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CDRUSASAALA FT CLAYTON PM//SOSA//
COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
USSOUTHAF ALBROOK AFB PM//LA//
USCINCSO HOWARD AFB PM//SCJ3-DDN//
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EXTEND CLASSIFICATION

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 12 LIMA PE 08655

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE/CASE ID: 15 APR 2002 199301772
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X1, 25X5, 25X6

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: FY 1992 SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS (PART I): FMF AND ESF AIASA

REF: A) STATE 119317 (DTG 132026Z APR 90)

OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CABLE IS SECRET
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SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE FY-92 AIASA FOR PERU IN
ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS UPDATED BY REFTEL. THIS
ASSESSMENT IS A FULLY COORDINATED, U.S. MISSION PERU
DOCUMENT.

I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A. POLITICAL: THE ARMED FORCES ARE A KEY POLITICAL
INSTITUTION IN PERU. DEMOCRATIC, CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTAL
CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IS WEAK AND NEEDS TO BE
STRENGTHENED. THE ARMED FORCES SEE THEMSELVES AS THE
DEFENDER AND, IN DEFENSE MATTERS AT LEAST, AS THE
INTERPRETER OF NATIONAL INTERESTS. SINCE THE RETURN TO
DEMOCRACY IN 1980, THEY HAVE SUPPORTED DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT, BUT REMAIN SENSITIVE TO POLICIES AFFECTING
MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND RETAIN A CLEAR POTENTIAL TO

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DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

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Exemptions		B1		Date 11/20/02
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CHANGE OR MODIFY PERU'S POWER STRUCTURE AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT. THE COOPERATION OF THE ARMED FORCES IS IMPORTANT TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF IMPORTANT U.S. OBJECTIVES IN PERU IN SUCH FIELDS AS ~~TERRORISM/INSURGENCY~~ NARCOTICS, REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND HEMISPHERIC POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION. U.S. INTERESTS REQUIRES A SUSTAINED COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIP.

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SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: SUPPORTING A PLURALISTIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF CONFRONTING THE MULTIPLE THREATS OF TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION IS THE HIGHEST USG GOAL IN PERU. IN THIS CONTEXT, OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WILL BE GEARED TO STRENGTHENING PERUVIAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENCOURAGING PERU TO ACT WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. PERUVIAN DEMOCRACY IS THREATENED BY AN INCREASINGLY VIOLENT AND COSTLY INSURGENCY, NARCOTRAFFICKING AND ITS ATTENDANT VIOLENCE AND

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CORRUPTION, AND WEAK POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. THE MILITARY, ~~A ONCE STRONG BUT NOW DEBILITATED INSTITUTION,~~ IS DISTRUSTFUL OF THE GARCIA ADMINISTRATION, BUT HAS REMAINED LOYAL TO THE DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. RUMORS OF MILITARY COUPS, HOWEVER, APPEAR CYCLICALLY. PERU HELD MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER 1989, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN APRIL 1990 AND WILL HOLD A PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF ON JUNE 10, 1990. THE MILITARY HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE ELECTION PROCESS BY INSURING A SECURE CLIMATE AND HOLDING A PARALLEL LIST OF THE VOTE COUNT TO PREVENT FRAUD. MANY CIVILIAN POLITICAL LEADERS REMAIN SUSPICIOUS OF THE MILITARY'S INTERVENTIONS AND COUP RUMORS ARE ONCE AGAIN COMMON IN LIMA.

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INSURGENCY: THE MAOIST SENDERO LUMINOSO INSURGENCY IS NOW ENTRENCHED THROUGHOUT THE CENTRAL SIERRA, FROM AYACUCHO TO HUANUCO, ALL OF WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED AN EMERGENCY ZONE. SENDERO IS ADDITIONALLY PRESENT IN THE HIGH JUNGLE VALLEYS EAST OF THE ANDES (WHERE COCA IS GROWN), THROUGHOUT MOUNTAIN TOWNS ON THE WESTERN SLOPES OF THE ANDES, AND IN COASTAL CITIES. IT ALSO HAS A STRONG PRESENCE IN MOST UNIVERSITIES. AN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT WITH NO SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN SUPPORT, SENDERO IS NOW ACQUIRING FINANCIAL RESOURCES FROM THE COCAINE TRADE. THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IS ALSO A SERIOUS THREAT IN LIMA, JUNIN, SAN MARTIN, AND UCAYALI DEPARTMENTS. ~~PERU LACKS EITHER THE RESOURCES OR THE~~

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~~STRATEGIC VISION TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN. CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY IS VERY WEAK.~~

B. MILITARY: OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS DIRECTLY

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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 SUBJECT: . FY 1992 SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING

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RELATED TO THE ANTI-NARCOTICS STRUGGLE. SPECIFICALLY,
 OUR AID IS DESIGNED TO GIVE THE PERUVIAN MILITARY BOTH
 THE MEANS, AND THE INCENTIVE, TO SUPPRESS TERRORIST
 PROTECTION FOR NARCOTRAFFICKERS.

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C. ECONOMIC: TO MAKE HEADWAY AGAINST TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, TO ALLEVIATE SOCIAL TENSIONS, AND TO PRESERVE ITS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, PERU MUST OVERCOME A DESPERATE AND THREATENING ECONOMIC SITUATION. THE ECONOMY IS DEEP IN RECESSION. THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT HAS PLUMMETED 22.4 PERCENT PER CAPITA IN TWO YEARS. INFLATION HAS ACCELERATED TO 5,000 PERCENT ANNUALLY. THE ECONOMY IS SUFFERING THROUGH UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT EXCEEDING 80 PERCENT OF THE LIMA WORK FORCE, SEVERE DETERIORATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION NETWORK AND OF PUBLIC SERVICES, DAILY ELECTRICITY BROWN-OUTS, AND A DRASTIC SHRINKING OF CREDIT FROM THE BANKING SYSTEM. PERU IS NEARLY WITHOUT FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES AND IS LARGELY CUT OFF FROM EXTERNAL FINANCING BY FAILURE TO SERVICE ITS DEBTS.

AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE GOP IS STRAPPED FOR FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES IN THE STRUGGLES AGAINST ILLICIT DRUGS AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE ECONOMY IS FAILING TO GENERATE NEW JOBS IN LEGITIMATE OCCUPATIONS. EFFORTS TO ATTRACT COCA FARMERS INTO ALTERNATIVE CROPS WILL FACE ENORMOUS OBSTACLES, INCLUDING A LACK OF SECURITY, DEPRESSED PRICES AND REASONABLY PRICED TRANSPORTATION TO MARKET.

PERU'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS REQUIRE, ABOVE ALL, THAT THE GOP ADOPT AN EFFECTIVE GROWTH-ORIENTED ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, PERU WILL NEED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING
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FOOD AID AND CREDIT TO FINANCE PRODUCTION AND TRADE. THE MOST IMPORTANT SOURCES OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE ARE POTENTIALLY THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND THE IDB WHICH CANNOT PROVIDE IT WITHOUT A RESOLUTION OF DEBT SERVICE ARREARS. IN ANY SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, U.S. SUPPORT WILL BE ESSENTIAL.

II. THREAT PERCEPTION

A. EXTERNAL THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY HOST COUNTRY:
PERU'S PAST MILITARY PURCHASES WERE BASED IN LARGE PART ON A PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREAT FROM A MILITARILY STRONG CHILE TO THE SOUTH AND MILITARILY WEAK BUT REVANCHIST AND ERRATIC ECUADOR TO THE NORTH. IN THE PAST THE PERUVIAN MILITARY HAS OBSESSED WITH A WORST-CASE SCENARIO IN WHICH IT WOULD FIGHT A TWO-FRONT WAR. HOWEVER, BEGINNING IN LATE 1988 THE FOCUS BEGAN TO SHIFT TO THE THREAT OF AN AGGRESSIVE INSURGENCY IN THE INTERIOR. COMBATING THIS INSURGENCY IS NOW THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FACING THE PERUVIAN MILITARY.

B. EXTERNAL THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY COUNTRY TEAM:
PERU'S OBSESSION WITH A TWO FRONT EXTERNAL THREAT IS A PRODUCT OF ITS DISASTROUS LOSS TO CHILE IN THE 1879-83 WAR OF THE PACIFIC. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT CHILE POSES AN ACTIVE THREAT TO PERU NOR DOES IT HAVE ANYTHING TO GAIN FROM A CONFLICT. WHILE IRREDENTIST RHETORIC IS STILL ACTIVE IN ECUADOR, WE DO NOT SHARE PERUVIAN

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CONCERNS THAT ECUADOR WILL ATTACK TO RECLAIM LOST
TERRITORY

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C. INTERNAL THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY HOST COUNTRY:
THE ARMED FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY CONFRONT TWO DANGEROUS
INSURGENCY GROUPS. THE MOST SERIOUS IS THE MAOIST

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JFKSWC FT BRAGG NC
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S E C R E T

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: FY 1992 SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING

SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) WHICH IS CONDUCTING A VIOLENT
GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN IN THE RURAL AREAS OF THE INTERIOR
AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, IN SOME CITIES. THEIR METHOD

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FOCUSES ON INTIMIDATION THROUGH BRUTAL KILLINGS OF
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VILLAGERS, ASSASSINATIONS OF KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND BOMBINGS. SL SEEKS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY A COMMUNIST "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY". SL HAS REJECTED DIALOGUE AND ANY ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. A SMALLER, MORE TRADITIONAL LATIN AMERICAN CASTROITE TERRORIST GROUP IS THE COALITION OF THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MRTA-MIR). MRTA IS ACTIVE PRIMARILY IN LIMA AND OTHER CITIES, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE COLUMNS IN JUNIN, UCAYALI AND SAN MARTIN DEPARTMENTS.

ALL OR PART OF ELEVEN DEPARTMENTS OUT OF A TOTAL OF TWENTY-FOUR ARE UNDER A DECLARED STATE OF EMERGENCY. THIS REPRESENTS APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL PERUVIAN LAND MASS.

MILITARY OFFICERS RECOGNIZE THAT GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY IS GROWING AND POSES A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO PERU'S STABILITY.

DESPITE SOME RECENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES, THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT IS STILL GEARED TOWARD A CONVENTIONAL EXTERNAL THREAT. IN ALL FAIRNESS, IT SHOULD BE MENTIONED THAT THE INVENTORY HAS PURCHASED LONG AGO AND IS NOT SUITABLE FOR CONFRONTING INSURGENTS IN AREAS WHERE THEY ARE NOW ACTIVE.

D. INTERNAL THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY COUNTRY TEAM:

DESPITE THE MILITARIZATION OF MUCH OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, BOTH SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) AND MRTA HAVE MADE IMPORTANT TERRITORIAL GAINS. SL HAS DEMONSTRATED METHODICAL ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATION ON BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY FRONTS. IT HAS ALSO ESTABLISHED AN IMPORTANT
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PRESENCE IN THE COCA-PRODUCING ZONES AND IS BELIEVED TO BE AMASSING CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES FROM ITS INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG PRODUCTION AND WITH TRAFFICKERS. MRTA HAS SUFFERED SOME MILITARY SETBACKS, BUT THROUGH KIDNAPPINGS AND THE COLLECTION OF "WAR TAXES" IT TOO HAS ACQUIRED THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO BE A SERIOUS ANTAGONIST.

ALTHOUGH THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS HAVE ENTERED THE FRAY, THE MAJOR BURDEN OF COUNTER INSURGENCY ACTION HAS FALLEN ON THE ARMY. THIS HAS STRETCHED ARMY MANPOWER AND LOGISTICS TO THEIR LIMITS.

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THE CONTINUED LACK OF A NATIONAL MILITARY OR COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY, EVER PRESENT INTERSERVICE RIVALRY, AND ALWAYS INSUFFICIENT BUDGET AND AN UNWILLINGNESS TO UTILIZE RESOURCES AT HAND HANDICAP

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PERU'S ABILITY TO WAGE A SUCCESSFUL LOW-INTENSITY FIGHT AGAINST THE SL AND MRTA. HOWEVER, SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS RECOGNIZE THE DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE OF THE INSURGENCY THREATS AND A MINORITY HAS ADVOCATED SIGNIFICANT MILITARY CHANGE. HOWEVER, TOO MANY REMAIN WHO ARE BOUND TO TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL ROLES AND CONSIDER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS AS BEYOND MILITARY CONTROL.

SINCE THE LAST AIASA WE HAVE SEEN GROWTH IN SL ACTIVITY IN FIVE DEPARTMENTS: ANCASH, LA LIBERTAD, JUNIN, NORTHERN UCAYALI, AND ICA. MOST OF THE INCREASED KILLING IN THESE DEPARTMENTS HAS BEEN IN ZONES OF GOVERNMENT WEAKNESS, DIRECTED AGAINST LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS, SMALL POLICE OR MILITARY POSTS, AND LOCAL SELF-DEFENSE FORCES. IN THE LAST YEAR THE SL HAS BEGUN AN EFFORT TO FORCE UHV TRAFFICKERS TO PAY ABOVE-MARKET PRICES FOR COCA PASTE AND BASE, AND HAVE KILLED A FEW DOZEN LOW-LEVEL TRAFFICKERS

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FOR UNDERCUTTING SL PRICES. SL PROPAGANDA HAS EMPHASIZED ANTI-U.S. THEMES MORE THAN EVER, PORTRAYING ALL U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS AS IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION. SL HAS NOT ATTEMPTED SERIOUS ATTACKS ON U.S. PERSONNEL OVER
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THE LAST YEAR, PERHAPS DUE TO THEIR PREFERENCE FOR PREDICTABLE, UNDEFENDED TARGETS.

MRTA HAS LOST GROUND IN UCAYALI TO SL, IS LESS ACTIVE THAN SL IN JUNIN, AND IS HOLDING STEADY IN NORTHERN SAN MARTIN, ITS OTHER AREA OF TRADITIONAL STRENGTH. MRTA'S MOST NOTEWORTHY ACTS OVER THE LAST YEAR HAVE BEEN IN LIMA: THE KIDNAPPING OF TELEVISION NETWORK OWNER, HECTOR DELGADO PARKER AND THE SHOOTING OF FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER, ENRIQUE LOPEZ ALBUJAR, SHOWS AN IMPRESSIVE MRTA ABILITY TO PLAN AND USE DEADLY FORCE.

III. ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

A. GENERAL:

IN OCTOBER 1987, OVER THE STRONG OBJECTIONS OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE, THE PERUVIAN CONGRESS APPROVED THE CREATION OF A DEFENSE MINISTRY, WHICH REPLACED THE FORMER WAR, NAVAL AND AIR MINISTRIES. THE DEFENSE MINISTER (MOD) HAS SOME POWER OVER SERVICE STRENGTHS, BUDGETING, PROMOTIONS, POLICY, ETC., BUT HE IS NOT OPERATIONAL. THAT IS, THE JOINT STAFF HAS OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY AND THE MOD DOES NOT. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE FIRST TWO MODS WERE RETIRED ARMY GENERALS, ALL OF THE SERVICES ARE WARY OF THE POWER WHICH A POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CIVILIAN MINISTER COULD WIELD.

THE WAR FIGHTING (OPERATIONAL) FUNCTIONS ARE RETAINED BY THE COMANDO CONJUNTO - THE RELATIVELY SMALL PERUVIAN JOINT COMMAND. PRINCIPAL VOTING MEMBERS OF THE COMANDO CONJUNTO ARE THE COMMANDERS OF THE THREE SERVICES. THE PRESIDENCY OF THE JOINT COMMAND ROTATES AMONG THE

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SERVICES. THE PRESENT COMMANDER IS A THREE-STAR NAVY ADMIRAL.

ALL SERVICES WANT TO MAINTAIN THE SUPERIORITY THEY CURRENTLY ENJOY OVER THEIR NEIGHBORS IN CONVENTIONAL

ARMAMENT. THE AIR FORCE AND THE ARMY, WHOSE HARDWARE IS MORE THAN 50 PERCENT SOVIET-SUPPLIED, HAVE INDICATED A DESIRE TO BREAK THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS FOR PARTS, TOOLS, SPECIAL LUBRICANTS AND TEST EQUIPMENT IN THE SHORT TERM AND TO AVOID FURTHER ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIETS IN THE LONG TERM. THIS GOAL HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE SINCE THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN THE MAIN SUPPLIER WILLING TO EXTEND CREDIT.

FINALLY, ALL OF THE SERVICES WANT BETTER EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO ALLOW THEM TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH INSURGENTS AND TERRORISTS. THE NEED FOR RIVER PATROL BOATS, LIGHT AIRCRAFT, TROOP TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS, GROUND TRANSPORT VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, ENGINEER CIVIC ACTION EQUIPMENT, IS OBVIOUS.

B. ARMY:

THE MISSION OF THE ARMY IS TO GUARANTEE THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC, COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS, AND IF CALLED UPON BY THE PRESIDENT, MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER DURING A STATE OF EMERGENCY.

CAPABILITIES: THE ARMY, AS CURRENTLY STRUCTURED AND EQUIPPED, IS BARELY CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THE DUAL MISSION OF CONDUCTING CONVENTIONAL AND INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND INFLATION HAVE ACCELERATED THE DECLINE OF ITS OPERATING CAPABILITY. THE MAJOR LIMITING FACTOR IS AN OVERALL LIMITED LOGISTICS

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INFRASTRUCTURE. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT FULL SCALE
 COMBAT OPERATIONS COULD BE SUSTAINED FOR ONLY 10 DAYS
 (OR LESS) WITHOUT MAJOR RESUPPLY FROM FOREIGN SOURCES.

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PERSONNEL STRENGTH: ESTIMATED 84,500 (7,488 OFFICERS; 12,350 NCOS; 64,680 ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND CONSCRIPTS), THE ARMY ALSO HAS 1,000 CADETS AND 9,289 CIVILIANS. TO SAVE OPERATING FUNDS, SOME ARMY UNITS ARE DELIBERATELY KEPT UNDER STRENGTH, MAKING OVERALL STRENGTH ESTIMATES UNRELIABLE.

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WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT: THE ARMY IS EQUIPPED WITH A VARIETY OF HARDWARE OF DIFFERENT ORIGINS DATING BACK TO MID-1967. INCLUDED ARE U.S. 105MM HOWITZERS, FRENCH AMX-13 LIGHT TANKS W/105MM GUNS, WEST GERMAN ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, COBRA ANTI-TANK MISSILES AND BELGIAN SMALL ARMS. IN 1973, THE PERUVIAN ARMY BECAME A CLIENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ACQUIRED T-55 TANKS, COMBAT CARS, FIELD ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY, ANTI-TANK MISSILES, AND TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS.

TRAINING: ALL ENLISTED PERSONNEL ENTER THE ARMY AS CONSCRIPTS WITH A ONE YEAR TERM OF SERVICE FOR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AND TWO YEARS FOR NON-GRADUATES. ALL BASIC MILITARY TRAINING, 10 WEEKS, IS CONDUCTED IN THE UNIT TO WHICH THE SOLDIER IS ASSIGNED WITH GREAT VARIANCE IN TRAINING STANDARDS AND QUALITY. A FEW SELECTED ENLISTED PERSONNEL RECEIVE FURTHER TRAINING IN BRANCH, SERVICE OR CIVILIAN TECHNICAL SCHOOLS.

THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM PROVIDES VARIOUS LEVELS OF TRAINING FOR OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AS THEY PROGRESS THROUGH THEIR CAREERS. THE MAJORITY OF INSTRUCTION IS CLASSROOM-ORIENTED AND COMPETITIVE. OFFICER EDUCATION FOR MOST CULMINATES IN A TWO YEAR COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE. THE COURSE, ENTIRELY IN A CLASSROOM SETTING, EMPHASIZES CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

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AGAINST AN EXTERNAL THREAT AND PERTINENT STAFF SKILLS. REPORTEDLY, CLASS RANKING IN THIS COURSE HAS GREAT EFFECT ON THE REMAINDER OF AN OFFICER'S CAREER.

SINCE 1973, APPROXIMATELY 460 OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION IN VARIOUS COURSES. THE NUMBER OF TRAINERS HAS DECLINED STEADILY IN RECENT YEARS TO LESS THAN 10 ANNUALLY.

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THE IMPACT OF A SERIOUSLY DETERIORATING ECONOMY HAS BEEN SO SIGNIFICANT ON THE ARMY THAT INSTITUTIONAL SURVIVAL HAS BECOME ITS PRINCIPAL GOAL. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ARMY NO LONGER FEELS SUPERIOR TO ITS NEIGHBORS. THUS THE BOTTOM LINE IS TO SETTLE FOR MAINTAINING THE APPEARANCE OF A VIABLE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY.

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NONETHELESS, A SECOND AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT GOAL HAS TAKEN SHAPE - A MAJOR ANTI-SUBVERSION CAMPAIGN IN THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. THE COMMITMENT OF SENIOR OFFICERS TO THIS CAMPAIGN IS REAL. HOWEVER, TACTICAL ABILITY AND RESOURCES ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY. HELO TRANSPORT CAPABILITY HAS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS WILL SATISFY PART OF THIS NEED. THE EFFECTS WILL NOT BE SEEN FOR SOME TIME DUE TO TRAINING COSTS AND CONTINUED LOGISTICS/MAINTENANCE WEAKNESSES. LOGISTICALLY, THE ARMY WOULD LIKE TO SIMPLIFY ITS CURRENT SPARE PARTS NIGHTMARE CAUSED BY DEPENDENCE ON TOO MANY SUPPLIERS. ALTHOUGH MANY ARMY LEADERS WISH TO DECREASE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS, THEY ARE RESIGNED TO A CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO. THE U.S. TRACK RECORD AS A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PARTNER IN PERU HAS BEEN SPOTTY. HOWEVER, IF FMF FUNDS BECOME A REALITY OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PERUVIAN ARMY SHOULD MARKEDLY SOLIDIFY.

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C. NAVY.

MISSION: THE MISSION OF THE NAVY IS TO DEFEND THE
COASTLINE, ENFORCE PERU'S CLAIM TO A 200-NAUTICAL MILE
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TERRITORIAL LIMIT, PROTECT COASTAL SHIPPING, AND PATROL
THE INLAND WATERS. THE NAVY ALSO ENGAGES IN COMMERCIAL
SHIPPING AND CIVIC ACTION MISSIONS IN THE AMAZON BASIN AS
WELL AS AT COASTAL PORTS .

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THE NAVY ALSO INCLUDES A MARINE CORPS AND A VERY SMALL
CADRE OF COAST GUARD OFFICERS. THREE NAVY HOSPITAL SHIPS
ARE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THE NAVY'S CIVIC ACTION
PROGRAM BY PROVIDING MEDICAL ATTENTION TO VILLAGERS,
TRANSPORTATION OF MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

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UNFORTUNATELY, LACK OF FUNDS PRECLUDES ACCOMPLISHMENT OF
THIS MISSION ON A REGULAR BASIS. MARINES ARE REGULARLY
DEPLOYED TO EMERGENCY ZONES IN THE INTERIOR AND CARRYOUT
AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS REGARD.

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PERSONNEL STRENGTH: 27,500 (2,610 OFFICERS; 14,200 PETTY OFFICERS; 10,700 ENLISTED MEN AND CONSCRIPTS). TOTAL INCLUDES 120 PILOTS, 65 COAST GUARD OFFICERS AND 4,000 MARINES (AN ESTIMATED 100 NAVAL OFFICERS ARE TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED AS MARINES). THE TOTAL DOES NOT INCLUDE 600 CADETS AND OVER 6,000 CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES (MOST OF WHOM WORK IN NAVY SHIPYARDS).

ORGANIZATION: THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE NAVY IS THE SENIOR OFFICER OF THE SERVICE AND IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF HIS SERVICE. HE EXERCISES COMMAND OVER THE OPERATIONAL FORCES THROUGH THE COMMANDER OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, OVER ALL NAVY LAND-BASED FACILITIES, AND THE PERSONNEL OF FIVE NAVAL ZONES. THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF IS ORGANIZED INTO THREE DEPARTMENTS WITH SUBORDINATE DIVISIONS AND HEADED BY THE CHIEF OF THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NAVY, THE DIRECTORATES GENERAL OF PERSONNEL, MATERIEL, INSTRUCTION, ECONOMY, MARITIME INTERESTS, AND PORT CAPTAINCIES AND COAST GUARD, AS WELL AS THE DIRECTORATES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE, ALL REPORT TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL. NAVAL SCHOOLS AND TRAINING CENTERS ARE SUBORDINATE TO THE DIRECTOR OF INSTRUCTION, A NAVY REAR ADMIRAL.

EQUIPMENT: SURFACE SHIPS ARE OF U.S., FRENCH, UK, ITALIAN AND DUTCH ORIGINS. TWO CRUISERS IN INVENTORY

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HAVE AN AVERAGE AGE OF 37 YEARS AND WERE BOTH PURCHASED FROM THE NETHERLANDS, AS WERE 8 OF 10 DESTROYERS. TWO DESTROYERS ARE MODIFIED UK DARING CLASS SHIPS AND IN 1973 HAD THEIR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED BY
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THE ADDITION OF EXOCET SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS. THE NAVY RECENTLY UPGRADED ITS FLEET WITH LUPO CLASS GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATES (FF) EQUIPPED WITH OTOMAT SSM AND ASPIDE SAW LAUNCHERS. IN 1982, SIX 560-TON, EXOCET-EQUIPPED, MISSILE PATROL BOATS AND 20 EXOCET MISSILES WERE RECEIVED FROM FRANCE. THE SUBMARINE FORCE TRADITIONALLY HAS BEEN THE BEST EQUIPPED PART OF THE FLEET. THERE ARE ELEVEN SUBMARINES IN THE NAVY INVENTORY. FIVE WERE OBTAINED FROM THE U.S. SIX ARE GERMAN TYPE 209'S. IN 1984 THE PERUVIAN NAVY LEASED FOUR AMPHIBIOUS LANDING SHIPS (LST'S) FROM THE U.S. NAVY. THESE LSTS WERE PROVIDED UNDER A 5-YEAR, NO-COST, RENEWABLE LEASE.

LOGISTICS:
 ITS FORCE

FRESH
 FOOD IS USED DUE TO THE HIGH COST OF FROZEN, CANNED AND DRIED FOOD. FUEL, GASOLINE, AND COMMON LUBRICANTS ARE LOCALLY AVAILABLE.

REPAIR FACILITIES: THREE FACILITIES (CALLAO, IQUITOS AND CHIMBOTE) OF THE PERUVIAN NAVY SHIPYARD-SIMA (SERVICIOS INDUSTRIALES DE LA MARINA) WORK UNDER CONTRACT FOR THE NAVY AND FOR OTHER GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE AGENCIES. SIMA HAS THE CAPABILITY TO CONSTRUCT SMALL PATROL SHIPS AND LARGE AUXILIARIES -- 25,000 TON FREIGHTERS, 90,000 TON TANKERS, AND OCEANIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SHIPS. SIMA DOES REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE WORK ON THE NAVY'S SUBMARINES AND SURFACE SHIPS. IN 1981, SIMA INITIATED A NEW ARMS PRODUCTION LINE INCLUDING THE DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE OF 10,000 SUBMACHINE GUNS FOR THE POLICE.

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NAVAL AVIATION: THE PERUVIAN NAVY HOPES TO OBTAIN A HELICOPTER THAT IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT WHILE OPERATING AT HIGH ALTITUDES. THEY ARE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING WITH THE ITALIANS FOR AUGUSTA-BELL HELICOPTERS. THEY ARE ALSO SEEKING TO UPGRADE THEIR SEVEN S-2 ACFT. CURRENTLY THERE IS VERY LITTLE FLYING BEING DONE BY PERUVIAN NAVAL AVIATION UNITS.

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MARINES: THE PERUVIAN NAVY PLANS TO REFOCUS THE MARINE MISSION TO THE INTERNAL THREAT AND DOWNPLAY THE AMPHIBIOUS ROLE.

D. AIR FORCE:

MISSION: THE MISSION OF THE AIR FORCE IS TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITIES ARE TO ASSIST THE GROUND FORCES IN THE PRESERVATION OF INTERNAL ORDER, ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY AND MORE RECENTLY TO ASSIST THE PHOTOGRAPHIC SERVICE, THE GOVERNMENT SCHOOL OF CIVIL AVIATION, AND THE GOVERNMENT AERONAUTICAL INDUSTRY.

CAPABILITY: THE PERUVIAN AIR FORCE HAS LIMITED BUT NOT INADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND ITS AIRSPACE. ITS SUPPORT ROLE FOR PERUVIAN GROUND FORCES COULD BE EXPANDED. POTENTIAL TO OPERATE AGAINST THE CHILEAN MIRAGE 50 AND THE ECUADOREAN MIRAGE F-1 HAS BEEN ENHANCED BY THE ADDITION OF 12 MIRAGE 2000'S BUT IS LIMITED BY INSUFFICIENT RADAR COVERAGE IN THE COASTAL AREA OF PERU, AND BY THE LOCATION OF THE PERUVIAN SQUADRONS. IN DAYLIGHT VISUAL CONDITIONS, THE AIR FORCE COULD REACH TARGETS IN COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, BOLIVIA AND CHILE. THE 47

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SU-22/FITTER FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT MAKE UP A FORMIDABLE
FIGHTING FORCE. THE AIR FORCE CAN PROVIDE SUPPORT TO
GROUND FORCES. BUT AIR TO GROUND COMMUNICATION IS POORLY
DEVELOPED. AIR FORCE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT INTERNAL
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SECURITY OPERATIONS HAS ENHANCED IN 1983 AND EARLY 1984
AFTER DELIVERY OF 14 MI-25/HIND ASSAULT HELICOPTERS AND
FIVE BELL 214 TROOP TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS. THE AIR FORCE
COULD ALSO PROVIDE SOME DAYLIGHT, FAIR-WEATHER SUPPORT TO
NAVAL OPERATIONS.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH: BETWEEN 12,000 AND 16,000 (1,500
OFFICERS, 2,500 NCOs, 2,000 ENLISTED AND 4,000
CONSCRIPTS). APPROXIMATELY 500 PILOTS ARE INCLUDED IN
THE OFFICER STRENGTH. TOTAL INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY 530
CADETS AND 6,000 CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.

ORGANIZATION: PERU IS DIVIDED INTO FIVE NUMBERED AIR
REGIONS. OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED PRIMARILY FROM NINE
AIR BASES: CIVILIAN/MILITARY AIRFIELDS AT JORGE CHAVEZ
INTERNATIONAL (CALLAO), CAPT J.A. QUINONES (CHICLAYO),
PISCO, CAPT MONTES (TALARA), AND CAPT CONCHA (PIURA);
PLUS FOUR MILITARY AIR BASES: EL PATO (TALARA), MARIANO
MELGAR (LA JOYA), AREQUIPA, AND IQUITOS. TRAINING IS
CONDUCTED PRIMARILY FROM LAS PALMAS AIR BASE NEAR LIMA.
THE FOUR WING HEADQUARTERS ARE LOCATED AT AREQUIPA (WING
3), CALLAO AIR BASE (WING 2), PIURA (WING 1) AND IQUITOS

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AIR BASE (WING 5). AIR WING 4 IS SLATED TO BE ACTIVATED AT PUERTO MALDONADO AIR BASE.

TRAINING: PERUVIAN AIR FORCE TRAINING, ALTHOUGH CONSIDERED SUPERIOR TO THAT OF MOST OTHER LATIN AMERICAN AIR FORCES, SUFFERS FROM SHORTAGES OF OPERATIONAL TRAINER AIRCRAFT, AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS AND INSUFFICIENT FUEL FOR TRAINING (ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS). THE AIR FORCE HAS SUFFERED A FAIRLY HIGH ACCIDENT RATE. ERRORS POINT TO POOR AIRCREW TRAINING, POOR MISSION PLANNING, AND POOR CREW DISCIPLINE. IT IS RUMORED THAT THE AIR FORCE IS DUE TO TAKE DELIVERY SOON OF AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY OF TUCANOS

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FROM BRAZIL.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FOR OFFICERS CONSISTS OF BASIC, COMMAND AND STAFF, AND HIGHER STUDIES. APPROXIMATELY 15 PERCENT OF THE OFFICERS COMPLETE THEIR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN ONE OF SEVERAL WESTERN NATIONS PARTICULARLY IN BASIC MILITARY, TECHNICAL, ON-THE-JOB, AND SYSTEMS TRAINING. FURTHER SYSTEMS TRAINING IS PROVIDED TO TECHNICIANS WHEN A NEW SYSTEM IS ACQUIRED GENERALLY SUCH TRAINING TAKES PLACE IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF THE EQUIPMENT. ONE NOTABLE EXCEPTION IS THE SYSTEMS TRAINING FOR SOVIET EQUIPMENT, OF WHICH A LARGE PERCENTAGE HAS BEEN PROVIDED IN PERU. SINCE 1973, AS MANY AS 2,000 PERUVIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE RECEIVED TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION. COURSES INCLUDE HELICOPTER PILOT, FIGHTER-BOMBER PILOT, TRANSPORT PILOT, EARLY WARNING RADAR, AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY, SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, AIR CONTROLLER, COMMANDO OPERATIONS, PARATROOP OPERATIONS, ARMORED CAR (BRDM-2) AND INTELLIGENCE. RECENTLY SUCH TRAINING HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. INTEL TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION IS CONTINUING.

THE PERUVIAN AIR FORCE IS IN DESPERATE NEED OF REPLACEMENT A/C FOR THEIR AGING CANBERRA BOMBERS, SU-22 FIGHTERS, AND T-37 TRAINERS.

IV. ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE SPENDING

A. ACTUAL DEFENSE SPENDING FOR PREVIOUS TWO YEARS: 1988: USD 646 MILLION; 1989: USD 421 MILLION.

B. MILITARY SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) FOR PREVIOUS TWO YEARS: 1988 2.99 PERCENT.

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1989 2.22 PERCENT.

C. THIRD COUNTRY SECURITY ASSISTANCE: THE SOVIET UNION
 HAS PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT TO THE PERUVIAN ARMY
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AND AIR FORCE AS MENTIONED ABOVE. THE PERUVIAN NAVY HAS
 BEEN DISCUSSING A USD 76 MILLION, 12-YEAR CONTRACT FOR
 HELICOPTERS WITH AUGUSTA BELL OF ITALY. BRAZIL MAY BE
 PROVIDING TUCANO AIRCRAFT FOR USE IN PILOT TRAINING.

V. ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS: THE PROPOSED U.S.
 SECURITY ASSISTANCE HEREIN SHOULD HAVE NO IMPACT ON THE
 REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL SITUATION.

VI. HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSMENT: PERUVIAN MILITARY OFFICERS

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HAVE SOME TRAINING IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE THAT PLACES EMPHASIS ON CIVIC ACTION, CIVILIAN-RUN ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, PUBLIC RELATIONS/PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS AND RESPECT FOR CIVILIAN POPULATIONS. SINCE RESOURCES FOR SUCH PROGRAMS DRIED UP UNDER CONDITIONS OF AUSTERITY, THE MILITARY HAS FOUND ITSELF ESSENTIALLY ALONE IN A STRUGGLE WITH AN ENEMY THAT, IN THE CASE OF SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL), IS FANATICAL AND BRUTALLY VIOLENT. IN THIS SITUATION, MILITARY CONDUCT HAS OFTEN BEEN ABUSIVE OF CIVILIANS SUSPECTED OF SUPPORTING SL. THE 1989 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON PERU DOCUMENTS AND EVALUATES THESE PRACTICES. IT IS NEITHER OFFICIAL MILITARY NOR GOVERNMENT POLICY TO COUNTENANCE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. ABUSES OCCUR FREQUENTLY, HOWEVER, AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES ARE RARE. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE PERUVIAN HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE WILL FACTOR PROMINENTLY IN THE DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

VII. STATUS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

DUE TO PERU'S CONTINUED ARREARAGES IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS AND THE RESULTANT SANCTIONS (E.G. BROOKE

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AMENDMENT) PERU'S SA PROGRAM IS SEVERELY LIMITED. SECDEF (USDP) REPORTED IN LATE MAY 90 THAT PERU IS FAST APPROACHING 12 MILLION DOLS IN ARREARS. HOWEVER, THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL ACT OF 1989 MAY GIVE NEW LIFE TO OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH PERU. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAT MAY BE PURCHASED WITH THE FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF) FUNDS CAN ONLY BE USED IN COUNTER NARCOTICS EFFORTS IT WILL STILL OFFER NEW BASIC EQUIPMENT FOR AND MAJOR ENHANCEMENTS OF PERUVIAN ARMY INFANTRY BATTALIONS, NAVY RIVERINE UNITS AND AIR FORCE SQUADRONS. IN FY89 1.5 MILLION DOLLARS MAP (EARMARKED) HAS MADE AVAILABLE AND HAS USED FOR THE PURCHASE OF INFANTRY EQUIPMENT (ARMS AND AMMUNITION).

VIII. PROJECTED FY92-SECURITY ASSISTANCE

A. GENERAL: THE FIGURES BELOW REPRESENT FMF FUNDS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE CONTINUUM OF THE FY-90 FMF PROGRAM WHICH AT THIS WRITING IS ANTICIPATED TO TOTAL 35.945 MILLION DOLS. THE FMF DUE TO BE RELEASED TO PERU IN FY-90 IS TO BE USED FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS PROGRAMS ONLY. ALL OTHER PROGRAMS (EXCEPT TRAINING WHICH IS COVERED IN PART II OF THIS YEAR'S AIASA) ARE FROZEN DUE TO SANCTIONS. THUS, SOME OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED FOR THE BELOW NUMBERED SECTIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE. WE HAVE CONCENTRATED ON THE FMF PROGRAM.

B. FMF RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. CASHFLOW FOR MAJOR ONGOING PROGRAMS: N/A. PERU IS ON SANCTIONS FOR OTHER THAN COUNTER NARCOTICS RELATED PROGRAMS. ALL CASES THAT REMAIN OPEN ARE FROZEN DUE TO SANCTIONS. IF PERU WOULD BEGIN TO PAY INTO DELINQUENT

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FMS CASES AND THEREBY BE TAKEN OFF SANCTIONS THEN ENTRIES
WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THIS SECTION.

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- 2. SUPPORT OF EXISTING EQUIPMENT/ACTIVITIES. THE

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FOLLOWING FY-92 REQUIREMENTS ARE PROJECTED ASSUMING THAT
 FY-90 FMF BECOMES AVAILABLE IN FY-90.

(A) ARMY (FIGURES IN THOUSANDS):

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WEAPONS SPARES	\$ 450
AMMUNITION	3700
INFANTRY EQT	810
COMMUNICATIONS EQT MAINT	615
TRUCK MAINT	300
NIGHT VISION GOGGLES MAINT	140
WED EQT MAINT	25
BATT TRAINING SITE (BTS) MAINT	2000
BTS MTTs	150
HELO FLIGHT HOURS PROGRAM	4275
AMMUNITION FOR HELOS	273.6
WEAPONS FOR HELOS	400
MTT HELO OPS	25
HELO INSTRUMENT COURSE	450
FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE	250
ADVANCED TRAUMA WED MTT	130
AEROMEDICAL EVAC MTT	130
MED ADMIN MTT	130
ARMY SUBTOTAL	\$ 14278.6

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(B). AIR FORCE

FIXED BASE COMMO	90
AIRFIELD CONTROL COMMO	100
AIRCRAFT CONTROL COMMO	220
FWD AIR CONTR COMMO (HF)	144
FWD AIR CONTR COMMO (VHF)	60
COMMO EQUIP MAINT	50
WEAPONS AND AMMO (VARIOUS)	1200
FLIGHT HOURS PROGRAM (FUEL)	1300
PILOT TRAINING	500

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FLIGHT EQUIP	100
AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION (OV-10)	6000
OV-10 AMMO	540
MTTS (VARIOUS TECHNICAL)	24
FIXED WING FLIGHT HOURS PROGRAM	1500
TACTICAL NAVAIDS	150
FUEL STORAGE/TRANSFER EQUIP	320
BASE DEFENSE COMMO	138
COMMO EQUIP MAINT	13
SPARES FOR BASE EQUIP	125
 AIR FORCE SUBTOTAL	 \$ 12574

(C). NAVY

ACQUIRE EIGHT 40FT BOATS	6000
BOAT SPARES/MAINT	1250
AMMO FOR NAVY RIVER FORCE	250
FLOATING BASE OUTFITTING	1000
FLOATING BASE SUSTAINMENT	500
COMMO SPARES	50
MED SUPPLIES	100
FUEL	1600
MTTS	75

NAVY SUBTOTAL \$ 10825

GRAND TOTAL \$ 37677.6

3. POTENTIAL NEW ACQUISITIONS. THE ONLY NEW MAJOR SYSTEM PROJECTED TO BE ACQUIRED IN FY-92 WITH U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE ARE THE OV-10 AIRCRAFT LISTED UNDER AIR FORCE IN SUBPARA 2(B) ABOVE. THE PATROL BOATS FOR

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INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 INR-05 SS-01 CIAE-00 EB-01
H-01 NSCE-00 ARA-01 NSAE-00 MC-02 HA-09 L-03
INRE-00 ACDA-13 SP-01 T-01 DPR-01 /041 W
-----232471 121306Z /47

R 112006Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA PE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8914
SECDEF WASHDC//USDP-DSAA//
INFO JCS WASHDC
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM//SCJ5-PM//
CSA WASHDC
CNO WASHDC
HQUSAF WASHDC//PRI/XOXXW/CVAI//
CDRUSASAALA FT CLAYTON PM//SOSA//
COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
USSOUTHAF ALBROOK AFB PM//LA//
USCINCSO HOWARD AFB PM//SCJ3-DDN//
OMB WASHDC
TRSYDEPT WASHDC
DISAM WPAFB OH
JFKSWC FT BRAGG NC
DIA WASHDC//DB3-C1//

S E C R E T SECTION 11 OF 12 LIMA PE 08655

S E C R E T

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PE
SUBJECT: FY 1992 SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING

THE RIVERINE FORCE ARE TO BEGIN BEING PURCHASED WITH
FY-90 FMF.

~~81~~

C. NON-FUNDED MILITARY SALES. SEE PARA B.1 AND OTHER
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PARAS ABOVE.

D. ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF): PERU IS CURRENTLY AT A
CRITICAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL JUNCTURE. THE
NEWLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT, SCHEDULED TO TAKE OFFICE ON
JULY 28, 1990, WILL FACE AN ECONOMY IN THE MIDDLE OF A
HYPERINFLATIONARY RECESSION, A MILITANT INSURGENCY ALLIED
WITH NARCOTRAFFICKERS, WIDESPREAD LABOR UNREST, SHARPLY
REDUCED STANDARDS OF LIVING, A BANKRUPT TREASURY, AND
PRACTICALLY EXHAUSTED FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. GOP

EFFORTS AT ADDRESSING SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY NARCOTRAFFICKING AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY, WILL HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST BETWEEN PERU AND THE UNITED STATES. THESE ISSUES SERVED AS THE BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S COUNTERNARCOTICS INITIATIVE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT STRATEGY FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN PERU OVER THE FY 91-94 PERIOD.

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THE U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGY IN PERU CONSISTS OF PROVIDING LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTRAFFICKERS, AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO ASSIST IN THE TRANSITION OF THE PERUVIAN ECONOMY FROM DEPENDENCE ON ILLEGAL NARCODOLLAR EARNINGS TO THE EXPANSION OF LEGAL EXPORT EARNINGS AND OTHER SUSTAINABLE AND LEGAL SOURCES OF INCOME FOR THE POPULACE. THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE CALLS FOR AN INITIAL ALLOCATION OF 363.1 MILLION DOLS IN ESF RESOURCES TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES. THESE RESOURCES WILL BE UTILIZED FOR THE FOLLOWING: (A) BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF THE IMMEDIATE ADOPTION OF A STABILIZATION PROGRAM, (B) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE GOP IN POLICY ANALYSIS, AND THE PREPARATION OF ECONOMIC PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS, (C)

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INVESTMENT AND EXPORT PROMOTION ACTIVITIES, (D) EMPLOYMENT GENERATION INVOLVING SMALL SCALE AND MICROENTERPRISES, (E) PROGRAM IN COCA GROWING AREAS TO MEET THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF FARMERS IN THE AREA TO IMPROVE PRODUCTIVITY AND MARKET ACCESS, AND EXPAND PROCESSING, OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT GENERATION, AND TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT, (F) EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF ON-GOING PUBLIC AWARENESS PROGRAMS TO BUILD A CONSENSUS ON THE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH NARCOTRAFFICKING AND DRUG USE, AND (G) STRENGTHENING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES AND PROSECUTION IN CASES DEALING WITH NARCOTRAFFICKING. THE FY-91 ALLOCATION FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING AMOUNTS TO 63.1 MILLION DOLS, WITH 100 MILLION DOLS ALLOCATED EACH SUBSEQUENT FISCAL YEAR UP TO AND INCLUDING FY94. ALTHOUGH THE ALLOCATION OF NEW ESF RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE NARCOTICS STRATEGY REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS FISCAL YEARS, THE USG SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER INCREASING ITS SUPPORT IN THE EVENT THAT PROGRESS TOWARD MEETING NARCOTICS OBJECTIVES EXCEED EXPECTATIONS WHICH WOULD CAUSE ADDITIONALLY, BUT TEMPORARY ECONOMIC DISLOCATION. IN ADDITION, ESF WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MODEST FUNDING TO THE ANDEAN PEACE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM.

E. OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACT ON HOST COUNTRY OF THE AFOREMENTIONED ACQUISITIONS: THE IMPACT ON THE ECONOMIC SECTOR OF ESF FUNDING COULD BE SUBSTANTIAL. WITH REGARD TO THE FMF PROGRAM, IT IS NOT BELIEVED IT WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT OTHER THAN FUNDING A PORTION OF THE ARMED FORCES NEEDS THEREBY REDUCING THE NECESSITY OF PERUVIAN ORIGINATED FUNDING FOR EQUIPMENT TO BE ACQUIRED.

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IX. FUTURE SECURITY ASSISTANCE NEEDS (FY-93 THRU FY-95):

SINCE PERU IS ON SANCTIONS AND SINCE THE ONLY MAJOR

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ACTION PM-01

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-01	INR-05	SS-01	CIAE-00	EB-01
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R 112006Z JUN 90
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 COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR PM
 USSOUTHAF ALBROOK AFB PM//LA//
 USCINCSO HOWARD AFB PM//SCJ3-DDN//
 OMB WASHDC
 TRSYDEPT WASHDC
 DISAM WPAFB OH
 JFKSWC FT BRAGG NC
 DIA WASHDC//DB3-C1//

S E C R E T SECTION 12 OF 12 LIMA PE 08655

S E C R E T

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MASS, PE
 SUBJECT: FY 1992 SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PURCHASES ANTICIPATED WILL BE MADE
 WITH FMF (COUNTERNARCOTICS USE ONLY) PROJECTIONS FOR
 FY-93 THRU FY-95 INESCAPABLY HINGE ON FY-90 FMF
 EXPENDITURES. IF NO FY-90 FMF BECOMES AVAILABLE WHAT WE

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PROJECT ABOVE FOR FY-92 WOULD THEN BECOME OUR PROJECTION FOR FY-93, AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS IF FY-90 FMF FUNDING SLIPS TO FY-91.

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X. ARMAMENTS-INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION IN GENERAL: IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE COMMERCIAL SECTION THE ONLY ACTIVE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION NOTED IS THE PRODUCTION OF ARMORED PERSONNEL VESTS. THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR SHIPBUILDING COOPERATIVE VENTURES AND POSSIBLY SOMETHING IN THE AVIATION FIELD AS WELL. PERHAPS WHEN THE NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES POWER IN JULY 90 OUTSIDE INVESTMENT WILL BE NEWLY ENCOURAGED.

XI. DEFENSE DELIVERIES TO HOST COUNTRY (88/89). THE ONLY USG DELIVERY OF NOTE IS 1.5 MIL FY-89 MAP (EARMARKED FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS), WHICH HAS MADE UP OF SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION DESTINED FOR THE PERUVIAN ARMY. ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF THIS EQUIPMENT HAS ARRIVED IN PERU. CONCLUDING COMMENT: ASSISTING THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE COMMITMENT TO NARCOTICS INTERDICTION AND ERADICATION IS AN OVERRIDING GOAL OF ALL MISSION ELEMENTS.

B1

RECOGNIZING THAT APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS MUST BE OBSERVED.

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** SECRET

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