



Case Number: S200200010

RELEASED IN PART B1, 1.5(D)

EXTEND CLASSIFICATION

PAGE 01

LIMA 05862 01 OF 03

ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 CORE-00 /000W

> -----C2BBAF 221918Z /38

O 221914Z MAY 93 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8575 INFO DIA WASHDC CIA WASHDC AMEMBASSY CARACAS USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

FION 01 OF 03 LIMA 05862

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356:

DECL: OADR

PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE


SUBJECT:

TAGS:

RETIRED GENERAL ON PLOTTING IN THE ARMY AND LA CANTUTA INVESTIGATION

ENTIRE TEXT.

A SENIOR RETIRED GENERAL SAID SUMMARY: CLANDESTINE "COMACA" ORGANIZING IN THE ARMY IS GROWING. HE HAD HEARD THREATS FROM COMACA OFFICERS TO KILL ARMY COMMANDER HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS IF THEY DID NOT RESIGN. HE SAID THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS WOULD ACCEPT A FULL



PAGE 02 LIMA 05862 01 OF 03 2219 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA PAGE 02 221917Z DISPUTING GOP STATEMENTS THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD PIT ARMY AGAINST CONGRESS. ARMY TRADITION REQUIRED THAT HERMOZA ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY. RATHER THAN HIDE OR PIN IT UPON OTHERS. CALLED FOR STEPPED-UP USG PRESSURE AS THE ONLY WAY TO KEEP FUJIMORI FROM BECOMING MORE DICTATORIAL. END SUMMARY.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E. LANDFAIR DATE/CASE ID: 29 JUL 2002 S200200010 **CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X6 DECLASSIFY AFTER: 22 MAY 2019**



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TENSIONS	MET	WITH	POLO	COUNS	ON	MAY	21	TO	DISCUSS	
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4. BEGAN BY NOTING AREAS IN WHICH HE HAD SUPPORTED THE GOP: ITS IMPROVED COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY, WHICH HAD PERMITTED THE



PAGE 03 LIMA 05862 01 OF 03 2219172 ARMY TO REDUCE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS; ITS ECONOMIC POLICIES; AND THE APRIL 1992 COUP. FUJIMORI, HOWEVER, WAS NOT CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY, AS HE HAD PLEDGED, BUT RATHER WAS CONSOLIDATING DICTATORIAL RULE. THE COMBINATION OF HIS DICTATORIAL AMBITIONS AND BAD ADVICE FROM MONTESINOS HAD LED TO FUJIMORI'S ATTEMPT TO SUBJUGATE THE ARMY. ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TO BE ABLE TO CHOOSE HIS ARMY COMMANDER. THE CHOICE, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE FROM AMONG THE ARMY'S TOP THREE OFFICERS, AND NOT FROM THE MOST MEDIOCRE. ISSUE WAS NOT ONE OF ARMY ACCEPTANCE OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY, BUT RATHER ONE OF EXCESSIVE POLITIZATION OF THE ENTIRE ARMY. OFFICERS TODAY KNEW THAT ADVANCEMENT DEPENDED ON ONE'S TIES TO MONTESINOS AND ASSOCIATES, RATHER THAN UPON MERIT.

5. THE ASSAULT ON THE ARMY INSTITUTION HAD BEGUN UNDER PRESIDENT GARCIA. GARCIA'S TACTIC



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WAS TO ENTICE GENERALS INTO CORRUPT ACTIVITIES AND THEN BLACKMAIL THEM. FUJIMORI, OF COURSE, HAD GONE MUCH FURTHER: FIRING SENIOR OFFICERS OR SENDING THEM ABROAD; PROMOTING FLUNKIES; INCREASING PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER ALL ARMY ASSIGNMENTS AND PROMOTIONS; AND TURNING THE SIN AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE INTO A "GESTAPO" TO INTIMIDATE OFFICERS FROM RESISTANCE.

6. THAT SAID, THERE WAS ORGANIZED RESISTANCE.



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THE CLANDESTINE OFFICER GROUP "COMACA" (GROUP OF
COMANDANTES - LTC., MAJORS, AND CAPTAINS) HAD
BEGUN UNDER GARCIA. HE HAD NO
FORMAL ASSOCIATION WITH COMACA, BUT THAT ITS
MEMBERS SOUGHT HIM OUT PERIODICALLY, AS DID MANY
OTHER ARMY OFFICERS. HE BELIEVED THAT COMACA
HAD GROWN SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE DECEMBER 1992, DUE
TO THE MISTREATMENT BY THE GOP OF GEN. SALINAS
AND HIS COUP PLOTTERS. NOW THERE WERE COMACA

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INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 CORE-00 /000W

-----C2BBC2 221921Z /38

O 221914Z MAY 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8576
INFO DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

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DECL: OADR

TAGS: SUBJECT: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE

RETIRED GENERAL ON PLOTTING IN THE

CELLS IN THE NAVY, AND EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE THEM IN THE AIR FORCE. HE DID NOT KNOW, AND DID NOT WANT TO KNOW, HOW MANY OFFICERS WERE IN COMACA, BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO HEAR HOW MANY ARMY BASES REPORTEDLY HAD COMACA MEMBERS. SUCH GROWTH WAS REMARKABLE GIVEN THE SIN'S AND ARMY'S EFFORTS TO PENETRATE THE GROUP AND TO ROOT IT OUT.

7. COMACA HAD ASKED HIM TO ASSUME

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LIMA 05862 02 OF 03 221921Z A LEADERSHIP ROLE AGAINST HERMOZA. HE HAD DECLINED, AND SUGGESTED COMACA INSTEAD SEEK SOME ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL, "BUT ROBLES DID NOT WORK OUT THE WAY THEY HAD HOPED." SAID HE HAD NOT SPOKEN WITH COMACA MEMBERS SINCE THE APRIL 21 "TANCAZO." THEY HAD, HOWEVER, INSISTED THAT IF HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS DID NOT RESIGN, COMACA WOULD ELIMINATE THEM. DISAGREED TOTALLY THAT ASSASSINATION WAS APPROPRIATE OR HELPFUL. HE DID, HOWEVER, TAKE THE COMACA THREAT SERIOUSLY. HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS WERE PUSHING COMACA TOWARDS MORE EXTREME BEHAVIOR.

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REGARDING ROBLES. SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM BEFORE HE REQUESTED ASYLUM IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. HE HAD DISLIKED ROBLES' MENTIONING OF INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS' NAMES IN HIS STATEMENT. BAID ROBLES HAD ALWAYS BEEN BETTER BEHIND A DESK THAN AS A COMMANDER. HE WAS, HOWEVER, HONEST. [SAID IT WAS HERMOZA, MORE THAN ANY OTHER PERSON, WHO HAD PUSHED ROBLES TOWARDS HIS ASYLUM REQUEST. HIS READING OF ROBLES' ACTIONS WAS THAT ROBLES HAD USED HIS TWO ARMY OFFICER SONS AS CONDUITS TO COMACA OFFICERS (WHO OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE HAD A HARD TIME APPROACHING ROBLES

WITHOUT DETECTION). ROBLES THEN MIGHT HAVE TOLD MILITARY JUDGE GEN. PICON, TO UNDERSCORE THE VALIDITY OF HIS INFORMATION ON LA CANTUTA, THAT

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IT HAD COME THROUGH HIS SONS. ONCE PICON BETRAYED ROBLES TO HERMOZA, ROBLES REALIZED HE



PAGE 03 02 OF 03 LIMA 05862 221921Z HAD JEOPARDIZED HIS SONS. THAT WOULD EXPLAIN ROBLES' HASTY DECISION TO PROTECT HIS SONS THROUGH ASYLUM.

9. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW ARMY OFFICERS VIEWED THE TANCAZO, THE ROBLES AFFAIR, AND POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA, SEVERAL INSIGHTS:

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FIRST, GEN. HERMOZA'S APRIL 23 COMMUNIQUE AND DISPLAY OF TANKS WAS, TO AN ARMY OFFICER, AS MUCH AN ADMISSION OF GUILT AS IT WAS A WARNING TO CONGRESS. IT DID NOT BOOST HERMOZA'S PRESTIGE IN THE OFFICER CORPS. AGREED WITH THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE COMMUNIQUE AND TANCAZO HAD BEEN APPROVED BY FUJIMORI -- HERMOZA WOULD NEVER HAVE DARED DO IT ON HIS OWN.)

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SECOND, WHILE NO ONE WOULD CRY OVER DEAD TERRORISTS, THE WAY THAT THE SIN/ARMY GROUP HAD CARRIED OUT THE DISAPPEARANCES HAD LEFT NO DOUBTS THAT THE ARMY HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE, AND HENCE THE DEATH SQUAD HAD DAMAGED THE ARMY'S IMAGE.

THIRD,

DISMISSED AS ABSURD THE GOP'S CONTENTION THAT A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING SUMMONING LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS TO TESTIFY, WOULD BREAK ARMY MORALE, HURT THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORT, INCREASE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, OR LEAD TO CALLS FOR A





PAGE 04 LIMA 05862 02 OF 03 CONFRONTATION AGAINST CONGRESS. OFFICERS KNEW THAT IN THESE SITUATIONS, THE COMMANDING OFFICER HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY, STEPPING DOWN IF NECESSARY. FULL CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION,



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WAS A PROBLEM ONLY FOR HERMOZA AND HIS FRIENDS -- NOT FOR THE ARMY.

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-- FINALLY, SHOULD THE GOP ONLY PUNISH SEVERAL LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS FOR THE CRIME, THE RESULT WOULD BE TO INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE ARMY, SINCE HERMOZA WOULD BE SEEN AS GUILTY OF COWARDICE.

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O 221914Z MAY 93 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8577 INFO DIA WASHDC CIA WASHDC AMEMBASSY CARACAS USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

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
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS:

PGOV, PINR, PHUM, US, PE

SUBJECT: RETIRED GENERAL ON PLOTTING IN THE

HE BELIEVED -- HE HINTED HE HAD INSIDE INFORMATION -- THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CONSIDERING REMOVING HERMOZA ON INDEPENDENCE DAY (JULY 28). TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT, FUJIMORI WOULD ALSO CHANGE THE HEADS OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE. THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER WOULD THEN REPLACE MALCA AS DEFENSE MINISTER, AND INTERIOR MINISTER BRIONES WOULD BECOME ARMY COMMANDER. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WAS TO ASSIGN FIRST MILITARY





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PAGE 02 LIMA 05862 03 OF 03 221922Z REGION COMMANDER HOWARD RODRIGUEZ AS ARMY COMMANDER, BUT AGREED THAT RODRIGUEZ COULD PROVE HARDER TO MANIPULATE THAN A KNOWN QUANTITY LIKE BRIONES. THE REAL LONGTERM SOLUTION, BUT UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN, WAS TO HAVE MONTESINOS STEP DOWN AS WELL.

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11. NOTING HE WAS AN ARDENT NATIONALIST AND IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN PERU,

UNFORTUNATELY THE ONLY ANSWER
WAS FOR THE U.S. TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO RESTRAIN FUJIMORI. THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT LISTEN TO ANYONE ELSE IN PERU, HE DECLARED.

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12. COMMENT: REMAINS
PLUGGED INTO THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS, AND WE SEE
NO REASON TO DOUBT HIS CLAIMS OF CONTACTS WITH
COMACA. IN CONTRAST TO ROBLES, HE CAME ACROSS
AS SERIOUS AND CONCERNED ABOVE ALL ABOUT THE
ARMY INSTITUTION.


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ANALYSIS. FIRST IS THE THREAT OF VIOLENT COMACA ACTIONS AGAINST THE ARMY LEADERSHIP OR MONTESINOS. WE HAD HEARD THIS POSSIBILITY BEFORE FROM A SEPARATE ACTIVE DUTY ARMY SOURCE. SECOND IS JUDGMENT THAT A FULL CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF LA CANTUTA, INCLUDING THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF JUNIOR OFFICER AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL. WOULD NOT

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PROVOKE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE ARMY
RANK-AND-FILE. THAT, OF COURSE, CONTRADICTS
THE GOP'S EXCUSE FOR TRYING TO AVOID A FULL
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION THAT WOULD LIKELY
FIND HERMOZA AND MONTESINOS AT LEAST POLITICALLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISAPPEARANCES.
VIEWS ON U.S. INTERVENTION AS AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT IN CURBING FUJIMORI'S AUTHORITARIAN
INSTINCTS IS ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY, GIVEN HIS
STRONG NATIONALIST CREDENTIALS.

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