

n/a

Case Number: S200200010

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.5(D)

PAGE 01 LIMA 05402 01 OF 02 112302Z
ACTION ARA-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AID-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DOEE-00
	EB-01	HA-09	H-01	INM-02	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-19
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/080W

-----BE49F6 112303Z /38

P 112258Z MAY 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8260
INFO DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 05402

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

EXTEND CLASSIFICATION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, US, PE
SUBJECT: WHY DID ROBLES DO IT -- A VIEW
FROM A RETIRED GENERAL

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.

PAGE 02 LIMA 05402 01 OF 02 112302Z

2. SUMMARY: RETIRED ARMY GENERAL [REDACTED]
DEFENDED AYLUM-SEEKER GEN. ROBLES AS AN HONEST,
"INSTITUTIONALIST" SENIOR OFFICER WHO CHOSE THE
BEST OPTION AVAILABLE. [REDACTED] STRESSED THAT
ROBLES' INFORMATION ABOUT ARMY/SIN ABUSES WAS
REAL. [REDACTED] SAID THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
RECENT DECLINE IN GOP ABUSES, IT WAS IMPERATIVE
THAT THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LA CANTUTA
AND BARRIOS ALTOS KILLINGS BE PUNISHED. FOREIGN

B1
B1
B1

n/a

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E. LANDFAIR
DATE/CASE ID: 29 JUL 2002 S200200010
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 11 MAY 2019

n/a

Case Number: S200200010

PRESSURE WOULD BE NEEDED. [REDACTED] SAID FUJIMORI WOULD RATHER KEEP ON A WEAKENED HERMOZA AS ARMY COMMANDER THAN REPLACE HIM WITH AN OFFICER HARDER TO CONTROL. FERMENT AT THE LEVEL OF COLONELS AND BELOW CONTINUES, BUT IS LEADERLESS. END SUMMARY.

B1

3. [REDACTED] GENERAL (RET.) [REDACTED] VISITED POLCOUNS MAY 10 TO REVIEW SITUATION IN THE MILITARY.

B1

B1

[REDACTED] MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE MILITARY. HE BEGAN BY ANALYZING ARMY COMMANDER GEN. HERMOZA'S CONFLICT WITH CONGRESS AND THE "TANCAZO" (APRIL 20-23), WHICH HE TERMED "BADLY THOUGHT OUT" AND WHICH DID NOT BOOST HERMOZA.

4. YOU HAD TO KNOW HERMOZA'S PERSONALITY, [REDACTED] TO KNOW THAT HE NEVER WOULD HAVE [REDACTED]

B1

PAGE 03 LIMA 05402 01 OF 02 112302Z DARED TO CROSS SWORDS WITH CONGRESS WITHOUT PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL. HERMOZA USED NOTES FOR HIS SUPPOSEDLY EXTEMPORANEOUS APRIL 20 REMARKS TO TELEVISION CAMERAS ON THE STEPS OF CONGRESS. NOR WOULD HERMOZA HAVE SECURED THE TRAVEL TO LIMA OF ALL FIVE MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS (WHO SIGNED THE COMMUNIQUE SUPPORTING HERMOZA) WITHOUT PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL. [REDACTED] INSISTED THAT FUJIMORI HAD CALLED THE SHOTS ON THE CONFRONTATION EVEN THOUGH HE WAS ABSENT FROM LIMA PART OF THE TIME. SOUNDINGS OF RETIRED AND ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL, [REDACTED] SHOWED THAT THE "TANCAZO" DID NOT CORRECT THE GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT HERMOZA WAS WEAK AND INEFFECTIVE.

B1

B1

5. [REDACTED] SAID THAT ROBLES, [REDACTED] WAS AN INTELLIGENT AND HONEST OFFICER. HIS INVESTIGATIONS OF CORRUPTION [REDACTED] HAD BEEN THOROUGH AND PERSISTENT.

B1

B1

B1

B1

n/a

[REDACTED]

n/a

Case Number: S200200010

[REDACTED] HE HAD HEARD FROM ROBLES' WIFE ON MAY 4 THAT THEY WOULD SEEK ASYLUM THE NEXT DAY IN THE U.S. EMBASSY.

B1

6. ROBLES' PROBLEM, [REDACTED] SAID, WAS THAT HE HAD NO GOOD OPTIONS. CONFRONTING HERMOZA WOULD HAVE BEEN POINTLESS. GIVING INFORMATION TO CONGRESS OR THE PRESS WAS RISKY, AND THERE WERE ALREADY ENOUGH ANONYMOUS ACCUSATIONS ON THE LA CANTUTA CASE. ROBLES' ONLY OPTION WAS TO TRY TO

B1

[REDACTED]

PAGE 04 LIMA 05402 01 OF 02 112302Z GET THE MILITARY JUDGE IN THE CASE, GEN. PICON, MORE INVOLVED. [REDACTED] SAID IT WAS LOGICAL FOR ROBLES TO HAVE TRUSTED PICON, SINCE THEY WERE CLASSMATES AND "COMPADRES." ONCE PICON BETRAYED ROBLES TO HERMOZA, [REDACTED] ROBLES WAS BOXED IN; AS LONG AS HIS TWO SONS SERVED IN THE ARMY, THEY WERE HOSTAGES.

B1

B1

7. POLCOUNS ASKED HOW CONVINCING [REDACTED] FOUND ROBLES' ACCUSATIONS, GIVEN ROBLES' ANTAGONISM TOWARDS HERMOZA AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT COUP-PLOTTERS (THE SALINAS SEDO GROUP) MIGHT HAVE FABRICATED SOME OF ROBLES' INFORMATION.

B1

[REDACTED]

NNNN

[REDACTED]

PAGE 01 LIMA 05402 02 OF 02 112303Z ACTION ARA-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	AID-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DOEE-00
	EB-01	HA-09	H-01	INM-02	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-19
	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SIL-00	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00
	SS-00	STR-16	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	/080W

-----BE4A09 112303Z /38

P 112258Z MAY 93
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8261

n/a

[REDACTED]

n/a

Case Number: S200200010

INFO DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

SECTION 02 OF 02 LIMA 05402

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, US, PE
SUBJECT: WHY DID ROBLES DO IT -- A VIEW

ACKNOWLEDGED ROBLES HAD BEEN DEEPLY
OFFENDED BY THE PRESIDENT'S SIDELINING A CAREER

B1

PAGE 02 LIMA 05402 02 OF 02 112303Z
THAT UNDER THE OLD RULES WOULD HAVE CULMINATED
IN ROBLES' COMMAND OF THE ARMY IN 1995. THAT
SAID, POINTED OUT THAT ROBLES CHOSE A
RISKY AND UNCERTAIN EXILE OVER A COMFORTABLE AND
REWARDING RETIREMENT POST IN WASHINGTON.
INSISTED -- HE DID NOT SAY HOW HE KNEW -- THAT
ROBLES' SOURCES IN THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE (SIN) AND THE ARMY WERE GENUINE AND WERE
NOT LINKED TO GEN. SALINAS. THERE WERE NO
"PRO-GOLPISTAS" LEFT IN POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE.
(COMMENT: GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS
OWN SOURCES CORROBORATED ROBLES' ACCUSATIONS.)

B1

B1

B1

8. SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE GOP
INVESTIGATE THE LA CANTUTA CASE AND PUNISH THOSE
RESPONSIBLE. OTHERWISE THESE ASSASSINATION
GROUPS COULD REINITIATE ACTIVITIES.
URGED THAT THE U.S., OR THE OAS, PRESS THE GOP
FOR A SUCCESSFUL INVESTIGATION.

B1

B1

9. CONCLUDED THAT ROBLES' ACCUSATIONS,
AND VERY PUBLIC PROTEST, HAD BEEN VIEWED WITH
SYMPATHY IN MUCH OF THE ARMY OFFICER CORPS.
DISCONTENT CONTINUED AMONG THE OFFICERS, BUT

B2

n/a

[REDACTED]

n/a

Case Number: S200200010

APPARENTLY IT HAD NO LEADERSHIP. THE FACT THAT PICON HAD BETRAYED ROBLES UNDERSCORED THE ABILITY OF THE ARMY AND SIN TO PENETRATE POTENTIAL OPPOSITION. [REDACTED] SAID THERE WOULD BE ADDITIONAL INCIDENTS IN THE ARMY THAT REFLECTED UNREST, BUT HE INSISTED THERE WOULD BE NO SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT.

B1

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 03 LIMA 05402 02 OF 02 112303Z

10. AS TO GEN. HERMOZA, [REDACTED] PREDICTED THAT FUJIMORI AND MONTESINOS WOULD PREFER TO KEEP HIM ON. CERTAINLY THE PRESIDENT HAD GONE OUT OF HIS WAY ON MAY 8 TO REITERATE SUPPORT FOR MONTESINOS AND HERMOZA. ALTHOUGH HERMOZA WAS WEAKENED, FUJIMORI DID NOT WANT A STRONG GENERAL AS ARMY COMMANDER. EVEN GEN. HOWARD RODRIGUEZ (THE COMMANDER OF THE FIRST MILITARY REGION GROOMED BY FUJIMORI) MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE OVERLY INDEPENDENT.

B1

11. COMMENT: [REDACTED] SYMPATHIES LIE WITH THOSE WHO DEFEND THE ARMY INSTITUTION. HE APPEARS, HOWEVER, TO BE RELATIVELY OBJECTIVE. ROBLES' ALLEGATIONS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ARE ONLY ONE PART OF THE LARGER ISSUE OF WHO CONTROLS THE MILITARY.

B1

BRAYSHAW##

[REDACTED]

NNNN

n/a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]