTH: 27,500 (2,610)

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 08 OF 17 221548Z
ACTION PM-10

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JFKSWC FT BRAGG NC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 08 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MASS, PE

SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS; 14,200 PETTY OFFICERS; 10,700 ENLISTED MEN AND CONSCRIPTS). TOTAL INCLUDES 120 PILOTS, 65 COAST GUARD OFFICERS AND 4,000 MARINES (INCLUDES ESTIMATED 100 NAVAL OFFICERS WHO ARE TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED AS MARINE OFFICERS). THE TOTAL DOES NOT INCLUDE 526 CADETS, 400 COAST GUARD PETTY OFFICERS AND NON-RATED ENLISTED PERSONNEL,

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 08 OF 17 221548Z

AND 6,278 CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.

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F) ORGANIZATION: THE COMMANDER GENERAL OF THE NAVY, THE SENIOR OFFICER OF THE SERVICE, IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF HIS SERVICE. HE EXERCISES COMMAND OVER THE OPERATIONAL FORCES THROUGH THE COMMANDER OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, COMMANDER OF THE AMAZON NAVAL FORCE AND OVER LAND-BASED FACILITIES AND THE PERSONNEL OF FIVE NAVAL ZONES. THE COMMANDER GENERAL OF THE NAVY IS ASSISTED BY THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF, ORGANIZED INTO THREE DEPARTMENTS WITH SUBORDINATE DIVISIONS, AND HEADED BY THE CHIEF OF THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NAVY, THE DIRECTORATES GENERAL OF PERSONNEL, MATERIEL, ECONOMY, MARITIME INTERESTS, AND PORT CAPTAINCIES AND COAST GUARD, AS WELL AS THE DIRECTORATES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE, ALL REPORT TO THE COMMANDER GENERAL. NAVAL SCHOOLS AND TRAINING CENTERS ARE SUBORDINATE TO THE DIRECTORATE OF INSTRUCTION.

G) EQUIPMENT: SURFACE SHIPS ARE OF U.S., FRENCH, UK, ITALIAN AND NETHERLANDS CONSTRUCTION. THE TWO CRUISERS HAVE AN AVERAGE AGE OF 35 YEARS AND WERE BOTH PURCHASED FROM THE NETHERLANDS, AS WERE 8 OF THE 10 DESTROYERS. TWO DESTROYERS ARE MODIFIED UK DRING CLASS SHIPS. IN 1973, THESE TWO HAD THEIR WEAPON CAPABILITIES SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED BY THE ADDITION TO EACH SHIP OF EIGHT EXOCET SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE (SSM) LAUNCHERS. THE NAVY RECENTLY UPGRADED ITS FLEET WITH THE ADDITION OF LUPO CLASS GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATES (FF) EQUIPPED

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PAGE 03 LIMA 09546 08 OF 17 221548Z

WITH OTOMAT SSM LAUNCHERS. TWO CONSTRUCTED IN ITALY WERE DELIVERED IN MARCH AND SEPTEMBER 1979, WHILE TWO OTHERS WERE BUILT WITH ITALIAN SUPPORT IN THE NAVAL SHIPYARD IN CALLAO, ONE (THE MONTERO) WAS DELIVERED IN 1985. THE SECOND FRIGATE -- THE MARIATEGUI -- WAS DELIVERED TO THE NAVY IN OCTOBER 1987. SEA TRIALS ARE SCHEDULED THROUGH THE END OF APRIL 1988. IN 1982, SIX 560-TON, EXOCET-EQUIPPED, MISSILE PATROL BOATS AND 20 EXOCET MISSILES WERE RECEIVED FROM FRANCE. THE SUBMARINE FORCE TRADITIONALLY HAS BEEN THE BEST EQUIPPED PART

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OF THE FLEET. OF THE 12 SUBMARINES IN THE NAVY INVENTORY, 6 WERE OBTAINED FROM THE U.S. - 2 GUPPY IA AND 4 TIBURON CLASS. SIX ARE THE GERMAN TYPE 209, PROBABLY THE MOST FAVORED SUBMARINE SOLD FOR EXPORT IN THE FREE WORLD. IN EARLY 1984, THE PERUVIAN NAVY LEASED FOUR AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES LANDING SHIPS (LST) FROM THE U.S. NAVY. THE SHIPS ARRIVED IN CALLAO IN MARCH 1985. THE LSTS WERE PROVIDED UNDER A 5-YEAR NO-COST LEASE, RENEWABLE FOR A SECOND 5-YEAR PERIOD. COST OF REACTIVATION WAS BORNE BY THE PERUVIAN NAVY. THIS ACTION WAS THE FIRST TRANSFER OF SHIPS TO PERU BY THE U.S. NAVY SINCE 1974.

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H) LOGISTICS: THE PERUVIAN NAVY HAS SOME PROBLEMS MAINTAINING ITS FORCE AT SEA FOR ANY EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, BUT MAJOR UNITS CAN OPERATE STEADILY FOR PERIODS OF AT LEAST 10 DAYS BASED ON THE QUANTITY OF FOOD SUPPLIES ABOARD. THE NAVY USES FRESH FOOD DUE TO THE HIGH COST OF FROZEN, CANNED AND DRIED FOOD. OTHERWISE, WITHOUT REPLENISHMENT

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 09 OF 17 221549Z
ACTION PM-10

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 09 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MASS, PE

SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY OF STORES, ON STATION TIME IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 10 DAYS. POL--FUEL, GASOLINE, AND COMMON LUBRICATION OILS ARE LOCALLY AVAILABLE.

I) FACILITIES: THREE FACILITIES (CALLAO, IQUITOS AND CHIMBOTE) OF THE PERUVIAN NAVY SHIPYARD-SIMA (SERVICIOS INDUSTRIALES DE LA

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 09 OF 17 221549Z

MARINA) WORK UNDER CONTRACT FOR THE NAVY AND FOR OTHER GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE AGENCIES. SIMA HAS

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THE CAPABILITY TO CONSTRUCT SMALL PATROL SHIPS AND LARGE AUXILIARIES -- 25,000 TON FREIGHTERS, 90,000 TON TANKERS, AND OCEANIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SHIPS. SIMA DOES REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE WORK ON THE NAVY'S SUBMARINES AND SURFACE SHIPS. IN 1981, SIMA INITIATED A NEW ARMS PRODUCTION LINE INCLUDING DESIGNING AND MANUFACTURING OF 10,000 SUBMACHINE GUNS FOR THE CIVIL GUARD AND THE REPUBLICAN GUARD.

- J) THE NAVY HAS NO PLANS TO FURTHER ENLARGE ITS SURFACE OR SUBSURFACE FORCE.

- J) WITH REGARD TO ITS NAVAL AVIATION, THE PERUVIAN NAVY DESIRES TO OBTAIN A HELICOPTER THAT IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT WHILE OPERATING AT HIGH ALTITUDES. THEY ARE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING WITH THE ITALIANS FOR 10 AUGUSTA-BELL HELICOPTERS. THEY ARE ALSO SEEKING TO UPGRADE THEIR S-2 ACFT.

- K) MARINES: THE PERUVIAN NAVY PLANS TO REFOCUS THE MARINE MISSION TO A COASTAL DEFENSE FORCE AND DOWNPLAY THE AMPHIBIOUS ROLE. THIS MOVE IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE RESULT OF AUSTERITY MEASURES IMPOSED THROUGHOUT THE NAVY.

- 4. AIR FORCE:

- A) MISSION: THE MISSION OF THE AIR FORCE IS TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITIES ARE TO ASSIST THE GROUND

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PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 09 OF 17 221549Z

FORCES IN THE PRESERVATION OF INTERNAL ORDER, ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY AND RECENTLY TO ASSIST THE POLICE IN THE DRUG WAR, PROVIDE A GOVERNMENT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC SERVICE, A GOVERNMENT SCHOOL OF CIVIL AVIATION, AND A GOVERNMENT AERONAUTICAL INDUSTRY.

- B) CAPABILITY: THE PERUVIAN AIR FORCE HAS A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO DEFEND ITS AIRSPACE, BUT ITS SUPPORT FOR PERUVIAN GROUND FORCES IS GROWING. *E*

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IN DAYLIGHT VISUAL CONDITIONS, THE AIR FORCE COULD REACH TARGETS IN COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, BOLIVIA AND CHILE WITH ITS CANBERRA BOMBERS. THE 47 SU-22/FITTER FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT MAKE UP A FORMIDABLE FIGHTING FORCE. THE AIR FORCE CAN PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT TO GROUND FORCES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY. AIR FORCE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS WAS ENHANCED IN 1983 AND EARLY 1984 AFTER DELIVERY OF 14 MI-25/HIND ASSAULT HELICOPTERS AND FIVE BELL 214ST TROOP TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS. IT COULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT DAYLIGHT, FAIR-WEATHER SUPPORT TO NAVAL OPERATIONS.

-
- C) PERSONNEL STRENGTH: BETWEEN 12,000 AND 16,000 (1,500 OFFICERS, 2,500 NCOs, 2,000 AND 4,000 ENLISTED MEN AND CONSCRIPTS). APPROXIMATELY

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 10 OF 17 221551Z
ACTION PM-10

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COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 10 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
580 PILOTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE OFFICER STRENGTH.
TOTAL INCLUDES 530 CADETS AND 6,000 TO 8,000
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.

- D) ORGANIZATION: PERU IS DIVIDED INTO
FIVE NUMBERED AIR REGIONS. OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED
PRIMARILY FROM NINE AIR BASES -- THE CIVIL/MILITARY
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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 10 OF 17 221551Z

AIRFIELDS OF JORGE CHAVEZ INTERNATIONAL (AT CALLAO),
CAPT J. A. QUINONES G (AT CHICLAYO), PISCO, CAPT

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MONTES (AT TALARA), AND CAPITAN CONCHA (AT PIURA); AND THE FOUR MILITARY AIR BASES OF EL PATO (AT TALARA), MARIANO MELGAR (AT LA JOYA), VITOR (AT AREQUIPA); AND IQUITOS. TRAINING IS CONDUCTED PRIMARILY FROM LAS PALMAS AIR BASE NEAR LIMA. THE FOUR WING HEADQUARTERS ARE LOCATED AT AREQUIPA (WING 3), AT CALLAO AIR BASE (WING 2), AT PIURA (WING 1) AND AT IQUITOS AIR BASE (WING 5). AIR WING 4 HAS NOT YET BEEN ACTIVATED AT PUERTO MALDONADO AIR BASE NOR DO WE KNOW IF IT EVER WILL BE ACTIVATED.

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E) TRAINING: PERUVIAN AIR FORCE TRAINING, ALTHOUGH CONSIDERED SUPERIOR TO THAT OF MOST OTHER LATIN AMERICAN AIR FORCES, SUFFERS FROM SHORTAGES OF SUITABLE STUDENTS, QUALIFIED INSTRUCTORS, FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION, THE PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM IS CURRENTLY STRAINED FOR LACK OF OPERATIONAL TRAINER AIRCRAFT AND AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF INSTRUCTOR PILOTS AS WELL AS SUFFICIENT FUEL FOR TRAINING (ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS). THEY RECEIVED 20 BRAZILIAN TUCANO TRAINERS IN 1987/88

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F) PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR OFFICERS CONSISTS OF BASIC, COMMAND AND STAFF, AND HIGHER STUDIES. APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF
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PAGE 03 LIMA 09546 10 OF 17 221551Z

THE OFFICERS COMPLETE THEIR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN ONE OF SEVERAL WESTERN NATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE BASIC MILITARY, TECHNICAL, ON-THE-JOB, AND SYSTEMS TRAINING. FURTHER SYSTEMS TRAINING, WHICH IS PROVIDED TO TECHNICIANS WHEN A NEW SYSTEM IS ACQUIRED, IS GENERALLY IN THE COUNTRY OF THE CONTRACTOR. ONE NOTABLE EXCEPTION IS THE SYSTEMS TRAINING FOR SOVIET EQUIPMENT, OF WHICH A LARGE PERCENTAGE WAS PROVIDED IN PERU.

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G) SINCE 1973, AS MANY AS 2,000 PERUVIAN

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AIR FORCE PERSONNEL ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE RECEIVED TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION. COURSES INCLUDE HELICOPTER PILOT, FIGHTER-BOMBER PILOT, TRANSPORT PILOT, EARLY WARNING RADAR, AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY, SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, AIR CONTROLLER, COMMANDO OPERATIONS, PARATROOP OPERATIONS, ARMORED CAR (BRDM-2) AND INTELLIGENCE. RECENTLY SUCH TRAINING HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED (SOME INTEL TRAINING REPORTED IN 1986) AS PERUVIANS FEEL THEY CAN TRAIN THEIR OWN PEOPLE IN SOVIET EQUIPMENT IN PERU WITH BETTER RESULTS AND LOWER COSTS.

- H) IN 1986 AND 1987, THE PERUVIAN AIR FORCE RECEIVED 12 MIRAGE 2000 INTERCEPTORS. **E**

I THEY HAVE AN AIR BASE AT PUERTO MALDONADO FOR THEIR SOUTHERN DEFENSES AND HAVE NO AIRCRAFT TO MOVE THERE.

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 11 OF 17 221552Z
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CNO WASHDC
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CDRUSASAALA FT CLAYTON PM//SOSA//
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USAFSO HOWARD AFM PM
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 11 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY

- 5. NATIONAL POLICE:

- PERU'S THREE POLICE FORCES -- THE CIVIL
GUARD (GC), THE REPUBLICAN GUARD (GR), AND THE
PERUVIAN INVESTIGATIVE POLICE (PIP) -- ARE ALL
UNDER THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, AND IN 1986 WERE

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 11 OF 17 221552Z

PLACED UNDER A COMBINED POLICE FORCES COMMAND.
UNDER THIS CONCEPT GENERAL OFFICERS ARE NO LONGER

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ASSOCIATED OFFICIALLY WITH ONE OF THE THREE BASIC INSTITUTIONS, BUT ARE "GENERALS OF THE POLICE FORCES". THE SENIOR UNIFORMED POLICE OFFICER IS THE THREE STAR DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE FORCES. TWO OF THE FORCES -- THE GC AND GR ARE DISCUSSED BELOW AS "PARAMILITARY FORCES".

-
6. CIVIL GUARD (GUARDIA CIVIL):

- THE CIVIL GUARD, A FORCE OF 37,500, IS CHARGED WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER, PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY, AND BORDER PATROL. THE CIVIL GUARD IS GEOGRAPHICALLY ORGANIZED INTO FIVE REGIONS COVERING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. IN THE CASE OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, THE CIVIL GUARD WOULD COME UNDER THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY.

-
7. THE REPUBLICAN GUARD (GUARDIA REPUBLICANA):

- A FORCE OF 15,500 IS CHARGED WITH THE PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, THE SECURITY OF NATIONAL FRONTIERS, AND THE OPERATION OF PRISONS. THE GUARD IS CAPABLE OF FULFILLING THESE DUTIES AND OF ASSISTING IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER WHEN NECESSARY. IN CASE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY, THE REPUBLICAN GUARD WOULD ALSO COME UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY.

IV. ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE SPENDING

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PAGE 03 LIMA 09546 11 OF 17 221552Z

- A. PREVIOUS YEAR ACTUAL DEFENSE SPENDING:
USD 646 MILLION.

- B. BREAKOUT BY TYPE OR EXPENSE OR BY MILITARY SERVICE IS UNAVAILABLE.

- C. THIRD COUNTRY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS:
NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE.

- V. ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS: WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PROPOSED U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE WOULD HAVE

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AN APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL SITUATION. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACQUISITION FROM THE U.S. WOULD BE HELICOPTERS AND TRUCKS FOR USE IN FIGHTING INSURGENTS AND DRUG TRAFFICKERS. ALTHOUGH SUCH ITEMS COULD BE USED IN A CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT, THEY WOULD ADD LITTLE TO THE PERUVIAN INVENTORY THAT ALREADY INCLUDES SOVIET TANKS, AIRCRAFT, AND OTHER OFFENSIVE WEAPONRY.

VI. HUMAN RIGHTS: PERU HAS A FREELY ELECTED DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, WITH BROAD POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS GENERALLY RESPECTED IN PRACTICE. THE GROWING INSURGENCY THAT BEGAN IN 1980 LED TO SIGNIFICANT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BOTH BY THE INSURGENTS AS WELL AS THE SECURITY FORCES. DURING 1987 THE NUMBER OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS REPORTEDLY CARRIED OUT BY THE SECURITY FORCES DROPPED; THOSE CARRIED OUT BY THE INSURGENTS CLIMBED. DISAPPEARANCES

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 12 OF 17 221555Z
ACTION PM-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
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R 221524Z JUL 88
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CDRUSASAALA FT CLAYTON PM//SOSA//
COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
USAFSO HOWARD AFM PM
OMB WASHDC
TRSYDEPT WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
JFKSWC FT BRAGG NC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 12 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
CARRIED OUT BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN THAT
YEAR REMAINED AT AN ESTIMATED 150-200, ABOUT
THE SAME AS IN 1986. CREDIBLE REPORTS OF
ARBITRARY DETENTION AND TORTURE BY THE MILITARY
AND POLICE CONTINUE. FOR MORE INFORMATION SEE
THE 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. THE ARMED FORCES
(AND THE POLICE) ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED TO WIN

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 12 OF 17 221555Z

THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION WHERE THE
INSURGENTS OPERATE. AT THE SAME TIME THEY

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BELIEVE THAT THE GUERRILLAS HAVE USED HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SHIELD FOR SUBVERSION. OUR GOAL HERE REMAINS TO INFLUENCE THE MILITARY TO INCREASE ITS RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AS AN ELEMENT ESSENTIAL TO A SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURENCY STRATEGY.

VII. STATUS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

	(\$ MILLIONS)			
FY 87 ACT	FY 88 REQ	FY 89 REC	FY 90 EST	
-----	-----	-----	-----	
FMSCR	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
MAP	0.0	3.0	3.1	20.
IMET	.350	.700	.743	1.5
ESF	4.8	10.0	5.0	5.0
SECURITY ASSISTANCE (SUBTOTAL)	5.15	13.7	8.843	26.5
DA	14.5	14.2	14.2	14.4
PL-480 TITLE I	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
PL-480 TITLE II	7.9	8.2	8.2	8.2
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PAGE 03	LIMA	09546	12 OF 17	221555Z
REFUGEE ASSISTANCE				
NARCOTICS CONTROL	6.7	8.5	12.9	12.5
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE (TOTAL)	54.25	64.6	64.143	81.6

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A. CUTS IN U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PERU IN FY 88 WILL CURTAIL OUR PROGRAMS TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY AND TO STEM THE FLOW OF DRUGS INTO THE UNITED STATES. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES WILL DIMINISH, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH THE TRAINING, MUCH LESS THE EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO FIGHT TWO INSURGENCIES. BELOW ARE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF PROGRAMS THAT WILL BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY SHRINKING LEVELS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

-- TRAINING. THE SHORTFALL IN FUNDING LEVELS FOR THE ANDEAN PEACE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, DESIGNED TO MATCH THE SOVIET UNION'S SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, COULD JEOPARDIZE OUR ABILITY TO MEET OUR LONG-TERM TRAINING TARGETS BEGINNING NEXT FISCAL YEAR. THE SHORTFALL THIS YEAR MUST BE MADE UP IN FY89 FOR THE PROGRAM TO MEET ITS OBJECTIVES.

-- SUPPORT FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR. ACTIVITIES IN THIS FIELD HAVE ALSO BEEN CUT BACK AS A RESULT OF

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 13 OF 17 221557Z
ACTION PM-10

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CNO WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC/PRI//
CDRUSASAALA FT CLAYTON PM//SOSA//
COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
USAFSO HOWARD AFM PM
OMB WASHDC
TRSYDEPT WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
JFKSWC FT BRAGG NC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 13 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
SHUFFLING MONEY FROM THIS AREA TO THOSE REQUIRING
OUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

-- IMET. CUTS IN TRAINING FUNDS TRANSLATE INTO
FEWER OPPORTUNITIES TO INFLUENCE THE PERUVIAN
MILITARY. THE PERUVIAN ARMY, THE MOST IMPORTANT
POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY OF THE THREE SERVICES,
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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 13 OF 17 221557Z

DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON IMET FUNDS TO SEND PERSONNEL
TO THE UNITED STATES FOR TRAINING. WE ARE COMPETING

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DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH PROVIDES EXTENSIVE TRAINING, TOGETHER WITH EQUIPMENT ON FAVORABLE TERMS, TO THE PERUVIAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE. RECENTLY, AN ELEVEN-MAN DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET MAAG EQUIVALENT, HEADED BY A MAJOR GENERAL, ARRIVED IN LIMA PRESUMABLY TO DISCUSS ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

- B. MAP. ALTHOUGH PERU HAS NOT HAD A MAP SINCE 1971, NOW IS THE TIME TO RESTART IT. MAP FUNDS ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE UP FOR EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST PERU'S TWO INSURGENT GROUPS.

VIII. PROJECTED FY 90 SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- A. THE ECONOMICS, NARCOTICS AND SUBVERSIVE/TERRORIST PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO THREATEN BOTH THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND U.S. GOALS FOR REGIONAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STABILITY. THE PERUVIAN MILITARY IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COUNTERING A TERRORIST/INSURGENT AND NARCO-TRAFFICKING/PRODUCTION THREAT. IT ALSO HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT VIA -- RURAL ROAD/BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION BUILDING IN SMALL TOWNS, AND OVERALL IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING CONDITIONS IN RURAL AREAS.

- TO MEET ITS VARIED DEMANDS, THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES MUST MODERNIZE ITS EQUIPMENT AND UPDATE ITS TRAINING TECHNIQUES. IT REQUIRES THE PROPER EQUIPMENT TO COUNTER A TERRORIST/SUBVERSIVE FORCE THAT OPERATES IN BOTH URBAN AND RUGGED MOUN-

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PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 13 OF 17 221557Z

TAIN TERRAIN. TO ACCOMPLISH ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT MISSION, THE ARMED FORCES MUST REPAIR IDLE EQUIPMENT AND REPLACE WORN-OUT ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT. TO ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE COUNTER-NARCOTICS EFFORTS, IT MUST PROCURE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT AND DETECTION DEVICES.

- A STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE REPAIR/ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS TRAINING IS A SERIOUS LACK OF ADEQUATE FUNDS. THIS IS COMPOUNDED BY THE EVER-PRESENT BROOKE-ALEXANDER, 620Q SANCTIONS WHICH PROHIBIT

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THE DISBURSEMENT OF SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FUNDS. FACED WITH THE DILEMMA OF MEETING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES WITH LITTLE OR NO U.S. ASSISTANCE, THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES WILL PROBABLY (DUE TO GENEROUS TERMS) CONTINUE TO RELY ON THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS SHORT-SIGHTED TO TRY TO SEEK POLITICAL STABILITY WHILE IGNORING THE MILITARY. UNLESS WE CAN OFFER VIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING, WE MUST RESIGN OURSELVES TO CONTINUED SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN PERU.

- TO PROTECT OUR REGIONAL GOAL OF ECONOMIC/SOCIAL/POLITICAL STABILITY, THE U.S. MUST EMBARK ON A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN PERU WHICH OFFERS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT AND PRESENCE. THIS PROGRAM WOULD ENCOMPASS A STRONG INET BUDGET (TO ADDRESS THE TRAINING DEFICIENCIES) AND AN EQUALLY STRONG MAP OFFERING.

- MINIMUM FUNDING LEVEL FOR FY 90:

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PAGE 01
ACTION PM-10

LIMA 09546 14 OF 17 221557Z

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AMAD-01	INRE-00	ACDA-12	SP-02	T-01	/051 W	
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R 221524Z JUL 88
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
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 CDRUSASAALA FT CLAYTON PM//SOSA//
 COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
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 DISAM WPAFB OH
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 14 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MASS, PE

SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY

- MAP \$20 MILLION

- IMET \$1.5 MILLION

- B. SPECIFIC MAP-FINANCED ACQUISITIONS:

ITEM	QTY	EST COST
------	-----	----------

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 14 OF 17 221557Z

AN/PRC 77 RADIO 150 263

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AN/GRC-160 RADIO	100	175
AN/VRC-46A	25	155
FIELD PACK W/LINER	5,000	225
COMBAT BOOTS (JUNGLE)	10,000	250
TRUCK, TRANSPORT	30	1,950
RECON VEH 1/4 TON	30	750
AMBULANCE 1/4 TON	20	500
WATER TANK TRUCK 2,000 GAL	10	170
FUEL TANK TRAILER 5,000 GAL	30	300
CATERPILLAR TRACTORS (D4-D8) REPAIR PARTS	1,500	6,238
GENERATOR REPAIR PARTS (27-130 KW)	250	6,488
WHEELED TRACTOR REPAIR PARTS	200	6,688
MOTORIZED ROAD GRADER	500	7,188

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PAGE 03 LIMA 09546 14 OF 17 221557Z

REPAIR PARTS

HELICOPTER (UH1-N OR SIMILAR)	1	5,000	12,188
HELICOPTER (UH-60 OR SIMILAR)	1	7,000	19,188
NIGHT VISION GOGGLES AN/PVS-5 (HELICOPTER/ INDIV SOLDIER)	50	400	19,588

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NIGHT VISION GOGGLES 50 200 19,788
AN/PVS-4 (INDIVIDUAL
WEAPON)

NIGHT VISION GOGGLES 40 240 20,028
AN/TVS-5 (CREW-SERVED
WEAPON)

FOLLOWING WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL FUNDING:

HELICOPTERS 3 15,000 35,028
(UH1-N OR SIMILAR)

HELICOPTERS 3 21,000 66,028
(UH-60 OR SIMILAR)

- C. COMMERCIAL ACQUISITIONS: UNK
-
- D. ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 15 OF 17 221600Z
ACTION PM-10.

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
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AMAD-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02 T-01 /051 W
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R 221524Z JUL 88
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0294
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INFO JCS WASHDC
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HQUSAF WASHDC/PRI//
CDRUSASAALA FT CLAYTON PM//SOSA//
COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
USAFSO HOWARD AFM PM
OMB WASHDC
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DISAM WPAFB OH
JFKSWC FT BRAGG NC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 15 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE.
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
- A. THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
CHALLENGES FACING THE ALAN GARCIA GOVERNMENT
ARE GREAT. PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN
REGARD TO PAYMENT OF FOREIGN DEBT POSE PROBLEMS
FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS. AT THE SAME
TIME, PERU'S CAMPAIGNS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF

PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 15 OF 17 221600Z

COCA, ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST LEFTIST DOMESTIC
TERRORISM, ITS EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE WELL-

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BEING OF THE POPULATION AND REINFORCE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT; PROVIDE A BROAD ARRAY OF ISSUES ON WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHARE MUTUAL INTERESTS AND WHERE WE CAN CONTINUE OUR CURRENT CLOSE COOPERATION.

- WHILE LARGE AMOUNTS OF ESF HAVE BEEN REQUESTED FOR PERU FROM CONGRESS, THE ACTUAL AMOUNTS MADE AVAILABLE HAVE BEEN SMALL. THE REQUEST FOR FY 1986 WAS USD 45 MILLION, BUT THE ACTUAL AMOUNT OBLIGATED WAS ONLY USD 7 MILLION. FOR FY 1987, THE REQUEST WAS FOR USD 37 MILLION, BUT THE ACTUAL AMOUNT OBLIGATED WAS USD 5.1 MILLION. FOR FY 1988, THE REQUEST TO CONGRESS WAS USD 10 MILLION, BUT ONLY USD 0.5 MILLION WILL BE OBLIGATED, FROM THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE EARMARK. THESE LOW LEVELS OF ESF HAVE MODESTLY HELPED TO OFFSET DESCENDING AMOUNTS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, BUT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED AREAS OF U.S.-GOP COOPERATION: SUPPORTING A RANGE OF ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS, IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, AND PROVIDING TRAINING IN THE U.S.

- PERU HAS ENGAGED IN VIGOROUS CAMPAIGNS TO DISRUPT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING FROM THE NORTHERN JUNGLE REGION, AND THE COCA GROWING REGIONS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS PREPARED A NEW COCA CONTROL PLAN WHICH THE U.S., UNFDAC AND OTHERS ARE STUDYING. ACTIONS ARE NOW BEING STEPPED UP, WITH U.S. SUPPORT, FOR ERADICATING COCA IN THE COCA GROWING REGIONS. IF

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PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 15 OF 17 221600Z

CURRENT TESTS OF HERBICIDES ARE SUCCESSFUL, A SIGNIFICANT AERIAL SPRAYING PROGRAM WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO ERADICATE LARGE AREAS OF ILLEGAL COCA PRODUCTION. ESF FUNDS HAVE BEEN USED TO HELP PEASANTS WHO NO LONGER GROW COCA AND SEEK ALTERNATE CROPS, AS WELL AS FOR PROGRAMS WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR AGENCIES THAT EDUCATE THE PUBLIC ON THE DANGERS OF DRUG USE IN PERU.

- THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO GIVEN STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROJECT

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MANDATED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN COMBATting TERRORISM FROM THE MADIST SENDERO LUMINOSO AND THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN LIMA AND THE NORTHERN COCA GROWING REGION. IT IS ATTEMPTING TO STRENGTHEN ITS JUSTICE SYSTEM TO ENSURE PROPER CONVICTION AND PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISTS, WHILE MAINTAINING HUMAN RIGHTS SAFEGUARDS.

-
- **THE ANDEAN PEACE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, PARTIALLY FUNDED BY ESF, PROVIDES TRAINING IN THE U.S. FOR MEMBERS OF DISADVANTAGED GROUPS WHO ARE INFLUENTIAL IN THEIR COMMUNITIES, AND IS DESIGNED TO OFFSET TO SOME EXTENT THE LARGE SCALE SOVIET TRAINING PROGRAM TARGETTED ON SIMILAR GROUPS.**

- **THE USD 2 MILLION OF ESF REQUESTED FROM CONGRESS FOR FY 1989 WILL PROVIDE CONTINUATION OF SUPPORT FOR THESE ACTIVITIES, BUT AT LEVELS WHICH WILL NOT MEET NEEDS, PARTICULARLY IN THE NARCOTICS AREA.**

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 16 OF 17 221601Z
ACTION PM-10

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
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CDRUSASAALA FT CLAYTON PM//SOSA//
COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 16 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY

- SINCE MID-1985, WHEN IT TOOK OFFICE,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT GARCIA HAS GIVEN A
HIGH PRIORITY TO INCREASING THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY IN PERU AND INCREASING THE INCOMES AND
WELL-BEING OF THE PERUVIAN PUBLIC. WHILE GDP GREW
OVER 16 PERCENT IN 1986-1987, AND THE INCOMES OF

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 16 OF 17 221601Z

THE LOWER CLASSES INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY, THIS
ACHIEVEMENT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY ABETTED BY SHARPLY

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LIMITING EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE. ARREARAGES ON AMORTIZATION AND INTEREST PAYMENTS ARE NOW OVER USD 7 BILLION. EVEN WITH THE RELIEF PROVIDED BY ITS POLICY ON DEBT SERVICE, PERU HAS LOST FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AT A RAPID RATE AND HAS A SERIOUS BUDGET DEFICIT BEING FINANCED BY DOMESTIC BORROWING. EFFORTS TO APPLY CONTROLS TO THE ECONOMY AND MICRO-MANAGE ECONOMIC POLICY, TO CONTROL THE BALANCE OF PAYMENT AND FISCAL PROBLEMS, WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL.

THE GOP HAS TAKEN SOME MEASURES TO COPE WITH THESE PROBLEMS. IT IS RECONSIDERING ITS POLICY OF GOING IT ALONE AND NOT COOPERATING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, THE PARIS CLUB AND THE PRIVATE BANKS IN MANAGING ITS ECONOMIC AND DEBT PROBLEMS. IF PERU ADOPTS SOUND POLICY REFORMS AND REACHES AGREEMENT WITH ITS CREDITORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND WITH THE OTHER DONORS AND CREDITORS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, IT WOULD BE STRONGLY IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO PARTICIPATE AND PROVIDE RESOURCES AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO SUPPORT A PERUVIAN STABILIZATION AND GROWTH PROGRAM.

GIVEN THE ALMOST COMPLETE CUTBACK IN ESF FUNDS FOR COUNTRIES THAT DO NOT HAVE CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, THE GREAT UNCERTAINTIES ON FUTURE GOP ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND CREDITORS, AND THE LARGE AMOUNT OF FUNDS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A STABILIZATION PROGRAM LED BY THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, NO REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE FOR ESF FUNDS FOR

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PAGE 03

LIMA 09546 16 OF 17 221601Z

THIS PURPOSE IN 1989 OR FOLLOWING YEARS.

SHOULD THE SITUATION DEVELOP FAVORABLY AND THE WORLD BANK, THE INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, AND OTHER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DONORS AND CREDITORS UNDERTAKE A MAJOR PROGRAM FOR STABILIZATION AND GROWTH WITH THE GOP, SPECIFIC DECISIONS WILL BE REQUIRED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE U.S. CONGRESS TO MAKE FUNDS AVAILABLE TO FINANCE U.S. GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM.

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**IX. FUTURE SECURITY ASSISTANCE NEEDS (FY 1991 THROUGH
- 1993)**

- THE FOLLOWING PROJECTIONS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO BE PROCURED THROUGH FMS CASH ARE BASED ON OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATES BY PERUVIAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS THAT WILL INEVITABLY BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARD DURING ACTUAL BUDGET FORMULATION. THE FOCUS OF EQUIPMENT PURCHASES IS PART OF A NATIONALLY DIRECTED PROGRAM TO INCREASE MOBILITY AND MATERIEL READINESS FOR COUNTERSUBVERSION OPERATIONS.

- FY 91

PRIORITY NUMBER	DEFENSE ARTICLES	QTY	EST COST (X USD 1,000)
1	AMBULANCES 1/4T	12	USD 300K
2	TRANS TRUCK 1/2T	15	USD 975

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PAGE 01 LIMA 09546 17 OF 17 221601Z
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SECDEF WASHDC//USDP//
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CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC/PRI//
CDRUSASAALA FT CLAYTON PM//SOSA//
COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
USAFSD HOWARD AFM PM
OMB WASHDC
TRSYDEPT WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
JFKSWC FT BRAGG NC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 17 OF 17 LIMA 09546

STATE PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MASS, PE

SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY

3	HELICOPTERS 212	3	USD 1,200K
4	HELICOPTERS 214	3	USD 1,200K
5	HERCULES C-130	3	USD 1.5M
6	SPARES FOR A-37,		APPROX.

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PAGE 02 LIMA 09546 17 OF 17 221601Z

- A-80, C-130, T-37, USD 7 MILLION
- T-4

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7

SPARES FOR GROUND
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

USD 3.2M

-
8

PERSONAL FLIGHT
EQUIPMENT

USD 190K

-
WATSON

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