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
EXDIS SPECAT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PTER, PINS, PREL, MASS, ASEC, PE

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON A PERUVIAN ANTI-

AND COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM

1. SECRET/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.





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OVERVIEW

4. GUERRILLA/TERRORIST VIOLENCE IS GROWING SIGNIFICANTLY IN PERU. SINCE 1980, INSURGENT AND COUNTER-INSURGENT OPERATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN APPROXIMATELY 10,000 DEATHS, THOUSANDS OF WOUNDED, AND AT LEAST 100,000 DISPLACED PERSONS. NATIONWIDE, THE SITUATION WORSENED IN 1987, BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY.

GUERRILLA ATTACKS NOW AVERAGE OVER 200 PER MONTH, AND ASSASSINATIONS OF GOP AND APRA

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PARTY MEMBERS AND LEADERS REACHED 65 IN 1987. THE TWO GUERRILLA/TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE SPREAD TO OTHER RURAL AREAS. THE MRTA INITIATED RURAL OPERATIONS IN OCTOBER IN THE JUNGLE AREAS OF SAN MARTIN DEPARTMENT. EARLIER THIS YEAR, SL GAINED A FOOTHOLD IN THE COCA-GROWING AREAS OF THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY (UHV), WHERE IT HAS SOME TIES TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. BOTH GROUPS CONTINUE INTERMITTENT BOMBING OF USG AND USG-AFFILIATED INSTALLATIONS.

THE GROWING POLITICAL IMPACT OF THESE GROUPS 5. IS PARTICULARLY WORRISOME. THE INSECURITY THEY PRODUCE IN THE GENERAL PUBLIC COINCIDES WITH GROWING DISSATISFACTION WITH A DECLINING ECONOMY. THERE IS A GROWING RISK THAT THE GOP'S INABILITY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THIS AND OTHER ISSUES

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TAGS: PTER, PINS, PREL, MASS, ASEC, PE

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON A PERUVIAN ANTI-

AND COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM

WILL UNDERMINE CONTINUED POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC RULE. SL'S SELECTIVE TARGETTING OF THE MILITARY AND THE UPPER CLASS APPEARS AIMED IN PART AT PROVOKING A COUP.

EITHER ALONE OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER PRESSURES, SL AND THE MRTA COULD DETERMINE THE CONSENSUS THAT HAS KEPT DEMOCRACY ON TRACK.

6. TERRORIST VIOLENCE THREATENS USG INTERESTS
BESIDES A STABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. SL'S
PRESENCE IN THE UHV COMPROMISES OUR INTERDICTION
AND ERADICATION PROGRAMS, MAKING THEM MORE
DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS. THE TRAFFICKERS, IN
TURN, HAVE STRENGTHENED SL THROUGH PROTECTION
PAYMENTS IN MONEY AND WEAPONS. TERRORIST VIOLENCE
AND COUNTER-TERRORIST AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

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(CT/CS) OPERATIONS HAVE HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, ANOTHER MAJOR USG INTEREST. FINALLY, TERRORIST VIOLENCE DIRECTLY AFFECTS EMBASSY SECURITY.

GUERRILLA/TERRORIST FORCES

- 7. TWO MAJOR GUERRILLA/TERRORIST GROUPS EXIST:
- (A) SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL), THE RADICAL MAOIST "SHINING PATH." SL USES TERRORISM -- ESPECIALLY SELECTIVE ASSASSINATION STRONGEST

IN THE SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA, IT HAS EXTENDED

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RURAL OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE (INCLUDING THE COCA-PRODUCING UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY - UHV). IT ALSO HAS AN EXTENSIVE, ACTIVE PRESENCE IN LIMA AND OTHER CITIES. ALTHOUGH SENDERO RELIES HEAVILY ON VIOLENT INTIMIDATION AND COERCION AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT INDIAN PEASANTS ARE ITS MAJOR VICTIMS, IT DOES HAVE SOME POPULAR SUPPORT, PROFITING FROM PROFOUND ETHNIC AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ANDEAN PEASANTRY AND THE LIMA-ORIENTED PERUVIAN ELITE (SEE 87 LIMA 6577 FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON SL).

THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA), (B) THE SECOND GROUP, LOOKS FOR INSPIRATION TO THE FSLN, CHE GUEVARA, AND THE FAILED PERUVIAN MIR INSURGENCY OF 1965 (SOME SURVIVORS OF WHICH JOINED THE MRTA). UNTIL RECENTLY, THE MRTA



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EMPHASIZED URBAN OPERATIONS ORIENTED TOWARD PROPAGANDA. IN NOVEMBER, HOWEVER, AN MRTA GUERRILLA COLUMN BRIEFLY SEIZED A LARGE TOWN IN THE NORTHERN JUNGLE, AS PART OF ITS NEW "NORTH-EASTERN FRONT, " CAUSING A POLITICAL SENSATION (OWING TO EFFECTIVE USE OF TELEVISION) THAT LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW EMERGENCY ZONE IN SAN MARTIN DEPARTMENT. STRONGEST IN THE UNIVERSITIES AND RADICALIZED UPPER MIDDLE CLASS, THE MRTA ALSO USES LEGAL POLITICAL FRONTS TO BUILD UP SUPPORT WITHIN THE LEFT (SEE 87 LIMA 6577 FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE MRTA, PLUS 87 LIMA 13587 AND 15410 FOR BACKGROUND ON THE MRTA IN SAN MARTIN).

WITH THE PROMINENT EXCEPTION OF THE PRISONS UPRISING (AND SUBSEQUENT MASSACRE OF PRISONERS) IN JUNE 1986, NEITHER SENDERO NOR THE MRTA HAS RESORTED MUCH TO HOSTAGE-TAKING TACTICS. NOR HAS KIDNAPPING FIGURED PROMINENTLY. THE MRTA HAS KIDNAPPED PRIVATE BUSINESSMEN AND THEIR DEPENDENTS FOR FUNDRAISING, AND THERE ARE REPORTS OF INTENTIONS TO INCREASE KIDNAPPINGS. BUT, SO FAR, SELECTIVE ASSASSINATIONS AND BOMB ATTACKS CONSTITUTE THE PRIMARY THREATS FROM PERUVIAN TERRORISTS.

GOP RESOURCES AND RESPONSE

8. WHO DOES WHAT? PERU HAS A MULTITUDE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN UNITS WITH COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES. INSUFFICIENT

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SECTION 03 OF 09 LIMA 00440

EXDIS SPECAT

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TAGS: PTER, PINS, PREL, MASS, ASEC, PE

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON A PERUVIAN ANTI-

AND COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM

WILL UNDERMINE CONTINUED POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC RULE. SL'S SELECTIVE TARGETTING OF COORDINATION AND COOPERATION AMONG THEM ARE BIG PROBLEMS. THE FOLLOWING IS A RUNDOWN ON THE

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VARIOUS GOP UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES:

THE MILITARY: THE MILITARY HAS PRIMARY (A) RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THOSE RURAL AREAS WHERE SL IS STRONGEST. THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE MILITARY TO OPERATE WITHIN PERU IS A DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY; SUCH DECLARATIONS NOW PLACE 32 OF PERU'S 181 PROVINCES UNDER "POLITICAL-MILIT ARY" CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES. A MODIFIED STATE OF EMERGENCY GOVERNS LIMA AND ALLOWS THE MILITARY TO PATROL WITHOUT CEDING POLITICAT CONTROL TO THE ARMED FORCES. CIVILIAN AND POLICE AUTHORITIES HAVE PRIMARY CONTROL OVER THE REST OF THE NATIONAL TERRITORY. THIS DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY FORCES HAS CONSIDERABLE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR



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CONSOLIDATION OF PERUVIAN CT/CS CAPABILITIES.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIN), A CIVILIAN SERVICE (EVEN THOUGH ITS TOP TWO POSITIONS ARE HELD BY MILITARY OFFICERS), ACTS AS A FUNNEL FOR INTELLIGENCE FROM THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES TO THE PRESIDENT. THERE ARE FOUR INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY. THE FIRST IS THE "SECOND DIVISION" OR J-2 OF THE

THE FIRST IS THE "SECOND DIVISION" OR 5-2 OF THE ARMED FORCES JOINT STAFF. IT IS A SMALL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE -- WITHOUT MAJOR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OR ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY -- AND HAS NOT BEEN VERY IMPORTANT IN THE PAST. IT WILL TAKE ON ADDED IMPORTANCE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE NEW MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WILL NOW LOOK TO THE J-2 FOR INTELLIGENCE TO BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS. IN ADDITION TO THE J-2, EACH OF THE THREE SERVICES -- ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE -- HAS ITS OWN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE, EACH WITH A COLLECTION AND ANALYTICAL

DIVISION. ALTHOUGH SERVICE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATES COOPERATE WITH THE J-2 OF THE JOINT STAFF, THEY ARE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR SERVICE COMMANDERS.

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THE MILITARY HAS FOUR PARTIALLY TRAINED COUNTER-TERRORIST UNITS THAT COULD BE USED IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND HOSTAGE-BARRICADE SITUATIONS: ONE EACH BELONGING TO THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINES, AND AIR FORCE.

THE POLICE: THE POLICE HAVE THE LEAD ROLE IN (B)



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COMBATTING GUERRILLA/TERRORISTS IN ALL AREAS OUTSIDE THE RURAL EMERGENCY ZONES. THERE ARE THREE POLICE FORCES, WHICH OPERATE UNDER THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR. THE CIVIL GUARD (GC) IS THE LARGEST POLICE ORGANIZATION IN PERU AND CONSTITUTES THE MAJOR POLICE PRESENCE IN BOTH URBAN AND RURAL AREAS. THE REPUBLICAN GUARD (GR) HAS RESPONSIBILITY -FOR THE PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS AND NATIONAL BORDERS. THE INVESTIGATIVE POLICE (PIP) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CERTAIN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS THROUGHOUT PERU BUT OPERATES MAINLY IN THE LARGER CITIES. WITHIN THE PIP IS THE ANTI-TERRORISM DIRECTORATE (DIRCOTE), WHICH HAS ENJOYED SOME SUCCESSES AGAINST BOTH THE MRTA AND THE SL IN LIMA, 'AND IS PROVIDING SOME LIMITED INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE ARMY IN THE SAN MARTIN EMERGENCY ZONE. OF THE THREE POLICE FORCES HAS ITS OWN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, NONE OF WHICH IS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE, AND THE GR AND GC HAVE ELITE PARAMILITARY UNITS, THE "LLAPAN ATIC" AND THE "SINCHIS, " RESPECTIVELY. THE LATTER HAS SOME LIMITED COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITY. THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ALSO HAS ITS OWN INTELLIGENCE UNIT SEPARATE FROM THE POLICE SERVICES. THIS UNIT BOTH RUNS OPERATIONS AND COORDINATES AND FUNNELS INTELLIGENCE FROM THE THREE POLICE UNITS TO THE MINISTER AND VICE MINISTER OF INTERIOR. THEY, IN TURN, ADVISE SENIOR GOP OFFICIALS AND THE PRESIDENT.

THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HAS RECENTLY CREATED A SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, DRAWN PRIMARILY FROM CIVIL GUARD FORCES, UNDER THE COMMAND OF A SENIOR GENERAL RESPONSIBLE DIRECTLY TO THE VICE MINISTER. THIS COMMAND WILL INCLUDE THE NEWLY CREATED ELITE

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SECTION 04 OF 09 LIMA 00440

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SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON A PERUVIAN ANTI-

AND COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM

WILL UNDERMINE CONTINUED POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC RULE. SL'S SELECTIVE TARGETTING OF QUICK-REACTION COUNTER-TERRORISM/COUNTER-INSURGENCY FORCE COMPOSED OF THE BEST FROM THE GC AND GR SPECIAL FORCES. ALL POLICE SPECIAL OPERATIONS PARAMILITARY FORCES, SUCH AS THE SINCHIS AND THE LLAPAN ATIC, WILL EVENTUALLY COME UNDER THIS COMMAND, I

TO FURTHER COMPLICATE THE PICTURE, THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR COUNTER-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS, AND BOTH THE GC AND THE GR HAVE COUNTER-NARCOTICS UNITS. THE GC NARCOTICS POLICE, UNDER THE COMMAND OF GENERAL ZARATE (GC), ALSO HAS ITS OWN INTELLIGENCE UNIT.

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ALTHOUGH THE THREE POLICE SERVICES ARE SCHEDULED TO MERGE INTO ONE ORGANIZATION, THE THREE SERVICES AT PRESENT REMAIN SEPARATE. THIS IS COMPENSATED TO SOME EXTENT BY THE FIRM CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY AND SPECIFICALLY BY THE



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VICE MINISTER, AGUSTIN MANTILLA.

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O 132037Z JAN 88 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5425

SECTION 05 OF 09 LIMA 00440

EXDIS SPECAT

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SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON A PERUVIAN ANTI-

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WILL UNDERMINE CONTINUED POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC RULE. SL'S SELECTIVE TARGETTING OF DECAPTIONED

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O 132037Z JAN 88 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5427

SECTION 07 OF 09 LIMA 00440

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SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON A PERUVIAN ANTI-

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WILL UNDERMINE CONTINUED POPULAR SUPPORT FOR

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DEMOCRATIC RULE. SL'S SELECTIVE TARGETTING OF

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SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON A PERUVIAN ANTI-

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WILL UNDERMINE CONTINUED POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC RULE. SL'S SELECTIVE TARGETTING OF

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