

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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~~SECRET~~  
DATE: 3-1-88

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (ROUTINE)

FROM : ADIC, NEW YORK (199J-4958)(P)(IT-1)

SUBJECT: TUPAC AMARU (MRTA)  
IT - PERU  
(OO: Bu)

DECLASSIFIED BY: 60262 NUS/cic/jed  
ON 11/18/99  
421789

GUZMAN/REYNOSO; F/NS RUBEN MANUEL ABIMAEL, aka  
"Comrade Gonzalo";  
IT - PERU  
(OO: LA)

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

Enclosed for FBI Los Angeles and FBIHQ Trac Unit are three articles regarding the Peruvian guerrilla groups, SENDERO LUMINOSO and TUPAC AMARU. The articles appeared in the 12/87 "Americas Watch Report" entitled: "A Certain Passivity; Failing to Curb Human Rights Abuses in Peru."

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"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

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- 2cc/enc 423
- ③-Bureau (Encls. 3) (RM)  
(1-Trac Unit)
  - 2-Los Angeles (Encls. 3) (RM)
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## II. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

Much of Peru has been governed under a state of emergency since December 1982 when then-President Fernando Belaunde imposed it in several provinces of Ayacucho, Apurimac and Huancavelica, in the Southern Andes, in response to the initial armed attacks by Sendero. More recently, other provinces in Peru have also been declared zones of emergency, notably the metropolitan provinces of Lima and Callao, and provinces in the Northern Andes and jungle regions. As of October 1987, some 29 provinces, out of a total of 180, were under emergency rule. The department of San Martin and an adjacent district in the department of Huanuco were added to this list in early November 1987 as a result of spectacular actions there by the heretofore urban-based *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru* (MRTA). Sendero operates in other areas as well, but the government has not yet extended exceptional measures to those areas.

A state of emergency is an exceptional situation contemplated in the Peruvian Constitution of 1979. Article 231 recognizes two levels of "states of exception": the state of emergency and the state of siege. The former may be imposed in situations of "disturbance of peace or internal order, catastrophes or grave circumstances affecting the life of the Nation"; a state of siege may be imposed in cases of "invasion, foreign war, civil war or imminent danger thereof." The Constitution provides that a decree establishing a state of siege must specify which personal rights remain in effect. Under a state of emergency, on the other hand, only four specifically enumerated guarantees may be suspended: individual freedom; the prohibition against unwarranted searches and seizures; freedom of association; and freedom of movement.\*

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\* Diego García Sayan: Peru: Estados de Excepcion y Regimen Juridico, in Comision Andina de Juristas, Proceedings of a Seminar on States of Exception in the Andean Region, Lima, 1987.

No part of the Peruvian territory is presently under a state of siege. The state of emergency in several provinces, though restricted to a 60-day period according to the Constitution, has been routinely extended by presidential decree (as contemplated in the Constitution). It is possible for the government not to suspend all four rights enumerated in Article 231, but all those rights have been restricted in the zones of emergency. Accordingly, there are no fixed terms within which detainees must be charged or released. As a matter of practice, however, all acknowledged detainees are eventually charged with crimes related to terrorism or the insurgency. Needless to say, practices such as forced disappearances and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, which continue to take place in the emergency zones, exceed the scope of the exceptional powers granted to the authorities by the state of emergency.

The most significant consequence of imposing a state of emergency has been that a "politico-military command" governs in the affected zones in place of the civilian officials who represent the central government. This practice originated under the military government of 1968-1980, though at that time there was no constitutional or legal authority for the role that was assumed by the Armed Forces. Article 231 of the Constitution of 1979, however, provides that during an emergency, "the Armed Forces assume control of internal order when the President so decides."

In practice, the role of the "politico-military commands" goes far beyond the "control of internal order." For all practical purposes, military authorities control all but the most local governmental functions. Lawyers and human rights activists have pointed out this legal anomaly since President Belaunde imposed a state of emergency in late 1982. The Belaunde administration submitted to Congress a bill to regulate states of emergency, but it was not enacted until 1985, after García's electoral victory but before his inauguration. With García's APRA party abstaining, Law 24150 was approved. This regulation of the "politico-military command" does not, however, remove the taint of

unconstitutionality as the powers given to the Armed Forces in Law 24150 far exceed those contemplated by the Constitution.\*

At the commencement of a new congressional session on July 28, 1987 (which coincided with the beginning of President García's third year in office), the government announced measures regarding the state of emergency that were well-received even by its most vocal critics in the human rights movement. The President announced his intention to terminate the curfews in Lima and Callao; to cancel the state of emergency in the city of Huamanga (capital of the Department of Ayacucho and sometimes referred to as the "city of Ayacucho"); and to repeal Law 24150 and replace it with a statute that would clearly establish that civilian authorities retain all their powers and functions under the state of emergency. Senator Rolando Ames (United Left-Independent) submitted a bill to repeal Law 24150 one year ago, but it was blocked by a Senate committee.

Though a state of emergency would not remain in effect in the metropolitan province of Huamanga, it would still apply in rural areas. Interior Minister Jose Barsallo told reporters in late August that the state of emergency would be lifted in Huamanga province in the first half of September.\*\* Unfortunately, the government reversed itself in September, and instead announced the extension for another 60 days of the state of emergency there because of continued activity\*\*\* by Sendero. The state of emergency also remains in effect in Lima and Callao, but as of early August the citizens of those metropolitan areas were no longer barred from the streets between 1 and 5 a.m. The termination of the curfew is an important step in restoring full democratic freedoms as it was widely considered ineffective against terrorism while inflicting hardship and fear on the general population. During the 17-month curfew, Armed Forces patrols killed at least sixteen innocent passersby who did not obey, did not hear, or were perceived as not heeding orders to halt. There have

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\* Garcia Sayan, *op. cit.*, pg. 22, *et. seq.*

\*\* "En 15 días levantan estado emergencia en Ayacucho," *Diario La Republica*, August 28, 1987.

\*\*\* "Se extiende el estado de emergencia," UPI, *Diario de Las Americas*, September 23, 1987.

been judicial investigations in only one or two such cases involving curfew deaths.

The announcements in late July reflect the government's sensitivity to the need to direct its efforts so as to try to curb Sendero while respecting fundamental human rights and ensuring the effectiveness of democratic institutions. At this writing, it is too soon to assess the impact of the new measures.

In rural areas, the Armed Forces continue to disregard the rights of the civilian population. Though there was a decline in the number of reported indiscriminate killings in the period on which this report focuses, the reason could be that the military authorities have established a nearly complete ban on access to conflictive areas by journalists, relief organizations and independent observers. Accordingly, it is possible that massacres in extremely remote areas are going unreported, though Peru's recent history suggests that such serious violations would not remain unknown for long. We believe, therefore, that an effort is under way to impose restraints on the units of the Armed Forces operating in the emergency zone, reducing the number of egregious violations.

The forced displacement of the civilian population in certain areas has continued, although at a lower level, as has the forced recruitment into *montoneras* or *comites de autodefensa civil*, a form of civil patrol that Americas Watch discussed extensively in earlier reports.\*

Some of the most serious abuses resulting from the military counterinsurgency policy are related to arrests and detentions and include the extensive use of torture against detainees. The suspension of the guarantee against arbitrary arrest has resulted in a pervasive practice of arrest without warrant and *incommunicado* detention for several days or weeks. Such detainees are routinely subjected to extreme forms of physical and psychological torture. Several individuals who were arrested and interrogated in the period covered

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\* These civil defense patrols have often been referred to as rondas campesinas, which has caused them to be confused with the autonomous, grass roots organizations formed by peasants mostly in northern Peru which are known by the same name. For a detailed analysis of the latter, see the Americas Watch internal memorandum "Rondas Campesinas: The Defense of Property and Norms in Peru's Highland Communities," by Joel Solomon.

by this report presented Americas Watch with credible testimony about the torture they suffered.

Elizabeth Gonzalez Otoya, a 25-year-old social worker we interviewed in the prison of Canto Grande, told us she was arrested at her home in Lima on April 5, 1987, by plainclothesmen from (as she found out later) the Division Against Terrorism (DIRCOTE) of the Investigations Police (PIP). They said they had a message for her. When she refused to open the door, they broke it down and searched the house. She was taken to DIRCOTE headquarters where she was held handcuffed and blindfolded for five days, the first three without receiving any food or water. She was interrogated every day and tortured on four consecutive nights. Her captors hung her from the ceiling with her hands behind her back, sexually assaulted her and threatened to rape her. The first night, she was subjected fifteen times to the torture known as "the submarine," in which the victim's head is submerged in water almost to the point of drowning. She told us she had been forced to drink something that was very bitter. On the first day, before the torture began, she was shown to her father and to a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, but for the next twenty days she was held *incommunicado*. She was allowed to see a lawyer later on, when she was taken to the prosecutor's office (*Fiscalia*). A few days after our interview in late May, Ms. Gonzalez Otoya was released at the order of a judge who dismissed all charges against her.

Lawyers who represent those arrested under these circumstances and representatives of human rights organizations have provided us with testimonies from many other cases. Our own interviews and the testimony we have examined persuade us that torture is used routinely by the armed and security forces of Peru against prisoners accused or suspected of involvement with the violent political opposition.

In certain regions of Peru, it appears that the counterinsurgency effort is being conducted under different guidelines. As Sendero has extended its operations into new regions, it has been necessary for the security forces to operate in new areas as well. The social and economic landscape in those parts of the country is vastly different from that in Ayacucho, and Sendero has adapted its behavior accordingly. For example, in Alto Huallaga, Sendero at-

...to organize coca growers and others who have benefited the least from the coca boom frequently clashing with large truckers and their goon squads, but also obstructing efforts to eradicate the coca plantations which are the main livelihood of their target population.

A state of emergency was declared in the Alto Huallaga on July 15, 1987, but in what is seen as an effort not to repeat past mistakes, the government has established a *comando politico-policia*, in which civilian authorities share responsibilities with the police, instead of a politico-military command. The Air Force is called in as needed, but the Armed Forces do not have overall command of operations.

Sendero has extended its influence into the rural areas of Puno, in the southern highlands, where landless peasants organized in communities (or *parcialidades*) are engaged in a raging land dispute with large private landowners and the managers of agricultural entities created during the land reform of the Velasco years. These large farms, nominally owned by some of their original workers, have generated a new landed class in the persons of their managers. Demands for land are strongly supported by the Catholic bishops of the area and by the local political forces associated with the United Left coalition, and the demands originate from a genuinely indigenous and independent social movement. The main tactic of this movement is the peaceful and often symbolic takeover of land from the large farms in an effort to speed up the implementation of redistribution schemes approved by the García government but delayed by political and bureaucratic pressures.

Sendero initiated violent actions in Puno in 1985. Though it too supports the land takeovers, it insists on pressing a hard line, demanding that the takeovers be carried out with violence to persons and premises and that the peasants resist their removal with arms. On several occasions, Sendero has clashed with the leadership of the land movement in Puno over these matters.

The government has not declared a state of emergency in Puno. Operations against Sendero are conducted by the local authorities of the *Guardia Civil*, which has specialized counterinsurgency units known as *unidades taticas antisubversivas* (UTA). We visited the rural areas of Puno in the immediate aftermath of a May 1987 demonstration by the peasant movement which involved

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150 separate but coordinated actions, including peaceful takeovers and *mar-chas de sacrificio*, a ritual dedication of land by a community before an actual takeover. The Army was called in to block occupations and remove the peasants from occupied lands, though it had no apparent legal authority to do so as there is no state of emergency in Puno. The Army detained 372 peasants, charged them with trespassing and, in a few cases, theft or terrorism, and handed them over to the police.

Sendero was not present during the May actions, possibly because only a few weeks earlier it had suffered a heavy blow in a clash with police in which most of its Puno leadership apparently perished. (See section on Sendero) To the government's credit, the security forces appear to have suppressed Sendero without punishing peasants for expressing legitimate grievances, even though landowners and managers undoubtedly urged heavy-handed methods. There were no forced disappearances and, as far as we could establish, the peasants were not mistreated. Most of them were released within a few days. Thugs hired by the management of the farms, who seemed to enjoy protection or tolerance by the Army and police, were responsible for some violence, however.

Repressive and unjust actions against innocent civilians have occurred in Alto Huallaga and in Puno. Some of these are described in other sections of this report. Yet we believe it is important to note that fair distinctions are being made between legitimate political and social movements and Sendero, and that the deliberate confusion that is present elsewhere in Peru seems to have been avoided in those areas.

general with extensive counterinsurgency training, were trying to develop a policy of contacts with local authorities and institutions as a way of overcoming these problems. Others in Puno told us that they saw these efforts as an attempt to draw the Church and the peasant movement into the struggle against Sendero, though in a more enlightened manner than the military has attempted previously.

## B. Abuses by Sendero

In the last two years, Sendero Luminoso, which officially calls itself the *Partido Comunista del Peru*, has greatly increased its violent activities which it now conducts in virtually the whole territory of Peru. Though its military operations continue to be relatively unsophisticated, this is probably by choice, since Sendero does not seem interested in spectacular military victories for the time being. On the other hand, according to the most credible observers, the number of actions by Sendero has grown year by year, as has the territory affected, not only in area but also in importance (though there have been some retreats). Also, Sendero has improved the operations of its clandestine networks.\*

That Sendero has been able to achieve such great success even while it was absorbing severe attacks (including the murder of almost 300 of its most committed activists and some very prominent leaders, in the course of the prison massacres of June 1986), baffles most observers of the Peruvian situation as much as it appears to confuse those responsible for meeting Sendero's challenge. (It must be noted that, although all the murdered prisoners were accused of being Sendero members, only a few had actually been convicted.) A report by a British security services company, quoted in Gorriti's article in *Posible*, holds that Sendero is now "virtually ineradicable," and that in the next three years it could be in a position to destroy the democratic state.\*\*

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\* Gustavo Gorriti, "Sendero: Que Hacer?" in *Posible*.

\*\* James Anderson, "Peru's Maoist Guerrillas," A Control Risks Information Services study, August 1986.

In the last year, Sendero seems to have made a series of adjustments in its operation, though by no means in its concept of revolutionary war. In earlier years, it had deliberately avoided contact with the press and with the outside world, preferring instead to take advantage of its aura of mystery. In late 1986, however, Sendero distributed a series of documents to the press, evaluating the six years of war and commenting on the impact of the massacre in the penitentiaries. In May 1987, a Sendero contingent "kidnapped" Abilio Arroyo, the correspondent for *Caretas* in Huanta, to grant him an exclusive interview, complete with photographs.

Also in the last year, Sendero has obtained the effective assistance of a national newspaper based in Lima, *El Nuevo Diario*, which is widely recognized as an unofficial spokesman for the guerrilla organization.\*

The most important document circulated by Sendero is entitled *Desarrollar la Guerra Popular Sirviendo a la Revolucion Mundial* (Develop Popular War Serving World Revolution), a 110- page tract apparently designed to make the organization better known to the outside world. The document probably exaggerates the number of operations Sendero has undertaken, as well as the impact of its presence in many areas, but it provides important clues to a better understanding of the movement.

The group claims to have reformulated Marxist doctrine in what it calls *Pensamiento Gonzalo* (Gonzalo's Thoughts; "Gonzalo" is the *nom de guerre* of its leader, Abimael Guzman), and it reaffirms its commitment to prolonged popular war, from the countryside to the city. It insists that Sendero's principal theatre of operation continues to be the Southern Andes (Ayacucho, Apurimac and Huancavelica). The document seems in part designed to counter the accusation that Sendero is a "terrorist" organization: it claims that, of more than 30,000 operations conducted in the last six years, only 900 were "selective annihilations," Sendero's euphemism for executions. Since annihilation is the way in which Sendero attempts to "sweep out" the old order, many observers believe

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\* Andres Oppenheimer, "Peruvian Paper Denies It's Mouthpiece for Maoist Rebels," *The Miami Herald*, Sunday, June 21, 1987.

that executions of individuals identified with the local power structure have increased as Sendero has moved into new areas.

In Puno, we gathered information on a recent case of "selective annihilation." Zenobio Huarsaya was a long-time peasant activist in the Azangaro province who had been in the past a leader of the Agrarian Federation for the whole Puno department. When Sendero began operations in Puno, Huarsaya apparently cooperated, or perhaps even joined the guerrillas. In 1985, however, he broke ranks with Sendero. At the request of his community of San Juan de Salinas, he ran for mayor on the United Left ticket, against the wishes of Sendero, and was elected. His inauguration as mayor was delayed for six weeks until February 1987, because of Sendero's pressure and because Huarsaya wanted the community to decide whether he should take office.

On April 8, 1987, a Sendero contingent entered the town, apprehended Huarsaya, and gathered the residents for a "popular trial." Tapes of the proceedings indicate that the villagers defended Huarsaya and pleaded for his life. The villagers did not ask for his execution, as reported in *El Nuevo Diario*, the Sendero mouthpiece. When the *senderistas* hesitated, a woman who seemed to be in charge ordered them to kill Huarsaya. The insurgents proceeded to execute him while the villagers shouted "murderers!" at them. The outrage created by this episode resulted in the police operation described above, in which seven *senderistas* were killed after residents of San Juan de Salinas told the police where to find them.

In March 1986, Sendero had similarly "annihilated" unarmed civilians in the community of Macari, also in Puno. They stopped trucks that were carrying peasants to a demonstration to demand land, addressed them in Spanish and Quechua, and then forced them to occupy and plunder a farm called Huacauta, belonging to the Kururana enterprise. The *senderistas* singled out ten men whose names were on a list, and proceeded to kill seven while sparing the other three. Three of the victims were enterprise workers and the other four were known as members of the ruling *aprista* party. The murders were particularly brutal: some of the victims had their eyes gouged out and their tongues cut.

On June 12, 1987, approximately forty armed *senderistas* intercepted a fleet of 35 boats travelling on the Apurimac River (that marks the border be-

tween the Departments of Ayacucho and Apurimac) and forced some 400 peasants of the province of La Mar, Ayacucho, to the shore at a place called Rinconada. The peasants had been shopping in San Francisco. A nine-year-old boy and a young man from Sendero's ranks proceeded to identify ten men whom they referred to as *yanahumas* (black heads), or members of the civil patrols. The *senderistas* slit the throats of two of them, who were pilots of the boats, in the presence of the passengers. The other eight were taken into the bush and murdered as well. Witnesses say the killers were between 9 and 15 years old, and used knives. Then they stole the goods and food the peasants had bought, burned three of the boats and escaped, leaving a red flag near the corpses. This episode immediately prompted the civil patrols in the communities affected to enter the village of Pan de Azucar and interrogate the villagers, a process that was interrupted when a contingent of Marines arrived. In the next few days, the patrols vowed to seek revenge, and blamed the Marines for the insecurity of their communities. According to a journalist present at one of the meetings, the civil patrollers demanded the ouster of the Navy and the return of the Army to the region.\*

Sendero has also resorted to indiscriminate attacks against civilians, and to attacks against arguably legitimate military targets in which the safety of civilians is disregarded, in violation of the laws of war. The placement of bombs in public buildings, particularly in Lima, has threatened civilian lives, and in many cases, caused actual harm. Many of the public places targeted have been foreign embassies, including the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. The latter attack was acknowledged in *Develop Popular War...*: "... the action against Soviet Social Imperialism was the strongest we ever made against any foreign delegation."\*\*

Similarly, Sendero's document took credit for the attack on the Cuzco-Macchu Picchu train on June 23, 1986, which left eight tourists dead (including one United States citizen) and more than forty wounded. In the document,

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\* Caretas, July 6, 1987, "Sendero Vuelve a Matar."

\*\* Quoted in Gustavo Gorriti, "The Shining Path," The Andean Report, March 1987, p. 38.

Sendero said that this action was launched because of the rage in its ranks caused by the murder of *senderistas* in the prison massacre a few days before.

X An example of a Sendero attack in disregard for the risks to civilians took place on April 9, 1987, at a restaurant called *Cevicheria El Piano*, in the Rimac neighborhood of Lima, where several uniformed policemen were having lunch. Two policemen died, together with an 18-year-old secretary in their party, another woman at a different table, a waiter and an architect who was talking to the owner of the restaurant. According to witnesses, the assailants fired at every one in the small place. Some of the assailants were apparently captured a few hours later.\*

Sendero has continued to commit selective murders. One of the most egregious in recent months may have been the murder of Zenobio Huarsaya in San Juan de Salinas, Puno, described above.

That outrage was by no means an isolated episode. Sendero is reported to have killed at least 27 engineers and technicians in Ayacucho, and some 40 nationwide. The victims were regional government employees in charge of implementing development programs in rural and mining areas. Sendero has identified them with the established power it is trying to wipe out. For the same reason, Sendero has targeted elected officials or national government representatives in small villages and towns (*alcaldes* and *tenientes gobernadores*). Though some escape execution because the attackers cannot identify them, Sendero incursions have forced them to hide or to leave their home towns. A recent article on an attack on Vilcashuaman, Ayacucho, within sight of an Army base, vividly portrays the terror under which these communities live.\*\*

Members of the government party, APRA, are among those targeted by Sendero. In March 1987, guerrillas dynamited the house of Andres Porras Mallqui, the 58-year-old mayor of Macachacra, near Huanta, Ayacucho. His daughter was wounded in the attack, which followed repeated threats against Porras by Sendero. On April 15, 1987, two masked men stopped a small bus

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\* "Terror Feral," *Caretas*, April 13, 1987.

\*\* Sonia Goldenberg, "Sendero Avanza," *SL*, March 16, 1987.

Porras was riding from Huanta to Macachacra. The men asked for him by name, and when they had identified him, one stabbed him five times.

Since 1981, Sendero has killed twelve residents of Macachacra. In 1986, Sendero killed Teofilo Corichagua by slitting his throat. He was the last president of the "front for the defense of the community," a form of civil defense patrol in Huayhuas, Ayacucho. In the same fashion, the guerrillas killed Pastor Huaman Infante, the 22-year-old *gobernador* of Corpacancha, and 18-year-old Adrian Retamozo Barron after a "popular trial." Both had moved to Macachacra after being displaced by the conflict. On the same day Porras was murdered, Sendero killed Lorenzo Rau Gararra, a 32-year-old agronomist, in the presence of some forty workers at a farming cooperative in Huancayo where Rau worked.\*

During the week of our visit, *Si* magazine published a cover story revealing a document captured from a *senderista* detainee detailing a plan to assassinate Alfonso Barrantes, the former mayor of Lima and the most prominent national leader of the United Left coalition, the main opposition grouping. The document, seized by police during a raid at San Marcos University, seemed to be an internal report submitted after patient observations of Barrantes's house and his daily movements.\*\*

In addition, Sendero has resorted increasingly to placing car bombs and booby traps, especially in Lima, which have caused numerous civilian victims. In Lima, Sendero has also conducted numerous diversionary actions, in an attempt to distract security forces and, it seems, to pin large numbers of them in the metropolitan areas while other Sendero units act in the interior of the country.

A significant new trend in Sendero's actions is the targeting of leaders of the *Aprista* ruling party, as well as elected officials. In January 1987, Sendero murdered Dr. Cesar Lopez Silva, a former President of the Medical Association and a close advisor to Armando Villanueva, a senior APRA leader. In August, Sendero assassins entered the house of Rodrigo Franco, after killing

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\* "Guadaña que no cesa," *Si*, April 20, 1987.

\*\* "Como matar a Barrantes," *Si*, May 18, 1987.

economist who directed ENCI, a governmental marketing agency, and was expected to be named Chairman of the Central Bank. On October 2, Sendero killed Nestor Pozo, the principal assistant of APRA organizational secretary Alberto Kitasono. Previously Sendero had failed in an attempt to kill Kitasono himself, an episode we described in our 1986 report. In addition, numerous APRA leaders and government officials report that they and their families have received repeated threats against their lives. These attacks have drawn some initial response from APRA activists, that we describe — and condemn — elsewhere in this report.

**C. Abuses By the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA)**

The MRTA is a much smaller armed organization that operates in the tradition of urban guerrillas elsewhere in Latin America. Its base is mostly in Lima and other larger cities, and it seems to recruit largely among university students. After an initial expression of willingness to take part in the dialogue offered by President García in 1985, the MRTA resumed violent attacks. Its activities have picked up recently and its numbers are believed to have grown. In the first week of November 1987, the MRTA surprised the nation by launching its first rural operation: seizing the town of Juanjui in the department of San Martin. A unit of about 70 uniformed guerrillas attacked the town's police headquarters and routed some 90 policemen there. One police lieutenant died in the fighting; the others were captured, lectured by the guerrillas, and then set free. The guerrillas also captured an important arsenal. The following day the guerrillas took over the town of San Jose de Sisa and invited the press to witness the event. On Sunday, November 8, the Peruvian media was saturated with television, radio and print interviews with the triumphant guerrillas. On November 10, the government declared a state of emergency in the department of San Martin and one adjacent district in the department of Huanuco, placing the whole area under army command. President García asked the MRTA to turn in its arms, but the commander of the action, known as "Rolando," responded with a four-point counterproposal, including a request for a dialogue with the



government. President García rejected the proposal, saying he would not yield to demands made under threat of armed attack.

Knowledgeable observers claim that a confrontation is developing between the MRTA and Sendero Luminoso. In fact, these observers suggest that Sendero's recent resort to propaganda statements, exemplified by the publication of "Develop Popular War...", as well as in the use of *El Nuevo Diario* (whose name was recently changed simply to *El Diario*), and in several kidnappings of journalists to give them statements or interviews, is actually motivated by Sendero's need to counter the MRTA's greater success in recruiting young students.\* Sendero considers the MRTA a tool of Soviet "social-imperialism." The MRTA's recent foray into rural warfare, previously the sole domain of Sendero, appears to reflect this ongoing competition. The MRTA's "Rolando" stressed that his forces have no contact with the narcotics industry, which he contrasted with what he called Sendero's "Machiavellian policy" of cooperating with the narcotics business in the south of San Martin department. The Sendero mouthpiece, *Diario*, responded with a bitter headline November 17, calling the MRTA attacks "a farse benefitting APRA" (*farsa a favor del APRA*).

The MRTA does not seem to resort to selective murders. Nonetheless the group has moved on from its early tactic of "expropriating" food to be distributed in poor neighborhoods to bombings in public places. According to the Peruvian magazine *Quehacer*, in the first three months of 1987, MRTA's violent acts included placing explosives in eight public buildings in Lima.\*\* In mid-1987, the MRTA placed a number of car bombs in Lima. In June, a car bomb that exploded in busy Larco Avenue at 6 a.m. severely wounded two passersby. In August, two car bombs placed by the MRTA went off the same day at the Sheraton Hotel and at the Citibank building. There were no victims, but both buildings suffered considerable damage.

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\* Raul Gonzalez, "Sendero vs. MRTA," *Quehacer*, No. 46, April-May 1987.

\*\* *Ibid.*