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ACTION SCT-02

6/17

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00
	EB-05	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00	L-02
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	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00
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O 101809Z JUN 87
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0120
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 AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/IR Date: 9/11/97
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FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority to
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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
 DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE

ALOW

SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:
- TAKING STOCK OF 1986-87 DEVELOPMENTS

REF: (A) LIMA 6649, (B) LIMA 5659

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: PERU'S GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE GROWN SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER SINCE MID-1986. THE MOST IMPORTANT GROUP, THE MAOIST SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL), INCREASED ATTACKS NATIONWIDE, EXPANDED ITS AREA OF OPERATIONS, AND RESURGED IN THE MILITARY-CONTROLLED AYACUCHO AREA. SL OVERCAME TWO CHALLENGES -- THE LOSS OF 250 MEMBERS IN THE JUNE 1986 PRISON KILLINGS, AND INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN ITS LIMA COMMITTEE. ITS MEMBERSHIP PROBABLY NUMBERS IN THE THOUSANDS AND APPEARS TO HAVE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. IT HAS SOME POPULAR SUPPORT. SL'S EXPANSION OUTSIDE TRADITIONAL AREAS BODES ILL FOR THE GOP, SUGGESTING SL IS MORE WIDESPREAD THAN PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED. ITS RESURGENCE IN THE COCA ZONES POSES PROBLEMS FOR ANTI-DRUG EFFORTS. SL'S PRINCIPAL SUCCESS IS TO HAVE CONVINCED PERU'S LEADERS AND MUCH OF THE PUBLIC THAT IT IS HERE TO STAY; SL IS NOW A FACTOR IN ALL POLITICAL

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EQUATIONS. WORSE, WE SEE THE FIRST INTIMATIONS BY SL WATCHERS THAT SL COULD WIN -- OR AT LEAST DEMOCRACY COULD LOSE.

3. SL HAS INCREASED ASSASSINATIONS, APPARENTLY TO DEMORALIZE THE GOP AND LEAD IT INTO GREATER REPRESSION, AND POSSIBLY TO PROVOKE A COUP. ATTACKS AGAINST FOREIGNERS HAVE INCREASED FOR SEVERAL REASONS; THE THREAT AGAINST THIS EMBASSY REMAINS HIGH. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS OF MORE INDISCRIMINATE SL VIOLENCE IN GENERAL. SL IS FAR MORE ACTIVE IN LIMA THAN BEFORE, ENGAGED IN A MAJOR URBAN

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RECRUITMENT DRIVE. THE LEGAL LEFT IS A PRINCIPAL TARGET FOR INFILTRATION AND RECRUITMENT. INCREASED USE OF THE MEDIA -- INCLUDING A PRO-SL DAILY -- IS ANOTHER INNOVATION. WE EXPECT INCREASED SL ATTACKS IN NON-TRADITIONAL AREAS UNDER SL'S NEW PLAN THAT BEGAN IN JANUARY. AN SL MILITARY VICTORY IS NOT IN THE CARDS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE; SL'S CHIEF NEAR-TERM THREAT IS TO PROVOKE A COUP AND GOVERNMENT REPRESSION THAT WOULD TEAR THE COUNTRY APART AND VASTLY INCREASE BLOODSHED.

4. THE MORE PRO-CUBA UNION OF THE MRTA AND THE MIR REMAINS PERU'S JUNIOR TERRORIST GROUP. STILL URBAN AND ANTI-U.S., THE MRTA-MIR (UNION OCCURRED IN DECEMBER) INCREASED ATTACKS IN LIMA AND EXPANDED TO OTHER CITIES. LIFTING ITS ONE-YEAR SO-CALLED TRUCE IN AUGUST 1986, IT BEGAN ATTACKS, MOSTLY NONLETHAL AGAINST THE GOP AND APRA. IT SUFFERED

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O 101809Z JUN 87
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0121
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 AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
DEAHQS WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ABOW:
SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

SEVERAL IMPORTANT CAPTURES IN 1986 AND SEVERAL LOSSES DURING ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE M-19'S AMERICA'S BATTALION. ITS DEMONSTRATED CONNECTIONS TO THE M-19 AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS, PLUS ITS PREVIOUS ANTI-U.S. ATTACKS, MAKE IT A SERIOUS THREAT TO US. THE MRTA-MIR'S THREAT TO THE GOP IS NOT MILITARY BUT RATHER ITS POTENTIAL TO RADICALIZE THE LEGAL LEFT AND TO PUSH IT AWAY FROM THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.

5. THE GOP'S RESPONSE IS UNEVEN. OVERALL, THERE ARE PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION AND INTELLIGENCE, COMPOUNDED BY LACK OF PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION. ALTHOUGH ECONOMIC AID TO THE SOUTH CENTRAL SIERRA, INCLUDING AYACUCHO, HAS INCREASED, THERE ARE QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND WHETHER IT IS ENOUGH. THE MILITARY, OPERATING IN

SPECIFIC "EMERGENCY ZONES," IS DEFICIENT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING, DOCTRINE, AND EQUIPMENT. IT REMAINS ORIENTED TOWARD BODY COUNTS AND CONTROL OF TERRITORY; VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE DECLINED SINCE 1984 BUT STILL CONTINUE AND PROVIDE SL OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE ITS SUPPORT. IN OTHER RURAL AREAS, THE POLICE HAVE THE

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LEAD. THE GOP HAS SHOWN SOME INNOVATION IN THESE AREAS, BUT OVERALL NEGLECT CONTINUES. IN LIMA, THE GOP REMAINS LARGELY UNABLE TO PENETRATE SL; GOP ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED MORE FOR PUBLIC OPINION, INCLUDING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND CURFEW. PERU'S ECONOMIC SITUATION ADVERSELY AFFECTS CIVIC ACTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. INSUFFICIENT PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION CONTINUES, ALTHOUGH THIS MAY CHANGE. WE REMAIN PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE GOP'S ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESS CAUSES -- NOT SYMPTOMS -- OF GUERRILLA/TERRORIST VIOLENCE. IN THE MEANTIME, WE EXPECT SL AND THE MRTA-MIR TO EXPAND AND POSE AN EVER GREATER CHALLENGE TO PERUVIAN DEMOCRACY. END SUMMARY.

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PART 1

SENDERO LUMINOSO -- THE MAOIST INSURGENCY GROWS:

6. PERU'S MOST IMPORTANT SUBVERSIVE GROUP REMAINS SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL), WHICH BEGAN ARMED OPERATIONS IN 1980 AFTER SOME 16 YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BY ITS KEY CADRE. "PRESIDENT GONZALO" -- THE NOM DE GUERRE OF ABIMAEEL GUZMAN -- IS SL'S FOUNDER AND LEADER. SL CALLS ITSELF THE "COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU" (PCP). AFTER THREE SUCCESSIVE

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O 101809Z JUN 87
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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW
SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

BREAKS WITH RIVAL PCP'S, SL EMERGED
IN 1970 AS A FORCE IN HUAMANGA
UNIVERSITY (AYACUCHO). THERE ITS STUDENT
GROUP ADOPTED THE NAME "FOR THE SHINING
PATH (LUMINOSO SENDERO) OF JOSE CARLOS
MARIATEGUI" (FOUNDER OF THE PCP IN 1928).
SL DEFINES ITSELF AS MARXIST-LENINIST-
MAOIST, AND ITS IDEOLOGY AND MILITARY
STRATEGY RELY HEAVILY UPON MAO. ITS GOAL
IS THE DESTRUCTION OF PERU'S "OLD ORDER"
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A "PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF NEW DEMOCRACY," UNDER A
DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT; A SUBSEQUENT
"GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION" WILL MOVE PERU
TOWARD COMMUNISM. THE VEHICLE F
OR THIS
TASK IS A REVOLUTION OF THE "POOR PEASANTRY,"
LED BY AN ELITE, CLANDESTINE, COMPARTMENTALIZED,
AND CENTRALIZED PARTY.

7. SL'S STRATEGY CALLS FOR THE "PEOPLE'S
GUERRILLA ARMY" (EGP), UNDER PARTY CONTROL,
TO "ENCIRCLE THE CITIES FROM THE COUNTRY-
SIDE," GRADUALLY BUILDING UP AREAS OF SL
CONTROL ("BASES DE APOYO") AND EVER LARGER
EGP UNITS. SL'S TACTICAL DOCTRINE EMPHA-
SIZES CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, SPEED AND
DECISIVENESS, QUICK RETREATS, AND RUTHLESS-

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NESS. SL HAS GIVEN PRIMACY TO THE MOUNTAIN-
OUS AYACUCHO COUNTRYSIDE BUT ALSO HAS
WORKED IN OTHER RURAL AREAS AND IN LIMA;
SL CALLS THIS "SIMULTANEOUS BUT UNEQUAL
DEVELOPMENT." SL USUALLY AVOIDS CONFRON-
TATIONS WITH LARGE FORCES, PREFERRING
AMBUSHES, ASSASSINATIONS, AND SABOTAGE.
ITS ARMAMENT IS LIMITED TO WEAPONS CAPTURED
FROM THE SECURITY FORCES AND DYNAMITE STOLEN
FROM MINES. IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE FORCED
RESIGNATIONS OR EXECUTIONS OF LOCAL AUTHORI-
TIES PAVE THE WAY FOR SL "PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES"
TO WIELD CONTROL. IN THE CITIES, SL
TRADITIONALLY HAS SOUGHT PUBLICITY, RECRUITS,
AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MANY POTENTIAL HIGH-
PROFILE ASSASSINATION VICTIMS.

8. OUR ABILITY TO TRACK AND EVALUATE SL
FACES SEVERAL OBSTACLES. FOREMOST IS SL'S
RECORD IN LIMITING HOSTILE PENETRATION --
A TRIBUTE TO ITS COMPARTMENTALIZATION AND
SECURITY AWARENESS. IN ADDITION, WHILE SL
HAS INCREASED DISSEMINATION OF PROPAGANDA,
IT HAS REFRAINED FROM REVEALING MATTERS
OF GREATEST INTEREST -- PARTY ORGANIZATION,
INTERNAL DISPUTES, PERSONALITIES, NUMBERS,
AND EVEN WHETHER SL PRESIDENT ABIMAEI
GUZMAN ("CAMARADA GONZALO") IS ALIVE.
ANOTHER RESTRICTION WE FACE IS SL'S
PREFERENCE FOR THE HINTERLAND, FREQUENTLY
IN PLACES WITHOUT ROADS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
OR GOVERNMENT PRESENCE. IN SUCH AREAS, IT
IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHETHER SL
IS PRESENT, LET ALONE JUDGE ITS STRENGTH
OR POPULAR SUPPORT. FINALLY, GOP OFFICIALS

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CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00
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 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
 ALOW
 SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

OFTEN ARE RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS SENSITIVE
 DETAILS OF THIS SUBJECT; THE GOP ITSELF
 LACKS AN EFFECTIVE CLEARINGHOUSE FOR THE

INFORMATION COLLECTED BY THE MANY AGENCIES INVOLVED IN INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-INSURGENCY, AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS.

9. WE NEVERTHELESS, HAVE A FAIRLY CLEAR -- BUT DISTURBING -- PICTURE OF MAJOR SL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE OUR MID-1986 REVIEW (REF A), BASED ON MEDIA REPORTS, GOVERNMENT STATISTICS, SL PUBLICATIONS, TRANSCRIPTIONS OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, CONVERSATIONS WITH GOP OFFICIALS AND NON-GOP OBSERVERS, AND TRAVEL TO THE MORE IMPORTANT AREAS OF SL GUERRILLA ACTIVITY.

SL GETS STRONGER

10. ATTACKS INCREASE AND EXPAND: ALREADY A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL FORCE, SL HAS BECOME EVEN STRONGER IN THE PAST YEAR. THERE ARE SEVERAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THIS:

-- A SHARP INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF [REDACTED]

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TERRORIST ATTACKS NATIONWIDE, FROM 1,997 IN 1985 TO 2,463 IN 1986 AND 638 IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1987 (DETAILS IN REF B). OBSERVERS AGREE THAT ATTACKS IN 1986 WERE WEIGHTED TOWARD THE LAST SIX MONTHS, INDICATING A MAJOR SL PUSH SINCE MID-1986;

-- A SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF SL OPERATIONS SINCE MID-1986 OUTSIDE ITS TRADITIONAL OPERATING AREAS (AYACUCHO, LA LIBERTAD) TO THE SOUTH (EASTERN APURIMAC AND SOUTHERN CUZCO DEPARTMENTS AND REPORTS OF PRESENCE IN NORTHERN AREQUIPA AND NORTHERN TACNA DEPARTMENTS); TO THE CENTER (JUNIN DEPARTMENT); TO THE UPPER HUALLAGA COCA GROWING ZONE; AND TO THE NORTH (ANCASH AND CAJAMARCA DEPARTMENTS). SL OPERATIONS IN THESE PLACES ARE BASED LARGELY ON LOCAL CADRE AND REBUT THE

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ARGUMENT OF SOME SL WATCHERS THAT SL'S APPEAL WOULD REMAIN LIMITED TO AYACUCHO. THE EXPANSION IS A POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE GOP; IT ALSO THREATENS TO DISPERSE GOP COUNTERINSURGENCY RESOURCES;

-- A RESURGENCE IN THE AYACUCHO EMERGENCY ZONE, WHERE THE GOP BELIEVED IT HAD PLACED A LID ON SL.

1986-87 -- CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES

11. THE PRISON KILLINGS: WHAT BEGAN AS SL'S GREATEST CHALLENGE -- THE LOSS OF

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SECTION 05 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW
SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

250-PLUS MEMBERS IN THE JUNE 1986 PRISON
KILLINGS -- BECAME A MONUMENT TO SL
PERSEVERANCE AND FANATICISM. IN RETRO-
SPECT, SL'S PRISONERS WERE FAR LESS
IMPORTANT TO DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS THAN
THE GOP HAD BELIEVED, ALTHOUGH THEY DID
PLAY A ROLE IN COMMUNICATIONS AND PLANNING.
THE SIZE OF THE LOSS, HOWEVER, AND THE
DEATH OF IDEOLOGUE AND FORMER NUMBER TWO,
ANTONIO DIAZ MARTINEZ, UNDOUBTEDLY WAS
TRAUMATIC. CONTINUED ATTACKS IN THE
COUNTRYSIDE AND -- AFTER A PAUSE --
RESUMED LIMA OPERATIONS SHOWED THE BLOW
WAS NOT FATAL. NOR, AS FAR AS OUR LIMITED
KNOWLEDGE GOES, DID THE LOSS PROMPT
ANY INTERNAL DISSENSION. ONE YEAR LATER,
IT APPEARS THAT SL IS USING THE KILLINGS
TO ITS ADVANTAGE -- AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE
GOP'S "GENOCIDAL" POLICIES AND (WITHIN
SL) AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE "QUOTA" A REVOLU-
TIONARY MUST BE PREPARED TO OFFER.

12. TROUBLE IN THE METROPOLITAN COMMITTEE --
DEAD MEN TELL TALES: ANOTHER CHALLENGE
WAS INTERNAL -- THE FORCED SIX-MONTH

REORGANIZATION IN DECEMBER 1985 OF THE
LIMA METROPOLITAN COMMITTEE (CML).

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ACCORDING TO INTERNAL SL DOCUMENTS, THE MOVE FOLLOWED THE DISCOVERY EARLIER THAT MONTH THAT AT LEAST TWO IMPORTANT CML MEMBERS HAD CREATED UNAUTHORIZED SL UNITS TO CARRY OUT ROBBERIES FOR PERSONAL GAIN (THE DEATH OF ONE OF THE GUILTY PARTIES TRIGGERED THE DISCOVERY). THE DEAD MAN'S FORMER TIES TO THE RIVAL MRTA TERRORISTS FUELED SUSPICIONS THAT THE MRTA WAS "CONTAMINATING" SL CADRE WITH "REVISIONIST" SOVIET AND CUBAN IDEAS; HIS PARTNER WAS KILLED -- PERHAPS EXECUTED -- BY A FEMALE SL MEMBER. A SUBSEQUENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION REVEALED LOWER LEVEL CADRE LOOKED FAVORABLY ON THE MRTA'S GREATER ACCESS TO MONEY AND ARMS. THE REORGANIZATION EFFORT MUST HAVE ENDED ABOUT THE TIME OF THE PRISON KILLINGS. UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE NO FURTHER REFERENCES TO ITS EFFECTIVENESS; FROM THE INCREASE IN URBAN LIMA ATTACKS SINCE MID-1986, HOWEVER, WE ASSUME SL SUCCESSFULLY REORGANIZED THE CML. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNCOVERING AND BEATING BACK THIS THREAT IS GREAT; INTERNAL SPLITS ARE AN IMPORTANT WEAKNESS IN ANY GUERRILLA MOVEMENT.

13. GROWING MEMBERSHIP: SL ISSUES NO MEMBERSHIP CLAIMS, AND WE AND OTHER OBSERVERS CAN ONLY GUESS HOW MANY MEMBERS IT HAS. ESTIMATES FROM GOP AND CIVILIAN OBSERVERS RANGE FROM 2,000 TO 6,000 FULL-FLEDGED SENDERISTAS, AND AN ADDITIONAL 5,000 TO 15,000

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ACTION SCT-02

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TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE

ALOW

SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

SYMPATHIZERS WHO MAY PERFORM OCCASIONAL TASKS. SL'S INCREASE IN ATTACKS AND GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION INDICATES THAT MEMBERSHIP HAS INCREASED. RECORDS OF SL INMATES WHO DIED IN THE PRISON KILLINGS AND PERSONS INDICTED FOR TERRORISM INDICATE THAT SL'S CHIEF APPEAL REMAINS TO LOWER CLASS YOUTH, RURAL AND URBAN; A SIGNIFICANT SHARE IS FEMALE. ACADEMICS ACQUAINTED WITH SL MEMBERS SAY THAT ARCHTYPICAL SENDERISTA IS THE SON OR DAUGHTER OF PEASANTS, WITH A HIGH SCHOOL OR UNIVERSITY EDUCATION, WHO NO LONGER HAS A PLACE IN RURAL OR URBAN SOCIETY. SL'S POPULAR SUPPORT IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE. ALTHOUGH THE VAST MAJORITY OF PERUVIANS REJECT IT, SL ENJOYS SOME SYMPATHY FROM THE RURAL POOR, ESPECIALLY IN AYACUCHO. IN SOME AREAS, PEASANTS SUPPORT IT OUT OF FEAR OR IN RESPONSE TO EXCESSES OF THE SECURITY FORCES. IN PUNO, SUPPORT FOR SL WAS TIED TO SL'S PROMISES OF LAND AND, WHEN THE GOP REDISTRIBUTED LAND, SUPPORT FOR SL DECLINED (FOR DETAILS, SEE PUNO TRIP REPORT, 86 LIMA 9729). AYACUCHO RESIDENTS TELL US THAT SL KILLINGS

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OF PEASANTS SOMETIMES GENERATE OPPOSITION TO THE GUERRILLAS. SL APPARENTLY REALIZES THIS; INTERNAL SL DOCUMENTS NOTE THE NEED TO KILL PEASANT COMMUNITY LEADERS RATHER THAN ORDINARY PEASANTS. UNFORTUNATELY, GOP FORCES HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS POTENTIAL OPPOSITION TO SL.

14. EXPANSION -- TIP OF THE ICEBERG?:
SL OPERATIONS OUTSIDE TRADITIONAL AREAS APPEAR TO BE CARRIED OUT AS A RULE BY LOCAL PEASANTS UNDER OUTSIDE DIRECTION AND NOT, AS SOME GOP OFFICIALS CLAIM, BY

EXISTING SL UNITS DISPLACED FROM OTHER ZONES. SL DOCTRINE INSISTS THAT THE EXISTENCE OF ARMED UNITS IN AN AREA IS A REFLECTION OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES' POLITICAL STRUCTURE; POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES) MUST PRECEDE THE FORMATION OF MILITIA AND EGP UNITS. IN PUNO, FOR EXAMPLE, SL GAINED NATIONAL ATTENTION ONLY IN EARLY 1986; YET SL HAD BEEN BUILDING ITS APPARATUS THERE SINCE AT LEAST 1981. SL ACTIVITY IN OTHER NON-TRADITIONAL AREAS MAY FOLLOW A SIMILAR PATTERN, REFLECTING A DISTURBING LEVEL OF METHODOICAL PREPARATION THAT IS LARGELY UNADDRESSED BY THE GOP. SL ACTIVITY IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY COCA ZONE (REF B) IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT FOR THE USG BECAUSE THE PRESENCE OF SL COULD PERSUADE THE GOP (OR OFFER IT AN EXCUSE) TO COMBAT SL INSTEAD OF NARCOTRAFFICKERS, AS OCCURRED IN 1984-85.

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ACTION SCT-02

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	EB-05	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00	L-02
	AMAD-01	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	FAAE-00	CCO-00	INRE-00
	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00
	M-01	FAIM-01	DS-01	DSE-00	ZOVD-00	P-02	T-01
	/032 W						

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O 101809Z JUN 87
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0126
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
 AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
 AMEMBASSY MADRID
 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

[REDACTED] SECTION 07 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
 DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

PAGE 02 LIMA 06577 07 OF 23 101926Z

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
 ALLOW :
 SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

15. POLITICAL PRESENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION:
 SL'S IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL SCENE AND
 PUBLIC OPINION IS IMPOSSIBLE TO QUANTIFY,
 BUT OBSERVERS AGREE THAT IT IS GROWING.
 SL ATTACKS DOMINATE THE MEDIA -- DESPITE
 GOP PRESSURE TO REDUCE SUCH COVERAGE --
 AND SECURITY PRECAUTIONS OF THE LIMA
 ELITE ARE GROWING. SIGNIFICANT DATES
 ASSOCIATED WITH SL -- THE INITIATION OF
 THE ARMED STRUGGLE, THE PRISON RIOTS, THE
 BIRTHDAYS OF COMMUNIST PARTY FOUNDER
 MARIATEGUI AND SL PRESIDENT GUZMAN --
 ELICIT A STREAM OF SPECULATION ABOUT
 HOW AND WHERE SL WILL ATTACK. WE DETECT
 INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT SL AMONG POLITICAL
 LEADERS AND PART OF THE PUBLIC. A FEW
 OBSERVERS EVEN RAISE THE POSSIBILITY THAT
 SL MIGHT WIN -- OR AT LEAST THAT DEMOCRACY

MIGHT LOSE. NEITHER THE CONSERVATIVE ELITE NOR SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, NOR THE LEFT, NOR THE GOP CAN OUTLINE PLAUSIBLY HOW SL MIGHT BE DEFEATED OVER THE NEXT FIVE TO TEN YEARS. IT IS THIS GRADUAL LOSS OF CONFIDENCE BY ITS OPPONENTS THAT MAY BE SL'S MOST SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS IN RECENT YEARS.

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SL -- A SHIFT TO MORE VIOLENCE

16. MORE ASSASSINATIONS: SL ASSASSINATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES INCREASED FROM 78 IN 1985 TO A COMBINED TOTAL OF 178 FOR 1986 AND THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF 1987 (REF B). SL HAS CONTINUED ITS TRADITIONAL PATTERN OF KILLINGS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO CREATE POLITICAL VACUUMS IT CAN FILL WITH ITS "PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES." IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, IT IS ADDING MORE SPECTACULAR ASSASSINATIONS OF OFFICIALS IN LIMA AND OTHER CITIES. RECENT EXAMPLES INCLUDE THE OCTOBER 1986 KILLING OF RETIRED ADMIRAL CAFFERATA; THE FEBRUARY 1987 FAILED ATTEMPT AGAINST THEN-ATTORNEY GENERAL ELEJALDE; A SERIES OF KILLINGS OF APRA OFFICIALS IN HUANCAYO; AND THE JANUARY MURDER OF APRA LEADER LOPEZ SILVA.

17. REVENGE FOR THE PRISON DEATHS IS A FACTOR IN THE UPSWING IN SL KILLINGS: AN SL FLYER IN AYACUCHO WARNED THAT TEN APRISTAS WOULD DIE FOR EVERY SL "MARTYR." THE KILLINGS OF SOME 30 DEVELOPMENT PERSONNEL IN THE PAST YEAR IS DESIGNED TO BLUNT THE ECONOMIC PORTION OF THE GOP'S COUNTERINSURGENCY PLAN. THE BASIC MOTIVATION FOR THE ASSASSINATIONS, HOWEVER, IS TO UNDERMINE GOP AND PUBLIC MORALE

UNCLASSIFIED

AND TO POLARIZE SOCIETY. CHAMBER OF

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ACTION SCT-02

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	EB-05	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00	L-02
	AMAD-01	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	FAAE-00	CCO-00	INRE-00
	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00
	M-01	FAIM-01	DS-01	DSE-00	ZOVD-00	P-02	T-01
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O 101809Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0137

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
 AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
 AMEMBASSY MADRID
 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

SECTION 18 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
 DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

PAGE 02 LIMA 06577 18 OF 23 101938Z

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
 *ALOW *
 SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

LACK OF AN APPROPRIATE COUNTERINSURGENCY
 DOCTRINE AND TRAINING, AND A PERVASIVE
 ACCEPTANCE OF VIOLENCE IN LOCAL SOCIETY;

-- THE MILITARY PRESENCE FOSTERS A
 TENDENCY TO EVALUATE THE WAR IN TERMS OF
 BODY COUNTS, PRISONERS, AND NUMBERS OF
 ENEMY OPERATIONS. SL'S REDUCTION IN
 ATTACKS IN THE AYACUCHO EZ DURING 1985,
 FOLLOWED BY A RESURGENCE IN 1986 AND
 1987, SHOWS HOW MISLEADING THIS CAN BE;

-- THE MILITARY'S PARTICIPATION MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO COORDINATE COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: THE MILITARY ANSWERS AT BEST TO ONLY ONE CIVILIAN -- THE PRESIDENT -- MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR GARCIA TO DELEGATE COORDINATION TO A SUBORDINATE;

.- FINALLY, CRITICISM OF THE MILITARY'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD HAS CONTRIBUTED TO STRAINED CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS; THE ARMED FORCES HAVE REACTED BY NOT ONLY REDUCING VIOLATIONS, BUT ALSO REDUCING PATROLLING IN THE COUNTRY-SIDE.

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44. THE NON-EZ COUNTRYSIDE -- BETWEEN INNOVATION AND NEGLECT: SINCE 1984, THERE HAS BEEN MAJOR SL GROWTH IN THE RURAL AREAS OUTSIDE THE EZ'S (THE MRTA-MIR REMAINS LIMITED TO THE CITIES), INCLUDING THE SIERRA DE HUAMACHUCO IN LA LIBERTAD DEPARTMENT, IN THE NORTH, JUNIN DEPARTMENT IN THE CENTER, AND PUNO AND CUZCO DEPARTMENTS IN THE SOUTH. MANY OF THESE AREAS HAVE BENEFITED SINCE 1986 FROM INCREASED DEVELOPMENT FUNDS; UNLIKE THE EZ'S, HOWEVER, THE POLICE HAVE THE LEAD FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, AND LOCAL CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IS UNAFFECTED.

45. THE GOP HAS LONG NEGLECTED SL'S POTENTIAL IN THESE AREAS, CONCENTRATING INSTEAD ON AYACUCHO AND (MORE RECENTLY) LIMA. YET THE RELATIVELY LOWER SL PROFILE OUTSIDE THE EZ'S MASKED INTENSE RECRUITMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL WORK, MAKING POSSIBLE THE DRAMATIC SL EXPANSION IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. THE GOP, NEVERTHELESS, HAS SIGNALLED RENEWED INTEREST IN SOME OF THESE AREAS AND HAS SHOWN SOME INNOVATION AS WELL:

[REDACTED]

-- POLICE FORCES HAVE INCREASED IN MAJOR NON-EZ HOT SPOTS, SUCH AS PUNO AND LA LIBERTAD. BY AND LARGE, THE POLICE THERE HAVE NOT BEEN ACCUSED OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS OR DEATHS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS (ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ALLEGATIONS OF ROBBERY AND TORTURE);

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00
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O 101809Z JUN 87
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0138
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
 AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
 AMEMBASSY MADRID
 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
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 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
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SECTION 19 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS

USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW

SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

-- MILITARY FORCES IN THE AREA ARE
CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS,
SHOWS OF FORCE, AND (AT LEAST IN JUNIN
AND PUNO) SOME
COUNTERINSURGENCY PATROLS.
ALTHOUGH THE LATTER ARE OF DUBIOUS
LEGALITY, THEY APPEAR TO BE A GOOD USE
OF MILITARY RESOURCES -- LOW PROFILE,
FEW ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS,
AND WITHOUT AFFECTING LOCAL CIVILIAN
AUTHORITY;

-- IN PUNO, THE GOP HAS UNDERCUT SL'S
CHIEF APPEAL -- LAND TENURE CLAIMS --
BY DISTRIBUTING SOME 1.5 MILLION ACRES TO
LAND-POOR PEASANTS. (THE GOP DID SO
AGAINST THE DESIRES OF ITS OWN PARTY
LEADERS IN PUNO.);

-- THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE NON-EZ SIERRA,
THE GOP HAS BEEN ABLE THUS FAR TO USE GOP
RESOURCES TO INCREASE ITS SUPPORT; IN THE
NOVEMBER 1986 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, THE GOP
WON OVERWHELMINGLY IN THIS AREA. THIS
CONTRASTS WITH AYACUCHO, WHERE HIGH ABSTENTION
RATES AND NULL/BLANK VOTES IN THE 1986 (AND
EARLIER) ELECTIONS SIGNALLED OPPOSITION TO
[REDACTED]
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THE GOP, AND WHERE VIOLENCE HAS REACHED SUCH LEVELS THAT TRADITIONAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY IS EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT AND RISKY.

46. LIMA - THE PROPAGANDA AND INTELLIGENCE BATTLE: EVEN MORE THAN OTHER LATIN COUNTRIES, PERU IS HEAVILY ORIENTED TOWARD ITS CAPITAL CITY. IN TERMS OF RESOURCES, PROGRAMS, AND GOVERNMENT PRESENCE, LIMA IS SIGNIFICANT EVEN BEYOND WHAT ITS 30 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION INDICATES. SL AND MRTA-MIR ATTACKS HERE CONTAIN A LARGE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA INGREDIENT AND BUILD PRESSURE ON THE GOP TO REACT -- WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES IF NOTHING ELSE. (A SAD COMMENTARY ON PERU IS THAT THE LIMA ELITE GENERALLY IS BLASE ABOUT NUMEROUS DEATHS OF PEASANTS AND RURAL OFFICIALS BUT IS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY LESS IMPORTANT ATTACKS CLOSER TO HOME.)

47. SINCE FEBRUARY 1986, THE GOP HAS KEPT LIMA AND CALLAO UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY. UNLIKE THE RURAL EZ'S, IN LIMA THE MILITARY DOES NOT EXERCISE "POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMAND" AND THUS DOES NOT CONTROL CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES. (THE APPARENT REASON IS THAT MILITARY CONTROL IN THE CAPITAL WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY.) ALTHOUGH LIMA IS NOT AN EZ LIKE AYACUCHO AND HUANTA, ITS STATE OF EMERGENCY DOES PROVIDE FOR MILITARY PATROLS AND A CURFEW, AS WELL AS SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN PERSONAL LIBERTIES (SEE 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT). BOTH THE MILITARY PATROLS AND THE CURFEW

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CHANNEL: n/a



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	AMAD-01	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	FAAE-00	CCO-00	INRE-00
	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00

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O 101809Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0139
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
DEAHQS WASHDC
DIA WASHDC

SECTION 20 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

*PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

PAGE 02 LIMA 06577 20 OF 23 101941Z

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW
SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

ARE LARGELY ORIENTED TOWARD PUBLIC RELATIONS
AND ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF LIMA RESIDENTS.
NEITHER STEP, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO HAVE
RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT CAPTURES OF SUB-
VERSIVES OR TO HAVE DETERRED THE STEADY
INCREASE IN URBAN ATTACKS. (SUBVERSIVES

NOW CARRY OUT MOST ATTACKS DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS BEFORE OR AFTER THE CURFEW.)

48. THE URBAN THEATER PLACES A PREMIUM ON GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS. THE GOP HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS AGAINST THE MRTA-MIR, THROUGH MINOR ARRESTS OR INFILTRATION, LEADING TO SEVERAL IMPORTANT CAPTURES IN 1986. SL IS A DIFFERENT STORY: THERE IS A BROAD CONSENSUS WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE GOP THAT THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION HAS FLAGGED HERE. OFTEN BLAMED ARE THE LACK OF RESOURCES DEVOTED TO INTELLIGENCE WORK (THE POLICE ANTI-TERRORIST UNIT CREATED IN 1981 HAD TO USE PAY TELEPHONES AT FIRST), AND RIVALRY AMONG THE SEPARATE INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE THREE POLICE SERVICES AND THE THREE ARMED FORCES. THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR, HOWEVER, IS SL'S OWN SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS. SL'S CELL STRUCTURE USUALLY LIMITS THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF ANY ONE INFORMANT OR PRISONER.

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[REDACTED]

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URBAN ATTACKS OFTEN ARE SCOUTED OUT WEEKS IN ADVANCE; THE ATTACKING GROUP IS THEN GATHERED WITHOUT WARNING, KEPT INCOMMUNICADO, AND THE TARGET REVEALED ONLY AT THE LAST MOMENT. NEW SL PERSONNEL ARE SCREENED CAREFULLY AND TESTED IN ACTION; SL DOCUMENTS STATE THAT TEN YEARS ARE NEEDED TO PRODUCE A TRULY DEPENDABLE MEMBER. SL OFTEN RECRUITS FROM PERSONNEL UNLIKELY TO CONTAIN POLICE, ESPECIALLY MINORS AND WOMEN. (GOP OFFICIALS TELL US SEVERAL AGENTS HAVE DIED TRYING TO INFILTRATE SL.) ONE OBSERVER REPORTS THAT SL FROZE PROMOTIONS TO MIDDLE- AND UPPER-LEVEL RANKS IN 1983 IN ORDER TO FURTHER REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF INFILTRATION. FINALLY, SEVERAL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL SOURCES CLAIM THAT SL PRISONERS OFTEN REFUSE TO TALK, EVEN UNDER TORTURE.

49. THE GOP HAS TAKEN SEVERAL POSITIVE STEPS IN URBAN OPERATIONS IN THE PAST YEAR:

UNCLASSIFIED

-- A REORGANIZATION OF THE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES;

-- SOME STEPS TOWARD MORE MILITARY-POLICE COOPERATION IN INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS. AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT HERE IS THAT THE NEW COMMANDER OF THE ARMY'S SECOND REGION (LIMA AND AYACUCHO) IS THE COUSIN OF INTERIOR VICE MINISTER MANTILLA;

-- LEGISLATION IS PENDING IN CONGRESS

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[REDACTED]

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ACTION SCT-02

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00
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	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00
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O 101809Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0140
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
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AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
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 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

SECTION 21 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
 DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

PAGE 02 LIMA 06577 21 OF 23 101942Z

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
 ALLOW
 SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

TO ESTABLISH SPECIAL TRIBUNALS, ALONG ITALIAN LINES, TO TRY ACCUSED TERRORISTS;

-- REWARDS FOR TERRORISTS ARE OFFERED, AND A HOTLINE FOR INFORMANTS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED;

-- THE GOP HAS PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE REDUCED SENTENCES AND EVEN AMNESTY FOR TERRORISTS WHO COOPERATE;

-- CONSOLIDATION OF POLICE BOMB DISPOSAL CAPABILITIES.

50. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN SOME NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS. THE FEBRUARY NIGHTTIME RAID AGAINST THREE LIMA UNIVERSITIES NETTED ALMOST NO TERRORIST MATERIEL;

OF THE SEVERAL HUNDRED STUDENTS INITIALLY
DETAINED, ONLY A HANDFUL HAD SUFFICIENT
PROOF AGAINST THEM TO JUSTIFY CHARGES.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE RAIDS INCREASED
STUDENT RESENTMENT OF THE GOP; ONE
POLICE COLONEL INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION
- TOLD US THAT ON BALANCE, SL
AND THE MRTA-MIR PROBABLY BENEFITED FROM
ADDITIONAL UNIVERSITY RECRUITS.

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SIMILARLY, JOINT ARMY-POLICE SWEEPS OF
SLUMS MAY PRODUCE ANTI-GOP SENTIMENT.
FINALLY, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE
GOP EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE THE MEDIA TO DOWN-
PLAY VIOLENCE INCLUDES HIGH-
PRESSURE TACTICS SMACKING OF CENSORSHIP
(SEE LIMA 3660).

51. THE ROLE OF GARCIA: UNTIL RECENTLY,
GARCIA HAS NOT GIVEN TOP PRIORITY TO THE
SECURITY SITUATION. HIS PERSONAL ATTENTION
HAS CONCENTRATED ON OTHER ISSUE ESPECIALLY THE
-ECONOMY, IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN HIS OWN
POLITICAL BASE AND TO ADVANCE HIS REGIONAL
AND NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP ASPIRA-
TIONS. HIS JULY 1986 INDEPENDENCE DAY
ADDRESS IGNORED TERRORISM; HE HAS YET TO
VISIT AYACUCHO. WE THINK THAT GARCIA AND
OTHER APRISTAS NAIVELY BELIEVED THAT THE
ADVENT OF A "REVOLUTIONARY" APRA ADMINISTRA-
TION AND ITS ATTENDANT REFORMS WOULD UNDERCUT
SL AND EVEN BRING ABOUT DIALOGUE WITH T
GUERRILLAS. GARCIA MAY NOT HAVE BEEN
IMMUNE FROM THE TENDENCY TO VIEW SUBVERSION
AS CONFINED TO THE AYACUCHO COUNTRYSIDE.
FINALLY, GARCIA PROBABLY WAS RELUCTANT TO
COMMIT HIS PRESTIGE TO THE SOLUTION OF SUCH
AN INTRACTABLE PROBLEM.

52. GARCIA'S MAY 15 SPEECH IN MONTEVIDEO
BEFORE THE INTERAMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION
(LIMA 5893) MAY INDICATE MORE PERSONAL
INVOLVEMENT BY GARCIA. THE SPEECH MARKED
THE FIRST TIME THAT A GOP OFFICIAL CALLED

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INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00
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	AMAD-01	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	FAAE-00	CCO-00	INRE-00
	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00
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P-02 T-01
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O 101809Z JUN 87
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0141
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
 AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
 AMEMBASSY MADRID
 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
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 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
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 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

C [REDACTED] SECTION 22 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS

USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI

DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

PAGE 02

LIMA 06577 22 OF 23 101943Z

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTEP, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW

SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

SL A GUERRILLA RATHER THAN A TERRORIST MOVEMENT -- A FRANK AND REALISTIC APPRAISAL. GARCIA ALSO DESCRIBED ACCURATELY SL'S HOME-GROWN NATURE. IN GLOOMY TONES, HE REVIEWED THE ENORMITY OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY TASK AND BEMOANED THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF REDRESSING IN A FEW YEARS CENTURIES OF INJUSTICE. THE LOCAL PRESS PLAYED DOWN THAT PART OF THE SPEECH; POSSIBLY GARCIA SAID MORE THAN HE MEANT TO.

53. WE ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE GOP'S ABILITY IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS TO CONTAIN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE, LET ALONE REDUCE IT. THIS IS NOT ENTIRELY THE GOP'S FAULT: SL IN PARTICULAR OWES SUCCESS TO ITS LONG, PATIENT ORGANIZING, AND CENTURIES OF POVERTY AND NEGLECT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE CANNOT BE BLAMED ON ANY ONE GOVERNMENT. THE GOP ALSO FACES RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS: IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO SQUEEZE INCREASED DEVELOPMENT AID TO THE COUNTRYSIDE OUT OF ITS BUDGET. THE RELATIVELY FAVORABLE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE PAST TWO YEARS, INCLUDING THE GOP'S SUCCESSFUL AGRICULTURAL POLICIES THAT IMPROVED THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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COUNTRYSIDE, CANNOT BE MAINTAINED MUCH LONGER WITHOUT MAJOR POLICY CHANGES. WE SEE LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT THESE CHANGES WILL OCCUR. NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT THE INCREASINGLY SKEPTICAL PRIVATE SECTOR WILL SUPPORT THE GOP'S DECENTRALIZATION DRIVE.

54. MORE IMPORTANT, WE BELIEVE, ARE THE CONCEPTUAL ROADBLOCKS TO SUCCESS. SINCE 1980, SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS CONSISTENTLY HAVE UNDERESTIMATED THE GUERRILLA/TERRORIST THREAT. BY SO DOING, THEY HAVE GIVEN THEIR ENEMIES INVALUABLE TIME. IN THIS REGARD, GARCIA HAS A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY; WITHOUT HIS PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT AND DIRECTION, THE GOP WILL NEVER HAVE A COORDINATED AND SERIOUS COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM. AS WE NOTED ABOVE, GARCIA'S MONTEVIDEO SPEECH SUGGESTS HE MAY BE CONSIDERING A MORE ACTIVE

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INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00
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O 101809Z JUN 87
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0142
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 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
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 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW

SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

ROLE. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER GARCIA CAN
TRANSLATE INCREASED PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTION
INTO MORE EFFECTIVE PLANNING AND ACTION.

55. A SECOND, MORE INTRACTABLE CONCEPTUAL
PROBLEM IS THE GOP'S FAILURE TO DESIGN A
COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY THAT TREATS THE
CAUSES, AND NOT JUST THE SYMPTOMS, OF
GUERRILLA VIOLENCE. SL DOCTRINE EMPHA-
SIZES THAT ITS STRUGGLE IS POLITICAL, WITH
ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS SUBORDINATED TO
THAT END. THE GOP NEEDS TO RESPOND
SIMILARLY: ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS
SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH ITS POLITICAL
OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING POPULAR SUPPORT
FOR SUBVERSIVES. THE GOP HAS TAKEN
A FEW STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION, BUT MUCH
REMAINS TO BE DONE. IN THE MEANTIME,
WE EXPECT SL AND THE MRTA-MIR TO
EXPAND AND TO POSE AN EVEN LARGER
CHALLENGE TO PERUVIAN DEMOCRACY.

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INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	EUR-00	SS-00	CIAE-00
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	AMAD-01	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	FAAE-00	CCO-00	INRE-00
	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	DOEE-00
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O 101809Z JUN 87
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0127
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
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 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

SECTION 08 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
 DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW

SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

DEPUTIES PRESIDENT LEON DE VIVERO RECENTLY VOICED MANY APRISTAS' FRUSTRATIONS WHEN HE CALLED FOR VIOLENCE TO BE ANSWERED WITH VIOLENCE AND BOMBS WITH BOMBS (SEE LIMA 5893). KILLINGS OF MILITARY OFFICERS ELICIT EVEN STERNER (ALTHOUGH PRIVATE) REACTIONS FROM THE ARMED FORCES, OFTEN TO THE EFFECT THAT PERU NEEDS THE "ARGENTINE" SOLUTION.

18. SL'S VIEW, WE BELIEVE, IS THAT STEADY PROVOCATION EVENTUALLY WILL PRODUCE AN INDISCRIMINATE GOP RESPONSE, IN WHICH SL LOSSES WILL BE MORE THAN COMPENSATED BY NEW RECRUITS AND BY THE GOP'S LOSS OF LEGITIMACY. THE PROSPECT OF A COUP DOES NOT FAZE SL; RATHER, IT PROBABLY WOULD WELCOME IT AS CONFIRMATION OF ITS CONCEPT THAT "BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY" IS WEAK AND TRANSITORY.

19. ATTACKS AGAINST FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND DIPLOMATS: SINCE MID 1986, WE HAVE ALSO SEEN AN INCREASE IN SL ATTACKS AGAINST FOREIGNERS. THESE INCLUDE THE JUNE 1986 BOMBING OF THE MACHU PICCHU TRAIN IN WHICH TWO AMERICANS AND SEVERAL OTHER FOREIGNERS DIED; THREE ATTACKS AGAINST SOVIET

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TARGETS, CAUSING ONE SOVIET DEATH; AN ATTACK AGAINST THE INDIAN EMBASSY, CAUSING THE DEATH OF THREE POLICEMEN; THE FAILED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST THE JAPANESE HEAD OF THE BANK OF TOKYO BRANCH (WHICH SERIOUSLY WOUNDED THE OFFICIAL); AND THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH KOREAN COMMERCIAL OFFICE, WOUNDING THREE NORTH KOREANS.

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20. SL HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED U.S. AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATIONS. IT IS, HOWEVER, HARD TO DETECT A PATTERN IN THESE ATTACKS. SL ACKNOWLEDGES THE CUZCO TRAIN BOMBING BUT HAS NOT REPEATED IT, DESPITE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY. POSSIBLY THE ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT WITHOUT TOP-LEVEL APPROVAL. THE ATTACKS AGAINST THE SOVIETS ARE CONSISTENT WITH SL'S VIEW THAT THEY ARE "REVISIONIST SOCIAL-IMPERIALISTS." THEIR TIMING -- MID-1986 -- COINCIDES WITH THE REORGANIZATION OF SL'S LIMA APPARATUS (SEE PARA 12 ABOVE); WE BELIEVE THE ATTACKS MIGHT HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO PROVE THAT THE NEW APPARATUS HAD FREED ITSELF OF "REVISIONIST" CONTAMINATION FROM THE MRTA. THE NORTH KOREAN ATTACK PROBABLY RESPONDS TO NORTH KOREA'S SALE OF 10,000 AUTOMATIC RIFLES TO THE GOP AND ITS EFFORTS TO COURT THE GOP AND APRA. IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES MAY ALSO BE AT WORK. THE ATTACK AGAINST THE INDIAN EMBASSY SERVED TO EMBARRASS GARCIA, WHO WAS VISITING NEW DELHI AT THE TIME. AN ADDITIONAL MOTIVATION MAY HAVE BEEN SL'S FRIENDSHIP WITH A FELLOW MAOIST PARTY IN INDIA (SL CALLS IT THE "COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA"). SL DOCU-

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ACTION SCT-02

INFO	LOG-00	COPY-01	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	EUR-00	SS-00
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	INRE-00	CA-02	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02
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O 101809Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0128
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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 AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
 DEAHQS WASHDC
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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
 ALOW
 SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

MENTS CONTINUE TO FLAG THE THREAT FROM
 "IMPERIALISM, PRINCIPALLY YANKEE," AND WE
 MUST ASSUME IT IS SEEKING AN OPPORTUNITY
 TO STRIKE ANOTHER BLOW AGAINST US.

21. MORE INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE?: DESPITE
 SOME EXCEPTIONS, SL HAS USUALLY REFRAINED
 UNTIL NOW FROM A PATTERN OF INDISCRIMINATE
 VIOLENCE. SL VIEWS TERRORISM AS A MEANS,
 NOT AN END IN ITSELF. WE NEVERTHELESS
 HAVE SEEN SEVERAL CASES OF MORE INDISCRIMI-
 NATE VIOLENCE IN THE PAST YEAR, INCLUDING
 THE JUNE 1986 BOMBINGS IN LIMA'S PLAZA

BOLOGNESI (THREE BLOCKS FROM THE EMBASSY), WHERE GARCIA WAS SCHEDULED TO SPEAK; THE CUZCO TRAIN BOMBING; AND THE APRIL 1987 GANGLAND-STYLE SHOOTING IN A LIMA RESTAURANT OF THREE ARMY OFFICERS THAT ALSO KILLED SEVERAL NEARBY CIVILIANS. INEXPERIENCED PERSONNEL MAY ACCOUNT FOR SOME OF THESE ATTACKS. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE SL IS MORE WILLING NOW TO RISK UNINTENDED CASUALTIES -- AND IN SOME CASES, SUCH AS THE TRAIN BOMBING, MAY EVEN SEEK THEM.

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A CHANGE IN STRATEGY? SL SHIFTS TO LIMA
[REDACTED]
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22. SINCE 1985, WE HAVE WITNESSED MOUNTING SL ATTACKS IN LIMA AND NEARBY RURAL ZONES. GOP STATISTICS (REF B) PLACE SL OPERATIONS HERE AT APPROXIMATELY 544 IN 1985 (ABOUT 27 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL), 775 IN 1986 (31 PERCENT), AND 248 IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1987 (36 PERCENT). THIS INCREASE HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A MAJOR CHANGE IN HOW SL DEALS WITH LIMA, AS WELL AS WORKERS, SLUM DWELLERS, AND MEMBERS OF THE LEFT. UNTIL 1985-86, SL USED LIMA AS AN "AMPLIFIER" ("CAJA DE RESONANCIA"), SEEKING PUBLICITY, EMBARRASSING THE GOP, AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF HIGH-PROFILE ASSASSINATION VICTIMS. CONSISTENT WITH SL'S RURAL ORIENTATION, RECRUITMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SL "COMMITTEES" OCCURRED BUT WERE SECONDARY OBJECTIVES.

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23. SEVERAL INTERNAL SL DOCUMENTS FROM 1985-86 CALL FOR GREATER GRASSROOTS POLITICAL WORK ("TRABAJO DE MASAS") IN LIMA; TARGET GROUPS ARE BROAD AND INCLUDE STUDENTS, WORKERS, WOMEN, SLUM DWELLERS, AND INTELLECTUALS. THESE SAME GROUPS, OF COURSE, ARE ALSO RECRUITED BY THE MRTA-




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CHANNEL: n/a

MIR, THE LEGAL UNITED LEFT (IU) MARXIST
COALITION, AND EVEN APRA. THERE IS NO
SIGN OF SL COOPERATION WITH ANY OF THESE
GROUPS. INCREASINGLY, HOWEVER, SL DRAWS
A LINE BETWEEN THE "TRAITORS" IN THE IU
LEADERSHIP AND THE "MASSES" UNDERNEATH.



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O 101809Z JUN 87
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0129
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
 AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS
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 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
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 AMEMBASSY QUITO
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
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 DIA WASHDC

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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JST-4B/DB-3C1

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW
SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

24. INCREASED RECRUITMENT BY A GUERRILLA GROUP IS ALWAYS A TWO-EDGED SWORD: MORE MEMBERS MEAN MORE POTENTIAL SPIES. SL DOCUMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY AND PROSELYTISM; SL'S ANSWER IS TO USE SPECIALIZED FRONT GROUPS (SL CALLS THEM "ORGANISMOS GENERADOS") TO CULTIVATE SUPPORTERS. ALTHOUGH IN THEORY CLOSE TO A DOZEN FRONT GROUPS EXIST, IN PRACTICE WE HAVE SEEN FEWER: PEOPLE'S AID (SOCORRO POPULAR), WHICH ASSISTS RELATIVES OF SL PRISONERS AND DEAD, PUBLICIZES ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND APPEARS FREQUENTLY ON CAMPUSES; THE ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, WHICH DEFENDS SL PRISONERS; AND THE MOVEMENT OF CLASS-ORIENTED WORKERS (MOTC).

25. AN INTEGRAL PART OF SL'S NEW RECRUITMENT AND PROPAGANDA EFFORT IS THE DAILY "EL DIARIO" (ED). FAIRLY RADICAL SINCE 1985, BY EARLY 1987 ED REAPPEARED WITH A SOLID SL SLANT. SALES ARE AN ESTIMATED 6,000 COPIES PER DAY. ED'S EDITORIAL PAGE OFFERS SOME INSIGHTS INTO SL VIEWS: RECENT EDITORIALS CONCENTRATE ON IU'S NEED FOR MORE RADICAL LEADERSHIP; THE

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JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RECENT POLICE STRIKE;
AND THE "FASCIST" AND "GENOCIDAL" CHARACTER

OF THE GOP.

26. OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF SL'S NEW POLICIES IN LIMA INCLUDE:

-- THE PUBLICATION OF A 110-PAGE TREATISE ON SL'S DEVELOPMENT AND OUTLOOK, WHICH OBSERVERS BELIEVE WAS AIMED AT NON-SL MEMBERS;

-- A SERIES OF ATTACKS AGAINST FACTORIES AND THE KILLING OF A COMPANY LABOR RELATIONS OFFICER DURING A STRIKE. THESE ACTIONS APPEAR TO BE PART OF SL'S DRIVE FOR MORE SUPPORT FROM RADICAL UNION MEMBERS;

-- THE OCCUPATIONS OF TWO FOREIGN NEWS AGENCIES IN JANUARY 1987 IN ORDER TO SEND A COMMUNIQUE -- SL'S FIRST USE OF THIS TACTIC.

27. IT IS UNCLEAR WHY SL HAS CHANGED ITS PATTERN OF LIMA OPERATIONS. EXISTING SL DOCTRINE DOES NOT RULE OUT MAJOR URBAN ACTIVITIES BUT SUGGESTS THIS WILL OCCUR ONLY RELATIVELY LATE IN SL'S STRATEGY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SL WANTS TO DEVELOP NOW ITS URBAN STRUCTURE, FORESEEING THAT FUTURE REPRESSION -- PERHAPS FROM A COUP -- WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT. IN ADDITION, SL MAY BE TRYING TO WEAKEN ITS POTENTIAL RIVALS -- THE IU AND THE MRTA-MIR. THERE MAY BE MORE TO THIS: CONCEIVABLY, THERE



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ACTION SCT-02

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O 101809Z JUN 87
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0130
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
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 AMEMBASSY PARIS
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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
 ALOW
 SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

IS DEBATE IN SL ABOUT WHETHER TO BE LESS
 OF A "VANGUARD" AND MORE A "MASSES" BASED
 PARTY, OR WHETHER TO ENGAGE IN S
 OME SORT
 OF COOPERATION WITH RADICAL SECTORS OF THE
 IU. (SL DOCTRINE HOLDS THAT THE PARTY,
 THE ARMY, AND THE "UNITED FRONT" (FRENTE
 UNICO) ARE THE THREE REVOLUTIONARY VEHICLES.

SO FAR, SL HAS NOT DEVELOPED THE "UNITED FRONT.")

SL'S THREAT

28. SL'S PREVIOUS MULTI-YEAR NATIONAL PLAN, "CONQUER BASES," REPORTEDLY ENDED IN DECEMBER 1986. THE NEW PLAN IS "DEVELOP BASES." WE HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS BUT ASSUME THAT THIS MEANS WE WILL SOON SEE INCREASED ACTIVITY IN THE NEWER AREAS OF SL OPERATIONS: THE BUILDING UP OF PARTY AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, THE REMOVAL OF GOP AUTHORITIES, AND (SL HOPES) EVENTUAL TERRITORIAL CONTROL. ONE SL WATCHER SPECULATES THAT SL ACTIVITY IN THE NEWER AREAS IS PLANNED TO DIVERT GOP ATTENTION FROM AYACUCHO, WHERE HE THINKS SL SEEKS A "LIBERATED ZONE." OVER THE LONGER

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TERM, SL DOCTRINE STIPULATES THAT A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION BEGIN TO ASSEMBLE EVER LARGER MILITIA AND ARMY UNITS AND BEGIN TO FIGHT LARGER ENEMY UNITS. EVENTUALLY, THE GOAL IS TO TERMINATE THE "WAR OF MOVEMENTS" -- GUERRILLA WAR -- AND ENTER THE "WAR OF POSITIONS" -- A MORE CONVENTIONAL WAR.

29. AN SL MILITARY VICTORY IS NOT IN THE CARDS FOR NOW. SL'S CHIEF IMMEDIATE THREAT IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT COULD CREATE CONDITIONS LEADING TO A COUP. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THIS COULD HAPPEN THROUGH THE KILLING OF GARCIA; IN THE MEDIUM TERM, CONTINUED SL ASSASSINATIONS OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS COULD AUGMENT EXISTING CIVILIAN-MILITARY TENSION (SEE LIMA 4253) AND MAKE A COUP MORE POSSIBLE. (IN THIS REGARD, PREDICTIONS OF WORSENING GOP ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANCE.) A COUP LIKELY WOULD LEAD TO SL'S DREAM SCENARIO --

INDISCRIMINATE GOVERNMENT REPRESSION THAT
WOULD TEAR THE COUNTRY APART, WITHOUT
ERADICATING SL. A RELATED DANGER IS THE
POSSIBILITY THAT PARAMILITARY RESPONSES
MAY EMERGE EVEN WITHOUT A COUP (SEE LIMA
5893).

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PART 2

THE TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)

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 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
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 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS
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 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS
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 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
 DEAHQS WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW
SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR):

30. PERU'S OTHER SUBVERSIVE GROUP IS THE UNION OF THE MRTA AND THE MIR. BOTH GROUPS ARE DESCENDED FROM THE MIR OF THE EARLY 1960'S, WHICH ATTEMPTED IN 1964-65 TO APPLY WITH DISASTROUS RESULTS THE "FOCO" THEORY OF CHE GUEVARA. WHAT REMAINED OF THE MIR BROKE UP INTO NUMEROUS FACTIONS; MANY BANDED TOGETHER WITH OTHER RADICALS IN 1978 TO FORM THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC UNITY (UDP). THE UDP, IN TURN, JOINED THE UNITED LEFT (IU) COALITION IN 1980. IN 1982, HOWEVER, A SMALL MIR FACTION ("MIR-BENITEZ") BROKE AWAY FROM THE UDP. ACCORDING TO MIR MEMBERS, THE DISSIDENTS WERE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE IU PARTIES' RELIANCE ON ELECTIONS. THEY PERCEIVED SL'S GROWING INFLUENCE (MARCH 1982 MARKED THE SPECTACULAR SL ATTACK AGAINST THE AYACUCHO PRISON) AS PROOF THAT PERU WAS RIPE FOR GUERRILLA WAR. THEY BECAME THE NUCLEUS OF THE MRTA, WHICH BEGAN ARMED OPERATIONS IN MID-1984. ANOTHER MIR FACTION SURFACED IN JULY 1985 UNDER THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND (CRP) AND IN 1986 CHANGED ITS NAME BACK
CONFIDENTIAL

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TO MIR. THE TWO GROUPS JOINED IN DECEMBER 1986 TO FORM THE MRTA-MIR. (THE REMAINDER OF THE UDP JOINED SEVERAL OTHER PARTIES IN 1984 TO FORM THE UNIFIED MARIATEGUISTA PARTY -- PUM -- WHERE THEY IRONICALLY ARE ONE OF THE MORE MODERATE ELEMENTS.)

31. THE MRTA-MIR FITS THE MOLD OF THE MORE TRADITIONAL LATIN MARXIST GUERRILLA/TERRORIST GROUP: URBAN, ANTI-U.S., PRO-SOVIET BLOC, AND DRAWING ITS MEMBERS FROM THE DISAFFECTED YOUTH OF THE UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASS. UNLIKE SL, IT OPENLY DECLARES ITS ADMIRATION FOR CUBA, THE SOVIET BLOC, AND GUERRILLA GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR, COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, AND CHILE. WE BELIEVE THE MRTA-MIR HAS SOUGHT UNSUCCESSFULLY TO COOPERATE WITH SL. THE MRTA-MIR HAS CRITICIZED SL FOR INDISCRIMINATE AND PROVOCATIVE VIOLENCE; MRTA-MIR ATTACKS ARE POTENTIALLY DEADLY (E.G., CAR BOMBS) BUT ARE ORIENTED TOWARD PROPAGANDA EFFECTS RATHER THAN CASUALTIES (WE CAN CONFIRM ONLY FOUR DEATHS DUE TO MRTA-MIR ATTACKS SINCE 1984, COMPARED TO SEVERAL THOUSAND FOR SL).

MRTA-MIR DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MID-1986

32. ALTHOUGH THE MRTA-MIR REMAINS PERU'S "JUNIOR" SUBVERSIVE GROUP, IT HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS POTENTIAL FOR SPECTACULAR URBAN ATTACKS, PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS SINCE

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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0132
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 DIA WASHDC

SECTION 13 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
 DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
 ALOW
 SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:
 MID-1986 INCLUDE:

- A. AN INCREASE IN ATTACKS FROM 45 IN 1985 TO 59 IN 1986, AND 31 IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1987 (REF B). THIS REFLECTS THE TERMINATION IN AUGUST 1986 OF THE MRTA'S UNILATERAL ONE-YEAR "TRUCE" (THE TRUCE HAD COVERED ONLY APRA AND CIVILIAN GOP OFFICES; POLICE STATIONS, BANKS, AND U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND BUSINESS INSTALLATIONS REMAINED FAIR GAME);

- B. GREATER ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE LIMA, INCLUDING CHICLAYO, TRUJILLO, AND CHIMBOTE. THIS MAY REFLECT THE INCORPORATION OF ADDITIONAL MIR MEMBERS, AS WELL AS THE MRTA-MIR'S APPEAL TO UNIVERSITY YOUTH; ALL THREE CITIES CONTAIN UNIVERSITIES;

- C. THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PERHAPS FIVE TO TEN MRTA MEMBERS WITH THE M-19 AND ECUADOR'S AVC IN THE "AMERICA BATTALION" IN COLOMBIA. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL MRTA MEMBERS WERE KILLED OR CAPTURED, THE EPISODE ILLUSTRATES THE MRTA-MIR'S TIES TO THE MORE ADVANCED M-19 -- AND THROUGH THE M-19, PERHAPS TO NICARAGUA, CUBA, AND

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LIBYA;

- D. SEVERAL LARGE POLICE ARRESTS OF MRTA-MIR MEMBERS AND CAPTURES OF SAFEHOUSES DEMONSTRATE THAT THE MRTA-MIR REMAINS FAR MORE VULNERABLE TO INFILTRATION AND CAPTURE THAN SL;

- E. THE MRTA-MIR REMAINS HIGHLY ANTI-U.S., AS REFLECTED BY ITS PROPAGANDA AND ITS CONTINUING ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. BUSINESSES AND U.S. GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS;

- F. OVER THE LAST YEAR, SEVERAL CONTACTS IN IU HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THE MRTA-MIR IS SUCCESSFULLY RECRUITING IU MEMBERS, ESPECIALLY IN THE UNIVERSITIES AND IN THE SLUMS. AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN RECRUITING

APPARENTLY IS PLAYED BY THE SUBVERSIVES' TWO LEGAL POLITICAL FRONTS: PEOPLE ON THE MARCH (PEM), TIED TO THE MRTA, AND THE UDP, LOOSELY LINKED TO THE MIR. FOLLOWING THE MRTA-MIR LEAD, IN DECEMBER PEM AND THE UDP ANNOUNCED THEIR UNION AS WELL; AND

- G. A GREATER FOCUS ON PROPAGANDA AND COURTSHIP OF IU, SHOWN BY THE APPEARANCE IN EARLY 1986 OF THE PEM WEEKLY "CAMBIO." IN OCTOBER, PEM OUSTED THE EDITOR AND ADOPTED A FAR MORE RADICAL, PRO-MRTA-MIR ATTITUDE. IN APRIL 1987, "CAMBIO" BECAME A DAILY.

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33. THE MRTA-MIR -- A DIFFERENT KIND OF THREAT: IN TERMS OF DEATHS, NUMBERS AND EXTENT OF

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O 101809Z JUN 87
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AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
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DIA WASHDC

SECTION 14 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
DIA FOR OA-5/OS-1D/DB-6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW

SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

OPERATIONS, AND SHEER FANATICISM, THE MRTA-MIR PALES BESIDE SL. PERHAPS FOR THIS REASON, MANY PERUVIANS HAVE DISMISSED IT. YET THE MRTA-MIR HAS DEMONSTRATED A CAPACITY FOR DEADLY ATTACKS; IT ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE GREATER ACCESS THAN SL TO MORE SOPHISTICATED ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES. SHOULD THIS GROUP FIND IT CONVENIENT, IT COULD QUICKLY SPREAD HAVOC IN PERU'S PRINCIPAL CITIES. GIVEN ITS PREVIOUS ANTI-U.S. ATTACKS, IT CERTAINLY IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO USG PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS.

34. TO JUDGE THE MRTA-MIR ONLY IN COMPARISON TO SL IS TO DOWNPLAY ITS TRUE THREAT. SL'S STRATEGY IS TO REMAIN ISOLATED FROM OTHER MARXIST GROUPS AND TO BUILD A POLITICAL BASE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE THAT WILL SUSTAIN A GUERRILLA WAR. THE MRTA-MIR, ON THE OTHER HAND, CARRIES OUT SMALL-SCALE TERRORISM -- USUALLY WITHOUT CASUALTIES -- IN ORDER TO RADICALIZE PERU'S SIZEABLE LEGAL LEFT (THE IU HAS RECEIVED ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF THE VOTE

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IN THE LAST THREE NATIONAL ELECTIONS). IU LEADERS AGREE THAT YOUNGER IU MEMBERS ARE INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY WITH THE "ACCOMMODATIONIST" POLICY FOLLOWED BY IU PRESIDENT BARRANTES

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(NOTE: BARRANTES RESIGNED JUNE 1, 1987 FOLLOWING RADICAL OPPOSITION) BUT HAVE FOUND FEW ALTERNATIVES: SL IS DOGMATIC AND TOO BLOODY FOR MANY, WHILE THE MORE RADICAL MEMBERS OF THE IU (SUCH AS PUM) APPEARED UNABLE TO REORIENT THE IU TOWARD MORE RADICAL GOALS. THE MRTA-MIR APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXPLOIT SUCH DISCONTENT. ONE OPPORTUNITY WAS THE DIVISION IN EARLY 1987 OF "PATRIA ROJA," A "PRO-CHINESE MEMBER OF IU. THE DISSIDENT GROUP, KNOWN AS THE "BOLCHEVIQUES," CRITICIZED PATRIA ROJA'S RELIANCE ON "BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY" INSTEAD OF "REVOLUTIONARY" METHODS. PUM, SL, AND THE MRTA-MIR ALL BEGAN TO COURT THE RADICAL DISSIDENTS; THE MRTA-MIR APPEARS TO HAVE THE MOST SUCCESS, ACCORDING TO A PUM MEMBER.

35. ON A LARGER SCALE, WE NOTE THE MRTA-MIR'S ENERGETIC SUPPORT FOR A PEOPLE'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (ANP), WHICH WOULD INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE IU, LABOR AND PEASANT GROUPS, AND NON-IU LEFTISTS. A PREPARATORY EVENT FOR THE ANP, HELD IN AUGUST 1986, MADE CLEAR THAT THE MRTA-MIR AND OTHER RADICAL LEFTISTS PERCEIVED THE ANP AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BYPASS IU'S LEADERSHIP AND TO CARRY OUT, IN EFFECT, A COUP D'ETAT WITHIN THE LEFT (SEE 86 LIMA 11526). THE AUGUST ANP CONGRESS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT TEST OF WILLS BETWEEN THE MRTA-MIR AND ITS RADICAL ALLIES, AND THE MAINSTREAM LEFT.

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
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O 101809Z JUN 87
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 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM
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SECTION 15 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW
SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

PART 3

THE GOP RESPONSE:

36. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO SL AND THE MRTA-MIR HAS EVOLVED THROUGH SEVERAL PHASES SINCE 1980. UNTIL MID-1982, THE BELAUNDE ADMINISTRATION INSISTED THAT SL WAS AN ISOLATED GROUP OF DEMENTED THIEVES AND MALCONTENTS. THE POLICE WERE CHARGED WITH RESPONDING TO SL BUT WERE GIVEN FEW ADDITIONAL RESOURCES. UNABLE TO DEFEND SMALL OUTPOSTS IN AYACUCHO DISTRICT CAPITALS, THE POLICE RETREATED TO THE SAFETY OF THE CITIES, IN EFFECT CEDING LIBERATED ZONES TO THE GUERRILLAS. IN LATE DECEMBER 1982, BELAUNDE ORDERED THE ARMED FORCES TO RESTORE ORDER IN THE AYACUCHO AREA.

37. THE ARMED FORCES HAD SUCCESSFULLY WIPED OUT SEVERAL "GUEVARISTA" GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN THE 1960'S. IN SL, HOWEVER, THEY FACED A DIFFERENT ENEMY, ONE THAT

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HAD A STRONG RURAL MEMBERSHIP AND POLITICAL BASE. TO THEIR CREDIT, SOME ARMY GENERALS RECOGNIZED THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS THAT FED THE INSURGENCY. UNFORTUNATELY, THEIR REQUESTS FOR AMBITIOUS CIVIC ACTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS WERE LARGELY UNHEEDED BY BELAUNDE. MILITARY COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS DURING 1983-84 DEALT SL A BLOW BUT FAILED TO CRUSH IT OR MAKE A SERIOUS DENT IN SL'S TOP LEADERSHIP. WHILE THE MILITARY UNDOUBTEDLY KILLED NUMEROUS SL MEMBERS (SL ADMITS TO 1,738),

IT ALSO KILLED LARGE NUMBERS OF APPARENTLY INNOCENT CIVILIANS, AS WELL AS ENGAGING IN THE TORTURE AND SUMMARY EXECUTIONS OF SL PRISONERS (SEE 1985 AND 1986 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS). SUCH REPORTS REPORTEDLY GAINED SYMPATHY FOR SL.

38. IN ESSENCE, THE MILITARY SOUGHT MILITARY VICTORIES, MARKED BY THE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY UNITS AND THE CONTROL OF TERRITORY, EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF INNOCENT LIVES. SL ALSO SOUGHT ENEMY CASUALTIES, BUT ABOVE ALL WANTED POLITICAL VICTORIES, MARKED BY INCREASING POPULAR SUPPORT AND THE TARNISHING OF THE GOP'S IMAGE. INDISCRIMINATE GOP VIOLENCE, SL THOUGHT, WOULD IN THE LONG RUN FORCE PEASANTS TO SUPPORT SL. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE KILLING BY THE MILITARY OF TEN SL MEMBERS AND FIVE CIVILIANS IN A VILLAGE WAS INTERPRETED BY EACH SIDE AS A VICTORY. SL'S INTERPRETATION PROBABLY IS MORE ACCURATE.

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AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
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SECTION 16 OF 23 LIMA 06577

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DEA FOR OF, PS, OC, OI
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW
SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

39. TWO IMPORTANT CHANGES OCCURRED DURING GARCIA'S FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE: A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES TO THE SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA, INCLUDING AYACUCHO; AND A RATIFICATION OF THE TREND IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF THE BELAUNDE ADMINISTRATION TOWARD FEWER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. GARCIA NEVERTHELESS DID NOT GIVE THE SECURITY SITUATION TOP PRIORITY NOR COMMIT HIS OWN PRESTIGE TO PROGRESS IN THAT AREA. GOP SPOKESMEN, HOWEVER, TOUTED A FOUR-PART COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY, BROKEN DOWN INTO MILITARY, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND PSYCHO-SOCIAL COMPONENTS.

40. IN PRACTICE, THE STRATEGY HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ITS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SEGMENTS. FURTHERMORE, IT IS APPLIED ONLY TO THE

MILITARY-CONTROLLED EMERGENCY ZONES;
DIFFERENT STRATEGIES HAVE EVOLVED FOR THE
NON-EMERGENCY ZONE COUNTRYSIDE AND FOR THE
GROWING SUBVERSIVE SITUATION IN THE CITIES.

41. THE EMERGENCY ZONES -- THE MILITARY
REMAINS IN CHARGE: THERE ARE TWO RURAL
EMERGENCY ZONES (EZ): THE 15-PROVINCE
AYACUCHO EZ, AND THE SIX-PROVINCE HUANUCO

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EZ. THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF
EMERGENCY CREATES AN EZ, PLACES UNDER
MILITARY AUTHORITY ("COMANDO POLITICO-
MILITAR") ALL POLICE AND CIVILIAN
AUTHORITIES IN A GIVEN AREA, AND THE
DECLARATION IS THE LEGAL AUTHORIZATION
FOR MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS.
THE JUNE 1986 DECLARATION OF A STATE OF
EMERGENCY IN TWO PROVINCES IN PASCO DEPARTMENT,
NEXT TO THE HUANUCO EZ, REVEALED A TREND
UNDER GARCIA TO REDUCE THE ZONES UNDER
MILITARY AUTHORITY. BY 1987, THE MILITARY
HAD LEGAL CONTROL OVER 21 PROVINCES
CONTAINING AN ESTIMATED 7 PERCENT OF
PERU'S 20 MILLION INHABITANTS. (IN ADDITION,
THE 6 MILLION INHABITANTS OF LIMA AND
CALLAO ARE UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY
WITHOUT BEING UNDER MILITARY CONTROL.)
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EZ'S RELY ON
PATROLS FROM NUMEROUS SMALL BASES, USUALLY
LOCATED IN DISTRICT CAPITALS. THE MILITARY
ALSO ENCOURAGES -- AND SOMETIMES FORCES --
THE CREATION OF PEASANT SELF-DEFENSE FORCES
("RONDAS"). USUALLY LACKING FIREARMS,
THE "RONDAS" ARE NO MATCH FOR SL, WHICH
ATTACKS THEM WHEN MILITARY PROTECTION IS
ABSENT.

42. THE EMERGENCY ZONES -- MORE ECONOMIC AID:
A BRIGHT SPOT IN THE GOP'S RESPONSE TO SUB-
VERSION IS ITS INCREASED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
TO THE SOUTH-CENTRAL SIERRA, INCLUDING THE
AYACUCHO EMERGENCY ZONE. BETWEEN 1985 AND

1986, SUCH ASSISTANCE INCREASED BY APPROXIMATELY
90 PERCENT, FOR A TOTAL OF \$135 MILLION. THE

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SECTION 17 OF 23 LIMA 06577

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, PINR, ASEC, SNAR, US, PE
ALOW,
SUBJECT: PERUVIAN GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE:

GOP'S DECENTRALIZATION EFFORTS AND NEW INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE SEEK IN PART TO INCREASE JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR RURAL YOUTH. GOP PRICE INCREASES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS ALSO HAVE BENEFITED THE INHABITANTS OF THE EZ'S AND OTHER AREAS OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY. A SOBER TRIBUTE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ASSISTANCE WAS SL'S TARGETING IN 1986 AND 1987 OF CIVILIAN DEVELOPMENT PERSONNEL, KILLING ABOUT 30 ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS. THERE ARE QUESTIONS, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (SUCH AS THE CACHI IRRIGATION PLAN) AND MALFEASANCE (AYACUCHO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION HEAD MARCIAL CAPELLETTI WAS RECENTLY ACCUSED BY THE CONTROLLER GENERAL OF CORRUPTION). PERHAPS THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT BOTH PROJECTS AND PERSONNEL ARE HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO GUERRILLA VIOLENCE; SL'S FREQUENT ATTACKS IN THIS AREA POINT TO INSUFFICIENT COORDINATION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES AND THE SECURITY FORCES.

43. EMERGENCY ZONES -- PROS AND CONS

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ON THE PLUS SIDE, THE EZ'S ALLOW THE GOP TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE MILITARY'S GREATER RESOURCES. THE THREE POLICE FORCES (TOTALING ABOUT 70,000 PERSONS) ARE SPREAD THROUGHOUT PERU. THE MILITARY, ON THE OTHER HAND, CAN CONCENTRATE

PERSONNEL IN THE EZ. SINCE 1983, IT HAS STATIONED ABOUT 5,000 TROUPS IN THE AYACUCHO EZ. THE MILITARY ALSO HAS FAR MORE EQUIPMENT (TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, WEAPONS) THAN THE POLICE, NOTWITHSTANDING IMPORTANT GAPS (HIGH-ALTITUDE HELICOPTERS, NIGHT VISION DEVICES). A POLITICAL ADVANTAGE TO THE EZ'S IS TO KEEP THE MILITARY INVOLVED IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY PROBLEM RATHER THAN CARPING ON THE SIDELINES. YET THERE ARE IMPORTANT DRAWBACKS TO THE MILITARY'S ROLE:

-- THE STATE OF EMERGENCY PLACES ALL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN THE EZ UNDER MILITARY CONTROL. THIS UNDERCUTS LOCAL CIVILIAN AUTHORITY AND THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE GOP'S STATED INTEREST IN COUNTERING THE GUERRILLAS POLITICALLY AS WELL AS MILITARILY;

-- THE MILITARY REMAINS A BLUNT INSTRUMENT: DESPITE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION, ADDITIONAL CASES OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS OCCUR, INCLUDING THE OCTOBER KILLINGS AT PARCCO AND POMATAMBO IN AYACUCHO. AT WORK ARE THE ARMED FORCES' AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION AND

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