

ROUTINE UNCLASSIFIED ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ARA/NEA REARCS

INCOMING

X38

PAGE 01 OF 02 LIMA 06338 08 OF 03 032324Z 033877 0814624

LIMA 06338 08 OF 03 032324Z 033877 0814624 LOYAL BUT NOT PARTICULARLY BRIGHT, INCAPABLE OF MAKING A DECISION WITHOUT GETTING PERMISSION FROM HIGHER UP (SPECIFICALLY PRESIDENT ALBERTO FUJIMORI OR HIS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR VLADIMIRO MONTESINOS) -- EXACTLY THE SAME QUALITIES THAT LED FUJIMORI AND MONTESINOS TO PICK HERMOZA AS ARMY COMMANDER IN THE FIRST PLACE. BESIDES, RODRIGUEZ IS TOO JUNIOR AND A RELATIVE UNKNOWN ENTITY. AS IT IS, BRIONES IS HIMSELF RATHER JUNIOR AND HIS NOMINATION WOULD LIKELY CAUSE FUJIMORI PROBLEMS WITH OTHER MORE SENIOR ARMY GENERALS, ACCORDING TO []

INFO: DAND (01) PKG (01) RJ (01) RSG (01) RJC (01) ARA (01) PPC (01) OAS (01) PPA (01) VE (02)

04/0932Z A1 RD (TOTAL COPIES: 013)

ACTION ARA-08 INFO LOG-08 ACDA-17 AID-08 AMAD-01 C-01 OASY-08 DOEE-08 EB-08 HA-09 H-01 INM-02 TEDE-08 INR-08 IO-19 L-08 ADS-08 NSAE-08 NSCE-08 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PH-08 PRS-01 P-01 SIL-08 SHP-08 SP-08 SR-08 SS-08 STR-16 TRSE-08 T-08 USIE-08 RPE-01 CORE-08 /0881W

NO PROSECUTIONS IN LA CANTUTA

R 032316Z JUN 93 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8869 INFO DIA WASHDC CIA WASHDC AMEMBASSY CARACAS USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

EXTEND CLASSIFICATION

RELEASED IN PART

B1, 1.5(D)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, PE SUBJECT: MILITARY WATCHER ON ARMY ATTITUDES TO LA CANTUTA DISAPPEARANCES

- 1. [] - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SUMMARY: [] A LEADING "MILITARY WATCHER," TOLD POL OFF RECENTLY THAT SENIOR ARMY OFFICER CONTACTS FIRMLY BELIEVE ARMY

HEAD GEN. HERMOZA MUST TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISAPPEARANCES AT LA CANTUTA UNIVERSITY. IN ORDER TO DEFEND THEIR INSTITUTION, THE CONTACTS WERE STRONGLY AGAINST PROSECUTING MEMBERS OF MILITARY DEATH SQUADS "JUST FOR KILLING TERRORISTS." HOWEVER, SOME CONTACTS COMMENTED THAT SOME MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THE LA CANTUTA DISAPPEARANCES APPARENTLY FREE-LANCED THEIR SKILLS AND ARE RUMORED TO HAVE EVEN KILLED AN ARMY OFFICER. THE OFFICERS ALSO TOLD [] THAT PRESIDENT FUJIMORI MAY REPLACE HERMOZA IN JULY. OBANDO LAYS MUCH OF FUJIMORI'S PROBLEMS WITH THE MILITARY ON BAD ADVICE FROM HIS INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR MONTESINOS. DISCONTENT CONTINUES TO SIMMER WITHIN THE MILITARY, BUT [] DISCOUNTED THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP IN THE NEAR TERM. END SUMMARY.

ARMY CHIEF HERMOZA MUST TAKE THE FALL

[] PRIDES HIMSELF ON HIS WIDESPREAD VARIETY OF CONTACTS OF VARIOUS RANKS WITHIN THE PERUVIAN ARMY AND OTHER ARMED SERVICES. ACCORDING TO [] HIS ARMY SOURCES BELIEVE ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE JOINT ARMED FORCE COMMAND GEN. NICOLAS HERMOZA MAY BE FORCED TO TAKE THE FALL FOR THE "STUPID" LA CANTUTA AFFAIR ON JULY 28 NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS. HERMOZA WOULD BE FIRED AND REPLACED BY MINISTER

OF INTERIOR GEN. JUAN BRIONES. A LONG SHOT ALTERNATIVE MAY ALSO BE GEN. HOWARD RODRIGUEZ, []

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L. MILLS DATE/CASE ID: 6 MAY 2002 199700716 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.6(1) DECLASSIFY AFTER: 2 JUN 2018

4. [] DOES NOT BELIEVE HERMOZA CAN AFFORD TO HAVE JUNIOR OFFICERS IMPLICATED AS TRIGGERMEN IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF NINE STUDENTS AND A PROFESSOR FROM THE LA CANTUTA TEACHING UNIVERSITY IN JULY 1992, QUESTIONED BY A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATORY COMMITTEE OR PROSECUTED BY THE COURTS. HERMOZA AS THE SENIOR COMMANDING OFFICER MUST TAKE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT; MILITARY OFFICERS ARE NOT LIKELY TO STAND BY AND LET OFFICERS WHO FOLLOWED ORDERS BE SACRIFICED FOR JUST "KILLING A BUNCH OF TERRORISTS."

5. ACCORDING TO [] SENIOR AND MID-GRADE OFFICERS ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTENCE OF MILITARY HIT SQUADS AND CORROBORATED DETAILS CONTAINED IN DOCUMENTS ISSUED UNDER THE "SLEEPING LION" (LEON DORMIDO) PSEUDONYM (REFTEL). THE SAME OFFICERS BELIEVED THAT THE JULY 1992 DISAPPEARANCES FROM LA CANTUTA UNIVERSITY WERE TERRIBLY PLANNED AND THE DETAILS TOO WIDELY KNOWN, AND THAT THESE FLAWS ALLOWED THE JAILED FOILED COUP-PLOTTERS LED BY GEN. JAIME SALINAS TO PUBLICLY EXPOSE THE AFFAIR IN ORDER TO CAUSE FUJIMORI PROBLEMS.

6. [] FOR HIS CONTACTS, THE ONLY REASON TO PROSECUTE THE DEATH SQUAD MEMBERS WAS THAT SOME MEMBERS HAVE MADE THEIR SKILLS AVAILABLE "FOR HIRE." MEMBERS HAVE REPORTEDLY WORKED FOR MARGOS AND ARE RUMORED TO HAVE EVEN KILLED ARMY OFFICERS. ONE RUMOR IS THAT IN LATE 1991 MONTESINOS HIRED THEM TO ASSASSINATE THE GENERAL COMMANDING LIMA'S MILITARY HOSPITAL BECAUSE HE WAS DATING A NURSE WHO WAS ALSO MONTESINOS' LOVER. AT THE TIME, THE KILLING PROVOKED WIDE SPECULATION BECAUSE IT OCCURRED AT A LIMA BEACH CALLED PLAYA DELFINES (A WELL USED "LOVERS' LANE" IN THE MIRAFLORES AREA) AND THE GENERAL WAS SHOT POINT BLANK BUT NOT ROBBED. THE GENERAL'S COMPANION WAS NEVER PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED, BUT PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THE INCIDENT SETTLED ON THE VIEW THAT THE GENERAL WAS WITH A

YOUNG MAN. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED TO VERIFY THAT THE INCIDENT WAS NOT A TERRORIST ACTION. THE YOUNG MAN WITH THE GENERAL IDENTIFIED IN THAT REPORT MUST NOT HAVE BEEN LINKED TO SENDERO OR MRTA.

MONTESINOS BLAMED (AGAIN)

7. [] MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR FUJIMORI'S

960 640 Box 10774 UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

INCOMING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ARA/NEA REARCS

PAGE 02 OF 02 LIMA 06338 00 OF 03 032324Z 033877 SB14624
PROBLEMS WITH THE MILITARY ON MONTESINOS. MONTESINOS HAS FED FUJIMORI BAD ADVICE, AND THE PRESIDENT HAS FOLLOWED IT. THE ARMY'S MAIN DIFFICULTY IS BETWEEN "INSTITUTIONALIST" OFFICERS AND OFFICERS LOYAL TO MONTESINOS/THEMSELVES/FUJIMORI (NOMINALLY), IN THAT ORDER. MONTESINOS HAS CONVINCED THE PRESIDENT THAT HE MUST CONTROL THE MILITARY, WHICH WAS OUT TO OVERTHROW HIM. TO DEFEND HIMSELF FROM A COUP, FUJIMORI WAS LED TO BELIEVE THAT COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT THINKERS LIKE GEN. PALOMINO AND GEN. VALDIVIA HAD TO BE PUSHED OUT OR MARGINALIZED. WHAT THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT REALIZE, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] AN "INSTITUTIONALIST" OFFICER LIKE ROBLES WOULD NOT STAGE A COUP. THE INSTITUTIONALISTS, WHILE ADAMANT ABOUT PRESERVING THE STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY, GENERALLY AGREE WITH MANY OF FUJIMORI'S REFORMS AND SEE NO ONE CAPABLE OF REPLACING FUJIMORI OR COMING CLOSE TO ENJOYING FUJIMORI'S PUBLIC STANDING. [REDACTED] BELIEVES "INSTITUTIONALISTS"

033877 SB14624

LIMA 06338 00 OF 03 032324Z

033877

SB14624

B1

B1

WOULD NATURALLY RESPECT FUJIMORI AND FOLLOW HIS ORDERS. OBANDO BELIEVES FUJIMORI CAN STILL COME TO TERMS WITH THE "INSTITUTIONALISTS" AND THAT THEY IN TURN WOULD ABIDE BY HIS PRESIDENCY. [REDACTED] FUJIMORI SHOULD, BUT WOULD NOT, BRING GEN. VALDIVIA BACK FROM GOLDEN EXILE AS ATTACHE IN THE UKRAINE AND MAKE HIM ARMY COMMANDER.

B1

THE ARMY POT CONTINUES TO BOIL

8. HOWEVER, FUJIMORI, UNDER MONTESINOS' ADVICE, CONTINUES TO GET RID OF ANY RESPECTED SENIOR OFFICER SEEN AS PROSING A SUPPOSED THREAT TO HIS PRESIDENTIAL POWER. [REDACTED] THE REAL DANGER IS NOT A COUP LED BY THE HEAVILY WATCHED GENERALS OR EVEN THE COLONELS OR MAJORS, BUT RATHER A MORE PROBABLE, BUT STILL REMOTE POSSIBILITY, IS THAT A DESPERATE OFFICER, ACTING ALONE OR IN A VERY SMALL GROUP, MAY ASSASSINATE HERMOZA OR MONTESINOS. FUJIMORI IS SIMPLY NOT DELIVERING ON ANY OF THE PROMISES MANY OFFICERS BELIEVE HE MADE WHEN HE STAGED HIS APRIL 5 AUTO-COUP: INCREASED PAY; INCREASED BUDGETS FOR THE SERVICES OVERALL; INCREASED BUDGETS FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS; AND PROTECTION FROM PROSECUTIONS OVER CONDUCT DURING THE ANTI-TERRORISM WAR. THE OFFICERS ARE NEARING THE END OF THEIR ROPE MONEY-WISE, BUT PROSECUTION FOR FIGHTING TERRORISTS IS SEEN AS A POLITICAL

B1

DECISION THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD PREVENT IF HE SO CHOSE.

9. COMMENT: MANY OF [REDACTED] STATEMENTS ECHO THOSE PREVIOUSLY HEARD FROM OTHER CONTACTS, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARDS TO CONTINUED DISCONTENT WITHIN THE MILITARY IN GENERAL AND AGAINST GEN. HERMOZA IN PARTICULAR. [REDACTED] IS PROBABLY UNREALISTIC IN HIS ASSUMPTIONS THAT FUJIMORI COULD EASILY Mend HIS RELATIONS WITH SCORNEED AND INSULTED "INSTITUTIONALIST" GENERALS. WE HAVE NO SOLID CONFIRMATION THAT DEATH SQUAD MEMBERS HAVE FREELANCED THEIR SERVICES, BUT NOTE THAT SEVERAL CONTACTS HAVE INDEPENDENTLY MENTIONED THIS.
BRAYSHAW

B1

B1

UNCLASSIFIED