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DOCUMENT ID: 27967931
INQNO: DOC25D 00270687
DOCNO: TEL 003073 93
PRODUCER: LIMA
SOURCE: STATE
DOCTYPE: IN
DOR: 19930318
TOR: 182051
DOCPREC: R
ORIGDATE: 199303181839
MHFNO: 93 1814360
DOCCLASS: U

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir.
 Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
Date 12/19/02 Exemption _____

HEADER

RR RUEAIIA
DE RUEHPE #3073/01 0771840
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181839Z MAR 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6775
INFO RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0206
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1708
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 3782
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2727
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0523
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 7796
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEHNA/DEAHQS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
BT

CONTROLS

UNCLAS LIMA 03073

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEAHQS FOR OFL/KANE
NSC FOR FEINBERG AND MORLEY
USIA FOR AR

E.O. 12356: DECL: N/A

TEXT

TAGS: PTER, PHUM, ASEC, AMGT, PE
COMBINE; COMPLETE

SUBJECT: VIOLENCE TRENDS IN LIMA:
- JANUARY 1992 - JANUARY 1993

REFS: A) LIMA 835, B) LIMA 1493,
- C) 92 LIMA 7204 AND PREVIOUS

1. SUMMARY: SENDERO LUMINOSO TERRORIST
ACTIVITY HAS NOT DECLINED NOTICEABLY DESPITE THE
CAPTURE OF ITS FOUNDER/LEADER ON SEPTEMBER 12,

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1992. BETWEEN JANUARY 1992 AND JANUARY 1993, THERE WERE 1083 REPORTED TERRORIST INCIDENTS (INCLUDING NON-LETHAL ACTIONS) IN METROPOLITAN LIMA, AND 486 RELATED DEATHS. NATIONWIDE, LIMA ACCOUNTED FOR 17 PERCENT OF TERRORIST RELATED DEATHS AND 50 PERCENT OF TERRORIST ACTIONS. SENDERO CENTERED MOST OF ITS ACTIVITY, INCLUDING ITS MOST LETHAL ATTACKS, IN LIMA'S HUGE EASTERN

SHANTY TOWNS AND THE CITY'S RUN-DOWN CENTER AND PORT CITY OF CALLAO. LESS THAN 15 PERCENT OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND RELATED DEATHS OCCUR IN LIMA'S "RESIDENTIAL" DISTRICTS, WHERE MOST EMBASSY PERSONNEL TEND TO LIVE. HOWEVER, THE RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS SUFFERED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF CAR BOMBINGS. TERRORIST ACTIVITY IS CYCLICAL, WITH PEAKS DURING SL'S "ARMED STRIKES." CAR BOMBS TEND TO OCCUR DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. SL'S FAVORITE TARGETS ARE GOP OFFICES, LARGE COMPANIES, AND RELATIVELY UNPROTECTED EMBASSIES. THESE FACTORS ASSIST THE EMBASSY IN KEEPING AN ADEQUATE SECURITY PROFILE. END SUMMARY.

LIMA VIOLENCE REMAINS CONSTANT

2. THE HIGH LEVEL OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN METROPOLITAN LIMA HAVE REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT (WITH FLUCTUATIONS) OVER THE LAST THIRTEEN MONTHS. SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR NEARLY ALL THE INCIDENTS REPORTED IN LIMA, WITH THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA) CONDUCTING SPORADIC, BUT MOSTLY INEFFECTUAL, ATTACKS. SENDERO'S CAPABILITIES TO MOUNT ATTACKS HAS NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY THE SEPTEMBER 12, 1992, CAPTURE OF SENDERO LUMINOSO FOUNDER/LEADER ABIMAEI GUZMAN AND NEARLY ALL HIS TOP LIEUTENANTS - EASILY THE HARSHTEST BLOW SL HAS EVER RECEIVED IN THE 13 YEARS OF THE WAR. THE STRATEGIC EFFECTIVENESS OF SL VIOLENCE, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE LOWER FOR LACK OF NATIONAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. THAT SL LACUNA COULD BE FILLED IN TIME.

3. THE CHARTS BELOW PROVIDE DATA FROM DESCO (A VIOLENCE MONITORING GROUP,) SHOWING THE NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND RELATED DEATHS IN METROPOLITAN LIMA BETWEEN JANUARY 1992 AND JANUARY 1993. TERRORIST INCIDENTS AS DEFINED BY DESCO EXTEND BEYOND BOMBINGS, CAR BOMBS, AND ASSASSINATIONS TO INCLUDE NON-LETHAL ACTIONS SUCH AS RADIO STATION TAKE-OVERS AND PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS LIKE GRAFFITI PAINTING OR LEAFLET ACTIONS. THE NUMBER OF DEATHS RELATED TO

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TERRORIST INCIDENTS MAY BE A BETTER INDICATOR OF STRICTLY VIOLENT TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN LIMA AND THE COUNTRY.

NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND RELATED DEATHS

INCIDENTS:

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	7MOS
- LIMA:	43	123	47	56	54	52	179	554
-ALL PERU:	121	191	152	119	151	96	296	1126
	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN		TOTAL
- LIMA:	50	70	58	169	104	78		1083
-ALL PERU:	170	149	125	272	167	154		2163

VICTIMS :

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	7MOS
- LIMA:	23	34	25	36	89	27	57	291
-ALL PERU:	368	218	319	133	379	169	192	1778
	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN		TOTAL
- LIMA:	32	51	26	25	30	31		486
-ALL PERU:	173	165	177	254	88	157		2792

4. COMMENT: THE CHARTS SHOW THAT APPROXIMATELY HALF OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS REPORTED OCCURRED IN METROPOLITAN LIMA, BUT THESE ONLY ACCOUNTED FOR ABOUT 17 PERCENT OF THE DEATH TOLL. THIS MAY REFLECT, IN PART, THAT INCIDENTS IN LIMA TEND TO BE REPORTED WHILE IN THE PROVINCES MANY INCIDENTS GO UNREPORTED OR THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IS UNDER-REPORTED DUE TO DISTANCE AND LACK OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. ALSO, IF WE ELIMINATE THE MAY 1992 POLICE ASSAULT TO REESTABLISH CONTROL OVER LIMA'S MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISONS -- IN WHICH 54 INMATES AND 3 POLICEMEN DIED -- LIMA'S SHARE OF THE BODY COUNT DROPS TO 15 PERCENT. NEVERTHELESS, SENDERO LUMINOSO'S LEADERSHIP MADE THE STRATEGIC DECISION IN THE LATE '80'S TO SHIFT ITS FOCUS FROM THE RURAL AREAS AND CONCENTRATE MORE OF ITS ACTIONS ON METROPOLITAN LIMA. END COMMENT.

WHERE IN LIMA DO THE ATTACKS OCCUR?

5. BY BREAKING DOWN THE LIMA NUMBERS, WE CAN BETTER IDENTIFY WHICH AREAS OF LIMA HAVE SUFFERED THE MOST TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND SUSTAINED HIGHER CASUALTIES. THE CHART BELOW BREAKS DOWN THE NUMBERS OF INCIDENTS AND DEATHS

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BY GEOGRAPHICAL SECTIONS OF METROPOLITAN LIMA. THE "RESIDENTIAL" SECTION IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE BECAUSE IT IS WHERE EMBASSY PERSONNEL TEND TO LIVE AND SPEND OFF-HOURS. THE EMBASSY IS LOCATED IN THE "CENTRAL" SECTOR. COMMENT: THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IN THE OUTLYING SECTIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA MAY BE UNDER-REPORTED BY THESE FIGURES. POST HAS ON MANY OCCASIONS BEEN INFORMED BY CONTACTS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE SHANTY TOWNS THAT WERE NOT REPORTED IN THE OPEN MEDIA. THIS MAY SOMEWHAT DISTORT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT IN THE RESIDENTIAL PARTS OF THE CITY RELATIVE TO THE MUCH LARGER SHANTY TOWNS SURROUNDING LIMA. END COMMENT.

KEY TO CITY DISTRICTS

CENTRAL: CERCADO DE LIMA, BRENA, RIMAC, LA VICTORIA, SAN LUIS.
 CONO OESTE: CALLAO, SAN MARTIN, LOS OLIVOS.
 CONO SUR: SAN JUAN DE MIRAFLORES, VILLA MARIA DEL TRUINFO, VILLA EL SALVADOR,
 LURIN, CHORRILLOS.
 CONO ESTE: SAN JUAN DE LURIGANCHO, EL AGUSTINO.
 CONO NORTE: INDEPENDENCIA, COMAS, CARABAYLLO, PUENTE PIEDRA.
 RESIDENCIAL: MIRAFLORES, SAN ISIDRO, SAN BORJA, SURCO, SURQUILLO, LA MOLINA, LINCE, JESUS MARIA.
 CARRETERA CENTRAL: ATE-VITATE, STA ANITA, CHOSICA

TERRORIST RELATED INCIDENTS IN METROPOLITAN LIMA
 - BY CITY DISTRICT: DESCO/IN-HOUSE

	1992							7MOS
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	
CENTRAL :	9	35	12	17	15	19	46	153
WEST :	7	17	6	6	9	12	34	91
SOUTH :	6	17	11	6	11	4	28	83
EAST :	11	17	8	13	11	13	27	100
NORTH :	1	9	0	0	4	4	20	38
RESIDENTIAL:	4	15	7	10	8	14	14	72
CENTRAL HWY:	4	6	4	7	4	2	10	37
TOTALS :	42	116	48	59	62	68	179	574

	1992					1993		6MOS	TOTAL
	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN			
CENTRAL :	9	13	17	40	12	20	111	264	
WEST :	9	12	7	25	15	17	85	176	
SOUTH :	3	9	5	19	13	11	60	143	

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EAST	:	13	21	21	29	21	14	119	219
NORTH	:	4	7	4	20	9	7	51	89
RESIDENTIAL:		7	17	15	28	23	7	97	169
CENTRAL HWY:		10	5	8	14	10	11	58	95
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TOTALS	:	55	84	77	175	103	87	581	1155

TERRORIST RELATED DEATHS IN METROPOLITAN LIMA
 - BY CITY DISTRICT: DESCO/IN-HOUSE

		1992							
		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	7MOS
CENTRAL	:	3	11	7	3	6	4	9	43
WEST	:	4	3	3	7	8	4	2	31
SOUTH	:	5	6	7	3	7	2	2	32
EAST	:	6	12	3	9	60	5	7	102
NORTH	:	0	0	0	0	2	1	5	8
RESIDENTIAL:		0	1	0	4	2	7	31	45
CENTRAL HWY:		5	1	3	8	3	1	1	22
		---		---		---		---	
TOTALS	:	23	34	23	34	88	24	57	283

		1992					1993		
		AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	6MOS	TOTAL
CENTRAL	:	3	11	12	2	3	15	46	89
WEST	:	4	10	3	1	4	3	25	56
SOUTH	:	2	3	0	4	2	4	15	47
EAST	:	12	21	7	5	9	2	56	158
NORTH	:	2	1	2	3	9	3	20	28
RESIDENTIAL:		5	1	2	7	1	0	16	61
CENTRAL HWY:		4	2	0	4	1	2	13	35
		---		---		---		---	
TOTALS	:	32	49	26	26	29	29	191	474

6. COMMENT: THE CHARTS ABOVE SHOW THAT THE TWO HARDEST HIT AREAS OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA (JANUARY 1992 TO JANUARY 1993) WERE THE CENTRAL LIMA/CALLAO (LIMA'S PORT CITY) AXIS, WITH 38 PERCENT OF THE REPORTED INCIDENTS AND 30 PERCENT OF THE DEATHS, AND THE MASSIVE SHANTY TOWNS TO

THE EAST OF LIMA, WHICH ACCOUNTED FOR 19 PERCENT OF THE INCIDENTS AND A STAGGERING 33 PERCENT OF THE VICTIMS. THE RESIDENTIAL SECTOR HAD A 14 PERCENT SHARE OF THE INCIDENTS AND 12 PERCENT OF THE DEATHS. HOWEVER, IF WE DO NOT INCLUDE THE 22 VICTIMS OF THE JULY 1992 TARATA STREET CAR BOMB, WITH AN UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, THE RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS ACCOUNTED FOR ONLY 8 PERCENT OF THE DEATHS.

ARMED STRIKES AND CHRISTMAS SKEW NUMBERS UPWARDS

7. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT FOUR OF THE MONTHS COVERED IN THIS PERIOD INCLUDED SIGNIFICANT EVENTS THAT MARKED UNUSUALLY INTENSE PERIODS OF SENDERO ACTIVITY. AN ENFORCED "ARMED STRIKE" (PARO ARMADO) ON JULY 22-23, 1992, WAS SENDERO'S HIGHWATER MARK IN LIMA AS REFLECTED BY THE HIGH DEATH TOLL AND NUMBER OF INCIDENTS. ARMED STRIKES TARGETED AT DISRUPTING CONSTITUENT CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS ON NOVEMBER 22, 1992, AND NATIONAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ON JANUARY 29, 1993, WERE LESS FEROCIOUS IN SCOPE AND VIOLENCE, BUT WERE STILL SIGNIFICANT IN THE NUMBER OF ATTACKS AND CASUALTIES. A "TRADITIONAL" SENDERO SPREE OF ATTACKS AROUND CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEARS BOLSTERED AN OTHERWISE LESS VIOLENT MONTH.

8. TO ILLUSTRATE THE SKEWING EFFECT OF THESE PERIODS OF CONCENTRATED SENDERO ACTIVITY, 145 OF 179 TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN LIMA DURING JULY 1992 OCCURRED BETWEEN JULY 16-23 -- THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO, AND INCLUDING, THE JULY PARO ARMADO. FORTY-THREE OF THE 57 VICTIMS REPORTED IN LIMA FOR JULY WERE KILLED DURING THE JULY 16-23 PERIOD; 22 VICTIMS IN ONE INCIDENT ALONE, THE TARATA STREET BOMBING IN LIMA'S UP-SCALE MIRAFLORES DISTRICT. SIMILARLY, 30 OF 78 TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND 12 OF 31 VICTIMS REPORTED IN JANUARY 1993 OCCURRED BETWEEN THE JANUARY 26-29 PERIOD ASSOCIATED WITH THE ARMED STRIKE CALLED TO DISRUPT THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. THE FIGURES ALSO SUGGEST A STEADY DECLINE IN SENDERO'S ABILITY TO CALL AND ENFORCE A SUCCESSFUL ARMED STRIKE IN METROPOLITAN LIMA.

CAR BOMBS: THE UNCERTAINTY FACTOR

9. SENDERO RESUMED USING CAR BOMBS IN 1992. BY THE JULY 1992 ARMED STRIKE, SENDERO BEGAN TO INCREASINGLY USE CAR BOMBS AGAINST SOFT CIVILIAN TARGETS AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND COMPANIES. BETWEEN JANUARY 1992 AND JANUARY 1993 SENDERO CAR BOMBS KILLED 66 PEOPLE IN METROPOLITAN LIMA.

10. THE FOLLOWING CHART SHOWS THE PATTERNS OF SUCCESSFUL SENDERO CAR BOMB BY CITY SECTOR. IT COMBINES INFORMATION FROM DESCO; PERU PAZ (SEN. BERNALES' FORMER CONGRESSIONAL VIOLENCE MONITORING GROUP) AND THE EMBASSY'S IN-HOUSE DATA BANK.

CAR BOMBS IN METROPOLITAN LIMA, BY CITY DISTRICT

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	1992							7MOS
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	
CENTRAL :	0	1	0	0	2	0	4	7
RESIDENTIAL:	0	0	0	1	2	1	6	10
NORTH :	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
WEST :	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	4
EAST :	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	4
CENTRAL HWY:	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
SOUTH :	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	6
TOTALS :	0	1	0	2	9	1	21	34

	1992				1993		6MOS	TOTAL
	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN		
CENTRAL :	0	1	0	3	1	4	9	16
RESIDENTIAL:	0	0	0	2	7	1	10	20
NORTH :	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
WEST :	1	1	0	1	2	1	6	10
EAST :	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	7
CENTRAL HWY:	1	0	0	1	1	0	3	4
SOUTH :	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	9
TOTALS :	2	2	0	13	11	6	34	68

11. COMMENT: THE SECTOR HIT MOST OFTEN BY CAR BOMBS, A HIGH VISIBILITY, LOW RISK FORM OF TERRORISM, IS LIMA'S "RESIDENTIAL" DISTRICT. HOWEVER, THE BULK OF THESE ATTACKS TEND TO OCCUR DURING PARO ARMADOS OR OTHER PERIODS OF TIME WHEN HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE INDICATES SENDERO IS LIKELY TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE. SENDERO HAS ALWAYS "ANNOUNCED" ITS ARMED STRIKES, SOMETIMES AS MUCH AS A MONTH IN ADVANCE, WHICH ALLOWS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE MISSION TO WARN PERSONNEL OF THE THREAT AND ADVISE THEM OF APPROPRIATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS TO TAKE TO MINIMIZE THE DANGER TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL. END COMMENT.

GUZMAN CAPTURE: NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT ON VIOLENCE

12. THE GUZMAN CAPTURES DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON SENDERO LUMINOSO LEVELS OF VIOLENCE. THE CONTINUING HIGH NUMBER OF SENDERO-RELATED INCIDENTS AND VICTIMS MONTHS AFTER THE CAPTURE SUGGESTS SENDERO'S REGIONAL CADRE REMAINS LARGELY UNSCATHED AND CONTINUES TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS AT PRE-CAPTURE LEVELS DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF THEIR TOP LEADERSHIP.

	NATION-WIDE		METRO LIMA	
	1/1-9/12	9/13-JAN93	1/1-9/12	9/13-JAN93
INCIDENTS:	1325	813	625	455

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DEATHS :	2005	761	352	134
PER DAY:	255 DAYS	141 DAYS	255 DAY	141 DAYS
INCIDENTS:	5.2	5.7	2.4	3.2
DEATHS :	7.8	5.4	1.4	1.0

13. COMMENT: DESPITE THE IMPERFECT NATURE OF THE DATA SOURCES AVAILABLE, THE GENERAL TRENDS SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT IN THE WAKE OF GUZMAN'S CAPTURE, LIMA CONTINUES TO BE A FAVORITE TARGET OF SENDERO LUMINOSO (MRTA ACTIVITY IS NEGLIGIBLE). LIMA'S HUGE SHANTY TOWNS, WITH THEIR POVERTY AND LACK OF GOVERNMENT PRESENCE, MAKE THEM THE NATURAL AREAS OF SENDERO ACTIVITY. BUT THE MORE ESTABLISHED AREAS OF CENTRAL LIMA AND ITS PORT CITY OF CALLAO HAVE BEEN JUST AS HARD HIT BY THE SUBVERSIVES. NEVERTHELESS, LIMA'S UP-SCALE "RESIDENTIAL" NEIGHBORHOODS HAVE NOT ESCAPED THEIR SHARE OF SENDERO'S TERRORISM, ALBEIT WITH MUCH LESS VIOLENCE AND FEWER DEATHS, EXCEPT FOR CAR BOMBS, THAN OTHER SECTORS OF THE CITY.

14. SL'S VIOLENCE IN LIMA, INCLUDING CAR BOMBS AND ACTIONS IN RESIDENTIAL AREA, ARE CYCLICAL, PEAKING DURING "ARMED STRIKES" ANNOUNCED IN ADVANCE. CAR BOMBS ARE USUALLY, BUT NOT ALWAYS, USED DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS. SL'S FAVORITE TARGETS ARE THE GOP, MILITARY, AND POLICE: LARGE COMPANIES, INCLUDING U.S. FIRMS, AND RELATIVELY UNPROTECTED EMBASSIES (CHINESE, JAPANESE, BOLIVIAN). THESE FACTORS ASSIST THE EMBASSY IN KEEPING AN APPROPRIATE SECURITY PROFILE.

BRAYSHAW##

ADMIN
END OF MESSAGE

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