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TEXT
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, KPRP, PE
SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN PERU
REFS: (A) 84 LIMA A-08, []
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL)-- PERU'S MAOIST INSPIRED, BUT PECULIARLY ANDEAN TERRORIST MOVEMENT--IS CONTINUING TO EXERT A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PERUVIAN LIFE. RELATIVE TO 1983, HOWEVER (REF A), THAT IMPACT HAD DECLINED AS 1984 ENDED. THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF SENDERO VIOLENCE, AND SL'S DETERMINED EFFORT TO DISRUPT THE 1983 MUNICIPAL ELECTION PROCESS, POINT TO RENEWED WAVES OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS AS THE 1985 ELECTORAL SEASON

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ADVANCES. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT SENDERO WILL SUCCEED IN ABORTING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. SENDERO'S MOST SIGNIFICANT IMPRINT REMAINS IN THE (NOW 17-PROVINCE) SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA "EMERGENCY ZONE" (EZ), WHERE GOP AUTHORITY CONTINUES TO DEPEND ON MILITARY FORCE AND WHERE, FOR THE MOST PART, TERRORIST/COUNTERTERRORIST BLOODSHED IN PERU REMAINS CONCENTRATED. BUT WHILE SENDERO'S SWAY IN 1983 EXTENDED OVER VAST EXTENSES OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, 1984 WITNESSED ATTACKS THAT WERE FAR MORE SPORADIC AND, EXCEPT FOR NORTHERN AYACUCHO, APPEARED TO DECLINE FURTHER AS THE YEAR ENDED. OCCASIONAL BLACKOUTS IN LIMA AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES REMINDED URBAN DWELLERS THAT THE TERRORISTS HAD NOT DISAPPEARED. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS NO REPETITION IN 1984 OF THE SL SHOOTINGS THAT CLAIMED MULTIPLE CIVILIAN LIVES IN THE CAPITAL IN JULY AND OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1983. ELSEWHERE IN PERU, SL DEMONSTRATED SUFFICIENT DEDICATION AND ORGANIZING ABILITY TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE IN REMOTE STRETCHES OF THE SIERRA, WHETHER IN PRE-EXISTING BASE AREAS OR IN NEWLY ESTABLISHED ONES. BUT IT CONSPICUOUSLY LACKED STAYING POWER IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY, WHERE (AT MID-YEAR) ITS DRAMATIC EXPANSION LED THE GOP TO ESTABLISH A SECOND REGIONAL EMERGENCY ZONE. AS IN 1983, PERU'S CIVILIAN LEADERS CONTINUED TO RELY ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE APPLICATION OF FORCE TO CONTROL SL TERRORISM. PARADOXICALLY, THE GREATEST PRESSURE TO ADOPT OTHER MEANS (EMPHASIZING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT) CAME FROM MILITARY LEADERS. BUT MILITARY RECOGNITION OF THE LONG-RANGE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPMENT DID NOT LEAD FIELD COMMANDERS TO CHANGE BASIC SHORT-TERM TACTICS. OUTSIDE OF THE EZ, SENDERO'S PRINCIPAL IMPACT ON PERUVIAN LIFE IN 1984 WAS INDIRECT: IT CAUSED SHORT-LIVED, BUT ACUTE, SWINGS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PENDULUM THAT PROVOKED BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GOP REACTIONS; TERRORIST VIOLENCE AGGRAVATED EXISTING TENSIONS AND FRAYED AN ALREADY TENUOUS SOCIAL FABRIC; AND WHOLE HIGHLAND COMMUNITIES, CAUGHT BETWEEN SL AND SECURITY FORCES, ABANDONED ANCESTRAL HOMES FOR THE RELATIVE SAFETY OF LIMA AND OTHER OVERCROWDED URBAN AREAS.

3. THE TERRORIST PICTURE WAS COMPLICATED BY THE EMERGENCE, IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1984, OF THE "REVOLUTIONARY TUPAC AMARU MOVEMENT" (MRTA). TARGETING THE U.S. EMBASSY AND PRIVATE AMERICAN FACILITIES IN LIMA MRTA PROCLAIMED ITSELF AN ENEMY OF U.S. IMPERIALISM AND ITS PERUVIAN LACKEYS (I.E. THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT BELAUNDE) AND HIGHLIGHTED ITS TACTICAL DIFFERENCES WITH SENDERO. SECURITY FORCES STRUCK MRTA A MAJOR BLOW IN LATE NOVEMBER, DISCOVERING AND BREAKING-UP A CELL IN CUZCO. BUT THE EXACT DIMENSION OF MRTA'S THREAT REMAINS A MYSTERY, AS DOES THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR HEMISPHERIC COMMUNIST STATES. END SUMMARY.

4. 1984: TWELVE MONTH OVERVIEW. AS 1983 ENDED, WE CONCLUDED (REF A) THAT SL TERRORIST PHENOMENON HAD EXPANDED, STRIKING OUT FROM ITS ISOLATED SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA BASE TO REACH INTO PERU'S MAJOR CITIES AND

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CREATING, IN ADDITIONAL REACHES OF THE SIERRA, STILL MORE RURAL FOCI OF SUBVERSION. BY MID-1984, THE HYPOTHESIS OF AN EXPANDING SENDERO APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED IN DRAMATIC FASHION, AS TERRORIST-PROVOKED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, KPRP, PE

SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN VIOLENCE SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE COCA GROWING UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY IN (DEPARTMENTS OF) HUANUCO AND SAN MARTIN. TERRORIST UPSURGE THERE, ALONG WITH RENEWED INCIDENTS IN LIMA AND OTHER PARTS OF COUNTRY, LED GOP TO DECLARE SECURITY-RELATED NATIONAL "STATE OF EMERGENCY" ON JULY 6 (84 LIMA 8032) AND, AT MID-MONTH, TO PLACE UPPER HUALLAGA REGION UNDER SPECIAL STATE OF EMERGENCY WHILE, AT SAME TIME, GRANTING ARMED FORCES OVERALL CONTROL OF ANTI-SUBVERSIVE EFFORT (84 LIMA 8617) SENDERO'S SEEMINGLY "OVERNIGHT" IMPLANTATION IN AN AREA THAT WAS TOPOGRAPHICALLY, RACIALLY, AND ECONOMICALLY DIFFERENT FROM ITS AYACUCHO HEARTLAND RAISED TROUBLING QUESTIONS CONCERNING ITS ABILITY TO EXPAND ITS POPULAR APPEAL. ANSWERS TO THOSE QUESTIONS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. ONCE MILITARY FORCES MOVED INTO THE UPPER HUALLAGA, HOWEVER, THE MYSTERY OF SENDERO'S SURGE DISSIPATED. SOME EIGHTY PERCENT OF CAPTURED SL ACTIVIST PROVED TO BE OUTSIDERS TO THE REGION, AN INDICATION BOTH OF SENDERO LEADERSHIP'S DELIBERATE DECISION TO MAKE VALLEY A PRIME TARGET FOR EXPANSION AND, GIVEN LIMITED LOCAL RESPONSE TO SL'S RECRUITING EFFORTS, OF TERRORISTS FAILURE TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ROOT THERE.

5. THE MILITARY'S ENTRY INTO THE VALLEY, UNLIKE THE CASE OF THE SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA EZ, PRODUCED RELATIVELY RAPID AND DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES. APPARENT MILITARY SUCCESSES IN AYACUCHO IN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF 1983 WERE FOLLOWED BY A SERIES OF SL COUNTERATTACKS, INCLUDING THE INSTIGATION OF COMMUNAL MASSACRES THAT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE TOLL OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. SENDERO THUS DEMONSTRATED AN IMPLANTATION AND RESILIENCY IN THE ZONE THAT RESISTED THE ARMED FORCES' EFFORTS TO UPROOT IT AND, BY COUNTERPOSING FORCE OF ITS OWN TO THAT APPLIED BY THE MILITARY, ACCELERATED A PROCESS OF VIOLENCE THAT LEFT MUCH OF THE EZ'S CIVILIAN POPULATION EXPOSED. THE OPPOSITE OCCURRED IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA. WITH ITS SUPPORT BASE TENUOUS, SL MILITANTS APPARENTLY OPTED TO ABANDON THE VALLEY RATHER THAN CONTEST ITS CONTROL WITH THE ARMED FORCES. FOR THEIR PART, MILITARY COMMANDERS MADE A POINT OF NOT ANTAGONIZING THE AREA'S CIVILIAN POPULATION, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THOSE PORTIONS OF IT ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTION OR TRAFFICKING OF COCA. THE REAPPEARANCE OF EXTENSIVE VIOLENCE IN THE VALLEY (END OF JANUARY 1985), ITS TRAPPINGS OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED SUBVERSION NOTWITHSTANDING, THUS SIGNIFIED

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A PUBLIC ORDER PROBLEM OF A DIFFERENT KIND AND MAGNITUDE.

6. SENDERO VIOLENCE SHIFTED INSTEAD TO A NEW, ALTHOUGH "FAMILIAR" LOCALE--THE REMOTE, HIGH SIERRA PROVINCES OF WESTERN HUANUCO AND ADJACENT PORTIONS OF EASTERN ANCASH (SEE 84 LIMA 13579 AND 14494). ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE IS FRAGMENTARY, THE EXPLANATION FOR THIS PHENOMENON APPEARS TO LIE LESS IN SENDERO'S NUMBERS (WHICH, IT APPEARS, INVOLVE A FEW MOBILE BANDS OF 20, 30, OR UP TO 50 ARMED MEMBERS ROAMING OVER LARGE EXPANSES) THAN IN A LACK OF GOVERNMENT FORCES CAPABLE, BY THEIR PRESENCE OF DETERRING SENDERO ATTACKS. COMMUNITIES IN THE AFFECTED ZONE DID NOT RALLY TO SENDERO'S CAUSE. TO THE CONTRARY, SENDERO APPEARED TO ATTRACT LESS SUPPORT THERE THAN HAD BEEN THE CASE MONTHS EARLIER IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA.

7. THE PICTURE EMERGING FROM THIS PATTERN OF APPARENT SL SPREAD, FOLLOWED BY RETREAT AND REAPPEARANCE ELSEWHERE DIFFERS FROM THAT OF A YEAR AGO. TOGETHER WITH EVIDENCE AVAILABLE FROM SL ACTIVITY IN OTHER PARTS OF PERU (SEE "REGION BY REGION BREAKDOWN" BELOW), IT TENDS TO SUGGEST THAT, SENDERO LUMINOSO IS A MORE REGIONALLY-BASED AND LESS VIRULENT ON A NATIONAL BASIS THAN ITS INITIAL SUCCESSES INDICATED. SL RETAINS A CORE OF DEDICATED ACTIVISTS AND ELUSIVE LEADERS WHO, BY SHIFTING SL'S LOCALE OF ACTIVITY, CAN PROJECT AN IMPRESSION OF DYNAMIC EXPANSION. BUT THIS "DYNAMISM" IS APPARENT ONLY WHERE THE GOP'S RESPONSE IS INEFFECTIVE OR LETHARGIC. AT BEST, SL RECRUITS SEEM BARELY ABLE TO REPLACE CADRE LOSSES, AND, WHERE SECURITY NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

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SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN FORCES HAVE BEEN ENERGETIC, RECRUITING HAS BEEN INSUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED LEVELS OF SL ACTIVISM. IN THIS SENSE, OUR ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS PARALLEL THOSE OF

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END-OF-THE-YEAR COMPARISON RATES SL'S 1984 EFFECTIVENESS AS STILL SUBSTANTIAL, BUT LESS THAN IT WAS IN 1983.

8. CYCLICAL NATURE OF SL VIOLENCE. REGARDLESS OF OVERALL DECLINE IN SENDERO'S EFFECTIVENESS, GROUPED SERIES OF INCIDENTS CAN PRODUCE A TEMPORARY PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF HEIGHTENED DANGER. THE CONTRARY ALSO HOLDS TRUE, IN THAT PROTRACTED LULLS HAVE LED PERUVIAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIGURES TO COUNT SENDERO OUT PREMATURELY. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT PEAKS AND TROUGHS IN RECURRING WAVES OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE CONSTITUTE THE NORM OF SENDERO ACTIVITY, EVEN THOUGH SECULAR TREND OF THESE OSCILLATIONS IN THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS HAS BEEN DOWNWARD. THIS MAY BE DUE TO THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH SENDERO'S CENTRALIZED COMMAND

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STRUCTURE IS FORCED TO OPERATE--WITHOUT MODERN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND OVER GREAT DISTANCES-- UNDER DECENTRALIZING CONDITIONS. SENDERO'S LAST NATIONALLY COORDINATED OFFENSIVE WAS LAUNCHED JUNE 22-24, 1984 (SEE 84 LIMA 7400). FOLLOWING A PERIOD OF RELATIVE QUIESCENCE, SL UNITS STRUCK AT WIDELY SEPARATED SPOTS IN UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY, EMERGENCY ZONE, ICA, TRUJILLO, NORTHWESTERN PASCO, AND AT RAILROAD LINKING LIMA TO THE INTERIOR. WE HYPOTHEZIZE THAT SENDERO ALSO WISHED TO ACT SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THE CAPITAL ITSELF BUT, BECAUSE OF POLICE INROADS AGAINST ITS PERSONNEL APPARATUS THERE, WAS UNABLE TO DO SO. IN ANY EVENT, THE RETURN OF SENDERO VIOLENCE TO LIMA WAS DELAYED UNTIL JULY 1-2 (SEE 84 LIMA 7836) AND, EVEN THEN, SENDERO'S "TRADEMARK" ELECTRICAL BLACKOUT PHENOMENON DID NOT RECUR UNTIL JULY 16 (84 LIMA 8396). MANY OF THESE SEPARATE INCIDENTS INVOLVED ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC SL TRADEMARK-- THE USE OF DYNAMITE. WE HYPOTHEZIZE THAT THE EXPLOSIVES USED IN THIS OFFENSIVE WERE THOSE GATHERED IN PRECEDING, RELATIVELY QUIET WEEKS, DURING WHICH SL SQUADS RAIDED DYNAMITE STORAGE FACILITIES AT MINING AND ROAD BUILDING SITES IN LIMA AND THE CENTRAL SIERRA (SEE 84 LIMA 7033 AND 5716). WE FURTHER HYPOTHEZIZE THAT SL'S DYNAMITE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES RESPONDED TO A PRIOR LEADERSHIP DECISION THAT ESTABLISHED GOALS AND TIMETABLES FOR CADRE MILITANTS TO FOLLOW. IN SIMILAR FASHION, WE BELIEVE THE JUNE-JULY OFFENSIVE WAS FOLLOWED-UP BY A PERIOD OF DELIBERATE, PLANNED RETRENCHMENT, INVOLVING SELF-CRITICISM, WOUND-LICKING, AND PREPARING FOR NEXT STAGE IN SENDERO'S ARMED STRUGGLE.

9. THAT "NEXT STAGE" WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY FOCUS ON PERU'S NATIONAL ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. SENDERO DEMONSTRATED IN 1983 ITS REPUDIATION OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, PULLING OUT ALL STOPS TO WHICH IT HAD ACCESS IN AN EFFORT TO FRUSTRATE EXPRESSION OF POPULAR WILL. IT SUCCESSFULLY FORCED CANCELLATION OF ELECTIONS IN SEVERAL KEY EZ PROVINCES. IN LIMA, HOWEVER, AND DESPITE BLOODY TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN FOUR WEEKS PRECEDING NOVEMBER 13, SL FAILED ITS FAILURE SET STAGE FOR MAJOR GAINS BY MARXIST--BUT LEGAL AND "NON-VIOLENT"--UNITED LEFT (IU), INCLUDING VICTORY BY IU HEAD ALFONSO BARRANTES IN LIMA MAYORALITY RACE. THEIR COMMON MARXIST IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS NOTWITHSTANDING, SL AND THE IU ARE CURRENTLY EMPLOYING DIAMETRICALLY DIFFERENT TACTICS. THE FORMER IS DEDICATED TO EFFECTING RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE THROUGH VIOLENCE, AND IT SHUNS DIALOGUE OR EVEN TEMPORARY ALLIANCES WITH OTHERS. IU, ON THE OTHER HAND, SEES THE WAY OPEN TO OBTAINING POWER THROUGH THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND BELIEVES IT HAS A CHANCE OF WINNING PERU'S PRESIDENCY IN 1985. IF THAT OCCURS, RADICAL YOUTH WOULD HAVE MORE REASON THAN EVER TO OPT FOR THE LEGAL LEFT; AND AN IU IN POWER, REACTING AS ANY GOVERNING FORCE FACED WITH A CHALLENGE NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

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DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, KPRP, PE

SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN TO ITS AUTHORITY, MIGHT WELL ATTEMPT TO COMBAT SENDERO WITH MEANS AVAILABLE TO IT. ALTHOUGH TOP IU LEADERS APPEAR DIVIDED ON THE WISDOM OF OPENING A DIALOGUE WITH SENDERO, ALL HAVE ADOPTED POSITION THAT SL AND THE IU ARE ANTAGONISTIC FORCES. FOR ITS PART, SENDERO HAS TREATED ELECTED IU OFFICIALS AS ENEMIES, FIT TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION AS MUCH AS OFFICEHOLDERS OF ANY OTHER POLITICAL PARTY. FOR THESE REASONS, WE BELIEVE SENDERO CANNOT RESPOND TO 1985 NATIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ANY FASHION OTHER THAN WITH REDOUBLED VIOLENCE. SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS, ESPECIALLY ELECTIONS RESULTS OF WHICH UNDERCUT SENDERO'S APPEAL TO RADICAL YOUTH, WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS A MAJOR DEFEAT. A CAMPAIGN IN WHICH VIOLENCE PROVOKED (OR OFFERED AN EXCUSE) FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION, HOWEVER, WOULD HOLD OUT HOPE FOR SENDERISTA LEADERS OF GIVING FURTHER IMPULSE TO RADICALIZING FORCES IN PERUVIAN SOCIETY. WHETHER PREPARED OR NOT, THEREFORE, 1985 ELECTORAL CALENDAR COMPELS SL CELLS THROUGHOUT PERU TO STEP UP THEIR ACTIVITIES IN WEEKS PRECEDING APRIL 14 VOTE AND, AGAIN, IN PERIOD BEFORE SECOND ROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. WE ARE ALREADY SEEING EVIDENCE OF THIS.

10. REGION-BY-REGION BREAKDOWN: THE EMERGENCY ZONE. SL'S "HEARTLAND" IS THE (NOW 17-PROVINCE) SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA REGION COMPOSED OF ALL OF HUANCVELICA DEPARTMENT, MOST OF AYACUCHO, AND PART OF APURIMAC (SEE LIMA 1596). ALTHOUGH VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN LARGE PORTIONS OF THE ZONE, SECURITY FORCES HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS SINCE REF A EVALUATION ONE YEAR AGO. THE MOST STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THIS CHANGE IS, PERHAPS, IN CANGALLO AND VICTOR FAJARDO PROVINCES. THE SCENE OF BOTH SL AND SECURITY FORCE COUNTER-VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT 1983, THE AREA HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY WITHOUT INCIDENT SINCE DECEMBER. THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF LUCANAS PROVINCE, WHERE SENDERO VIOLENCE--WHICH NEVER HAD BEEN WIDE-SCALE--PETERED OUT IN FIRST HALF OF AUGUST. APURIMAC, THE ONLY REGION WHERE SECURITY FORCES ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS IN 1983, CONTINUED RELATIVELY QUIET THROUGH 1984. MOST OF HUANCVELICA DEPARTMENT ALSO APPEARED PACIFIED AT YEAR'S END, ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL DYNAMITE EXPLOSIONS CONTINUED TO SHAKE DEPARTMENTAL CAPITAL AND NEARBY COMMUNITIES, AND REGION'S MANY MINES (WITH THEIR TEMPTING STORES OF EXPLOSIVES) ATTRACTED ATTENTION OF SL RAIDING PARTIES.

11. THE EXCEPTION TO THIS DOWNWARD PATTERN OF EZ VIOLENCE IS NORTHERN AYACUCHO WHERE, CONTINUING INTO 1985, PROVINCES OF HUANTA AND LA MAR HAVE BEEN LOCALE FOR SL-SECURITY FORCE CONFRONTATIONS AND CLASHES BETWEEN SENDERO-ALIGNED AND OPPOSED COMMUNITY "MILITIAS." (THESE VIGILANTE BANDS ARE REFERRED TO BY VARIOUS TERMS: "RONDAS CAMPESINAS," "RONDEROS," "MONTONEROS.")

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NOT UNCOINCIDENTALLY, THESE PROVINCES ALSO WERE SCENE OF SOME OF WORST INSTANCES OF SECURITY FORCE HUMAN RIGHT ABUSE, INCLUDING CASES OF "DISAPPEARED" JOURNALIST JAIME AYALA (84 LIMA 9488) AND MASS GRAVES FOUND AT PUCAYACU (84 LIMA 10128), BADO CHICO (84 LIMA 12599), AND ELSEWHERE (LIMA 683).

12. FALLING SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN--BOTH IN GEOGRAPHIC TERMS AND IN LEVEL OF VIOLENCE--ARE DEPARTMENTAL CAPITAL, (CITY OF) AYACUCHO, AND ITS PROVINCE OF HUAMANGA HINTERLAND. THIS MAY BE WHERE SENDERO BEGAN AND WHERE, THROUGH MUCH OF 1983, MILITARY CONCENTRATED PRESENCE WAS ENOUGH TO DENY SL EFFECTIVE CONTROL ONLY BY DAY. NEVERTHELESS, SENDERO'S SUBTLE "CO-GOVERNANCE" WITH THE MILITARY ERODED IN 1984 AND, WE JUDGE, IN 1985 SECURITY FORCES DOMINATE THE SITUATION IN MOST OF HUAMANGA BOTH BY DAY AND BY NIGHT. WHAT THE MILITARY CANNOT DO, HOWEVER, IS PREVENT OCCASIONAL DYNAMITINGS AND ELECTRICAL BLACK-OUTS WHICH, THROUGH ALL OF 1984, CONTINUED TO MANIFEST TERRORISTS' BACKGROUND PRESENCE IN AN AREA THEY ONCE NEARLY CONSIDERED A "LIBERATED ZONE."

13. TERRORISM IN THE CITIES. METROPOLITAN TERRORIST NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

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SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN VIOLENCE CONTINUED TO ATTRACT PUBLIC ATTENTION IN 1984 AND, BY ITS CYCLICAL REAPPEARANCE, TO PROVOKE CRISIS-LIKE RESPONSES FROM URBAN PUBLIC AND GOVERNING ELITE ALIKE. SUCH WAS THE CASE IN LIMA IN JULY WHEN, FOLLOWING MAJOR SL-PROVOKED BLACKOUT JULY 16 (84 LIMA 8396), GOP RESPONDED WITH SERIES OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO REASSURE PSYCHOLOGICALLY SHAKEN PUBLIC THAT MATTERS WERE NOT OUT OF CONTROL (84 LIMA 9264). LESS NOTICEABLE, BUT POTENTIALLY MORE DESTABILIZING, WAS SENDERO'S TARGETING OF VULNERABLE POLICEMEN. COP KILLING, BOTH OPPORTUNISTIC AND PLANNED (E.G. LIMA 473 AND 2750), APPEARED TO ASSUME GREATER SIGNIFICANCE IN SENDERO'S METROPOLITAN AREA OPERATIONS FOLLOWING SL'S SUCCESSFUL NOV. 4 ATTACK AGAINST SOLDIERS AT LIMA'S MORRO SOLAR (84 LIMA 13253). MORE SUCH PROVOCATIVE ACTS APPEAR TO BE INEVITABLE OVER BALANCE OF ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. JUDGED BY POLICE COUNTER-MEASURES, HOWEVER, SENDERO FARED WORSE IN LIMA IN 1984 THAN 1983: ARRESTS CONTINUED TO TAKE A HIGH TOLL OF SL'S URBAN PERSONNEL INFRASTRUCTURE, AND QUALITY OF RECRUITS SL DID ATTRACT CLEARLY WAS NOT UP TO STANDARDS SET BY MORE SEASONED CADRE. [

) SENDERO'S INABILITY TO INCREASE "ITS OPERATIVE CAPACITY IN TERMS OF PERSONNEL, ARMS, AND/OR EXPLOSIVES" THUS SEEMS PARTICULARLY APT WITH RESPECT TO LIMA.

14. OTHER MAJOR PERUVIAN CITIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN JUNIN DEPARTMENT'S MANTARO RIVER VALLEY, DID NOT

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GO UNSCATHED IN 1984. AS WITH LIMA, HOWEVER, SL'S CYCLICAL PATTERN OF VIOLENCE WAS CHARACTERIZED BY PEAKS AND VALLEYS THAT, ON THE WHOLE, TRENDED DOWNWARD. THE ON NON-LIMA EVENT IN "MAJOR URBAN VIOLENCE" CATEGORY THAT SEEMED MOST THREATENING--JULY 24 ASSASSINATION OF HUANCAYO MAYOR SAUL MUNOZ (84 LIMA 8742)--FORTUNATELY DID NOT RPT NOT PROVE TO BE FIRST IN A SERIES. (TO DATE, MUNOZ' MURDER REMAINS UNRESOLVED, AND IT IS SPECULATIVE TO ATTRIBUTE HIS DEATH TO SENDERO OR ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION.)

15. UPPER HUALLAGA/HUANUCO SIERRA EMERGENCY ZONE. GOP FORMALLY RECOGNIZED FACT OF SENDERO'S SPREAD TO UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY WITH DECLARATION JULY 20 OF (SECOND) REGIONAL "STATE OF EMERGENCY" TO COVER ALL OF HUANUCO AND A PORTION OF SAN MARTIN DEPARTMENTS (84 LIMA 8617 AND 10011). WITH INITIAL OPERATIONS AN APPARENT SUCCESS, AND WITH RELOCATION OF SENDERO CADRE TO HUANUCO'S WESTERN (SIERRA) PROVINCES, GOP REDEFINED AREA COVERED BY EMERGENCY DECREE TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN JUNGLE AREAS AND, AT SAME TIME, INCORPORATE ADJACENT PORTION OF PASCO DEPARTMENT'S SIERRA. (SEE LIMA 1371 FOR AREA CURRENTLY AFFECTED.) MILITARY SUCCESSES IN THIS REGION DURING SECOND HALF OF 1984 APPEARED TO BE RESULT OF DEGREE OF PREPAREDNESS MILITARY DISPLAYED WHEN IT ENTERED ZONE AND, CONVERSELY, SENDERO'S RELATIVE UNPREPAREDNESS. ARMED FORCES COMMANDERS INCORPORATED INTO THEIR ANTI-SUBVERSIVE STRATEGY AN EMPHASIS ON MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH LOCAL POPULATION AND, AS PART OF THIS APPROACH, AVOIDANCE OF ACTS THAT MIGHT PROVOKE HOSTILE RESPONSES FROM LOCAL FORCES ALLIED WITH NEITHER SENDERO NOR THE GOVERNMENT. THE PRESCRIPTION ENTAILED ACTIVE PROSECUTION OF ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES, WHILE POLICE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE ANTI-DRUG LAWS AND PROGRAMS GROUND TO A HALT. WHAT MILITARY STRATEGISTS APPARENTLY FAILED TO CONSIDER, HOWEVER, WAS STRATEGIC LAW ENFORCEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF A POLICY THAT, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, ALLOWED CRIMINAL ELEMENTS A FREE HAND. A FLOURISHING DRUG TRAFFIC INTRODUCED LARGE QUANTITIES OF ADDITIONAL COCA-DOLLARS INTO THE AREA, PERHAPS UPSETTING POWER BALANCES WITHIN LOCAL UNDERWORLD AND CREATING CONDITIONS FOR LATER EXPLOSION IN REGION'S RATE OF CRIME-RELATED VIOLENCE. EMBASSY MESSAGES (E.G. LIMA 1845, 2183, AND 3055) HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DESCRIBE THIS VIOLENCE, WITHOUT NECESSARILY ATTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT. IDENTITY OF PRINCIPAL LAW BREAKERS MAY NEVER BE ESTABLISHED. MUCH OPPORTUNISTIC SCORE-SETTING MAY BE NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

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SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN TAKING PLACE, MASQUERADING UNDER "TERRORISM" LABEL; AND SENDERO--WHETHER IT HAS DONE SO YET OR NOT--THUS HAS A RENEWED OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE CHAOS IN A REGION THAT

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REMAINS ONLY marginally under central government's control.

16. REST OF PERU. REF A REFERRED TO RURAL SL FOCI OUTSIDE OF AYACUCHO: PROVINCE OF DANIEL CARRION IN PASCO (NOW IN HUANUCO EZ), HUAMACHUCHO IN LA LIBERTAD, PORTIONS OF SOUTHERN CUSCO, AND SPECIAL PERIL IN PUNO. PERIODIC REPORTING (E.G. 84 LIMA 9264 AND 14251; LIMA 1190, 2056) MAKES CLEAR THAT HUAMACHUCHO/OTUZCO/SANTIAGO DE CHUCO REGION OF LA LIBERTAD SIERRA CONTINUES TO BE AREA OF RESIDUAL SL ACTIVITY. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT SANDINISTAS THERE HAVE NOT EXPANDED SCOPE OR RANGE OF THEIR OPERATIONS BEYOND LEVEL ACHIEVED AT END OF 1983. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT SL ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN CUSCO SINCE AUGUST (SEE LIMA 9264). PUNO, APART FROM OCCASIONAL DYNAMITE EXPLOSIONS IN DEPARTMENT'S PRINCIPAL CITIES, ALSO WAS QUIET IN LATTER HALF OF 1984. RECURRING INCIDENTS IN AND AROUND JUNIN'S MANTARO RIVER VALLEY DEMONSTRATE THAT SENDERO RECOGNIZES THIS REGION'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. NEVERTHELESS, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT SL HAS BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A POPULAR VALLEY FOOTHOLD, AND POLICE ARRESTS CONTINUE TO ERODE WHATEVER RECRUITING PROGRESS TERRORISTS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IN REGION'S CITIES.

17. SENDERO'S IMPACT ON PERUVIAN SOCIETY. SENDERO'S IMPACT OBVIOUSLY HAS BEEN GREATEST IN THOSE AREAS OF RURAL PERU, MOST OF WHICH ARE IN ONE OF THE TWO REGIONAL EMERGENCY ZONES, WHERE ITS PRESENCE HAS BEEN ENDEMIC. LIFE IN THESE AREAS HAS COME TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY EITHER REALITY OF VIOLENCE OR PREPARATIONS FOR VIOLENCE. EZ MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN AYACUCHO, IN PARTICULAR, HAVE ENCOURAGED FORMATION OF LOCAL PEASANT MILITIAS WHOSE OFFICIAL PURPOSE IS THAT OF DEFENDING THEIR COMMUNITIES AGAINST SL ATTACK. THESE "RONDAS" TEND TO BE POORLY ARMED, POORLY TRAINED, AND SUBJECT TO ONLY LIMITED SUPERVISION. PRECISE DATA CONCERNING THE "RONDAS" IS NOT AVAILABLE. OUR IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, IS THAT RONDAS' CONTRIBUTION TO ENHANCED LOCAL SECURITY IS, AT BEST, MARGINAL; AT WORST, RONDAS REPRESENT ADDITIONAL INCREMENT OF ORGANIZED VIOLENCE--PITTING RIVAL PEASANT COMMUNITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER--IN REGIONS ALREADY INUNDATED BY VIOLENCE. SENDERO'S DISRUPTION OF NORMAL LIFE IN THESE ZONES, THUS, IS ALL-ENCOMPASSING, WITH TERRORISTS, SECURITY FORCES, AND CAMPESINOS ALIKE INVOLVE IN DISTORTION OF COMMUNITIES' PREVIOUS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, CIVIC, AND MORAL NORMS.

18. SOME OF THIS DISTORTION CAN BE SEEN IN REGION'S REDUCED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, PARTICULARLY IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN PARTS OF AYACUCHO. FORMERLY PRODUCTIVE FIELDS LIE ABANDONED, AND PRODUCE THAT ONCE ABOUNDED IN LOCAL MARKETS IS NOW ABSENT. CAMPESINOS FLED THEIR RURAL COMMUNITIES FOR RELATIVE SAFETY OF (CITY OF) AYACUCHO OR, IN OTHER CASES, ABANDONED REGION ENTIRELY AND MIGRATED TO URBAN SLUMS OF LIMA, RURAL HINTERLAND AROUND HUANCAYO, NORTHERN JUNIN, AREQUIPA, CUSCO, ICA, OR PIONEERING SETTLEMENTS IN JUNGLE. NEW ELECTORAL

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REGISTER COMPILED FOR UPCOMING NATIONAL ELECTIONS SHOWS SHARP DROP IN NUMBER OF AYACUCHO DEPARTMENT'S VOTERS-- A UNIQUE SITUATION IN COUNTRY WHERE POPULATION RISE IS THE RULE. SOCIOLOGISTS WILL HAVE TO CATALOGUE NATURE AND EXTENT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES BUT, FOR PRESENT, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT SENDERO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSIDERABLE, AND PROBABLY PERMANENT, ALTERATIONS OF PRE-EXISTING RURAL AND URBAN SETTLEMENT NORMS.

14. FOR MOST PERUVIANS, HOWEVER, CONCENTRATED IN CITIES ON OR NEAR THE COAST, SENDERO'S 1984 IMPACT WAS INDIRECT FOR THEM, PERU'S ONGOING TERRORIST-COUNTERTERRORIST VIOLENCE HIT HOME ONLY OCCASIONALLY. THE PRINCIPAL SUCH OCCASION CAME IN SECOND HALF OF JULY, WHEN CYCLICAL SWELL IN SL VIOLENCE CAUSED LIMA'S LIGHTS TO FLICKER, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

DIA FOR IR BRANCH; PANAMA FOR ADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, KPRP, PE

SUBJECT: PROFILE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TERRORISM IN THEN EXTINGUISH, AND SOUNDS OF DYNAMITE EXPLOSIONS AND GUNFIRE COULD BE HEARD IN BACKGROUND. PUBLIC REACTION, FANNED BY WIDESPREAD NEWSPAPER/MEDIA COVERAGE AND AGITATED EDITORIALS, IMPELLED GOP TO "ACT." WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES MOUNTING, CIVILIAN LEADERS DEMONSTRATED THEY WERE ON TOP OF SITUATION BY ANNOUNCING JULY 20, AN INCREASED ROLE FOR MILITARY IN COMBATTING SUBVERSION (84 LIMA 9264). EXTENT TO WHICH DECISION ANNOUNCED JULY 20 ACTUALLY SHIFTED BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, AS OPPOSED TO RATIFYING SHIFTS ALREADY IN PLACE, IS NOT CLEAR. WE UNDERSTAND THAT POLICE UNITS IN EMERGENCY ZONE, ON WHOSE SHOULDERS PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMBATTING TERRORISTS WAS SUPPOSED TO LIE, HAD LONG SINCE BEEN RELEGATED TO LESS PROMINENT ROLES. REGARDLESS OF TRUE DIVISION OF LABOR, HOWEVER, JULY 20 ANNOUNCEMENT SYMBOLICALLY INDICATED EXTENT TO WHICH CIVILIAN LEADERS AND CIVILIAN-DIRECTED POLICE SERVICES WERE PREPARED TO CEDE AUTHORITY TO MILITARY. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S IRRITATED REASSERTION OF CIVILIAN SUPREMACY IN LATE AUGUST, WITH REMOVAL OF EZ POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMANDER GEN. ADRIAN HUAMAN (84 LIMA 10224), DID NOT REDRESS THIS BALANCE. MILITARY LEADERS RECOGNIZED THAT HUAMAN HAD OVERSTOPPED PUBLICLY ACCEPTABLE BOUNDS OF BEHAVIOR WITH HIS REPEATED CRITICISMS OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES' LETHARGY IN DOING THEIR SHARE TO COMBAT SENDERO. NEVERTHELESS, HIS VIEWS REPRESENTED INSTITUTIONAL THINKING WITHIN ARMY'S HIGH COMMAND, AND HIS REPLACEMENT-- COL. WILFREDO MORI--MAINTAINED HUAMAN'S OPERATIONAL APPROACH IN EZ UNCHANGED. AS YEAR ENDED, MILITARY'S PUBLIC AND SELF IMAGES PROBABLY BOTH STOOD HIGHER THAN THEY HAD AT OUTSET, WHILE THOSE OF ELECTED CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES--ALREADY BUFFETED BY SHORTCOMINGS IN HANDLING HOST OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS--FARED POORER BECAUSE OF

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GOP'S INEPTITUDE IN DEALING WITH SENDERO MENACE.

20. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO GAUGE EXTENT OF CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP'S REDUCED MORAL GOVERNING STATURE, WHAT IS EVEN LESS EASY TO MEASURE IS EXTENT TO WHICH PERU'S SOCIAL FABRIC AS A WHOLE HAS CONTINUED TO FRAY. REF A REFERRED TO "NUMBING" EFFECT ON PERUVIAN SOCIETY OF INCREASING VIOLENCE, AN EFFECT AUGMENTED BY STEADILY WORSENING LIVING STANDARDS AND CONDITIONS OF LIFE THAT CONFRONT MOST OF POPULATION. AS POPE JOHN PAUL'S VISIT SHOWED (LIMA 889), A SENSE OF CIVIC SPIRIT REMAINS WHICH, WHEN PROPERLY MOBILIZED, IS CAPABLE OF GENERATING SELEFLESS SACRIFICE FROM THOUSANDS. BUT THE RULE TO WHIC PAPAL VISIT'S EFFECTS WERE EXCEPTION IS THAT, FOR MOST PERUVIANS, SENSE OF COMMUNITY CONSCIOUSNESS AND NEED FOR INVOLVEMENT ARE LESS ATTRACTIVE THAN EVER. SENDERO VIOLENCE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THIS PHENOMENON'S CAUSE. BUT IT SEEMS EQUALLY CERTAIN THAT, SO LONG AS TERRORIST GENERATED VIOLENCE LASTS, IT WILL CONTRIBUTE T PULLING PERUVIAN SOCIETY APART AND HELP ASSURE THAT THE TREND OF SOCIAL SPIRAL CONTINUES DOWNWARD.

21. ASSESSING CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES' RESPONSE. EXAMININ CHARGES OF WIDESCALE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN PERU, A PROMINENT U.S. ORGANIZATION ISSUED A REPORT IN LATE 1984 ENTITLED, "ABDICATING DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY." THIS TITLE DESCRIBES ACCURATELY A FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE FOR PERU'S INABILITY TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH SL'S TERRORIST CHALLENGE. IT WAS MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN EZ WHO, IN 1984, TOOK LEAD IN URGING GOP TO DEVOTE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING REGION'S ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE, TO MAKING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES THERE MORE RESPONSIVE TO NEEDS OF PUBLIC, TO FIRING CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT OFFICIALS, AND TO REFORMING ANTIQUATED LEGAL SYSTEM THAT FEW OF REGION'S CAMPESINOS COULD UNDERSTAND, LET ALONE MASTER. YET PATTERN OF RESPONSE FROM LIMA IN 1984, AS IN 1983, WAS TO EVADE "HARD CHOICES THE TERRORIST SITUATION POSES. . . WHILE (CONCENTRATING) PUBLICLY ON MINIMIZING SENDERO'S SIGNIFICANCE AND BLAMIN THE PROBLEM ON A VARIETY OF NON-PERUVIAN FACTORS NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

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THAT VICTORY OVER A POPULARLY-BASED PROTEST MOVEMENT INVOLVES ELIMINATING THAT ORGANIZATION'S BASE OF SUPPORT, EVENTUAL GOP VICTORY OVER SENDERO LUMINOSO TERRORISM DEPENDS ON INCORPORATION INTO OFFICIAL STRATEGY OF ELEMENTS OF PERSUASION TO ACCOMPANY COERCION. STRATEGY ALSO MUST IMPOSE LIMITS ON COERCION'S USE, TO ASSURE THAT IT DOES NOT SENDERO VIOLENCE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THIS PHENOMENON'S CAUSE. BUT IT SEEMS EQUALLY CERTAIN THAT, SO LONG AS TERRORIST GENERATED VIOLENCE LASTS, IT WILL CONTRIBUTE T PULLING PERUVIAN SOCIETY APART AND HELP ASSURE THAT THE TREND OF SOCIAL SPIRAL CONTINUES DOWNWARD.

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ADDRESS SUBVERSION PROBLEM ON BASIS OF SUCH A LONGER TERM APPROACH AND, ACCORDINGLY, WHATEVER PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE HAS COME FROM SHORT-TERM COERCION ALONE.

22. MRTA. THE "REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TUPAC AMARU" (MRTA) BURST INTO INTERNATIONAL SPOTLIGHT WITH COORDINATED SERIES OF ATTACKS SEPT. 28-29 AGAINST EMBASSY, AP AND UPI OFFICES, AND SEARS AT TIME WHEN PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WAS MAKING APPEARANCES IN WASHINGTON AND AT UN (84 LIMA 11620). MRTA'S "PLATFORM" FOCUSED ON POPULIST, PRO-NATIONALIST/ANTI-IMPERIALIST THEMES, AND AVOIDED PREDOMINANTLY MARXIST JARGON (84 LIMA 10898). FOLLOWING A MULTI-WEEK LULL, MRTA AGAIN MADE NEWS AT END NOVEMBER, WHEN POLICE IN CUSCO UNCOVERED TERRORIST CELL AND EXTENSIVE CACHES OF MODERN WEAPONS. ALLEGEDLY TO PROTEST POLICE'S MISTREATMENT OF CAPTURED CADRE, MRTA SQUAD IN LIMA KIDNAPPED TWO TV NEWSPERMAN DEC. 8 AND ATTEMPTED TO COERCE BROADCAST OF PRERECORDED CASSETTE (84 LIMA 14311). LIMA POLICE ANNOUNCED IN EARLY FEBRUARY CAPTURE OF SUSPECTS IN THESE CASES (LIMA 1811). NEVERTHELESS, FURTHER SERIES OF MRTA-CLAIMED INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE IN CAPITAL MARCH 19 AND 20. (LIMA 3088 AND 3201).

23. THESE EVENTS, TOGETHER WITH MRTA'S SPECIFICALLY ANTI-AMERICAN RHETORIC AND TARGETING, MAKE ORGANIZATION LEGITIMATE OBJECT OF USG INTEREST AND CONCERN. PRESS ARTICLES ON MRTA'S SUPPOSED FOREIGN CONNECTIONS AND FUNDING, ALONG WITH CONFLICTING INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AS TO CLANDESTINE (RATHER THAN PERUVIAN) SOURCE OF ITS ARMS, AUGMENT THIS CONCERN. AT SAME TIME, HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS COMPORMENT OF (MOSCOW-LINING) COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED LIMA DAILY "EL DIARIO" SUGGESTS, INDIRECTLY, EXISTENCE OF FOREIGN LINK (84 LIMA 14903, LIMA 1307, 3088). BUT, BOTTOM LINE, IN OUR VIEW, IS THAT HARD EVIDENCE AVAILABLE REMAINS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MRTA'S CHARACTER, ARMS/FINANCING SOURCES, ULTIMATE AIMS, OR EXTENT OF DANGER IT REPRESENTS. POLICE INTERROGATIONS OF CUSCO AND LIMA SUSPECTS MAY PROVIDE USEFUL CLUES (WE DO NOT NOW HAVE ACCESS TO THIS INFORMATION). TRACES ON WEAPONS CAPTURED IN CUSCO ALSO COULD PROVIDE INVALUABLE LEADS. PENDING APPEARANCE OF SUCH DATA, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT BEST TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT MRTA JURY IS STILL OUT AND VERDICT MUST HANG IN ABEYANCE.

24. THE NEAR TERM FUTURE. AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, WE CONSIDER IT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT ANOTHER PEAK PERIOD IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY HAS ALREADY BEGUN IN CONTEXT OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS. EVENTS OF PAST FEW DAYS STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT MRTA AS WELL AS SENDERO WILL ENGAGE IN A SERIES OF ATTACKS INTENDED TO INTERRUPT OR AT LEAST DISRUPT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. CAN THEY SUCCEED? NATURE OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE MAKES IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION. NEITHER POPULAR SUPPORT NOR GREAT RESOURCES ARE NECESSARY TO PERPETRATE A SERIES OF SELECTED ASSASSINATIONS OR NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO

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BOMBINGS. PERU'S SECURITY FORCES ARE POISED TO DEAL
WITH AN INCREASED CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE, BUT THAT DOES
NOT MEAN THEY CAN STOP IT. DANGER TO PROCESS ITSELF
DERIVES FROM POSSIBILITY THAT TERRORISTS MIGHT KILL
ONE OF FRONT-RUNNING CANDIDATES, OR THAT INDISCRIMINATE
BOMBINGS OF ELECTORAL RALLIES OR VOTING FACILITIES
COULD GENERATE PUBLIC PANIC (LIMA 1308). WE BELIEVE
THAT IN ALL BUT MOST DIRE SITUATIONS, PERUVIAN MAIN-
STREAM IS LIKELY TO CLOSE RANKS AGAINST TERRORISTS
TO DEFEND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION INSTEAD OF PRESSING FOR
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN PROCESS. JORDAN

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