

Case Number: S200200010

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.5(D)

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ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 CORE-00 /000W  
-----C2BBAF 221918Z /38

O 221914Z MAY 93  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8575  
INFO DIA WASHDC  
CIA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

TION 01 OF 03 LIMA 05862

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE  
SUBJECT: RETIRED GENERAL ON PLOTTING IN THE  
ARMY AND LA CANTUTA INVESTIGATION

EXTEND CLASSIFICATION

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: A SENIOR RETIRED GENERAL SAID  
CLANDESTINE "COMACA" ORGANIZING IN THE ARMY IS  
GROWING. HE HAD HEARD THREATS FROM COMACA  
OFFICERS TO KILL ARMY COMMANDER HERMOZA AND  
MONTESINOS IF THEY DID NOT RESIGN. HE SAID THE  
ARMY OFFICER CORPS WOULD ACCEPT A FULL

[REDACTED]

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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA,  
DISPUTING GOP STATEMENTS THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD  
PIT ARMY AGAINST CONGRESS. ARMY TRADITION  
REQUIRED THAT HERMOZA ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY,  
RATHER THAN HIDE OR PIN IT UPON OTHERS. HE  
CALLED FOR STEPPED-UP USG PRESSURE AS THE ONLY  
WAY TO KEEP FUJIMORI FROM BECOMING MORE  
DICTATORIAL. END SUMMARY.

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E. LANDFAIR  
DATE/CASE ID: 29 JUL 2002 S200200010  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X6  
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 MAY 2019

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[REDACTED] MET WITH POLCOUNS ON MAY 21 TO DISCUSS  
TENSIONS IN THE ARMY. [REDACTED]

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4. [REDACTED] BEGAN BY NOTING AREAS IN WHICH HE  
HAD SUPPORTED THE GOP: ITS IMPROVED COUNTER-  
INSURGENCY STRATEGY, WHICH HAD PERMITTED THE

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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ARMY TO REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS; ITS  
ECONOMIC POLICIES; AND THE APRIL 1992 COUP.  
FUJIMORI, HOWEVER, WAS NOT CONSTRUCTING  
DEMOCRACY, AS HE HAD PLEDGED, BUT RATHER WAS  
CONSOLIDATING DICTATORIAL RULE. THE COMBINATION  
OF HIS DICTATORIAL AMBITIONS AND BAD ADVICE FROM  
MONTESINOS HAD LED TO FUJIMORI'S ATTEMPT TO  
SUBJUGATE THE ARMY. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT HE  
BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE ABLE TO  
CHOOSE HIS ARMY COMMANDER. THE CHOICE, HOWEVER,  
SHOULD BE FROM AMONG THE ARMY'S TOP THREE  
OFFICERS, AND NOT FROM THE MOST MEDIOCRE. THE  
ISSUE WAS NOT ONE OF ARMY ACCEPTANCE OF CIVILIAN  
AUTHORITY, BUT RATHER ONE OF EXCESSIVE  
POLITIZATION OF THE ENTIRE ARMY. OFFICERS TODAY  
KNEW THAT ADVANCEMENT DEPENDED ON ONE'S TIES TO  
MONTESINOS AND ASSOCIATES, RATHER THAN UPON  
MERIT.

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5. THE ASSAULT ON THE ARMY INSTITUTION HAD  
BEGUN UNDER PRESIDENT GARCIA. GARCIA'S TACTIC

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WAS TO ENTICE GENERALS INTO CORRUPT ACTIVITIES AND THEN BLACKMAIL THEM. FUJIMORI, OF COURSE, HAD GONE MUCH FURTHER: FIRING SENIOR OFFICERS OR SENDING THEM ABROAD; PROMOTING FLUNKIES; INCREASING PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER ALL ARMY ASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS; AND TURNING THE SIN AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE INTO A "GESTAPO" TO INTIMIDATE OFFICERS FROM RESISTANCE.

6. THAT SAID, THERE WAS ORGANIZED RESISTANCE.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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THE CLANDESTINE OFFICER GROUP "COMACA" (GROUP OF COMANDANTES - LTC., MAJORS, AND CAPTAINS) HAD BEGUN UNDER GARCIA. [REDACTED] HE HAD NO FORMAL ASSOCIATION WITH COMACA, BUT THAT ITS MEMBERS SOUGHT HIM OUT PERIODICALLY, AS DID MANY OTHER ARMY OFFICERS. HE BELIEVED THAT COMACA HAD GROWN SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE DECEMBER 1992, DUE TO THE MISTREATMENT BY THE GOP OF GEN. SALINAS AND HIS COUP PLOTTERS. NOW THERE WERE COMACA

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8576  
INFO DIA WASHDC  
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: RETIRED GENERAL ON PLOTTING IN THE

CELLS IN THE NAVY, AND EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE THEM IN THE AIR FORCE. HE DID NOT KNOW, AND DID NOT WANT TO KNOW, HOW MANY OFFICERS WERE IN COMACA, BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO HEAR HOW MANY ARMY BASES REPORTEDLY HAD COMACA MEMBERS. SUCH GROWTH WAS REMARKABLE GIVEN THE SIN'S AND ARMY'S EFFORTS TO PENETRATE THE GROUP AND TO ROOT IT OUT.

7. [REDACTED] COMACA HAD ASKED HIM TO ASSUME

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A LEADERSHIP ROLE AGAINST HERMOZA. HE HAD DECLINED, AND SUGGESTED COMACA INSTEAD SEEK SOME ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL, "BUT ROBLES DID NOT WORK OUT THE WAY THEY HAD HOPED." [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD NOT SPOKEN WITH COMACA MEMBERS SINCE THE APRIL 21 "TANCAZO." THEY HAD, HOWEVER, INSISTED THAT IF HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS DID NOT RESIGN, COMACA WOULD ELIMINATE THEM. [REDACTED] DISAGREED TOTALLY THAT ASSASSINATION WAS APPROPRIATE OR HELPFUL. HE DID, HOWEVER, TAKE THE COMACA THREAT SERIOUSLY. HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS WERE PUSHING COMACA TOWARDS MORE EXTREME BEHAVIOR.

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8. REGARDING ROBLES, [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM BEFORE HE REQUESTED ASYLUM IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. HE HAD DISLIKED ROBLES' MENTIONING OF INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS' NAMES IN HIS STATEMENT. [REDACTED] SAID ROBLES HAD ALWAYS BEEN BETTER BEHIND A DESK THAN AS A COMMANDER. HE WAS, HOWEVER, HONEST. [REDACTED] SAID IT WAS HERMOZA, MORE THAN ANY OTHER PERSON, WHO HAD PUSHED ROBLES TOWARDS HIS ASYLUM REQUEST. HIS READING OF ROBLES' ACTIONS WAS THAT ROBLES HAD USED HIS TWO ARMY OFFICER SONS AS CONDUITS TO COMACA OFFICERS (WHO OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE HAD A HARD TIME APPROACHING ROBLES WITHOUT DETECTION). ROBLES THEN MIGHT HAVE TOLD MILITARY JUDGE GEN. PICON, TO UNDERSCORE THE VALIDITY OF HIS INFORMATION ON LA CANTUTA, THAT

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IT HAD COME THROUGH HIS SONS. ONCE PICON  
BETRAYED ROBLES TO HERMOZA, ROBLES REALIZED HE

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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HAD JEOPARDIZED HIS SONS. THAT WOULD EXPLAIN  
ROBLES' HASTY DECISION TO PROTECT HIS SONS  
THROUGH ASYLUM.

9. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW ARMY  
OFFICERS VIEWED THE TANCAZO, THE ROBLES AFFAIR,  
AND POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA  
CANTUTA, [REDACTED] SEVERAL INSIGHTS:

-- FIRST, GEN. HERMOZA'S APRIL 23 COMMUNIQUE  
AND DISPLAY OF TANKS WAS, TO AN ARMY OFFICER, AS  
MUCH AN ADMISSION OF GUILT AS IT WAS A WARNING  
TO CONGRESS. IT DID NOT BOOST HERMOZA'S PRESTIGE  
IN THE OFFICER CORPS. [REDACTED] AGREED WITH  
THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE COMMUNIQUE AND TANCAZO  
HAD BEEN APPROVED BY FUJIMORI -- HERMOZA WOULD  
NEVER HAVE DARED DO IT ON HIS OWN.)

-- SECOND, WHILE NO ONE WOULD CRY OVER DEAD  
TERRORISTS, THE WAY THAT THE SIN/ARMY GROUP HAD  
CARRIED OUT THE DISAPPEARANCES HAD LEFT NO  
DOUBTS THAT THE ARMY HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE, AND  
HENCE THE DEATH SQUAD HAD DAMAGED THE ARMY'S  
IMAGE.

-- THIRD, [REDACTED] DISMISSED AS ABSURD THE  
GOP'S CONTENTION THAT A CONGRESSIONAL  
INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING SUMMONING LOWER-RANKING  
OFFICERS TO TESTIFY, WOULD BREAK ARMY MORALE,  
HURT THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORT, INCREASE  
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, OR LEAD TO CALLS FOR A

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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CONFRONTATION AGAINST CONGRESS. OFFICERS KNEW  
THAT IN THESE SITUATIONS, THE COMMANDING OFFICER  
HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY, STEPPING DOWN  
IF NECESSARY. FULL CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION,

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[REDACTED] WAS A PROBLEM ONLY FOR HERMOZA  
AND HIS FRIENDS -- NOT FOR THE ARMY.

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-- FINALLY, SHOULD THE GOP ONLY PUNISH SEVERAL  
LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS FOR THE CRIME, THE RESULT  
WOULD BE TO INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE ARMY, SINCE  
HERMOZA WOULD BE SEEN AS GUILTY OF COWARDICE.

[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
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10. [REDACTED] HE BELIEVED -- HE HINTED HE  
HAD INSIDE INFORMATION -- THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS  
CONSIDERING REMOVING HERMOZA ON INDEPENDENCE DAY  
(JULY 28). TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT, FUJIMORI  
WOULD ALSO CHANGE THE HEADS OF THE NAVY AND AIR  
FORCE.. THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER WOULD THEN  
REPLACE MALCA AS DEFENSE MINISTER, AND INTERIOR  
MINISTER BRIONES WOULD BECOME ARMY COMMANDER.  
ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS TO ASSIGN FIRST MILITARY

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[REDACTED]

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 REGION COMMANDER HOWARD RODRIGUEZ AS ARMY  
 COMMANDER, BUT [REDACTED] AGREED THAT RODRIGUEZ  
 COULD PROVE HARDER TO MANIPULATE THAN A KNOWN  
 QUANTITY LIKE BRIONES. THE REAL LONGTERM  
 SOLUTION, BUT UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN, WAS TO HAVE  
 MONTESINOS STEP DOWN AS WELL.

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11. NOTING HE WAS AN ARDENT NATIONALIST AND IN  
 PRINCIPLE AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN PERU,  
 [REDACTED] UNFORTUNATELY THE ONLY ANSWER  
 WAS FOR THE U.S. TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO RESTRAIN  
 FUJIMORI. THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT LISTEN TO  
 ANYONE ELSE IN PERU, HE DECLARED.

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12. COMMENT: [REDACTED] REMAINS  
 PLUGGED INTO THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS, AND WE SEE  
 NO REASON TO DOUBT HIS CLAIMS OF CONTACTS WITH  
 COMACA. IN CONTRAST TO ROBLES, HE CAME ACROSS  
 AS SERIOUS AND CONCERNED ABOVE ALL ABOUT THE  
 ARMY INSTITUTION. [REDACTED]

B1

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13. TWO ELEMENTS STAND OUT IN [REDACTED]  
 ANALYSIS. FIRST IS THE THREAT OF VIOLENT COMACA  
 ACTIONS AGAINST THE ARMY LEADERSHIP OR  
 MONTESINOS. WE HAD HEARD THIS POSSIBILITY  
 BEFORE FROM A SEPARATE ACTIVE DUTY ARMY SOURCE.  
 SECOND IS [REDACTED] JUDGMENT THAT A FULL  
 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA,  
 INCLUDING THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF JUNIOR  
 OFFICER AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL, WOULD NOT

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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 PROVOKE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE ARMY  
 RANK-AND-FILE. THAT, OF COURSE, CONTRADICTS  
 THE GOP'S EXCUSE FOR TRYING TO AVOID A FULL  
 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION THAT WOULD LIKELY  
 FIND HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS AT LEAST POLITICALLY  
 RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISAPPEARANCES. [REDACTED]  
 VIEWS ON U.S. INTERVENTION AS AN ESSENTIAL  
 ELEMENT IN CURBING FUJIMORI'S AUTHORITARIAN  
 INSTINCTS IS ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY, GIVEN HIS  
 STRONG NATIONALIST CREDENTIALS.

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