

~~NOFORN~~

INQUIRE=DOC23D
ITEM NO=00554605
ENVELOPE
CDSN = LGX407 MCN = 93280/07661 TOR = 932800553
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS6299 2800557-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 070557Z OCT 93
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 062145Z OCT 93
FM USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2-JICSOUTH//
TO AIG 7084
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC//J2M/CH-5/PAN-3D/PGT//
RUEKJCS/USDEL IADB WASHINGTON DC
RUCKDDA/CG SECOND MARDIV CAMP LEJEUNE NC
RUWDCAA/FIRST SRI GROUP CAMP PENDLETON CA
RUCLFVA/CG FOURTH MAW
RULYSCC/NAVSPECWARUNIT EIGHT
RUCOSYA/SPECBOATU TWO SIX
RULGSAA/NAVINSERVRA ROOSEVELT ROADS RQ
RUHQHQA/CG FMFPAC
RUWDCAA/CG I MEF
RUCKMDA/CG SECOND FSSG
RUCOKAB/COMPHIBGRU TWO
RUCKFCA/CG SECOND MAW
RULGSCC/CG FIRST MARDIV
RULGSCC/MAG FOUR NINE DET BRAVO
RULYSCC/TWO TWO MEU SOC
RUCKDDA/TWO TWO MEU FWD
RUCKDDA/CG II MEF CAMP LEJEUNE NC
RULYSHH/COMNAVSPECWAR GRU TWO
RUCLFVA/CG MARRESFOR
INFO RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ3/SCJ3-DDX/SCJ5//
RUERHNA/CDR7THSFGA FT BRAGG NC//AOSO-SFB-SN-MI//
RUCKDDA/CG SECOND MARDIV CAMP LEJEUNE NC//G-2//
RUCQVAU/AUCADRE MAXWELL AFB AL//WGOI//
RUEHQT/USMILGP QUITO EC//TAT//
RUANJTF/CJTF FOUR//OO/J2/J3/J5//
RUCLBMB/33 OSS EGLIN AFB FL//OSN//
RUVKAUS/USSOUTHAF BERGSTROM AFB TX//CDO/CDOI//
RUCBSAA/LANTCOM IDHS NORFOLK VA
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUCDNCC/TAG LA NEW ORLEANS LA//LANG-DST-IS//S2 225 ENG BDE//
RULGSAD/COMFAIRCARIB ROOSEVELT ROADS PR//N2//
RUVMDBC/USSOUTHAF DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ//DO//
RHHMCMY/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUERHNA/CDR 20TH ENG BDE FT BRAGG NC//S2//
RHLBSIM/SIMS QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
BT

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CONTROLS

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BODY

SUBJ: USSOUTHCOM DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 6 OCTOBER 1993 (U)

- 1. (U) THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS ITEMS PRESENTED TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, USSOUTHCOM, ON 6 OCTOBER 1993.
- 2. (U) NICARAGUA---IBARRA WINS EXTRADITION CASE.
 - A. (U) ON 5 OCTOBER, THE BOLIVIAN SUPREME COURT DENIED NICARAGUA'S PETITION TO HAVE ANTONIO IBARRA EXTRADITED TO FACE CRIMINAL CHARGES. IBARRA HAS BEEN FREED FROM HOUSE ARREST, BEING DETAINED AT NICARAGUA'S REQUEST SINCE JANUARY.
 - B. ~~(C)~~ IBARRA WHO IS ALSO AN AMERICAN CITIZEN WAS VICE MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY UNDER LACAYO BEFORE BEING FIRED IN JANUARY 1992 FOR "MISUSE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS". IBARRA FLED TO THE UNITED STATES AND THEN MOVED TO BOLIVIA.

[REDACTED] (b)(1); (d)

- C. ~~(C)~~ IBARRA WILL PROBABLY RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES, AND NICARAGUA WILL CONTINUE EXTRADITION EFFORTS.
- [REDACTED] (b)(1);(d);(c)

U.S. AID IS DESPERATELY NEEDED BY NICARAGUA, SINCE THE GOVERNMENT IS BANKRUPT AND ITS CASH RESERVE WILL PROBABLY DRY UP BY THE END OF THIS MONTH. IF THE U.S. AID IS NOT RECEIVED, WE ANTICIPATE INCREASED CIVIL UNREST AND PRESSURE ON THE CHAMORRO GOVERNMENT. (SCJ2 ANALYST: 1LT CARPENTER, USA. SOURCE: FBIS)

- 3. (U) PANAMA---STRIKES UPDATE.
 - A. (U) OPEN PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THE TELEPHONE (INTEL) WORKERS CONCLUDED THEIR 34 DAY STRIKE ON 4 OCTOBER. COMPTROLLER GENERAL CHARLES FINALLY AUTHORIZED PAYMENT FOR THE DAYS THAT THE WORKERS WERE ON STRIKE AS WELL AS THE BACKPAY. IN RETURN, THE INTEL WORKERS AGREED TO WORK AN EXTRA 17.5 HOURS PER WEEK TO COMPENSATE FOR LOST SALARIES. TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES HAVE BEEN REESTABLISHED AND WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT FULFILLS ITS PROMISE.
 - B. (U) CONTRARY TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTEL STRIKE, THE TEACHERS CONTINUE TO DEMAND A 100 DOLLAR MONTHLY SALARY INCREASE. THE GOP NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE EDUCATORS. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY PROPOSED A 20 DOLLAR MONTHLY RAISE INCREASE, BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT AN AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED ANY TIME SOON. SCJ2 ANALYST: 1LT RAMOS, USA. SOURCE: MEDIA)

- (U) PERU---UPDATE ON GUZMAN'S PEACE OFFER.
 - ~~(C)~~ REACTION IN PERU TO ABIMAELE GUZMAN'S PEACE OFFER CONTINUES TO BE GUARDED OPTIMISM WITH PERUVIANS STILL BACKING PRESIDENT UJIMORI'S CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) CEASE-FIRE. MILE NEWSPAPERS ARE RUNNING HEADLINES ANNOUNCING THE COLLAPSE, THE END AND THE END OF PERU'S INSURGENCIAS, THEY MAY BE PREMATURE.

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SPECULATION IS NOW CENTERED ON WHETHER GUZMAN'S PEACE OFFER WILL CAUSE FACTIONALIZATION WITHIN SL AND IF GUZMAN WILL MAKE FURTHER OFFERS OF CAPITULATION. THERE HAS BEEN NO REACTION THUS FAR FROM SL ITSELF, NO POLITICAL DECLARATIONS, AND NO TERRORIST REPRISALS TO GUZMAN'S OFFER OR FUJIMORI'S REJECTION. THE SL GENERALLY MAKES DECISIONS VERY SLOWLY, SO WE DO NOT EXPECT AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN A LACK OF SL ACTION IN LIMA SINCE GUZMAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT, THIS IS PROBABLY DUE TO INCREASED SECURITY, AND IS NOT DIRECTLY TIED TO THE OFFER OF NEGOTIATIONS.

B. ~~(S)~~ AS A RESULT OF GUZMAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT, PRESIDENT FUJIMORI'S HIGH POPULARITY HAS RISEN FURTHER.

(b)(1);(d)

[REDACTED] PRESS REPORTS ARE NAMING MONTEZINOS FOR THE DIRECTING OF GUZMAN'S INTERROGATIONS.

C. ~~(S)~~

(b)(1);(d);(a)

(SCJ2 ANALYST: CAPT SHULT, USAF. SOURCES: AMEMB, PALO)

5. (U) ARGENTINA---ELECTION RESULTS.

A. ~~(S)~~ ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] PRESS REPORTING, THE RESULTS OF THE 3 OCTOBER CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION GIVES THE RULING PERONISTS APPROXIMATELY 42 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL VOTE. THE OTHER LARGE NATIONAL PARTY, THE RADICALS, RECEIVED ABOUT 31 PERCENT. ALTHOUGH MENEM AND OTHER PERONISTS ARE CLAIMING AN ELECTION SWEEP AND A MANDATE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, THEIR 42 PERCENT VICTORY IS NOT A MANDATE FOR MENEM'S REELECTION.

(b)(1);(c)

B. ~~(S)~~ THE MAKEUP OF THE CONGRESS HAS CHANGED VERY LITTLE, WITH THE PERONISTS GAINING 6 TO 9 SEATS IN THE 257 MEMBER LOWER HOUSE. AT THE MOST, THE MAKE UP GIVES THEM 48 PERCENT OF THE LOWER HOUSE, FAR FROM THE TWO-THIRDS NEEDED TO CALL AN AMENDING CONVENTION. IF LEGISLATION TO DO SO IS INTRODUCED, IT WILL LIKELY BE DEFEATED.

C. ~~(S)~~ ALTHOUGH PERONISTS HOPE THEIR VICTORY WILL FORCE THE OPPOSITION TO AGREE TO CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, THIS IS UNLIKELY. MENEM WILL IN THE END LIKELY APPEAL DIRECTLY TO THE PEOPLE BY CALLING A NATIONAL REFERENDUM. A MASSIVE PERONIST CAMPAIGN TO BUILD PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR REFORM IS LIKELY. WHILE DETERMINED TO REMAIN IN POWER, MENEM STILL FACES MANY OBSTACLES TO REELECTION IN MAY OF 95.

(SCJ2 ANALYST: LT WILLIAMS, USN. SOURCES: AMEMB, REUTERS, FBIS)
6. (U) QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS MESSAGE MAY BE ADDRESSED TO MSG IYLEMON, USA, DSN 313-285-6291 OR LTC MCNEIL, USA, DSN 313-285-6282.

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INQUIRE=DOC29D
ITEM NO=00365130

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS023 MCN = 95025/28691 TOR = 950251521
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2629 0251519-SSSS--RUEANSS.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 251519Z JAN 95
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEALGX/SAFE
P 242047Z JAN 95
FM USCINCSO SCJ2 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2-JICSOUTH//
TO AIG 7084

INFO RUWMEGA/640AMSS HOWARD AFB PM
RUERFCP/CDR3RDSOSC FT CLAYTON PM//SOSC-IN//
RUERFCP/CDRMPC FT CLAYTON PM//SOMP-IN/SOMP-MA//
RUERPMB/CDR3CO7THSFGA FT WILLIAM D DAVIS PM//AOSO-SFB-TB-C//
RUERPMB/CDRUSAJOTB FT WILLIAM D DAVIS PM//AFVW-JT//
RUDMQAN/MARCORINTACT QUANTICO VA//MCIA-IIB//
RHCDAAA/720STG HURLBURT FLD FL//IN//
RHLBMXI/MAXI QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RHLBSIM/SIMS QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

BT

CONTROLS

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SECTION 01 OF 04

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY
SUBJ: USSOUTHCOM INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 24 JANUARY 1995 (U)

1. (U) THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS ITEMS PROVIDED TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, USSOUTHCOM, 24 JANUARY 1995.

PART I--THIS PART CONTAINS SELECTED ITEMS OF INTEREST FROM THROUGHOUT THE AOR. ITEMS ARE SUMMARIES OF SINGLE SOURCE REPORTS AND OPEN PRESS ITEMS. ANALYST COMMENTS ARE INCLUDED AS REQUIRED.

2. ~~(S/NF)~~ GUATEMALA---MG ENRIQUEZ WILL REMAIN AS MOD UNTIL AT LEAST JUNE 1995.

[REDACTED] (b)(1);(d)

[REDACTED] (b)(1);(d)

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-- GONZALEZ TARACENA REPORTEDLY SAID ALL ARMY PERSONNEL NAMED IN INQUIRIES INTO BAMACA CASE SHOULD STAND TRIAL FOR MURDER, A POSITION NO OFFICER IS WILLING TO SUPPORT.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(d)

-- COMMENT: MG ENRIQUEZ MAINTAINS THE CONFIDENCE OF DE LEON. WHILE HE IS LOSING SUPPORT WITH RANK AND FILE DUE TO HIS QUESTIONABLE DEALS, THERE IS NO TALK OF BARRACKS COUP OR FORCEABLE REMOVAL.

3. ~~(S/NF/WH)~~ GUATEMALA---ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT RESULTING FROM BAMACA CASE.

-- [REDACTED] REPORTS ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT RUNS DEEP THROUGHOUT THE OFFICER CORPS; SIMILAR VIEWS ALSO WIDESPREAD AMONG CIVILIANS.

(b)(1);(d)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(d)

---MANY CONFUSED BY U.S. SUPPORT OF OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS WHILE ATTACKING GUATEMALAN ARMY FOR PAST ACTIONS TAKEN TO DEFEND THEIR COUNTRY.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(d)

-- COMMENT: USG RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA HAVE BEEN STRAINED AS A RESULT OF THIS AND SEVERAL OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS CASES. HOWEVER, THESE VIEWS ARE NOT SURPRISING SINCE THE GUATEMALAN ARMY VIEWS BAMACA AS A TERRORIST WHO TOOK UP ARMS AGAINST THE STATE.

PART III--SPECIAL ITEMS.

1. (U) NICARAGUA---MILITARY REPORTS SUCCESS OF ONGOING OPERATION.


1. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE SANDINISTA POPULAR ARMY (EPS) HAS CLAIMED SUCCESS SO FAR DURING THIS YEAR'S JOINT MILITARY-POLICE OPERATION, PLAN NORTE, WHICH WAS INITIATED IN OCT 94 AND IS SCHEDULED TO RUN THROUGH FEB 95. THE ANNUAL OPERATION IS CONDUCTED TO PROTECT THE COFFEE HARVEST AND REDUCE THE VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IN RECENT YEARS, COFFEE HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN A TOP AGRICULTURAL EXPORT.

1. ~~(S/NF)~~ THROUGH EARLY JANUARY, THE MILITARY CLAIMED TO HAVE REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ARMED IRREGULARS [REDACTED]

(b)(1);(a);(d)

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(b)(1);(a);(d)

C. ~~(S/NF)~~ ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES HAVE BEEN MINIMAL. THE EPS CREDITED THE SUCCESS, THUS FAR, ON COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND LOCAL POPULACE. IN THE PAST, HOSTILITIES HAVE OCCURRED; HOWEVER, LOCAL RESIDENTS HAVE BEEN MORE WILLING TO HELP THE EPS THIS YEAR DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY LIAISONS, IMPROVED EPS DEMEANOR, AND THE PROSPECTS OF FINANCIAL BENEFITS RESULTING FROM THE ABSENCE OF REGIONAL VIOLENCE. IN ADDITION, UNLIKE PREVIOUS YEARS, ARMED BANDITS AND REMAINING IRREGULARS ARE WITHOUT A POLITICAL AGENDA. THEREFORE, THE LOCAL POPULACE HAS NO SYMPATHY FOR THE CRIMINALS, BUT, INSTEAD, SUPPORTS THE SECURITY FORCES.

D. ~~(S/NF)~~ WHILE ALL REPORTS INDICATE THE ONGOING OPERATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL, NUMBERS ARE SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORY (NUMBER OF WEAPONS CAPTURED, RECONTRAS KILLED, IRREGULARS REMAINING) AND MAY BE INFLATED, WHICH IS OFTEN THE CASE. THE LACK OF REPORTS ALLEGING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES APPEARS TO PARTIALLY VALIDATE EPS CLAIMS OF SUCCESS.

(b)(1);(d);(b)(7)(D)



THE APPARENT SUCCESS OF PLAN NORTE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO LESSONS LEARNED FROM SIMILAR OPERATIONS OF THE PAST (I.E. COSECHA 94). THESE LESSONS INCLUDE USE OF MILITARY LIAISONS IN AREAS OF CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE, APPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF EQUIPMENT (E.G.

***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/
HELICOPTER USE FOR TRANSPORT NOT ASSAULT), AND AN ALL OUT CAMPAIGN TO PACIFY THE COUNTRYSIDE ONCE AND FOR ALL.

E. ~~(S/NF)~~ THE MILITARY GOAL TO PACIFY THE HISTORICALLY ACTIVE NORTH PRIOR TO THE NOV 96 ELECTIONS APPEARS REALISTIC. OVERLY OPTIMISTIC EXPECTATIONS FOR PEACE FOLLOWED THE APR 94 DEMOBILIZATION OF THE 3-80 NORTHERN FRONT, THE LARGEST REMAINING RECONTRA ORGANIZATION. IN CONTRAST, JUST A MINIMAL PRESENCE OF DELINQUENTS AND BANDITS SHOULD REMAIN FOLLOWING A SUCCESSFUL PLAN NORTE.

F. ~~(S/NF)~~ PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE NORTH MAY IMPROVE THE MILITARY'S REPUTATION BUT, IN TURN, ADVERSELY AFFECT THE JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS EXISTENCE. THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKELY REDUCE THE MILITARY SIZE AND BUDGET IN FAVOR OF UPGRADING THE POLICE FORCE. THE NATIONAL POLICE CONTINUES TO BE UNDER-MANNED AND WELL-EQUIPPED SUFFERING FROM PLAYING SECOND FIDDLE TO THE EPS, A LACK OF FUNDS IN THE MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT (WHICH HAS BEEN PART OF A LOW NATIONAL BUDGET, OVERALL), AND NO OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESSES (UNLIKE THE EPS) TO HELP SUPPORT ITS INSTITUTION.

SCJ2 ANALYST: 1LT STAMP, USAF. SOURCES: USDAO, FBIS, AMEMB)

5. (U) COLOMBIA---KIDNAPPED!

A. ~~(S/NT)~~ SINCE 1980, 69 U.S. CITIZENS HAVE BEEN REPORTED KIDNAPPED IN COLOMBIA IN 58 SEPARATE INCIDENTS. CURRENTLY, EIGHT U.S. CITIZENS ARE IN CAPTIVITY:

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(d);
(b)(7)(A)

-- 31 JANUARY 1993, THREE NEW TRIBE MISSIONARIES (NTM) WERE CAPTURED IN THE DARIEN PROVINCE, PANAMA.

-- 16 JANUARY 1994, TWO NTM MISSIONARIES, AT THE "RANCH OF HOPE" LOCATED SEVEN KM OUTSIDE OF VILLAVICENCIO (0409N 07339W).

-- 31 MARCH 1994, THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC RELATIONS FOR THE "SUMMER INSTITUTE OF LINGUISTICS" (SIL) WAS ABDUCTED NEAR LOMA LINDA, META ABOUT THREE HOURS OUTSIDE OF VILLAVICENCIO.

-- 3 JUNE, TWO U.S. OIL WORKERS FOR INTAIRDRIL COMPANY WERE SEIZED IN LAGO AGRIO (0004N 07700W), ECUADOR AND TAKEN INTO COLOMBIA ON 4 JUNE 1994.

-- 23 SEPTEMBER 1994, A WORKER FOR THE CENTRO INTERNACIONAL DE AGRICULTURA TROPICAL (CIAT) WAS CAPTURED AT A [REDACTED] ROAD BLOCK OUTSIDE OF PUERTO TEJADA (0314N 07625W) EN ROUTE CALI.

(b)(1);(d)

--18 JANUARY, A U.S. ENGINEER WORKING FOR A COAL MINING CORPORATION WAS ABDUCTED [REDACTED] NEAR THE TOWN OF HATO NUEVO, LA GUAJIRA, 550 MILES NORTH OF BOGOTA.

(b)(1);(d)

3. ~~(S/NT)~~ SCOPE. REUTERS CITES A RECENTLY PUBLISHED REPORT BY THE PAIS LIBRE FOUNDATION WHICH SAYS THAT KIDNAPPING "HAS BECOME A \$350 MILLION INDUSTRY IN COLOMBIA, WITH FOUR VICTIMS SNATCHED DAILY AND 54 FOREIGNERS ABDUCTED IN THE PAST THREE YEARS FOR HUGE RANSOMS." SOME OTHER NOTEWORTHY FACTS:

-- ALTHOUGH REPORTED KIDNAPPINGS FELL 23 PERCENT BETWEEN 1992 AND 1993, LAST YEAR THEY ROSE BY MORE THAN ONE-THIRD TO 1,378.

-- AN ESTIMATED FEWER THAN ONE-HALF OF THE KIDNAPPINGS ARE REPORTED TO THE AUTHORITIES.

-- THE NUMBER OF HOSTAGES TAKEN IN URBAN LOCATIONS IS VERY LOW, THE MAJORITY ARE CAPTURED IN RURAL AREAS AND AT GUERRILLA ROADBLOCKS.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(d)

THE GOVERNMENT RECENTLY IDENTIFIED OVER 200 SEPARATE GROUPS THEY BELIEVE TO BE ENGAGED IN KIDNAPPING OR RELATED ACTIVITIES.

-- THE GUERRILLAS HAVE ACHIEVED A HIGH LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF ABDUCTIONS AND HAVE, IN SOME INSTANCES, DEVELOPED NARROW SPECIALTIES, WITH DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS HANDLING INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THE CRIME, E.G., ESTABLISHING VICTIMS' ECONOMIC WORTH, PROVIDING NECESSARY EQUIPMENT, CAPTURE, TRANSPORT, IMPRISONMENT, OR NEGOTIATION OF THE RANSOM PAYMENT.

E. ~~(S/NF)~~ AS WELL AS ITS OBVIOUS MONETARY ASPECTS, KIDNAPPING IS ALSO USED BY SOME GROUPS AS A POLITICAL TOOL:

-- IN MAR 94, FOR EXAMPLE, TWO FRENCH TOURISTS WERE KIDNAPPED BUT LATER RELEASED WHEN IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THEY WERE NOT U.S. CITIZENS.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)

F. ~~(S/NF)~~ TOUGH LAWS, SPARSE ENFORCEMENT. FEWER THAN ONE IN 30 KIDNAPPERS WERE CAUGHT AND SENTENCED OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS BECAUSE OF POOR POLICE WORK AND A WEAK LEGAL SYSTEM. A TOUGH ANTI-KIDNAPPING LAW PASSED IN 1993 WITH PRISON SENTENCES OF UP TO 60 YEARS FOR ABDUCTIONS HAS COMPLETELY FAILED TO STOP KIDNAPPINGS, LARGELY BECAUSE PROSECUTORS FAILED TO PRESS CHARGES AND BECAUSE VICTIMS' FAMILIES DID NOT REPORT CRIMES BECAUSE THEY MISTRUSTED GOC AUTHORITIES.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

-- (U) SECURITY FORCES RESCUED ONLY ONE IN 10 OF THE REPORTED KIDNAP VICTIMS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS AND MANY OTHERS WERE MURDERED BY THE KIDNAPPERS, WHO OFTEN DEMANDED A FEE FROM THE FAMILY TO RETURN THE DEAD BODY.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)

-- (U) PART OF THE REASON FOR GOC UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY TO ENFORCE EXISTING KIDNAPPING LAWS PROBABLY, IN PART, STEMS FROM RULING CLASS COMPLACENCY; I.E. WHILE KIDNAPPING IS ENDEMIC, THE ELITE ARE GENERALLY INSULATED FROM THE THREAT. PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN, POLITICIANS, WRITERS, MUSICIANS AND EVEN BULLFIGHTERS TRAVEL IN HEAVILY ARMED MOTORCADES SURROUNDED BY UZI-TOTING BODYGUARDS TO AVOID THE RISK OF ABDUCTION.

G. ~~(S/NF)~~ PROSPECTS FOR RELEASE OF U.S. HOSTAGES IN COLOMBIA IN THE NEAR-TERM LOOKS BLEAK.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)
(b)(7)(A)

H. ~~(S/NF)~~ KIDNAPPING IS INTEGRAL TO COLOMBIAN SOCIETY. WE BELIEVE IMPOVERISHMENT, THE ONGOING INSURGENCY, LACK OF GOC WILL TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM, AND THE READINESS OF FAMILIES TO PAY RANSOM DEMANDS WILL ALL CONTINUE TO UNDERPIN THE KIDNAPPING THREAT. (SCJ2 ANALYST: LT BRUCE, USN. SOURCES: REUTERS, AMEMBASSY, USDAO BOGOTA, USDAO QUITO)

6. (U) PERU---REASSIGNMENTS LAY GROUNDWORK FOR POSSIBLE SERVICE CHIEF RETIREMENTS.


A. ~~(S/NF)~~ ALTHOUGH THE LAST WORD ON 1995 PERUVIAN GENERAL OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS WILL NOT BE OUT UNTIL AFTER THE 9 APRIL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, ASSIGNMENTS THUS FAR RELEASED APPEAR TO HAVE LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE MOST REVOLUTIONARY REORGANIZATION IN RECENT PERUVIAN MILITARY HISTORY.

B. ~~(S/NF)~~ UPON ASSUMING OFFICE ON 28 JULY 1990, PRESIDENT ALBERTO FUJIMORI REALIZED THAT ONE OF THE GREATEST OBSTACLES TO PERUVIAN DEMOCRATIZATION LAY IN THE ARMED FORCES' HISTORICAL ROLE AS ARBITER OF NATIONAL POLITICAL POWER.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(d)

C. ~~(S-4NF)~~ ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT APPOINTMENTS IN THIS STRATEGY HAS BEEN ARMY COMMANDING GENERAL (CG) AND PRESIDENT OF THE JOINT COMMAND, NICOLAS DE BARI HERMOZA. GENERAL HERMOZA HAS FAITHFULLY SERVED THE ADMINISTRATION SINCE 1991. HOWEVER, HE IS THREE YEARS PAST MANDATORY RETIREMENT AND, AS ARMY RESTLESSNESS OVER PROMOTIONS BLOCKAGES THREATENS TO DISRUPT MILITARY UNITY, THE ISSUE OF HIS RETIREMENT CAN NO LONGER BE IGNORED. THERE IS LITTLE DEBATE OVER THE NEED TO TRANSITION HERMOZA. HOWEVER, THE PRESS APPEARS TO BE INSTIGATING THE MILITARY BY ALLEGING A RIFT BETWEEN HERMOZA AND THE FUJIMORI-MONTESINOS REGIME.



(b)(1);(d)

D. ~~(S-4NF)~~ IN THE MEAN TIME, THE ARMY'S FOUR PROMOTIONS TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL (LTG) AND TWENTY FIVE PROMOTIONS TO MAJOR GENERAL (MG) WERE AS MUCH FUJIMORI-MONTESINOS LOYALIST CHOICES AS THEY EVER WERE. FOR EXAMPLE, NEWLY PROMOTED ARTILLERY LTG ALBERTO RIOS RUEDA WAS FORMERLY HEAD OF THE PRESIDENTIAL MILITARY HOUSEHOLD, AN INFLUENTIAL INSIDER POSITION WHICH NO DOUBT HELPED WIN FUJIMORI'S CONFIDENCE AND LANDED HIM COMMAND OF 3D MILITARY REGION (3MR), AREQUIPA. THE 1MR COMMAND, PIURA, WAS AWARDED TO NEWLY PROMOTED INFANTRY LTG CESAR RAMAL PESANTES, A FORMER SPECIAL FORCES DIVISION (DIFE) OFFICER WHO IS LIKEWISE IN GOOD FAVOR WITH THE FUJIMORI-MONTESINOS REGIME. RAMAL IS WELL-RESPECTED AND HAS A REPUTATION FOR HONEST AND DEDICATED SERVICE. THE 2MR COMMAND, LIMA, WAS AWARDED TO LTG JUAN LEON VARILLAS, FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE LOGISTICS COMMAND. LEON REPLACES MONTESINOS LOYALIST, LTG THOMAS CASTILLO MEZA, WHO MOVES TO THE EP NUMBER THREE SLOT AS

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/
INSPECTOR GENERAL. IRONICALLY ENOUGH, ALTHOUGH THE RIOS, LEON, AND RAMAL ASSIGNMENTS ROUND OUT LOYALIST CONTROL OVER VIRTUALLY 100 PERCENT OF PERU'S ARMORED ASSETS, THEY ALL FACE MANDATORY RETIREMENT JANUARY 1996.

E. ~~(S-4NF)~~ THIS YEAR'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL PROMOTION WAS ARMED FORCES JOINT COMMAND CHIEF OF STAFF, NEWLY PROMOTED INFANTRY LTG LOUIS PEREZ DOCUMET



(b)(1);(d)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(d)

F. (S/NP) OTHER KEY ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDED THE NEW ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, LTG HOWARD RODRIGUEZ MALAGA, AND THE NEW SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL'S OFFICE MG DAVID JAIME SOBREVILLA. RODRIGUEZ WAS THE FUJIMORI-MONTESINOS LOYALIST, CAUGHT FOUR MONTHS AGO HANDING OUT FUJIMORI CALENDARS DURING A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT AS HE SERVED AS MRI COMMANDER, PIURA. MEDIA CLAMOR OVER THAT OBVIOUS POLITICIZATION BLEW OVER QUICKLY AND HE IS NOW CONSIDERED PERUVIAN ARMY (EP) NUMBER TWO. JAIME'S NEW POSITION MAKES HIM HERMOZA'S EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT AND RIGHT HAND MAN. HE FORMERLY SERVED AS 31ST INFANTRY DIVISION COMMANDER AND MANTARO FRONT POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMANDER, HEADQUARTERS HUANCAYO IN JUNIN DEPARTMENT.

(b)(1);(c)

(S/NP) THE LAST MAJOR, PROMOTION/REASSIGNMENTS WERE ARMY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DINTE) HEAD, NEWLY PROMOTED ARTILLERY MG JUAN YANQUI CERVANTES AND THE MAN HE REPLACES, MG JORGE NADAL PAIVA, WHO IS LIKELY TO BECOME THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE FOR THE JOINT COMMAND. YANQUI FORMERLY SERVED AS DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIN) AND, AS HE IS CLEARLY A MONTESINOS FAVORITE,

(b)(1);(c);(d)

G. PERUVIAN AIR FORCE (FAP) PROMOTIONS CONSISTED OF 4 NEW LTGS AND 11 MGS. ALTHOUGH 1995 POSTINGS HAVE NOT OFFICIALLY BEEN MADE, THIS YEAR'S PROMOTIONS WERE JUST AS POLITICAL, IF NOT MORE SO THAN LAST YEAR.

(b)(1);(d)

H. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, CG ASTETE, LIKE GENERAL HERMOZA, WAS ALSO RETAINED. HIS RETIREMENT ALSO LOOKS LIKE IT WILL COME IN JUNE OR JULY DURING AIR FORCE OR PERUVIAN DAY CELEBRATIONS. AS LONG AS FUJIMORI IS RELECTED, THE NEXT FAP COMMANDER WILL PROBABLY BE FAP INSPECTOR GENERAL LTG LUIS FERNANDO MOY ROMARIONI.

(b)(1);(d)

I. EXPECTED CHANGES IN THE TOP ECHELONS OF THE PERUVIAN NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) WERE ALSO POSTPONED

(b)(1);(d)

CLASSIFIED

~~NOFORN UNINTEL~~

(b)(1);(d)

[REDACTED]

SURPRISING WAS THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO PROMOTIONS TO LTG, EVEN MORE DESPITE THE REPORTED EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATELY TEN STRONG CANDIDATES. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, QUITE A FEW COLONELS PROMOTED TO GENERAL. THUSLY REINFORCING OUR ANALYSIS THAT THE BASE HAS BEEN LAID FOR A MAJOR POST-ELECTION JOB RESHUFFLE.

J. ~~(S)~~ THERE WERE FEW MAJOR CHANGES IN THE PERUVIAN NAVY AS WELL. THE REAL CHANGES ARE ALSO EXPECTED TO OCCUR AROUND PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION TIME, WHEN IT IS EXPECTED THAT NAVY COMMANDER ADMIRAL ARNAIZ WILL FINALLY RETIRE. OF NOTE IS THAT NO VICE ADMIRALS WERE INVITED TO RETIRE, INCREASING THEIR NUMBERS FROM NINE TO ELEVEN, INCLUDING ARNAIZ, WHO WEARS THE RANK OF A FULL ADMIRAL BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION AS HEAD OF THE NAVY. REAR ADMIRALS HAVE ALSO SWELLED FROM 37 TO AT LEAST 41, SINCE ONLY TWO WERE FORCED TO RETIRE.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(d)

K. ~~(S)~~ WHAT PROMOTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS THERE HAVE BEEN ADD TO AN ALREADY SUBSTANTIAL LOYALIST SUPPORT BASE THROUGHOUT MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COMMANDS. OTHER LOYALIST POSITIONS PREVIOUSLY SECURED INCLUDE ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE JOINT COMMAND, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, SUPREME MILITARY JUSTICE COUNCIL, AND THE DIRECTORSHIPS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE.

L. ~~(S)~~ THE CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED LOYALIST APPARATUS THAT FUJIMORI AND MONTESINOS HAVE ERECTED CONTINUES TO CONSOLIDATE PRESIDENTIAL HOLD ON POWER.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)

SOURCES: USDAO LIMA) (SCJ2 ANALYST: CPT JOHNSON, USA.

7. (U) QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS MESSAGE MAY BE ADDRESSED TO SFC THOMAS, USA, DSN 313-285-6291 OR LTC KNUDSEN, USA, DSN 313-285-6282. CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECL: OADR

IT
2632
NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

~~NOFORN UNINTEL~~

~~SECRET~~

1. CLASSIFIED

PAGE:1662

~~NOFORN~~

INQUIRE=DOC30D
ITEM NO=00236523
ENVELOPE
CDSN = CFS763 MCN = 95089/20600 TOR = 950891138
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS3224 0891136-SSSS--RUEANSS.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 301136Z MAR 95
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEKJSA/STOC
RUEALGX/SAFE
P 300155Z MAR 95
FM USCINCSO SCJ2 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2//
TO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2/J3/J5//
INFO AIG 7084
RUEKJCS/CJCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ALA//
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//B3/B34//
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//IN//
RUDMONI/ONI WASHINGTON DC//
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//DIRINT//
RUVMBBC/USSOUTHAF DAVIS MONTHAN AFB AZ//DONI//
RUCBLFA/COMMARFORLANT//G2//

RHLBAAK/CDRUSARSO MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//DSCINT//
RHLBAAK/COMJTF-PM MAXI FT CLAYTON PM//J2//
RHLBAAE/COMSOCSOUTH QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//J2//
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N2//
RUWMJAC/CINCLANTFLT DET SO RODMAN PM//N2//
RUANJFC/DIRJIATF EAST JNTFUSIONCTR
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHBR/USMLO BRASILIA BR
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
RHLBMXI/MAXI QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RHLBSIM/SIMS QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

QQQQ
SECTION 01 OF 03

HQDA PLEASE PASS TO LTG MENOHER

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY
SUBJ: PERU-ECUADOR BORDER SITUATION AS OF 2200Z 29 MAR 95 (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PROVIDE AN
UPDATE ON THE PERU-ECUADOR BORDER SITUATION.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~NOFORN~~

REPORT

2. (S//NF) SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY.

A. (S//NF) NO CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED SINCE THE 27 MARCH INCIDENT.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

B. (S//NF)

THERE HAVE BEEN 130 ECUADORIAN LANDMINE-RELATED CASUALTIES (SEE PARA 4.A.).

(b)(1);(c);(d)

C. (S//NF)

SEVERAL HIGH-LEVEL PERSONNEL CHANGES WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ARE EXPECTED IF FUJIMORI IS REELECTED (SEE PARA 4.B.).

(b)(1);(c)

3. (S//NF) DISPOSITION OF FORCES:

A. (S//NF) PERU

(1) (S//NF) GROUND:

(A) (S//NF) WESTERN SECTOR (WEST OF 79 DEGREES WEST LONGITUDE):

/UNITDES/UNITLOC/UNITSTR/SUBORD/STATUS/CMNTS

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

REPORT

~~NOFORN~~

***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

(2) (~~S/NF~~) NAVAL:

(A) (~~S/NF~~)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

(B) (~~S/NF~~) PERUVIAN NAVY SHIPS AT SEA:

[REDACTED]

(C) (~~S/NF~~) PERUVIAN NAVY SHIPS IN PORT CALLAO:

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

(D) (~~S/NF~~) PERUVIAN NAVY SHIPS IN PORT PAITA:

[REDACTED]

(3) (~~S/NF~~) AIR:

(A) (~~S/NF~~) DISPOSITION OF FORCES (ALL ACFT NUMBERS OPERATIONAL):

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

~~NOFORN~~

NOFORN

- CAPITAN MONTES AFLD (TALARA) (043425S/0811531W): [REDACTED]
- CAPITAN CONCHA AFLD (PIURA) (051226S/0803702W): [REDACTED]
- CAPITAN QUINONES AFLD (CHICLAYO) (064819S/0794922W): [REDACTED] (b)(1);(c)
- LAS PALMAS AFLD (120949S/0765953W): [REDACTED]
- JORGE CHAVEZ INTL (LIMA) (120044S/0770658W): [REDACTED]
- EL MILAGRO (054025S/0783839W): [REDACTED]
- UNLOCATED ACFT: [REDACTED]

(B) ~~(S/NF)~~ AIRCRAFT LOSSES:

/ACFT	/TOTAL	/FMC	/CBT LOSSES	/NON-CBT LOSSES
-------	--------	------	-------------	-----------------

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

B. ~~(S/NF)~~ ECUADOR

(1) ~~(S/NF)~~ GROUND:

(A) ~~(S/NF)~~ WESTERN SECTOR (WEST OF 79 DEGREES WEST LONGITUDE):

/UNITDES/UNITLOC/UNITSTR/SUBORD/STATUS/CMNTS

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

(B) ~~(S/NF)~~ EASTERN SECTOR (EAST OF 79 DEGREES WEST LONGITUDE):

/UNITDES/UNITLOC/UNITSTR/SUBORD/STATUS/CMNTS

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

NOFORN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(2) ~~(S//NF)~~ NAVAL:

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

(A) ECUADORIAN NAVY SHIPS OUT OF PORT:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

(B) ECUADORIAN NAVY SHIPS IN PORT GUAYAQUIL:

[REDACTED]

(C) ECUADORIAN NAVY SHIPS IN PORT MANTA:

[REDACTED]

(3) ~~(S//NF)~~ AIR:

(A) DISPOSITION OF AIR FORCES (ALL ACFT NUMBERS OPERATIONAL):

MACAS AFLD (021809S/0780716W):

MANTA AFLD (005655S/0804332W):

CUENCA AFLD (025248S/0785816W):

COTOPAXI AFLD (005444S/0783659W):

TAURA AFLD (21536S/0794047W):

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

MARISCAL SUCRE (000828S/0782917W):

GEN. DEFIANO LAEZ AFLD:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(B) ~~(S//NF)~~ AIRCRAFT LOSSES:

ACFT	/TOTAL	/FMC	/CBT LOSSES	/NON-CBT LOSSES
------	--------	------	-------------	-----------------

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

~~NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

- 4. ~~(S,AF)~~ ASSESSMENT:
- A. ~~(S,AF)~~ MINE UPDATE:

[REDACTED] ESTIMATED THAT 40-60 PERCENT OF THE MINES IN THE DISPUTED AREA HAVE BEEN RECOVERED. HE ALSO STATED THAT RECOVERY OF THE REMAINING MINES IS IMPOSSIBLE DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS, LOOSE SOIL, AND DENSE VEGETATION.

(b)(1);(c)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)

B. ~~(S,AF)~~ [REDACTED]

HIGH-LEVEL PERSONNEL CHANGES WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ARE EXPECTED IF PRESIDENT FUJIMORI IS REELECTED. THESE CHANGES INCLUDE THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, FOREIGN MINISTER, AND PERUVIAN NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR. HE BELIEVES GENERAL HERMOZA, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY AND PRESIDENT OF THE JOINT STAFF, WILL REMAIN AT LEAST THROUGH 1995. GIVEN PERU'S POOR MILITARY PERFORMANCE IN THE DISPUTED BORDER AREA, WE ASSESS THAT SELECTED CHANGES OF SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS ARE ALSO LIKELY.

(b)(1);(d)

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(d)

- C. ~~(S,AF)~~ EXPECT ISOLATED INCIDENTS TO CONTINUE UNTIL SEPARATION OF FORCES IS ACCOMPLISHED. MINES REMAIN THE GREATEST THREAT TO DEPLOYED FORCES. BOTH SIDES WILL KEEP SIGNIFICANT FORCES IN THE DISPUTED REGION UNTIL WITHDRAWAL PROCEDURES ARE ACCEPTED.
- 5. (U) POC: LTC SWANSON, SCJ2, DSN 282-3169.

ADMIN
DECL: OADR

BT
#3226
JNNN

~~NOFORN~~

UNCLASSIFIED

INQUIRE=DOC35D
ITEM NO=00223045

ENVELOPE

CDSN = CFS905 MCN = 96169/28665 TOR = 961692351
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS8391 1692352-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 172352Z JUN 96
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RHEFJII/J2
RUEALGX/SAFE

P 172210Z JUN 96
FM USCINCSO SCJ2 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//SCJ2-JICSOUTH//
TO AIG 7084
INFO RUCBAIC/AIC NORFOLK VA
RULYVBA/COMSECONDFLT//N2//
RHFJFYW/COMWESTHEMGRU
RUANJTF/DIRJIATF EAST//J2/J3//
RUHPQUA/COMTHIRDFLT//N2//
RHLBMXI/MAXI QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RHLBSIM/SIMS QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~

QQQQ

BODY

SUBJ: USSOUTHCOM INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR 17 JUNE 1996 (U)
1. (U) THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS ITEMS PROVIDED TO THE SOUTHCOM COMMAND
GROUP ON 15 THRU 17 JUNE 1996.

PART I CONTAINS ITEMS BRIEFED 12 JUNE 1996

2. ~~(S)~~ HONDURAS---DWINDLING MILITARY FORCE HURTING MORALE WHILE
PROMOTING CIVILIAN ASCENDANCY

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(a);(c)

--ARMY CANNOT ATTRACT RECRUITS UNDER VOLUNTARY SERVICE LAW; SALARIES
TOO LOW

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)

--IMPACT ON ADR: WHILE CUTBACKS ARE HARD ON MORALE, IN THE LONG
TERM, THE FORCE REDUCTION WILL AID IN BRINGING THE LAST AUTONOMOUS
CENTRAL AMERICAN MILITARY UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL. (DAO 062140Z)

3. ~~(S)~~ PERU---NEW INTELLIGENCE NETWORK [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c);(d)

--IMPACT ON AOR:

[REDACTED]

W/DAO) (DAO 071703Z, PHONECON

4. ~~(S)~~ ECUADOR---BUCAÑAM ECONOMIC GOALS NOT LIKELY TO IMPACT MILITARY INITIALLY
--IF ELECTED, REPORTEDLY INTENDS TO RENEGOTIATE DEBTS AND LOWER INTEREST RATES
--PLANS ALSO INCLUDE SELECTIVELY REDUCING DIFFERENT BUDGETS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT
--SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE MILITARY INTO CONSIDERATION
--FUTURE EQUIPMENT PURCHASES COULD BE AFFECTED
--IMPACT ON AOR:

[REDACTED]

(b)(1);(c)

(AMEMB 102157Z)

PART II CONTAINS ITEMS PROVIDED BY THE INDICATIONS AND WARNING SECTION ON 15 THRU 17 JUNE 1996.

5. COLOMBIA

(U) U.S. FUGITIVE ARRESTED IN BARRANQUILLA
--ON 14 JUN, U.S. CITIZEN CHARLES RUBLEE WAS CAPTURED IN BARRANQUILLA AND FLOWN TO BOGOTA PENDING HIS DEPORTATION TO THE U.S.
--RUBLEE IS WANTED IN OREGON ON MARIJUANA DISTRIBUTION AND SMUGGLING CHARGES
--RUBLEE HAS BEEN LIVING AND WORKING IN BARRANQUILLA SINCE HE FLED OREGON FOLLOWING AN ARREST IN OCT 92 (REUTER 15-JUN-96 11:02)

6. VENEZUELA

(U) ARMED FORCES DETECT NO COLOMBIAN TROOPS ALONG BORDER
[REDACTED] THE ARMED
FORCES HAVE NOT DETECTED ANY COLOMBIAN TROOP DEPLOYMENTS OR EQUIPMENT ALONG THE BORDER
--VENEZUELA WOULD LIKE TO SEE A DEPLOYMENT OF COLOMBIAN MILITARY POSTS AND UNITS ACTING IN COORDINATION WITH VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES TO RESTORE ORDER ALONG THE BORDER (CARACAS VENEZOLANA 11226Z)

(b)(1);(c)

7. (U) QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS MESSAGE MAY BE ADDRESSED TO MSG GRIFFIN, USA, DSN 313-285-6291 OR LTC KNUDSEN, USA, DSN 313-285-6282.
DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES

ADMIN
DECLASSIFY ON: X6
BT



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

02 SEP 1999

Directorate of Manpower, Personnel
and Administration

Ref: 99-081

Mr. Jeremy Bigwood
3445 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20010

Goetter:
by page 1798 - 1801
1662 - 1668
0760

Dear Mr. Bigwood

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act request of February 19, 1997, wherein you asked for information relating to Vladimiro Montesinos Torres a Peruvian national and presently the advisor to Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori.

We conducted a thorough and extensive review of the document referred to us by the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command. Upon review, we determined portions of the information are currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12958, Section 1.5 (a), which refers to military plans; (c), which refers to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods; and (d), which refers to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources. Other deleted information has been withheld because its release would reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings. Captain Charles C. Cook, USN, Vice Director of Intelligence, an Initial Denial Authority has denied this information under Title 5 USC 552 (b)(1) and (b)(7)(A) of the Executive Order.

You have the right to appeal Colonel Christian's decision to withhold this information by writing to the Director for Freedom of Information and Security Review, Room 2C757, 1155 Defense - Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155, within 60 days of receipt of this letter. Both your letter and envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Also, a copy of this letter should be enclosed with your appeal.

Sincerely,

T. K. CHO
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy
Chief, Administrative Services Division

Enclosures

OF INTEREST: IBARRA = NIC/BOL/USA - 2522
VLAD = PERU - 2522, 2523
ENRIQUEZ / ANTI-US SENTIMENT / IBARRA - GUAR - 1793, 4
EPS - SUCCESSES - NIC - 1794, 1795
KIDNAPPING - COLOMBIA - 1796, 78,
1798 -> POST - MONTESINOS / IBARRA / ECUADOR / KOMBORAS ADULT 0760
1662-8 - ... WITH ... PERU INTEL 0760