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**EXCISE**

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Dept of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, Dir  
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HEADER

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TO RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 8237  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 2508  
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RUEADWD/USDA WASHDC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 4783  
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RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 2671  
RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC 4153  
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC  
BT

CONTROLS

[REDACTED] STATE 249132  
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL/ORCON FOR THE AMBASSDOR  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TEXT

TAGS: AMGT, APER, ASEC AMER, KFLO, AALS, PE

COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: NSDD-38: REVIEW OF STAFFING AT EMBASSY LIMA

1. [REDACTED]/NOFORN -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE RECENT WAVE OF SENDERO LUMINOSO BOMBINGS IN LIMA UNDERSCORES THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO USG PERSONNEL IN PERU. THE DEPARTMENT IS CONVINCED THAT OUR SECURITY POSTURE WILL NOT IMPROVE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, AND THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO REDUCE DRAMATICALLY THE PROFILE OF MISSION PERSONNEL. END SUMMARY.
3. LAST YEAR POST SOUGHT TO DRAW DOWN EMBASSY STAFFING

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THROUGH A NSDD-38 EXERCISE. AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT. WHILE THIS EFFORT AIMED AT REDUCING AMCIT PERSONNEL BY 30 PERCENT (FROM APPROXIMATELY 200 TO 130), RESISTANCE FROM THE VARIOUS AGENCIES ENDED UP LIMITING REDUCTIONS TO LESS THAN 10 PERCENT -- A TOTAL OF ONLY 17 POSITIONS. SINCE THEN, THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS ONLY WORSENERED. (SEE DS THREAT ASSESSMENT OF JULY 30, 1992 SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 6 BELOW).

4. MEANWHILE, THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD THAT CONVENED THIS SPRING TO LOOK INTO THE FEBRUARY BOMBING OF THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE NSDD-38 PROCESS SHOULD BE REOPENED AND VIGOROUSLY PROSECUTED. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THIS RECOMMENDATION BE IMPLEMENTED PROMPTLY IN LIGHT OF THE CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN LIMA.

5. ACCORDINGLY, WE REQUEST THAT YOU CONSIDER EMBARKING UPON ANOTHER NSDD-38 EXERCISE. YOUR VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD BE MOST WELCOME. PLEASE RESPOND TO US WITH YOUR THOUGHTS BY COB AUGUST 4.

6. BEGIN TEXT OF THREAT ASSESSMENT.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

(S/NF) THE LEVEL OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN LIMA DURING 1992 HAS RISEN CONSIDERABLY, AND IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL), LATIN AMERICA'S MOST RUTHLESS AND BRUTAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, IS MOVING TOWARDS A GREATER ASSERTION OF ITS POWER IN THE LIMA METROPOLITAN AREA. SENDERO LUMINOSO HAS WAGED THREE SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST OFFENSIVES IN THE CAPITAL THIS YEAR (BEGIN BOLDFACE) EACH CHARACTERIZED BY GROWING INTENSITY AND LETHALITY. (END BOLDFACE)

(S/NF) SENDERO'S FIRST OFFENSIVE COMMENCED IN EARLY FEBRUARY WHEN THE GROUP EMBARKED UPON A BLOODY TERRORIST CAMPAIGN IN A BUILD-UP TO A PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED ARMED STRIKE (WORK STOPPAGE) ON FEBRUARY 14. ASSASSINATIONS AND LOW-LEVEL BOMBINGS WERE CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE CITY, INCLUDING ATTACKS AGAINST POLICEMEN, BUSES, BANKS, THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT (GOP) BUILDINGS, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, AND SEVERAL SHANTYTOWNS. THE MOST NOTABLE INCIDENT OCCURRED ON FEBRUARY 11. WHEN THE SL DETONATED A CAR BOMB NEAR THE U.S. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, (BEGIN BOLDFACE) THE MOST LETHAL AND DESTRUCTIVE ATTACK ON A USG FACILITY IN LIMA TO DATE (END BOLDFACE). THREE PERUVIAN POLICEMEN WERE KILLED IN THE BOMBING AND EXTENSIVE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED TO THE RESIDENCE. AS A RESULT OF THIS PRELUDE TO VIOLENCE, THE SENDERO'S CALL FOR AN ARMED STRIKE MET WITH RELATIVE SUCCESS, A FIRST FOR THE GROUP AFTER TWO PAST FAILURES. LIMA'S TRANSPORTATION SECTOR WAS PARALYZED ON FEBRUARY 14, AS BUSES AND OTHER TRANSPORT WERE INTIMIDATED FROM GOING INTO THE CAPITAL'S SHANTYTOWNS. PREVENTING MANY WORKERS FROM REACHING DOWNTOWN LIMA.

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(S/NF) IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT FUJIMORI'S COUP IN EARLY APRIL 1992, SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) INITIATED ITS SECOND URBAN OFFENSIVE, (BEGIN BOLDFACE) UTILIZING SOME ITS LARGEST CAR BOMBS EVER (END BOLDFACE). DURING THE APRIL-MAY TIMEFRAME, THE SL CARRIED OUT AT LEAST 13 CAR BOMBINGS, MANY OF WHICH CONTAINED BETWEEN 200-600 KILOGRAMS OF DYNAMITE ENHANCED WITH ANFO (AMMONIUM NITRATE FUEL OIL). THE MAJORITY OF THE ATTACKS WERE SPECIFICALLY TARGETED AGAINST POLICE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. TO COUNTER THIS OFFENSIVE, THE GOP INCREASED MILITARY URBAN PATROLS IN LIMA, NEUTRALIZED SENDERO'S CONTROL OF THE CANTO GRANDE PRISON, AND INSTITUTED A CITYWIDE EVENING NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL/ORCON FOR THE AMBASSDOR E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

CURFEW. SENDERO SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDED ITS BOMBING CAMPAIGN IN EARLY JUNE. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT U.S. INTERESTS WERE NOT ATTACKED AT ANY TIME DURING THIS OFFENSIVE.

(C/NF) AFTER A LULL OF APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS. SENDERO LUMINOSO RESUMED ITS URBAN CAMPAIGN ON JULY 16, 1992. BY BOLDLY DETONATING A MASSIVE CAR BOMB IN LIMA'S AFFLUENT MIRAFLORES DISTRICT AT APPROXIMATELY 9:00 P.M. THE BLAST CAUSED BY AN ESTIMATED 300-350 KILOS OF DYNAMITE, KILLED AT LEAST 20 PEOPLE, WOUNDED 200 OTHERS AND GUTTED SEVERAL NEARBY BUILDINGS. AMONG THOSE SUFFERING MINOR INJURIES WERE THREE VISITING U.S. OFFICIALS STAYING IN NEARBY HOTELS. THE U.S. CONSULATE, LOCATED THREE BLOCKS FROM THE BLAST ALSO SUFFERED SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE. IN REPORTING THIS ATTACK, THE U.S. EMBASSY NOTED THAT THE TIMING AND LOCATION OF THE MIRAFLORES BOMB INDICATED THAT (BEGIN BOLDFACE) SENDERO WAS SEEKING TO CAUSE MASS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM ITS PREVIOUS BOMBINGS (END BOLDFACE). MOREOVER. THE DAMAGE AND LOSS OF LIFE INCURRED IN THIS ATTACK COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE SEVERE. POLICE BOMB SQUAD OFFICIALS CONFIRMED THAT ANOTHER 300-KILO CAR BOMB WAS DISCOVERED AND DEACTIVATED THAT SAME NIGHT ONE BLOCK AWAY FROM WHERE THE FIRST BOMB DETONATED. ACCORDING TO AMEMBASSY LIMA, HAD THE SECOND BOMB EXPLODED, IT WOULD HAVE BRACKETED THE BLOCK AND MULTIPLIED THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE.

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J NO U.S. INTERESTS WERE SPECIFICALLY TARGETED DURING THIS CAMPAIGN AS SENDERO'S ONLY DIRECT ATTACKS ON FOREIGN INSTALLATIONS WERE BOMBINGS OF THE BOLIVIAN EMBASSY AND AN ALITALIA HANGAR AT LIMA.S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS

(S/NF) ATTACKS CONDUCTED BY THE SL DURING JULY 16-23 MARKED A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN TACTICS FROM THEIR PREVIOUS TARGETING HABITS. RATHER THAN EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSING ON GOP INTERESTS AND THE SECURITY SERVICES. SENDERO SUCCEEDED IN PANICKING LIA'S MIDDLE CLASS BY CONDUCTING EXTREMELY LETHAL ATTACKS AGAINST DEFENSELESS CIVILIAN TARGETS IN MAJOR COMMERCIAL AND RESIDENTIAL AREAS. AFFECTED TARGETS INCLUDED HOTELS, APARTMENT BUILDINGS. SHOPS, BANKS. TAXIS, BUSES, AND SCHOOLS ATTENDED BY DEPENDENTS OF PERU.S MILITARY FORCES. PERUVIAN SECURITY FORCES WERE. FOR THE MOST PART, UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY CURTAIL THE RAMPANT VIOLENCE THAT OCCURRED. DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC ANTI-U.S. ACTIVITY, (BEGIN BOLDFACE) THE THREAT TO AMERICANS IN LIMA DURING THIS RECENT UPSURGE OF SL ACTIVITY WAS AT ITS HIGHEST LEVEL IN RECENT YEARS. (END BOLDFACE) U.S. EMBASSY EMPLOYEES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS. WHO LIVE, EAT AND SHOP IN SOME OF THESE UPSCALE AREAS. NOW FOUND THEMSELVES TO BE AT (BEGIN BOLDFACE) SUBSTANTIALLY (END BOLDFACE) HIGHER RISK OF BECOMING INADVERTENT CASUALTIES THAN IN ANY OTHER TIME IN RECENT MEMORY.

(S/NF) WHILE WE ARE CURRENTLY AWARE OF NO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES THAT SENDERO LUMINOSO IS PLANNING TO STAND DOWN FROM ITS RECENT OFFENSIVE, SL TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS IN LIMA HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN CYCLICAL. SENDERO OFFENSIVES GENERALLY FLARE UP AND SUBSIDE ON A ONE TO FOUR MONTH BASIS, AND SENDERO MAY CURRENTLY BE ENTERING A PLANNING (VICE OPERATIONAL) PHASE. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE NOTED ABOVE, (BEGIN BOLDFACE) NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL/ORCON FOR THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED INCREASE IN THE FREQUENCY, INTENSITY, AND LETHALITY OF SENDERO ATTACKS DURING EACH OF THE THREE SL TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS IN LIMA THIS YEAR. (END BOLDFACE) GIVEN SENDERO.S RECENT SUCCESS, COUPLED WITH WE FEEL THAT THE SL

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WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT LARGE SCALE  
INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO CREATE  
WIDESPREAD TERROR THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL. CONSEQUENTLY,  
THIS STRATEGY WILL LIKELY (BEGIN BOLDFACE) ELEVATE (END  
BOLDFACE) THE ALREADY DANGEROUS THREAT OFFICIAL U.S.  
PERSONNEL CURRENTLY FACE IN PERU.

END TEXT OF THREAT ASSESSMENT EAGLEBURGER

ADMIN  
END OF MESSAGE

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